The Open Source DocuSign Alternative.
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import { NEXT_PUBLIC_WEBAPP_URL } from '@documenso/lib/constants/app';
import { createMiddleware } from 'hono/factory';
import type { HonoEnv } from './router';
const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);
/**
* Origin-based CSRF protection for cookie-authenticated mutations.
*
* Needed because the embed session cookie is `SameSite=None; Partitioned`, so
* any page hosting our embed iframe can send credentialed cross-site form/fetch
* requests that skip CORS preflight.
*
* Bearer/API-token requests are exempt since a browser can't attach
* `Authorization` cross-site without a preflight we never grant. Browser-managed
* schemes (e.g. `Basic` via a reverse proxy) deliberately aren't exempt.
*/
export const csrfMiddleware = createMiddleware<HonoEnv>(async (c, next) => {
if (SAFE_METHODS.has(c.req.method)) {
return await next();
}
if (isApiAuthorization(c.req.header('Authorization'))) {
return await next();
}
const origin = c.req.header('Origin');
const validOrigin = new URL(NEXT_PUBLIC_WEBAPP_URL()).origin;
if (origin !== validOrigin) {
c.get('logger').warn({
event: 'csrf.origin_rejected',
method: c.req.method,
path: c.req.path,
origin: origin ?? null,
});
return c.json(
{
message: 'Forbidden',
statusCode: 403,
},
403,
);
}
return await next();
});
const isApiAuthorization = (header: string | undefined): boolean => {
if (!header) {
return false;
}
const value = header.trim().toLowerCase();
return value.startsWith('bearer ') || value.startsWith('api_');
};