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fix: csp frame-ancestors on signing routes
Lucas Smith6243a514af2a
diff --git a/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts b/apps/remix/server/security-headers.tsindex 871af694f..e87d7cb7a 100644--- a/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts+++ b/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts@@ -19,23 +19,32 @@ const NON_PAGE_PATH_REGEX = /^(\/api\/|\/ingest\/|\/__manifest|\/assets\/|\/applconst EMBED_PATH_REGEX = /^\/embed(\/|\.data|$)/;/**- * Auth pages reachable from inside an embed iframe during the+ * Non-`/embed` page routes that customers iframe directly, plus the auth+ * pages reachable from inside an embed iframe during the* reauth-as-different-account flow.*+ * Signing routes (`/sign/:token`, `/d/:token`):+ * Some customer integrations embed these URLs directly (without going+ * through `EmbedSignDocument`). Without `frame-ancestors *` here, those+ * integrations break with a "refused to connect" iframe error.+ *+ * Auth routes (`/signin`, `/forgot-password`, `/check-email`,+ * `/unverified-account`):* `apps/remix/app/components/general/document-signing/document-signing-auth-account.tsx`* does `window.location.href = '/signin?...'` inside the iframe when the* user needs to sign out and sign back in as a different account, and* `<SignInForm>` links/navigates to `/forgot-password`, `/check-email`, and- * `/unverified-account` from there.- *- * Without `frame-ancestors *` on these routes, the customer's iframe gets- * blocked the moment the user clicks "Login" in the reauth dialog.+ * `/unverified-account` from there. Without `frame-ancestors *` on these+ * routes, the customer's iframe gets blocked the moment the user clicks+ * "Login" in the reauth dialog.** These routes still get the strict nonced `script-src`/`style-src-elem`- * policy — only `frame-ancestors` is relaxed.+ * policy — only `frame-ancestors` is relaxed. The `(\/|\.data|$)` tail+ * keeps `/sign` from matching `/signin`/`/signup` and `/d` from matching+ * `/dashboard`.*/-const AUTH_FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX =- /^\/(signin|forgot-password|check-email|unverified-account)(\/|\.data|$)/;+const FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX =+ /^\/(signin|forgot-password|check-email|unverified-account|sign|d)(\/|\.data|$)/;/*** Hono context variable name where the per-request CSP nonce is stashed.@@ -59,7 +68,7 @@ const generateNonce = () => {return btoa(binary);};-type CspPathKind = 'embed' | 'auth' | 'default';+type CspPathKind = 'embed' | 'frameable' | 'default';const buildCspHeader = ({ nonce, kind }: { nonce: string; kind: CspPathKind }) => {// `'self'` is included alongside `'strict-dynamic'` as a fallback for@@ -87,18 +96,18 @@ const buildCspHeader = ({ nonce, kind }: { nonce: string; kind: CspPathKind }) =// Embeds inject customer-supplied CSS via runtime-created `<style>`// elements (see apps/remix/app/utils/css-vars.ts). Nonce-stamping those// would be brittle for white-label customers, so we accept- // `'unsafe-inline'` on the embed scope only. Auth pages do NOT load- // customer CSS and keep the strict nonced policy.+ // `'unsafe-inline'` on the embed scope only. Frameable (auth/signing)+ // pages do NOT load customer CSS and keep the strict nonced policy.if (kind === 'embed') {directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`);} else {directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`);}- // Embed and auth routes are both reachable from inside a customer's- // iframe and therefore need `frame-ancestors *`. Every other page gets- // clickjacking protection.- if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'auth') {+ // Embed, signing, and auth routes are all reachable from inside a+ // customer's iframe and therefore need `frame-ancestors *`. Every other+ // page gets clickjacking protection.+ if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'frameable') {directives.push(`frame-ancestors *`);} else {directives.push(`frame-ancestors 'self'`);@@ -112,8 +121,8 @@ const classifyPath = (path: string): CspPathKind => {return 'embed';}- if (AUTH_FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {- return 'auth';+ if (FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {+ return 'frameable';}return 'default';@@ -130,13 +139,16 @@ const classifyPath = (path: string): CspPathKind => {* Router for `<ServerRouter nonce>` and `<Scripts nonce>` etc.** Path-aware classification:- * - `embed` — wildcard `frame-ancestors`, `'unsafe-inline'` style-src-elem- * (white-label CSS injection), strict nonced script-src.- * - `auth` — wildcard `frame-ancestors` only; needed because the embed- * reauth flow redirects the iframe to `/signin` etc. Strict- * nonced script-src and style-src-elem otherwise.- * - default — strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem,- * `frame-ancestors 'self'` for clickjacking protection.+ * - `embed` — wildcard `frame-ancestors`, `'unsafe-inline'`+ * style-src-elem (white-label CSS injection), strict+ * nonced script-src.+ * - `frameable` — wildcard `frame-ancestors` only; needed because the+ * embed reauth flow redirects the iframe to `/signin` etc,+ * and because some customers iframe `/sign/:token` and+ * `/d/:token` directly without using `EmbedSignDocument`.+ * Strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem otherwise.+ * - default — strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem,+ * `frame-ancestors 'self'` for clickjacking protection.*/export const securityHeadersMiddleware = createMiddleware<HonoEnv>(async (c, next) => {const nonce = generateNonce();