Build Agentic workflows, RAG pipelines, with rich AI model and tool support on one collaborative workspace. Deploy on cloud, VPC, or self-hosted, so teams move from prototype to production without rebuilding the stack.
Python agentagentic-aiagentic-frameworkagentic-workflowaiautomationclaudedeepseekgenaigptllmlow-codemcpnextjsno-codeopenaipythonskillsworkflow
fix(api): make SSRF-blocked error message actionable (#39867)
Taranum Wasu83b3a8fd8828
diff --git a/api/core/helper/ssrf_proxy.py b/api/core/helper/ssrf_proxy.pyindex 9f0bc17f0f2..95b07c36903 100644--- a/api/core/helper/ssrf_proxy.py+++ b/api/core/helper/ssrf_proxy.py@@ -246,10 +246,21 @@ def make_request(# Squid typically identifies itself in Server or Via headersif "squid" in server_header or "squid" in via_header:+ # The deny ACL is usually ``to_private_networks`` (RFC1918 ++ # loopback / link-local / CGN / IPv6 ULA, etc.). We don't know+ # which specific ACL tripped from Squid's response alone, but+ # the actionable remediation is the same in every case:+ # allowlist the destination in the SSRF proxy. Tell the user+ # exactly which env var to set so they don't have to grep the+ # squid config. Mention a concrete example CIDR (e.g. the+ # 172.21.0.0/16 from the bug report) so they can copy-paste it.response.close()raise ToolSSRFError(- f"Access to '{url}' was blocked by SSRF protection. "- f"The URL may point to a private or local network address. "+ f"Access to '{url}' was blocked by SSRF protection "+ f"(e.g. SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS=172.21.0.0/16 to "+ f"allow 172.21.0.0/16). The URL resolves to a private, "+ f"loopback, link-local, or otherwise non-public network "+ f"address. See https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/issues/38443.")if response.status_code not in STATUS_FORCELIST or max_retries == 0:diff --git a/api/tests/unit_tests/core/helper/test_ssrf_proxy.py b/api/tests/unit_tests/core/helper/test_ssrf_proxy.pyindex f065728b227..5b51a99aa58 100644--- a/api/tests/unit_tests/core/helper/test_ssrf_proxy.py+++ b/api/tests/unit_tests/core/helper/test_ssrf_proxy.py@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from core.helper.ssrf_proxy import (max_retries_exceeded_error,request_error,)+from core.tools.errors import ToolSSRFError@patch("core.helper.ssrf_proxy._get_ssrf_client", autospec=True)@@ -360,3 +361,96 @@ def test_graphon_ssrf_proxy_wraps_module_requests(method_name: str) -> None:assert wrapped.status_code == 200assert wrapped.url == "https://example.com/resource"assert wrapped.content == b"ok"+++# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# Squid-blocked 403 regression tests (issue #38443)+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------+# When the SSRF proxy denies a request to a private/internal network address,+# Squid returns 401/403 with itself identified in the Server or Via header.+# The Python client must raise ToolSSRFError with a message that tells the+# user exactly which env var to set, instead of just "blocked by SSRF+# protection" (the pre-#38443 message gave no actionable guidance).+++def _build_squid_blocked_response(status_code: int = 403) -> MagicMock:+ """Construct a mock httpx.Response that looks like Squid's ACL deny."""+ response = MagicMock()+ response.status_code = status_code+ response.headers = {"server": "squid/4.10", "via": "1.1 squid (squid/4.10)"}+ return response+++@patch("core.helper.ssrf_proxy._get_ssrf_client", autospec=True)+def test_squid_block_raises_actionable_tool_ssrf_error(mock_get_client) -> None:+ """A 403 from Squid must raise ToolSSRFError whose message tells the user+ exactly which env var to set. Pre-#38443 the message had no remediation+ hint, so users hit dead ends when their internal API was blocked."""+ mock_client = MagicMock()+ mock_client.send.return_value = _build_squid_blocked_response(status_code=403)+ mock_get_client.return_value = mock_client++ with pytest.raises(ToolSSRFError) as exc_info:+ make_request("GET", "http://172.21.0.5/api/health")++ msg = str(exc_info.value)+ assert "172.21.0.5" in msg, f"URL should appear in the error, got: {msg!r}"+ assert "SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS" in msg, "Error must tell the user which env var to set; got: " + msg+ # The remediation hint must include a concrete example, otherwise users+ # still have to grep the squid config to figure out the syntax.+ assert "172.21.0.0/16" in msg+ # And it must point to the issue so maintainers can find context.+ assert "issues/38443" in msg+++@patch("core.helper.ssrf_proxy._get_ssrf_client", autospec=True)+def test_squid_401_via_header_also_triggers_actionable_error(mock_get_client) -> None:+ """Squid can return 401 with only the Via header set (no Server header)+ on some configurations. The detection must work for both."""+ mock_client = MagicMock()+ response = MagicMock()+ response.status_code = 401+ # Server header absent — only Via identifies Squid.+ response.headers = {"server": "", "via": "1.1 squid (squid/4.10)"}+ mock_client.send.return_value = response+ mock_get_client.return_value = mock_client++ with pytest.raises(ToolSSRFError) as exc_info:+ make_request("GET", "http://10.0.0.1/internal")++ assert "SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS" in str(exc_info.value)+++@patch("core.helper.ssrf_proxy._get_ssrf_client", autospec=True)+def test_non_squid_403_is_not_treated_as_ssrf_block(mock_get_client) -> None:+ """A 403 from the *target server* (not Squid) must NOT be re-raised as+ a ToolSSRFError — that would mislead the user into editing SSRF config+ when the real problem is application-level authorization on the target.+ Pre-#38443 we didn't have this guard at all; the new wording only changes+ the Squid path, so verify we don't accidentally widen it."""+ mock_client = MagicMock()+ response = MagicMock()+ response.status_code = 403+ response.headers = {"server": "nginx/1.21", "via": "1.1 varnish"}+ mock_client.send.return_value = response+ mock_get_client.return_value = mock_client++ # Should return the response, not raise.+ returned = make_request("GET", "http://public.example.com/admin")+ assert returned.status_code == 403+++@patch("core.helper.ssrf_proxy._get_ssrf_client", autospec=True)+def test_squid_block_with_internal_10_x_url_mentions_allowlist(mock_get_client) -> None:+ """Real-world repro from #38443: 10.x.x.x internal API blocked. The error+ message must still point at SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS, not just say+ "private address" without telling the user what to do."""+ mock_client = MagicMock()+ mock_client.send.return_value = _build_squid_blocked_response(status_code=403)+ mock_get_client.return_value = mock_client++ with pytest.raises(ToolSSRFError) as exc_info:+ make_request("POST", "http://10.0.0.42/v1/chat/completions")++ assert "10.0.0.42" in str(exc_info.value)+ assert "SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS" in str(exc_info.value)diff --git a/docker/.env.example b/docker/.env.exampleindex c79c3b32334..49329aadc5b 100644--- a/docker/.env.example+++ b/docker/.env.example@@ -214,6 +214,13 @@ SSRF_DEFAULT_WRITE_TIME_OUT=5SSRF_POOL_MAX_CONNECTIONS=100SSRF_POOL_MAX_KEEPALIVE_CONNECTIONS=20SSRF_POOL_KEEPALIVE_EXPIRY=5.0+# Comma-separated CIDR ranges that the SSRF proxy should allow even when they+# resolve to private, loopback, link-local, or otherwise non-public addresses.+# Leave empty (the default) to keep the deny-by-default policy. Required when+# Dify needs to reach internal HTTP endpoints (e.g. an internal API on+# http://172.21.x.x) from an HTTP Request node, a tool, or a plugin.+# Example: SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS=172.21.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8+SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS=# Plugin daemonDB_PLUGIN_DATABASE=dify_plugindiff --git a/docker/envs/infrastructure/ssrf-proxy.env.example b/docker/envs/infrastructure/ssrf-proxy.env.exampleindex 3624bd9fbb4..9dedcc35c90 100644--- a/docker/envs/infrastructure/ssrf-proxy.env.example+++ b/docker/envs/infrastructure/ssrf-proxy.env.example@@ -6,7 +6,16 @@ SSRF_PROXY_HTTP_URL=http://ssrf_proxy:3128SSRF_PROXY_HTTPS_URL=http://ssrf_proxy:3128SSRF_HTTP_PORT=3128SSRF_COREDUMP_DIR=/var/spool/squid+# Comma-separated CIDR ranges that the SSRF proxy should allow even when they+# resolve to private, loopback, link-local, or otherwise non-public addresses.+# Leave empty (the default) to keep the deny-by-default policy. Required when+# Dify needs to reach internal HTTP endpoints (e.g. an internal API on+# http://172.21.x.x) from an HTTP Request node, a tool, or a plugin.+# Example: 172.21.0.0/16,10.0.0.0/8SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS=+# Comma-separated domain suffixes that the SSRF proxy should allow even when+# they would otherwise resolve to a denied range. Leave empty to keep the+# deny-by-default policy.SSRF_PROXY_ALLOW_PRIVATE_DOMAINS=SSRF_DEFAULT_TIME_OUT=5SSRF_DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIME_OUT=5diff --git a/web/app/components/datasets/documents/create-from-pipeline/data-source/online-drive/file-list/header/breadcrumbs/dropdown/menu.tsx b/web/app/components/datasets/documents/create-from-pipeline/data-source/online-drive/file-list/header/breadcrumbs/dropdown/menu.tsxindex fa553fafbb4..6ceb016c2b6 100644--- a/web/app/components/datasets/documents/create-from-pipeline/data-source/online-drive/file-list/header/breadcrumbs/dropdown/menu.tsx+++ b/web/app/components/datasets/documents/create-from-pipeline/data-source/online-drive/file-list/header/breadcrumbs/dropdown/menu.tsx@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const Menu = ({ breadcrumbs, startIndex, onBreadcrumbClick }: MenuProps) => {{breadcrumbs.map((breadcrumb, index) => {return (<Item- key={`${breadcrumb}-${index}`}+ key={breadcrumb}name={breadcrumb}index={startIndex + index}onBreadcrumbClick={onBreadcrumbClick}