The Open Source DocuSign Alternative.
TypeScript digital-signaturedocument-signingdocusign-alternativee-signatureesignesignaturenext-authnextjsopen-sourcepades-standardpdfpdf-signpdf-signaturepostgresqlprismaself-hostedsigningtypescript
import { createMiddleware } from 'hono/factory';
import type { HonoEnv } from './router';
/**
* Paths that never render HTML and therefore do not need security headers.
*
* Browsers ignore CSP and friends on non-document responses, so we skip
* them to keep API/manifest/asset responses clean.
*/
const NON_PAGE_PATH_REGEX = /^(\/api\/|\/ingest\/|\/__manifest|\/assets\/|\/apple-.*|\/favicon.*)/;
/**
* Embed routes serve our white-label embed UI. Customers iframe these from
* arbitrary origins, so `frame-ancestors` must be wildcard, and customer-
* supplied CSS is injected at runtime as `<style>` elements which means
* `style-src-elem` cannot be nonce-restricted on these routes.
*/
const EMBED_PATH_REGEX = /^\/embed(\/|\.data|$)/;
/**
* The popup auth pages exchange the auth nonce with their opener via
* `postMessage` and must never be framed, or a hostile page could drive the
* handshake. Checked before `EMBED_PATH_REGEX`.
*/
const EMBED_AUTH_PATH_REGEX = /^\/embed\/auth(\/|\.data|$)/;
/**
* Non-`/embed` page routes that customers iframe directly.
*
* Some customer integrations embed `/sign/:token` and `/d/:token` directly
* (without going through `EmbedSignDocument`). Without `frame-ancestors *`
* here, those integrations break with a "refused to connect" iframe error.
*
* Direct framing is best-effort; `/embed/*` is the supported surface. Sign in
* from these pages goes through the popup flow, so `/signin` etc. are never
* framed and keep `frame-ancestors 'self'`. CSC/TSP signing is not supported
* when framed directly.
*
* These routes still get the strict nonced `script-src`/`style-src-elem`
* policy — only `frame-ancestors` is relaxed. The `(\/|\.data|$)` tail
* keeps `/sign` from matching `/signin`/`/signup` and `/d` from matching
* `/dashboard`.
*/
const FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX = /^\/(sign|d)(\/|\.data|$)/;
/**
* Hono context variable name where the per-request CSP nonce is stashed.
*
* Read by `getLoadContext` (server/load-context.ts) so the nonce can be
* threaded into React Router's `<ServerRouter nonce>` and surfaced in the
* root loader for use by `<Scripts>`, `<Links>`, etc.
*/
export const CSP_NONCE_KEY = 'cspNonce' as const;
const generateNonce = () => {
const buf = new Uint8Array(16);
crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
let binary = '';
for (let i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) {
binary += String.fromCharCode(buf[i]);
}
return btoa(binary);
};
type CspPathKind = 'embed' | 'embed-auth' | 'frameable' | 'default';
const buildCspHeader = ({ nonce, kind }: { nonce: string; kind: CspPathKind }) => {
// `'self'` is included alongside `'strict-dynamic'` as a fallback for
// browsers that don't understand `'strict-dynamic'`. Modern browsers
// ignore `'self'` (and other host/scheme sources) when `'strict-dynamic'`
// is present.
const directives = [
`base-uri 'self'`,
`object-src 'none'`,
`form-action 'self'`,
`script-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}' 'strict-dynamic'`,
// PDF.js (apps/remix/app/components/general/pdf-viewer/pdf-viewer.tsx)
// creates a Web Worker via `new Worker(url)`. `'strict-dynamic'` does
// not reliably propagate to worker creation across browsers, and
// without `worker-src` the browser falls back to `script-src` which
// would block the worker. `blob:` covers libs that inline workers.
`worker-src 'self' blob:`,
// Inline `style=""` attributes cannot be nonced or hashed (CSP3 has no
// mechanism for it), and React inline styles, framer-motion, react-rnd,
// konva, etc. all rely on them. `'unsafe-inline'` for attributes is
// industry standard and does not weaken `style-src-elem`.
`style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'`,
];
// Embeds inject customer-supplied CSS via runtime-created `<style>`
// elements (see apps/remix/app/utils/css-vars.ts). Nonce-stamping those
// would be brittle for white-label customers, so we accept
// `'unsafe-inline'` on the embed scope only. Everything else does NOT load
// customer CSS and keeps the strict nonced policy.
if (kind === 'embed') {
directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`);
} else {
directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`);
}
if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'frameable') {
directives.push(`frame-ancestors *`);
} else if (kind === 'embed-auth') {
directives.push(`frame-ancestors 'none'`);
} else {
directives.push(`frame-ancestors 'self'`);
}
return directives.join('; ');
};
const classifyPath = (path: string): CspPathKind => {
if (EMBED_AUTH_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
return 'embed-auth';
}
if (EMBED_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
return 'embed';
}
if (FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
return 'frameable';
}
return 'default';
};
/**
* Owns response security headers for page responses:
* `Content-Security-Policy`, plus `Referrer-Policy` and
* `X-Content-Type-Options` on embed routes (preserved from the per-route
* `headers()` export this middleware replaces).
*
* Generates a per-request CSP nonce and stashes it on the Hono context so
* `getLoadContext` (server/load-context.ts) can thread it into React
* Router for `<ServerRouter nonce>` and `<Scripts nonce>` etc.
*
* Path-aware classification:
* - `embed` — wildcard `frame-ancestors`, `'unsafe-inline'`
* style-src-elem (white-label CSS injection), strict
* nonced script-src.
* - `embed-auth` — strict policy with `frame-ancestors 'none'`; the popup
* auth pages must never be framed.
* - `frameable` — wildcard `frame-ancestors` only; some customers iframe
* `/sign/:token` and `/d/:token` directly. Strict nonced
* script-src and style-src-elem otherwise.
* - default — strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem,
* `frame-ancestors 'self'` for clickjacking protection.
*/
export const securityHeadersMiddleware = createMiddleware<HonoEnv>(async (c, next) => {
const nonce = generateNonce();
c.set(CSP_NONCE_KEY, nonce);
await next();
const path = c.req.path;
if (NON_PAGE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
return;
}
const kind = classifyPath(path);
c.res.headers.set('Content-Security-Policy', buildCspHeader({ nonce, kind }));
// Preserved from the per-route `headers()` export in
// apps/remix/app/routes/embed+/_v0+/_layout.tsx, which has been removed.
if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'embed-auth') {
if (!c.res.headers.has('Referrer-Policy')) {
c.res.headers.set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
}
if (!c.res.headers.has('X-Content-Type-Options')) {
c.res.headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
}
}
});