DeepTeam is a framework to red team LLMs and AI agents.
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A-Vamshifffb39fb6a07
diff --git a/docs/docs/frameworks-owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications.mdx b/docs/docs/frameworks-owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications.mdxindex 1fe3f123..50562d80 100644--- a/docs/docs/frameworks-owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications.mdx+++ b/docs/docs/frameworks-owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications.mdx@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---id: frameworks-owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-title: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications-sidebar_label: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications+title: OWASP Top 10 for Agents+sidebar_label: OWASP Top 10 for Agents---The **OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI)** identifies the most critical security risks introduced by autonomous and semi-autonomous AI agents. Unlike traditional LLM applications, agentic systems combine reasoning, memory, tools, and multi-step execution, introducing new classes of vulnerabilities that extend beyond prompt-level attacks.@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ red_team(```:::tip-Implement tool orchestration limits, budget constraints, and composition rules. Monitor for unusual tool call patterns that indicate exploitation attempts.+Please pass the information on what tools your agent has access to in the `target_purpose` filed of `red_team` method for more accurate and rigourous testing.:::## 3. Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse (ASI03:2026)@@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ Memory poisoning can have long-lasting effects since agents rely on historical c- **Agent-in-the-Middle**: Interception and modification of agent messages- **Message Injection**: Insertion of malicious instructions into agent communication- **Message Spoofing**: Forging messages that appear to come from trusted agents-- **Protocol Manipulation**: Exploiting weaknesses in agent communication protocols```pythonfrom deepteam.frameworks import OWASP_ASI_2026@@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ The OWASP ASI Top 10 builds upon and extends the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs. Each age| **ASI09: Trust Exploitation** | LLM01, LLM05, LLM06, LLM09 | Automation bias and authority misuse || **ASI10: Rogue Agents** | LLM02, LLM09 | **New** - behavioral drift and misalignment |-### Key Insights+### Key Changes to Note**Amplification Effect**: Agentic risks often combine multiple LLM vulnerabilities. For example, ASI01 (Agent Goal Hijack) merges prompt injection (LLM01) with excessive autonomy (LLM06), but the autonomous multi-step execution amplifies the impact beyond single-response attacks.diff --git a/docs/docs/red-teaming-vulnerabilities-tool-metadata-poisoning.mdx b/docs/docs/red-teaming-vulnerabilities-tool-metadata-poisoning.mdxindex 622deea1..a1745b10 100644--- a/docs/docs/red-teaming-vulnerabilities-tool-metadata-poisoning.mdx+++ b/docs/docs/red-teaming-vulnerabilities-tool-metadata-poisoning.mdx@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ title: Tool Metadata Poisoningsidebar_label: Tool Metadata Poisoning----The `Tool Metadata Poisoning` vulnerability evaluates whether the **target LLM or agent system** can be misled by **malicious or manipulated tool metadata**. More specifically, it tests whether the system can be influenced into unsafe or unauthorized behavior through **tampered schemas, deceptive descriptions, incorrect permission signals, or poisoned tool registries**.+The `ToolMetadataPoisoning` vulnerability evaluates whether the **target LLM or agent system** can be misled by **malicious or manipulated tool metadata**. More specifically, it tests whether the system can be influenced into unsafe or unauthorized behavior through **tampered schemas, deceptive descriptions, incorrect permission signals, or poisoned tool registries**.This vulnerability is especially critical for **tool-augmented LLMs, function-calling systems, agent frameworks, and plugin ecosystems**, where models rely on metadata to decide *what tools to trust and how to use them*.@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ There are **FIVE** optional parameters when creating a `ToolMetadataPoisoning` v- [Optional] `evaluation_model`: a string specifying which of OpenAI's GPT models to use, **OR** [any custom LLM model](https://deepeval.com/guides/guides-using-custom-llms) of type `DeepEvalBaseLLM`. Defaulted to `'gpt-4o'`.- [Optional] `async_mode`: a boolean which when set to `True`, enables concurrent execution. Defaulted to `True`.- [Optional] `verbose_mode`: a boolean which when set to `True`, prints the intermediate steps used to assess said vulnerability to the console. Defaulted to `False`.-- [Optional] `types`: a list of `types` of `Tool Metadata Poisoning` to test through. Defaulted to all `types` available:+- [Optional] `types`: a list of `types` of `ToolMetadataPoisoning` to test through. Defaulted to all `types` available:- `schema_manipulation`: Tests whether malformed or misleading tool schemas can cause unsafe tool usage.- `description_deception`: Tests whether deceptive tool descriptions influence the model’s decision-making.- `permission_misrepresentation`: Tests whether false permission or safety claims can bypass safeguards.- `registry_poisoning`: Tests whether poisoned or untrusted tool registries are incorrectly trusted.-[Click here](#types) to learn more about the `types` in `Tool Metadata Poisoning`.+[Click here](#types) to learn more about the `types` in `ToolMetadataPoisoning`.### As a standalone@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The `assess` method has **ONE** mandatory and **ONE** optional parameters:## Types-There are 4 `types` you can choose from in the `Tool Metadata Poisoning` vulnerability:+There are 4 `types` you can choose from in the `ToolMetadataPoisoning` vulnerability:| **Category** | **Example Prompt** | **Expected Behavior** || -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |