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# frozen_string_literal: true
describe FinalDestination::Connector do
describe "round-trip" do
it "recovers the addresses it encoded" do
token = described_class.encode("example.com", %w[1.2.3.4 2400:c800::1])
expect(described_class.token?(token)).to eq(true)
expect(described_class.addresses(token)).to eq(%w[1.2.3.4 2400:c800::1])
end
it "does not treat an ordinary hostname as a token" do
expect(described_class.token?("example.com")).to eq(false)
end
end
describe ".addresses_for_family" do
let(:ips) { %w[1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8 2400:c800::1] }
it "returns only IPv4 addresses for AF_INET" do
expect(described_class.addresses_for_family(ips, Socket::AF_INET)).to contain_exactly(
"1.2.3.4",
"5.6.7.8",
)
end
it "returns only IPv6 addresses for AF_INET6" do
expect(described_class.addresses_for_family(ips, Socket::AF_INET6)).to contain_exactly(
"2400:c800::1",
)
end
it "returns every address when the family is unspecified" do
expect(described_class.addresses_for_family(ips, nil)).to eq(ips)
end
end
# The host is attacker-controlled (it comes from the URL) and rides in the token
# only for readable errors. It must not be able to smuggle addresses past the
# SSRF filter by embedding the token's delimiters.
it "ignores delimiters smuggled into the host" do
vetted = %w[1.2.3.4 2400:c800::1]
[
"evil|9.9.9.9",
"evil|0.001|9.9.9.9",
"a|b|c|d",
"",
"9.9.9.9,6.6.6.6",
].each do |malicious_host|
token = described_class.encode(malicious_host, vetted)
expect(described_class.addresses(token)).to eq(vetted)
end
end
end