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25 MB lightweight cross-platform database client for 100+ databases, including MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite, Redis, MongoDB, DuckDB, SQL Server, and Dameng. Built-in AI, MCP Server, CLI, desktop and Docker. | 轻量级跨平台数据库管理工具,支持 MySQL、PostgreSQL、SQLite、Redis、MongoDB、达梦等 100+ 数据库,提供桌面端、Docker、CLI、内置 AI 助手和 MCP。

feat(mcp): zero-config plugin tool surface with tiered grants

Jinpye652945d399d
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/McpSqlApprovalDialog.vue b/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/McpSqlApprovalDialog.vue
index 6cec355218..8542300762 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/McpSqlApprovalDialog.vue
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/McpSqlApprovalDialog.vue
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
<script setup lang="ts">
-import { computed, onMounted, onUnmounted, ref } from "vue";
+import { computed, onMounted, onUnmounted, ref, watch } from "vue";
import { useI18n } from "vue-i18n";
import { invoke } from "@tauri-apps/api/core";
import { listen, type UnlistenFn } from "@tauri-apps/api/event";
import { getCurrentWindow } from "@tauri-apps/api/window";
+import { ShieldAlert } from "@lucide/vue";
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
import { Dialog, DialogContent, DialogFooter, DialogHeader, DialogTitle } from "@/components/ui/dialog";
@@ -11,7 +12,10 @@ import { Dialog, DialogContent, DialogFooter, DialogHeader, DialogTitle } from "
* Desktop confirmation for MCP calls the policy marks "ask first":
* high-risk SQL (`mcp-sql-approval`, may grant a timed approval) and other
* high-risk tools such as plugin tools declared `full` or dangerous Redis
- * commands (`mcp-tool-approval`, always one-shot).
+ * commands (`mcp-tool-approval`, always one-shot). Every request carries a
+ * visible countdown; when it runs out the request is dropped and the caller
+ * sees an error. A per-tool "remember" checkbox stores a 24h auto-approve
+ * consent so repeated calls to the same tool skip the dialog entirely.
*/
interface SqlApproval {
allow_timed?: boolean;
@@ -31,27 +35,96 @@ interface ToolApproval {
detail: string;
}
-type Approval = ({ type: "sql" } & SqlApproval) | ({ type: "tool" } & ToolApproval);
+type Approval = (({ type: "sql" } & SqlApproval) | ({ type: "tool" } & ToolApproval)) & { deadline?: number };
+
+const APPROVAL_WINDOW_MS = 90_000;
+const AUTO_APPROVE_KEY = "dbx.mcp-tool-approval.auto-approve";
+const AUTO_APPROVE_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+interface ToolConsent {
+ tool: string;
+ until: number;
+}
const { t } = useI18n();
const pending = ref<Approval[]>([]);
const current = computed(() => pending.value[0]);
-const expirationTimers = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>();
+const now = ref(Date.now());
+const rememberTool = ref(false);
+let ticker: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | undefined;
const unlisteners: UnlistenFn[] = [];
+function loadToolConsents(): ToolConsent[] {
+ try {
+ const raw = localStorage.getItem(AUTO_APPROVE_KEY);
+ return (raw ? (JSON.parse(raw) as ToolConsent[]) : []).filter((item) => typeof item?.tool === "string" && typeof item.until === "number" && item.until > Date.now());
+ } catch {
+ return [];
+ }
+}
+
+function toolConsented(tool: string): boolean {
+ return loadToolConsents().some((item) => item.tool === tool);
+}
+
+function saveToolConsent(tool: string) {
+ const consents = loadToolConsents().filter((item) => item.tool !== tool);
+ consents.push({ tool, until: Date.now() + AUTO_APPROVE_TTL_MS });
+ try {
+ localStorage.setItem(AUTO_APPROVE_KEY, JSON.stringify(consents));
+ } catch {
+ // Persistence is best-effort: without storage the user simply re-approves.
+ }
+}
+
function enqueue(approval: Approval) {
if (pending.value.some((item) => item.id === approval.id)) return;
+ // A remembered tool skips the dialog entirely: the stored consent answers
+ // this call and the visible queue is not touched.
+ if (approval.type === "tool" && toolConsented(approval.tool)) {
+ void invoke("respond_mcp_sql_approval", { id: approval.id, decision: "once" }).catch((error) => {
+ console.error("[DBX] MCP approval auto-approve failed:", error);
+ });
+ return;
+ }
+ approval.deadline = Date.now() + APPROVAL_WINDOW_MS;
pending.value.push(approval);
- expirationTimers.set(
- approval.id,
- setTimeout(() => {
- pending.value = pending.value.filter((item) => item.id !== approval.id);
- expirationTimers.delete(approval.id);
- }, 90_000),
- );
void getCurrentWindow().setFocus();
+ startTicker();
+}
+
+function startTicker() {
+ if (ticker === undefined) {
+ ticker = setInterval(() => {
+ now.value = Date.now();
+ const alive = pending.value.filter((item) => (item.deadline ?? 0) > now.value);
+ if (alive.length !== pending.value.length) pending.value = alive;
+ if (pending.value.length === 0) stopTicker();
+ }, 250);
+ }
+}
+
+function stopTicker() {
+ if (ticker !== undefined) {
+ clearInterval(ticker);
+ ticker = undefined;
+ }
}
+const remainingSeconds = computed(() => {
+ if (!current.value) return 0;
+ return Math.max(0, Math.ceil(((current.value.deadline ?? 0) - now.value) / 1000));
+});
+
+const remainingPercent = computed(() => {
+ if (!current.value) return 0;
+ return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, Math.round((((current.value.deadline ?? 0) - now.value) / APPROVAL_WINDOW_MS) * 100)));
+});
+
+watch(current, () => {
+ rememberTool.value = false;
+});
+
onMounted(async () => {
unlisteners.push(await listen<SqlApproval>("mcp-sql-approval", (event) => enqueue({ type: "sql", ...event.payload })));
unlisteners.push(await listen<ToolApproval>("mcp-tool-approval", (event) => enqueue({ type: "tool", ...event.payload })));
@@ -59,16 +132,15 @@ onMounted(async () => {
onUnmounted(() => {
for (const unlisten of unlisteners) unlisten();
- for (const timer of expirationTimers.values()) clearTimeout(timer);
- expirationTimers.clear();
+ stopTicker();
});
async function decide(decision: "once" | "hour" | "day" | "deny") {
const approval = current.value;
if (!approval) return;
pending.value.shift();
- clearTimeout(expirationTimers.get(approval.id));
- expirationTimers.delete(approval.id);
+ if (approval.type === "tool" && decision === "once" && rememberTool.value) saveToolConsent(approval.tool);
+ rememberTool.value = false;
try {
// One response channel for both kinds; tool approvals only accept once/deny.
await invoke("respond_mcp_sql_approval", { id: approval.id, decision: (approval.type === "tool" || approval.allow_timed === false) && decision !== "deny" ? "once" : decision });
@@ -86,9 +158,19 @@ function toolTitle(approval: Extract<Approval, { type: "tool" }>): string {
<template>
<Dialog :open="!!current" @update:open="(open) => !open && decide('deny')">
- <DialogContent class="sm:max-w-[640px]" :data-mcp-approval="current?.type">
+ <!--
+ A stray click must never decide a security approval: outside clicks and
+ focus moves keep the dialog open, and only the explicit buttons (or Esc /
+ the close button, which land here as update:open → deny) resolve it.
+ -->
+ <DialogContent class="sm:max-w-[640px]" :data-mcp-approval="current?.type" @pointer-down-outside="(event) => event.preventDefault()" @interact-outside="(event) => event.preventDefault()" @focus-outside="(event) => event.preventDefault()">
<DialogHeader>
- <DialogTitle>{{ current?.type === "tool" ? toolTitle(current) : t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalTitle") }}</DialogTitle>
+ <div class="flex items-center gap-2.5">
+ <span class="grid size-8 shrink-0 place-items-center rounded-full bg-amber-500/15 text-amber-600 dark:text-amber-400" data-mcp-approval-icon>
+ <ShieldAlert class="size-4" />
+ </span>
+ <DialogTitle>{{ current?.type === "tool" ? toolTitle(current) : t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalTitle") }}</DialogTitle>
+ </div>
</DialogHeader>
<div v-if="current?.type === 'sql'" class="min-w-0 space-y-3">
<p class="text-sm">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalScope", { connection: current.connection_name, database: current.database }) }}</p>
@@ -98,22 +180,41 @@ function toolTitle(approval: Extract<Approval, { type: "tool" }>): string {
<p class="text-sm">{{ t("settings.mcpToolApprovalDescription") }}</p>
<dl class="grid grid-cols-[6rem_minmax(0,1fr)] gap-x-3 gap-y-1 text-xs">
<dt class="text-muted-foreground">{{ t("settings.mcpToolApprovalTool") }}</dt>
- <dd class="font-mono">{{ current.tool }}</dd>
+ <dd>
+ <span class="rounded bg-muted px-1.5 py-0.5 font-mono" data-mcp-approval-tool>{{ current.tool }}</span>
+ </dd>
<template v-if="current.connection_name">
<dt class="text-muted-foreground">{{ t("settings.mcpToolApprovalTarget") }}</dt>
<dd>{{ current.database ? `${current.connection_name} / ${current.database}` : current.connection_name }}</dd>
</template>
</dl>
- <pre class="max-h-64 overflow-auto rounded border bg-muted/40 p-3 text-xs whitespace-pre-wrap break-all" data-mcp-approval-detail>{{ current.detail }}</pre>
+ <div class="space-y-1">
+ <p class="text-xs font-medium text-muted-foreground">{{ t("settings.mcpToolApprovalDetail") }}</p>
+ <pre class="max-h-64 overflow-auto rounded border bg-muted/40 p-3 text-xs whitespace-pre-wrap break-all" data-mcp-approval-detail>{{ current.detail }}</pre>
+ </div>
+ <label class="flex items-center gap-2 text-xs text-muted-foreground" data-mcp-approval-remember>
+ <input v-model="rememberTool" type="checkbox" class="size-3.5 accent-primary" />
+ {{ t("settings.mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove") }}
+ </label>
</div>
- <DialogFooter class="flex-wrap gap-2">
- <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('deny')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalDeny") }}</Button>
- <template v-if="current?.type === 'sql' && current.allow_timed !== false">
- <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('once')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalOnce") }}</Button>
- <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('hour')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalHour") }}</Button>
- <Button variant="destructive" @click="decide('day')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalDay") }}</Button>
- </template>
- <Button v-else variant="destructive" data-mcp-approval-allow-once @click="decide('once')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalOnce") }}</Button>
+ <DialogFooter class="flex-col items-stretch gap-3 sm:flex-col">
+ <div class="space-y-1.5" data-mcp-approval-countdown>
+ <div class="h-1 w-full overflow-hidden rounded-full bg-muted">
+ <div class="h-full rounded-full transition-[width] duration-300 ease-linear" :class="remainingSeconds <= 10 ? 'bg-red-500' : 'bg-amber-500'" :style="{ width: `${remainingPercent}%` }" data-mcp-approval-remaining-bar />
+ </div>
+ <p class="text-right text-xs" :class="remainingSeconds <= 10 ? 'font-medium text-red-500' : 'text-muted-foreground'" data-mcp-approval-remaining>
+ {{ t("settings.mcpApprovalExpires", { seconds: remainingSeconds }) }}
+ </p>
+ </div>
+ <div class="flex flex-wrap gap-2">
+ <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('deny')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalDeny") }}</Button>
+ <template v-if="current?.type === 'sql' && current.allow_timed !== false">
+ <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('once')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalOnce") }}</Button>
+ <Button variant="outline" @click="decide('hour')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalHour") }}</Button>
+ <Button variant="destructive" @click="decide('day')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalDay") }}</Button>
+ </template>
+ <Button v-else variant="destructive" data-mcp-approval-allow-once @click="decide('once')">{{ t("settings.mcpSqlApprovalOnce") }}</Button>
+ </div>
</DialogFooter>
</DialogContent>
</Dialog>
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/__tests__/McpSqlApprovalDialog.spec.ts b/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/__tests__/McpSqlApprovalDialog.spec.ts
index fd22bdb323..6b49205672 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/__tests__/McpSqlApprovalDialog.spec.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/components/mcp/__tests__/McpSqlApprovalDialog.spec.ts
@@ -21,20 +21,31 @@ vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/window", () => ({ getCurrentWindow: () => ({ setFocus:
vi.mock("@/components/ui/button", () => ({ Button: { template: "<button><slot /></button>" } }));
vi.mock("@/components/ui/dialog", () => ({
Dialog: { props: ["open"], template: '<div v-if="open"><slot /></div>' },
- DialogContent: { template: "<div><slot /></div>" },
+ DialogContent: {
+ inheritAttrs: false,
+ setup(_: Record<string, never>, { slots, attrs }: { slots: { default?: () => unknown }; attrs: Record<string, unknown> }) {
+ dialogContentAttrs = attrs as Record<string, ((event: { preventDefault: () => void }) => void) | undefined>;
+ return () => slots.default?.() ?? null;
+ },
+ },
DialogFooter: { template: "<div><slot /></div>" },
DialogHeader: { template: "<div><slot /></div>" },
DialogTitle: { template: "<div><slot /></div>" },
}));
+import { h } from "vue";
import McpSqlApprovalDialog from "../McpSqlApprovalDialog.vue";
+let dialogContentAttrs: Record<string, ((event: { preventDefault: () => void }) => void) | undefined> = {};
+
let host: HTMLDivElement;
let app: ReturnType<typeof createApp>;
beforeEach(async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
bridge.handlers = {};
+ dialogContentAttrs = {};
+ localStorage.clear();
bridge.invoke.mockClear();
bridge.focus.mockClear();
bridge.unlisten.mockClear();
@@ -60,6 +71,9 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "Review the call",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Tool",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Target",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Call payload",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Remember this tool and auto-approve its calls for 24 hours",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Auto-deny in {seconds}s",
},
},
},
@@ -98,6 +112,20 @@ it("shows the exact SQL and sends a one-time decision for its request ID", async
expect(host.textContent).not.toContain("DROP TABLE important;");
});
+it("keeps the dialog open on outside clicks or focus moves instead of denying", async () => {
+ request("approval-outside");
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(host.textContent).toContain("DROP TABLE important;");
+ for (const key of ["onPointerDownOutside", "onInteractOutside", "onFocusOutside"]) {
+ const event = { preventDefault: vi.fn() };
+ dialogContentAttrs[key]?.(event);
+ expect(event.preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+ }
+ // No decision was sent and the approval is still on screen.
+ expect(bridge.invoke).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect(host.textContent).toContain("DROP TABLE important;");
+});
+
it("removes an unanswered request when the desktop approval times out", async () => {
request("approval-2");
await nextTick();
@@ -107,6 +135,41 @@ it("removes an unanswered request when the desktop approval times out", async ()
expect(bridge.invoke).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
+it("shows a visible countdown and drops the request when it expires", async () => {
+ request("approval-cd");
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(host.querySelector("[data-mcp-approval-remaining]")?.textContent).toContain("Auto-deny in 90s");
+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(2000);
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(host.querySelector("[data-mcp-approval-remaining]")?.textContent).toContain("Auto-deny in 88s");
+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(90_000);
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(host.textContent).not.toContain("DROP TABLE important;");
+ expect(bridge.invoke).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+it("auto-approves remembered tools without showing the dialog", async () => {
+ localStorage.setItem("dbx.mcp-tool-approval.auto-approve", JSON.stringify([{ tool: "dbx_ssh__exec", until: Date.now() + 60_000 }]));
+ toolRequest("tool-auto");
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(bridge.invoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith("respond_mcp_sql_approval", { id: "tool-auto", decision: "once" });
+ expect(host.textContent).not.toContain("Confirm Terminal tool");
+});
+
+it("stores a 24h consent when remembering is checked before allowing once", async () => {
+ toolRequest("tool-remember");
+ await nextTick();
+ host.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>("[data-mcp-approval-remember] input")!.click();
+ await nextTick();
+ Array.from(host.querySelectorAll("button"))
+ .find((button) => button.textContent === "Once")
+ ?.click();
+ await nextTick();
+ expect(bridge.invoke).toHaveBeenCalledWith("respond_mcp_sql_approval", { id: "tool-remember", decision: "once" });
+ const consents = JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem("dbx.mcp-tool-approval.auto-approve")!) as { tool: string }[];
+ expect(consents.map((consent) => consent.tool)).toContain("dbx_ssh__exec");
+});
+
it("confirms high-risk tool calls once only and queues them with SQL approvals", async () => {
toolRequest("tool-1");
request("approval-3");
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/az.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/az.ts
index be1941957f..05f141c3f3 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/az.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/az.ts
@@ -8679,6 +8679,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Təhlükəli Redis əmrini təsdiqləyin",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An MCP müştərisi wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Alət",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Çağrı məzmunu",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Bu aləti yadda saxla və 24 saat ərzində çağrışları avtomatik təsdiqlə",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds} san sonra avtomatik rədd",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Hədəf",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Qabiliyyətlər",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "MCP çağırış tarixçəsinə bax",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/en.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/en.ts
index 4902dd7ecd..7dc5dd6c1f 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/en.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/en.ts
@@ -11290,6 +11290,9 @@ export default {
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Confirm dangerous Redis command",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An MCP client wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Tool",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Call payload",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Remember this tool and auto-approve its calls for 24 hours",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Auto-deny in {seconds}s",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Target",
mcpSqlApprovalScope: "Connection: {connection} · Database: {database}",
mcpSqlApprovalOnce: "This request only",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/es.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/es.ts
index 9f5d188b60..ec32398f9b 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/es.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/es.ts
@@ -9974,6 +9974,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Confirmar comando Redis peligroso",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Cliente MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Herramienta",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Contenido de la llamada",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Recordar esta herramienta y aprobar automáticamente sus llamadas durante 24 horas",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Denegación automática en {seconds}s",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Destino",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Capacidades",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "Ver historial de llamadas MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/id.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/id.ts
index 7f113eed70..91ffbb5d98 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/id.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/id.ts
@@ -9499,6 +9499,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Konfirmasi perintah Redis berbahaya",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Klien MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Alat",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Isi panggilan",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Ingat alat ini dan setujui otomatis panggilannya selama 24 jam",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Tolak otomatis dalam {seconds} detik",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Target operasi",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Kapabilitas",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "Lihat riwayat panggilan MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/it.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/it.ts
index d22e1ac12a..38d1587967 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/it.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/it.ts
@@ -9726,6 +9726,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Conferma il comando Redis pericoloso",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Client MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Strumento",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Contenuto della chiamata",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Ricorda questo strumento e approva automaticamente le chiamate per 24 ore",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Rifiuto automatico tra {seconds}s",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Destinazione",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Funzionalità",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "Visualizza cronologia chiamate MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ja.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ja.ts
index 568130bc0f..c4eeb956b0 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ja.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ja.ts
@@ -9704,6 +9704,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "危険な Redis コマンドを確認",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An MCP クライアント wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "ツール",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "呼び出し内容",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "このツールを記憶し、24 時間以内の呼び出しを自動承認します",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds} 秒後に自動拒否",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "対象",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "機能",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "MCP 呼び出し履歴を表示",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ko.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ko.ts
index 972747669c..fd1c188f71 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ko.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ko.ts
@@ -9873,6 +9873,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "위험한 Redis 명령 확인",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An MCP 클라이언트 wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "도구",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "호출 내용",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "이 도구를 기억하고 24시간 동안 호출을 자동 승인합니다",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds}초 후 자동 거부",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "대상",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "기능",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "MCP 호출 기록 보기",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pl.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pl.ts
index 5cb2ae9c6c..ef6cb06893 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pl.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pl.ts
@@ -8271,6 +8271,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Potwierdź niebezpieczne polecenie Redis",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "Klient MCP chce wykonać operację wysokiego ryzyka. Zezwól tylko wtedy, gdy oczekujesz tego wywołania.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Narzędzie",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Treść wywołania",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Zapamiętaj to narzędzie i automatycznie zatwierdzaj jego wywołania przez 24 godziny",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Automatyczna odmowa za {seconds}s",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Cel",
mcpCapabilityConnectionCreate: "Dodawanie/powielanie połączeń MCP (globalne uprawnienia domyślne)",
mcpCapabilityConnectionRemove: "Usuwanie połączeń MCP (globalne uprawnienia domyślne)",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pt-BR.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pt-BR.ts
index 9fc55f18ad..f4e5fc9182 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pt-BR.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/pt-BR.ts
@@ -9722,6 +9722,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Confirmar comando Redis perigoso",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Cliente MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Ferramenta",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Conteúdo da chamada",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Lembrar esta ferramenta e aprovar automaticamente suas chamadas por 24 horas",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Negação automática em {seconds}s",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Destino",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Capacidades",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "Ver histórico de chamadas MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ru.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ru.ts
index 1733dbbd73..42a62e5c4f 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ru.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/ru.ts
@@ -11359,6 +11359,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Подтвердить опасную команду Redis",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Клиент MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Инструмент",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Содержимое вызова",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Запомнить этот инструмент и автоматически одобрять его вызовы в течение 24 часов",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "Автоотказ через {seconds} с",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Цель",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Возможности",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "Просмотреть историю вызовов MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/th.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/th.ts
index 68dc80d025..f105afe8f9 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/th.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/th.ts
@@ -11731,6 +11731,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "ยืนยันคำสั่ง Redis ที่อันตราย",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An Client MCP wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "เครื่องมือ",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "เนื้อหาการเรียก",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "จดจำเครื่องมือนี้และอนุมัติการเรียกโดยอัตโนมัติเป็นเวลา 24 ชั่วโมง",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "ปฏิเสธอัตโนมัติในอีก {seconds} วินาที",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "เป้าหมาย",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "ความสามารถ",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "ดูประวัติการเรียก MCP",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/tr.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/tr.ts
index 199ba28153..d89a88b25a 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/tr.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/tr.ts
@@ -8591,6 +8591,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "Tehlikeli Redis komutunu onayla",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "An MCP istemcisi wants to run a high-risk operation. Allow it only if you expect this call.",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "Araç",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "Çağrı içeriği",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "Bu aracı hatırla ve 24 saat boyunca çağrılarını otomatik onayla",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds} sn sonra otomatik red",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "Hedef",
mcpManagementCapabilities: "Yetenekler",
mcpOpenCallHistory: "MCP çağrı geçmişini görüntüle",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts
index 1567fc0b67..5c6bb5653a 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-CN.ts
@@ -11256,6 +11256,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "确认高危 Redis 命令",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "MCP 客户端请求执行一个高危操作。只有在你预期这次调用时才允许。",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "工具",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "调用内容",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "记住此工具,24 小时内自动批准其调用",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds} 秒后自动拒绝",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "目标",
mcpSqlApprovalScope: "连接:{connection} · 数据库:{database}",
mcpSqlApprovalOnce: "仅本次",
diff --git a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts
index b6b5e55527..24d46dd64b 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts
+++ b/apps/desktop/src/i18n/locales/zh-TW.ts
@@ -8921,6 +8921,9 @@ export default withEnglishFallback({
mcpToolApprovalRedisTitle: "確認高危 Redis 命令",
mcpToolApprovalDescription: "MCP 用戶端請求執行一個高危操作。只有在你預期這次呼叫時才允許。",
mcpToolApprovalTool: "工具",
+ mcpToolApprovalDetail: "呼叫內容",
+ mcpToolApprovalAutoApprove: "記住此工具,24 小時內自動批准其呼叫",
+ mcpApprovalExpires: "{seconds} 秒後自動拒絕",
mcpToolApprovalTarget: "目標",
mcpSqlApprovalScope: "連線:{connection} · 資料庫:{database}",
mcpSqlApprovalOnce: "僅本次請求",
diff --git a/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/mcp_access.rs b/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/mcp_access.rs
index 91554c0bde..35477bca3f 100644
--- a/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/mcp_access.rs
+++ b/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/mcp_access.rs
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use crate::storage::{McpDatabaseScope, McpGlobalPolicy};
pub const MCP_ACCESS_POLICY_VERSION: u8 = 2;
/// How plugin MCP tools are exposed to clients.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum McpPluginToolsMode {
Auto,
@@ -34,6 +34,25 @@ pub enum McpPluginToolsMode {
Lazy,
}
+// Tolerant on purpose: the desktop app and the standalone `dbx-mcp` binary
+// version independently, so a policy written by a newer build may carry a
+// mode this build does not know. Rejecting the whole policy would take down
+// every MCP tool; fall back to `auto` and let Auto resolve instead.
+impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for McpPluginToolsMode {
+ fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> {
+ let text = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+ Ok(match text.as_str() {
+ "auto" => Self::Auto,
+ "flat" => Self::Flat,
+ "lazy" => Self::Lazy,
+ unknown => {
+ log::warn!("[mcp] unknown pluginToolsMode {unknown:?} in saved policy; falling back to auto");
+ Self::Auto
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
impl McpPluginToolsMode {
/// Preserve the behavior of saved policies written without this field.
/// New policies use `Default` (flat); explicit saved modes always win.
@@ -387,6 +406,27 @@ impl McpAccessPolicy {
self.connection_rule(connection_id).and_then(|rule| rule.sub_scope).unwrap_or_default()
}
+ /// Effective level for a plugin connection. Identical to [`Self::resolve`]
+ /// except that a connection with no explicit connection/group rule falls
+ /// back to its own protection level instead of the global default:
+ /// read-only connections stay read, writable ones resolve to at least
+ /// write. Explicit rules (connection or group) always win.
+ pub fn resolve_plugin_connection(
+ &self,
+ group_ids: &[String],
+ connection_id: &str,
+ connection_read_only: bool,
+ ) -> McpResolvedAccess {
+ let mut resolved = self.resolve(group_ids, connection_id, None);
+ if resolved.source == McpAccessSource::Default
+ && !connection_read_only
+ && resolved.level < McpAccessLevel::Write
+ {
+ resolved.level = McpAccessLevel::Write;
+ }
+ resolved
+ }
+
/// Whether a request that enumerates every value of a sub-scope can be
/// admitted without evaluating each value separately. This is only safe
/// when the connection explicitly permits all sub-scopes and no rule
@@ -1587,3 +1627,26 @@ mod tests {
assert!(serde_json::to_value(&policy).unwrap()["rules"].is_array());
}
}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod plugin_tools_mode_tests {
+ use super::McpPluginToolsMode;
+
+ #[test]
+ fn plugin_tools_mode_serializes_lowercase_and_tolerates_unknown_values() {
+ assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(McpPluginToolsMode::Flat).unwrap(), serde_json::json!("flat"));
+ assert_eq!(
+ serde_json::from_value::<McpPluginToolsMode>(serde_json::json!("flat")).unwrap(),
+ McpPluginToolsMode::Flat
+ );
+ assert_eq!(
+ serde_json::from_value::<McpPluginToolsMode>(serde_json::json!("lazy")).unwrap(),
+ McpPluginToolsMode::Lazy
+ );
+ // A mode written by a newer build must not take the whole policy down.
+ assert_eq!(
+ serde_json::from_value::<McpPluginToolsMode>(serde_json::json!("both")).unwrap(),
+ McpPluginToolsMode::Auto
+ );
+ }
+}
diff --git a/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/plugin_mcp.rs b/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/plugin_mcp.rs
index 7cac777a08..a925cb6f59 100644
--- a/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/plugin_mcp.rs
+++ b/crates/dbx-core/src/ai/plugin_mcp.rs
@@ -81,14 +81,21 @@ pub fn author_allows_external(manifest: &PluginManifest) -> bool {
manifest.mcp_contribution().is_some_and(|mcp| mcp.external_tools)
}
-/// The grant in force for a plugin: the saved one, or "not authorized".
-pub fn effective_grant(saved: Option<&PluginMcpGrant>) -> PluginMcpGrant {
- saved.cloned().unwrap_or(PluginMcpGrant {
- external: false,
- ceiling: PluginMcpAccessLevel::Read,
- approved_tools: Default::default(),
- disabled_tools: Vec::new(),
- })
+/// The grant in force for a plugin. A saved grant always wins. Without one,
+/// a plugin whose author opted into the external server (`external_tools`)
+/// runs under a read-only default: its declared read tools are exposed with
+/// zero setup, while write/full tools stay above the ceiling until the user
+/// grants them. Plugins that did not opt in stay fully unauthorized.
+pub fn effective_grant(manifest: &PluginManifest, saved: Option<&PluginMcpGrant>) -> PluginMcpGrant {
+ match saved {
+ Some(saved) => saved.clone(),
+ None => PluginMcpGrant {
+ external: author_allows_external(manifest),
+ ceiling: PluginMcpAccessLevel::Read,
+ approved_tools: Default::default(),
+ disabled_tools: Vec::new(),
+ },
+ }
}
/// Decides one tool's exposure under an effective grant.
@@ -148,7 +155,7 @@ pub fn exposed_tools(
saved: Option<&PluginMcpGrant>,
tools: Vec<RawPluginTool>,
) -> Vec<RawPluginTool> {
- let grant = effective_grant(saved);
+ let grant = effective_grant(manifest, saved);
tools
.into_iter()
.filter(|tool| tool_exposure(manifest, &grant, &tool.name).is_exposed())
@@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ pub fn plugin_view(
Err(error) => (Vec::new(), Some(error)),
};
let contribution = manifest.mcp_contribution();
- let grant = effective_grant(saved);
+ let grant = effective_grant(manifest, saved);
let tool_views = tools
.iter()
.map(|tool| PluginMcpToolView {
@@ -561,11 +568,27 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
- fn nothing_is_exposed_before_the_user_authorizes() {
- assert!(exposed(&declared(), None).is_empty());
+ fn read_tools_work_without_a_grant_when_the_author_opts_in() {
+ // Zero-setup default: the author's `external_tools` opt-in exposes the
+ // declared read tier immediately; write/full wait above the ceiling.
+ assert_eq!(exposed(&declared(), None), ["list_dir"]);
let view = plugin_view(&declared(), None, Ok(tools()));
+ assert!(!view.has_saved_grant);
+ assert!(view.grant.external);
+ assert_eq!(view.grant.ceiling, PluginMcpAccessLevel::Read);
+ assert_eq!(view.tools[0].exposure, PluginToolExposure::Exposed);
+ assert_eq!(view.tools[1].exposure, PluginToolExposure::AboveCeiling);
+ assert_eq!(view.tools[2].exposure, PluginToolExposure::AboveCeiling);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn nothing_is_exposed_when_the_author_did_not_opt_in() {
+ let legacy = manifest(serde_json::Value::Null);
+ assert!(exposed(&legacy, None).is_empty());
+ let view = plugin_view(&legacy, None, Ok(tools()));
assert!(!view.has_saved_grant && !view.grant.external);
- assert!(view.tools.iter().all(|tool| tool.exposure == PluginToolExposure::PluginDisabled));
+ // No contribution means no declarations: Undeclared, never Exposed.
+ assert!(view.tools.iter().all(|tool| tool.exposure == PluginToolExposure::Undeclared));
}
#[test]
diff --git a/crates/dbx-mcp/src/backend.rs b/crates/dbx-mcp/src/backend.rs
index 742020ee29..4b1e423662 100644
--- a/crates/dbx-mcp/src/backend.rs
+++ b/crates/dbx-mcp/src/backend.rs
@@ -310,6 +310,16 @@ pub trait DbxBackend: Send + Sync {
}
async fn load_connections(&self) -> Result<Vec<ConnectionConfig>, String>;
+
+ /// Whether the user has saved any MCP policy. Fresh installs have none,
+ /// in which case writable plugin connections fall back to their own
+ /// protection level (at least write) instead of the global default. Once
+ /// a policy is saved, its explicit settings are authoritative everywhere.
+ /// Unreadable storage counts as configured: unreadable hides, never widens.
+ async fn mcp_policy_configured(&self) -> bool {
+ false
+ }
+
async fn save_history_entry(&self, entry: &HistoryEntry) -> Result<(), String> {
let _ = entry;
Err("Query history is not supported by this backend.".to_string())
@@ -1298,6 +1308,10 @@ impl DbxBackend for LocalBackend {
self.state.storage.load_mcp_access_policy().await.map(effective_mcp_access_policy)
}
+ async fn mcp_policy_configured(&self) -> bool {
+ self.state.storage.load_enforced_mcp_policy().await.map(|state| state.configured).unwrap_or(true)
+ }
+
async fn list_plugin_mcp_tools(&self) -> Result<Vec<crate::plugin_tools::PluginToolProvider>, String> {
self.detect_plugin_tool_providers().await
}
@@ -1781,6 +1795,16 @@ impl DbxBackend for WebBackend {
.map_err(|error| format!("Invalid MCP policy response: {error}"))
}
+ async fn mcp_policy_configured(&self) -> bool {
+ // Same source as `load_mcp_global_policy` and as LocalBackend: the
+ // enforced global policy state's `configured` flag. Transport or
+ // parse failures count as configured — unreadable hides, never widens.
+ match self.request(reqwest::Method::GET, "/api/app-settings/mcp-policy", None).await {
+ Ok(response) => response.json::<McpGlobalPolicyState>().await.map(|state| state.configured).unwrap_or(true),
+ Err(_) => true,
+ }
+ }
+
async fn load_mcp_access_policy(&self) -> Result<dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessPolicy, String> {
let body = self
.request(reqwest::Method::GET, "/api/app-settings/mcp-access-policy", None)
@@ -3619,6 +3643,56 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(paths.get("web-db"), Some(&vec!["Project".to_string()]));
}
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn web_backend_policy_configured_follows_the_enforced_state() {
+ // `mcp_policy_configured` must mirror the same source the local
+ // backend uses: the enforced global policy state's `configured` flag.
+ // A configured (or unreadable) web source keeps the saved policy
+ // authoritative — unreadable hides, never widens.
+ for (body, expected) in [
+ (r#"{"configured":true,"readOnly":false,"allowDangerousSql":false}"#, true),
+ (r#"{"configured":false,"readOnly":true,"allowDangerousSql":false}"#, false),
+ ] {
+ let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+ let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+ let (request_sender, request_receiver) = mpsc::channel();
+ let server = std::thread::spawn(move || {
+ let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().unwrap();
+ stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5))).unwrap();
+ let mut request = Vec::new();
+ let mut buffer = [0_u8; 1024];
+ loop {
+ let count = stream.read(&mut buffer).unwrap();
+ request.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..count]);
+ if count == 0 || request.windows(4).any(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ request_sender.send(String::from_utf8(request).unwrap().lines().next().unwrap().to_string()).unwrap();
+ write!(
+ stream,
+ "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
+ body.len(),
+ body
+ )
+ .unwrap();
+ });
+
+ let backend = WebBackend::new(format!("http://{address}"), String::new()).unwrap();
+ backend.auth.lock().await.checked = true;
+ let configured = backend.mcp_policy_configured().await;
+
+ server.join().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(request_receiver.recv().unwrap(), "GET /api/app-settings/mcp-policy HTTP/1.1");
+ assert_eq!(configured, expected, "body: {body}");
+ }
+
+ // Unreachable desktop (transport error) counts as configured.
+ let backend = WebBackend::new("http://127.0.0.1:1".to_string(), String::new()).unwrap();
+ backend.auth.lock().await.checked = true;
+ assert!(backend.mcp_policy_configured().await);
+ }
+
#[tokio::test]
async fn web_backend_loads_v2_access_policy_with_plugin_scope_rules() {
// The desktop test suite normally exercises the HTTP path below. Some
diff --git a/crates/dbx-mcp/src/server.rs b/crates/dbx-mcp/src/server.rs
index dccc2fb40b..347d49202c 100644
--- a/crates/dbx-mcp/src/server.rs
+++ b/crates/dbx-mcp/src/server.rs
@@ -2229,6 +2229,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
Ok(allowed) => allowed,
Err(error) => return error,
};
+ let read_only_by_connection = self.plugin_connection_read_only_if_unconfigured().await;
if self.scope.enabled() && allowed_connections.is_empty() {
return tool_error(
"PLUGIN_OUT_OF_SCOPE",
@@ -2243,12 +2244,24 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
let connection_hidden = owned
.iter()
.filter(|entry| {
- !plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(access.as_ref(), group_paths.as_ref(), entry, &allowed_connections)
+ !plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(
+ access.as_ref(),
+ group_paths.as_ref(),
+ entry,
+ &allowed_connections,
+ &read_only_by_connection,
+ )
})
.count();
hidden += connection_hidden;
owned.retain(|entry| {
- plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(access.as_ref(), group_paths.as_ref(), entry, &allowed_connections)
+ plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(
+ access.as_ref(),
+ group_paths.as_ref(),
+ entry,
+ &allowed_connections,
+ &read_only_by_connection,
+ )
});
if owned.is_empty() {
// An all-allowlist-hidden plugin, a plugin with no usable
@@ -2273,6 +2286,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
group_paths.get(connection_id).map(|path| path.ids.as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[]),
entry,
connection_id,
+ read_only_by_connection.get(connection_id).copied(),
)
})
.cloned()
@@ -5050,7 +5064,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
.await
.map_err(|error| backend_tool_error("MCP_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE", error))?;
if entry.scope.is_none() && connection_id.is_none() {
- return ensure_plugin_scope(&access, entry, &[], None, arguments);
+ return ensure_plugin_scope(&access, entry, &[], None, None, arguments);
}
let policy = self.load_policy().await?;
let group_paths = self
@@ -5059,7 +5073,21 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
.map_err(|error| backend_tool_error("MCP_POLICY_UNAVAILABLE", error))?;
let group_ids =
connection_id.and_then(|id| group_paths.get(id)).map(|path| path.ids.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
- ensure_plugin_scope(&access, entry, &group_ids, connection_id, arguments)
+ // The connection's own protection level feeds the plugin-connection
+ // default (writable plugin connections resolve to at least write when
+ // no explicit rule says otherwise). The default only applies to fresh
+ // installs: once the user saves any MCP policy, its explicit settings
+ // are authoritative. The same configured-aware map the listings use
+ // keeps advertised visibility and call decisions identical. Unknown
+ // facts keep the plain policy default.
+ let connection_read_only = match connection_id {
+ Some(id) => {
+ let read_only_by_connection = self.plugin_connection_read_only_if_unconfigured().await;
+ read_only_by_connection.get(id).copied()
+ }
+ None => None,
+ };
+ ensure_plugin_scope(&access, entry, &group_ids, connection_id, connection_read_only, arguments)
}
/// The advertised `tools/list` view: router-enabled tools narrowed to the
@@ -5410,6 +5438,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
let entries = crate::plugin_tools::build_catalog(&providers);
// Tool calls fail closed on policy errors anyway; keep the view.
let allowed = self.allowed_plugin_connections().await.unwrap_or_default();
+ let read_only_by_connection = self.plugin_connection_read_only_if_unconfigured().await;
let access = self.backend.load_mcp_access_policy().await.ok();
let policy = policy.cloned();
let group_paths = match policy.as_ref() {
@@ -5424,7 +5453,13 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
return None;
}
let connections = allowed.get(&entry.plugin_id).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
- if !plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(access.as_ref(), group_paths.as_ref(), &entry, &connections) {
+ if !plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(
+ access.as_ref(),
+ group_paths.as_ref(),
+ &entry,
+ &connections,
+ &read_only_by_connection,
+ ) {
return None;
}
let connections = match (&access, &group_paths) {
@@ -5436,6 +5471,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
group_paths.get(connection_id).map(|path| path.ids.as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[]),
&entry,
connection_id,
+ read_only_by_connection.get(connection_id).copied(),
)
})
.collect(),
@@ -5558,6 +5594,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
// Listing degrades on policy errors the same way the flat view does;
// `dbx_plugin_tools`/`dbx_plugin_call` still fail closed.
let allowed = self.allowed_plugin_connections().await.unwrap_or_default();
+ let read_only_by_connection = self.plugin_connection_read_only_if_unconfigured().await;
let policy = self.load_policy().await.ok();
let access = self.backend.load_mcp_access_policy().await.ok();
let group_paths = match policy.as_ref() {
@@ -5598,6 +5635,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
group_paths.as_ref(),
entry,
connections,
+ &read_only_by_connection,
)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
@@ -5615,6 +5653,7 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
group_paths.get(connection_id).map(|path| path.ids.as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[]),
entry,
connection_id,
+ read_only_by_connection.get(connection_id).copied(),
),
_ => true,
}
@@ -5634,6 +5673,35 @@ impl DbxMcpServer {
Ok(allowed.get(plugin_id).cloned().unwrap_or_default())
}
+ /// Read-only flag per plugin connection. Feeds the plugin-connection
+ /// access default (writable plugin connections resolve to at least write
+ /// when no explicit rule says otherwise) on both the listing and the call
+ /// path so a tool never advertises where it cannot run, and never hides
+ /// where it can.
+ async fn plugin_connection_read_only(&self) -> Result<HashMap<String, bool>, CallToolResult> {
+ let connections =
+ self.backend.load_connections().await.map_err(|error| tool_error("CONNECTION_LOAD_ERROR", error))?;
+ Ok(connections
+ .into_iter()
+ .filter(|config| config.plugin_id.as_deref().is_some_and(|id| !id.trim().is_empty()))
+ .map(|config| (config.id, config.read_only))
+ .collect())
+ }
+
+ /// The configured-aware plugin-connection read-only map: the single
+ /// source every listing and the call path share. The write-widening
+ /// default only applies to fresh installs — once the user saves any MCP
+ /// policy its explicit settings are authoritative, so the map stays empty
+ /// and resolution falls back to the plain policy default on listings and
+ /// calls alike. Backends map unreadable storage to configured, so this
+ /// fails closed (never widens) there too.
+ async fn plugin_connection_read_only_if_unconfigured(&self) -> HashMap<String, bool> {
+ if self.backend.mcp_policy_configured().await {
+ return HashMap::new();
+ }
+ self.plugin_connection_read_only().await.unwrap_or_default()
+ }
+
/// Shared call core for `dbx_plugin_call`: locates the tool by
/// `(plugin_id, tool name)` over a fresh discovery pass, strips
/// selector arguments, binds the connection, and forwards to the
@@ -6326,8 +6394,21 @@ fn plugin_connection_level_allowed(
group_ids: &[String],
entry: &crate::plugin_tools::PluginToolEntry,
connection_id: &str,
+ connection_read_only: Option<bool>,
) -> bool {
let required = plugin_tool_required_access(entry);
+ // Scope-less entries resolve directly so the plugin-connection default
+ // (writable plugin connections count as write) applies to the listing
+ // exactly as it does at call time. Scope-bound entries keep the
+ // sub-scope-aware check.
+ if entry.scope.is_none() {
+ let resolved = match connection_read_only {
+ Some(read_only) => access.resolve_plugin_connection(group_ids, connection_id, read_only),
+ None => access.resolve(group_ids, connection_id, None),
+ };
+ let ceiling = access.toolset_ceiling(connection_id, &entry.toolset);
+ return resolved.visible && ceiling.map_or(resolved.level, |c| resolved.level.min(c)) >= required;
+ }
let scopes = entry.scope.as_ref().map(|(kind, _)| [kind.as_str()]);
connection_has_tool_access(
access,
@@ -6355,6 +6436,7 @@ fn plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(
group_paths: Option<&HashMap<String, dbx_core::mcp_policy::McpConnectionGroupPath>>,
entry: &crate::plugin_tools::PluginToolEntry,
connections: &[(String, String)],
+ read_only_by_connection: &HashMap<String, bool>,
) -> bool {
if !entry.requires_connection() {
return access.is_none_or(|access| access.default_access >= plugin_tool_required_access(entry));
@@ -6369,6 +6451,7 @@ fn plugin_entry_has_allowed_connection(
group_paths.get(connection_id).map(|path| path.ids.as_slice()).unwrap_or(&[]),
entry,
connection_id,
+ read_only_by_connection.get(connection_id).copied(),
)
}),
_ => true,
@@ -6385,6 +6468,7 @@ fn ensure_plugin_scope(
entry: &crate::plugin_tools::PluginToolEntry,
group_ids: &[String],
connection_id: Option<&str>,
+ connection_read_only: Option<bool>,
arguments: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel, CallToolResult> {
let Some(connection_id) = connection_id else {
@@ -6394,10 +6478,16 @@ fn ensure_plugin_scope(
format!("Plugin tool \"{}\" requires a policy-bound connection.", entry.exposed_name),
));
}
- if access.default_access < plugin_tool_required_access(entry) {
+ let needed = plugin_tool_required_access(entry);
+ if access.default_access < needed {
return Err(tool_error(
"MCP_READ_ONLY",
- format!("Plugin tool \"{}\" is above the effective DBX MCP access level.", entry.exposed_name),
+ format!(
+ "Plugin tool \"{}\" needs {} access but the global default is {}. Raise the connection's access level in DBX Settings → MCP, or call it with an authorized connectionId.",
+ entry.exposed_name,
+ access_level_name(needed),
+ access_level_name(access.default_access)
+ ),
));
}
return Ok(access.default_access);
@@ -6426,7 +6516,10 @@ fn ensure_plugin_scope(
}
}
} else {
- access.resolve(group_ids, connection_id, None)
+ match connection_read_only {
+ Some(read_only) => access.resolve_plugin_connection(group_ids, connection_id, read_only),
+ None => access.resolve(group_ids, connection_id, None),
+ }
};
if !resolved.visible {
return Err(tool_error(
@@ -6437,12 +6530,28 @@ fn ensure_plugin_scope(
if cap(resolved.level) < needed {
return Err(tool_error(
"MCP_READ_ONLY",
- format!("Plugin tool \"{}\" is above the effective DBX MCP access level.", entry.exposed_name),
+ format!(
+ "Plugin tool \"{}\" needs {} access; connection \"{}\" resolves to {} in the DBX MCP settings. Raise that connection's access level in DBX Settings → MCP.",
+ entry.exposed_name,
+ access_level_name(needed),
+ connection_id,
+ access_level_name(resolved.level)
+ ),
));
}
Ok(cap(resolved.level))
}
+/// Lowercase stable names for error messages and audits.
+fn access_level_name(level: dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel) -> &'static str {
+ match level {
+ dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel::None => "none",
+ dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel::Read => "read",
+ dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel::Write => "write",
+ dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessLevel::Full => "full",
+ }
+}
+
/// The exposed tool is declared `full`: `exposed_tools` rewrites
/// `destructiveHint` from the manifest level, so the hint is authoritative here.
fn plugin_tool_is_destructive(tool: &dbx_core::ai::plugin_tools::RawPluginTool) -> bool {
@@ -7674,6 +7783,7 @@ mod tests {
struct FakeBackend {
connections: Vec<ConnectionConfig>,
policy: McpGlobalPolicy,
+ mcp_policy_configured: bool,
recorded_arguments: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<(String, serde_json::Value)>>,
history: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<dbx_core::history::HistoryEntry>>,
closed_sessions: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<String>>,
@@ -7712,6 +7822,7 @@ mod tests {
Self {
connections: Vec::new(),
policy: McpGlobalPolicy::default(),
+ mcp_policy_configured: true,
recorded_arguments: std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
history: std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
closed_sessions: std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
@@ -8090,6 +8201,10 @@ mod tests {
Ok(self.policy_override.lock().unwrap().clone().unwrap_or_else(|| self.policy.clone()))
}
+ async fn mcp_policy_configured(&self) -> bool {
+ self.mcp_policy_configured
+ }
+
async fn load_mcp_access_policy(&self) -> Result<dbx_core::mcp_access::McpAccessPolicy, String> {
self.access_policy_loads.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
if !self.tool_approvals.lock().unwrap().is_empty() {
@@ -9612,11 +9727,102 @@ mod tests {
McpRuleTarget::Scope { connection_id: "k1".into(), scope: "namespace".into(), value: "prod".into() },
rule,
);
- let error = ensure_plugin_scope(&access, &entry, &[], Some("k1"), &json!({})).unwrap_err();
+ let error = ensure_plugin_scope(&access, &entry, &[], Some("k1"), None, &json!({})).unwrap_err();
assert!(result_text(&error).contains("SCOPE_REQUIRED"));
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn writable_plugin_connections_default_to_write_without_explicit_rules() {
+ use dbx_core::mcp_access::{McpAccessLevel, McpAccessPolicy, McpAccessRule, McpRuleTarget};
+ let provider = plugin_provider("io.dbx.ssh", "Terminal", json!({"tools": [{"name": "exec"}]}));
+ let entry = crate::plugin_tools::build_catalog(&[provider]).remove(0);
+ let access = McpAccessPolicy::default(); // default_access: Read
+
+ // No rule + writable plugin connection: the connection's own
+ // protection level replaces the global read default.
+ let level = ensure_plugin_scope(&access, &entry, &[], Some("c1"), Some(false), &json!({})).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(level, McpAccessLevel::Write);
+
+ // Read-only plugin connection keeps the read default.
+ let error = ensure_plugin_scope(&access, &entry, &[], Some("c1"), Some(true), &json!({})).unwrap_err();
+ assert!(result_text(&error).contains("MCP_READ_ONLY"), "{}", result_text(&error));
+
+ // Unknown facts (older call paths) keep the plain policy default.
+ let error = ensure_plugin_scope(&access, &entry, &[], Some("c1"), None, &json!({})).unwrap_err();
+ assert!(result_text(&error).contains("MCP_READ_ONLY"), "{}", result_text(&error));
+
+ // An explicit connection rule always wins over the default.
+ let mut explicit = McpAccessPolicy::default();
+ explicit.rules.insert(
+ McpRuleTarget::Connection { id: "c1".into() },
+ McpAccessRule { access: Some(McpAccessLevel::Read), ..Default::default() },
+ );
+ let error = ensure_plugin_scope(&explicit, &entry, &[], Some("c1"), Some(false), &json!({})).unwrap_err();
+ assert!(result_text(&error).contains("resolves to read"), "{}", result_text(&error));
+ explicit.rules.insert(
+ McpRuleTarget::Connection { id: "c1".into() },
+ McpAccessRule { access: Some(McpAccessLevel::Full), ..Default::default() },
+ );
+ let level = ensure_plugin_scope(&explicit, &entry, &[], Some("c1"), Some(false), &json!({})).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(level, McpAccessLevel::Full);
+ }
+
+ #[tokio::test]
+ async fn saved_policy_keeps_plugin_write_tools_out_of_every_listing() {
+ // A saved policy with a read default must stay authoritative on every
+ // surface: the write-widening plugin-connection default (writable
+ // connection => at least write) only applies to fresh installs with
+ // no saved policy. Here the connection IS writable, so the raw map
+ // would widen — the listings must not advertise what the call denies.
+ let backend = |configured: bool| {
+ Arc::new(FakeBackend {
+ connections: vec![plugin_connection("k1", "prod", "io.dbx.kafka")],
+ // A saved read-default policy: from_v1 maps read_only => Read.
+ policy: McpGlobalPolicy { read_only: true, ..Default::default() },
+ plugin_providers: vec![plugin_provider("io.dbx.kafka", "Kafka Studio", kafka_plugin_listing())],
+ mcp_policy_configured: configured,
+ ..Default::default()
+ })
+ };
+
+ // Saved policy: the write-tier tool disappears from the flat
+ // tools/list and the call denies it, while the read-only one stays.
+ let server = DbxMcpServer::with_runtime_options(backend(true), McpScope::default(), false);
+ let names =
+ server.policy_filtered_tools().await.into_iter().map(|tool| tool.name.to_string()).collect::<HashSet<_>>();
+ assert!(!names.contains("dbx_kafka__kafka_topics_delete"), "flat listing must not widen: {names:?}");
+ assert!(names.contains("dbx_kafka__kafka_topics_list"), "read-only tool stays visible: {names:?}");
+
+ let list = server.plugin_list(Parameters(PluginListRequest { filter: None })).await;
+ let text = result_text(&list);
+ assert!(text.contains("1 tool(s)"), "dbx_plugin_list counts only the read tool: {text}");
+
+ let tools = server.plugin_tools(Parameters(PluginToolsRequest { plugin_id: "io.dbx.kafka".into() })).await;
+ let text = result_text(&tools);
+ assert!(!text.contains("kafka_topics_delete"), "dbx_plugin_tools must not widen: {text}");
+ assert!(text.contains("kafka_topics_list"), "{text}");
+
+ let call = server
+ .plugin_call(Parameters(PluginCallRequest {
+ plugin_id: "io.dbx.kafka".into(),
+ tool: "kafka_topics_delete".into(),
+ arguments: Some(json!({ "topics": ["t"] })),
+ dbx_connection: None,
+ }))
+ .await;
+ assert!(result_text(&call).contains("MCP_READ_ONLY"), "{}", result_text(&call));
+
+ // Fresh install (no saved policy): the widening default applies again
+ // and listings stay consistent with calls.
+ let server = DbxMcpServer::with_runtime_options(backend(false), McpScope::default(), false);
+ let names =
+ server.policy_filtered_tools().await.into_iter().map(|tool| tool.name.to_string()).collect::<HashSet<_>>();
+ assert!(names.contains("dbx_kafka__kafka_topics_delete"), "zero-config widening expected: {names:?}");
+ let tools = server.plugin_tools(Parameters(PluginToolsRequest { plugin_id: "io.dbx.kafka".into() })).await;
+ assert!(result_text(&tools).contains("kafka_topics_delete"), "{}", result_text(&tools));
+ }
+
#[tokio::test]
async fn plugin_writes_honor_connection_hard_protections() {
for production in [false, true] {