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fix: csp frame-ancestors on signing routes

Lucas Smith6243a514af2a
diff --git a/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts b/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts
index 871af694f..e87d7cb7a 100644
--- a/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts
+++ b/apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts
@@ -19,23 +19,32 @@ const NON_PAGE_PATH_REGEX = /^(\/api\/|\/ingest\/|\/__manifest|\/assets\/|\/appl
const EMBED_PATH_REGEX = /^\/embed(\/|\.data|$)/;
/**
- * Auth pages reachable from inside an embed iframe during the
+ * Non-`/embed` page routes that customers iframe directly, plus the auth
+ * pages reachable from inside an embed iframe during the
* reauth-as-different-account flow.
*
+ * Signing routes (`/sign/:token`, `/d/:token`):
+ * Some customer integrations embed these URLs directly (without going
+ * through `EmbedSignDocument`). Without `frame-ancestors *` here, those
+ * integrations break with a "refused to connect" iframe error.
+ *
+ * Auth routes (`/signin`, `/forgot-password`, `/check-email`,
+ * `/unverified-account`):
* `apps/remix/app/components/general/document-signing/document-signing-auth-account.tsx`
* does `window.location.href = '/signin?...'` inside the iframe when the
* user needs to sign out and sign back in as a different account, and
* `<SignInForm>` links/navigates to `/forgot-password`, `/check-email`, and
- * `/unverified-account` from there.
- *
- * Without `frame-ancestors *` on these routes, the customer's iframe gets
- * blocked the moment the user clicks "Login" in the reauth dialog.
+ * `/unverified-account` from there. Without `frame-ancestors *` on these
+ * routes, the customer's iframe gets blocked the moment the user clicks
+ * "Login" in the reauth dialog.
*
* These routes still get the strict nonced `script-src`/`style-src-elem`
- * policy — only `frame-ancestors` is relaxed.
+ * policy — only `frame-ancestors` is relaxed. The `(\/|\.data|$)` tail
+ * keeps `/sign` from matching `/signin`/`/signup` and `/d` from matching
+ * `/dashboard`.
*/
-const AUTH_FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX =
- /^\/(signin|forgot-password|check-email|unverified-account)(\/|\.data|$)/;
+const FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX =
+ /^\/(signin|forgot-password|check-email|unverified-account|sign|d)(\/|\.data|$)/;
/**
* Hono context variable name where the per-request CSP nonce is stashed.
@@ -59,7 +68,7 @@ const generateNonce = () => {
return btoa(binary);
};
-type CspPathKind = 'embed' | 'auth' | 'default';
+type CspPathKind = 'embed' | 'frameable' | 'default';
const buildCspHeader = ({ nonce, kind }: { nonce: string; kind: CspPathKind }) => {
// `'self'` is included alongside `'strict-dynamic'` as a fallback for
@@ -87,18 +96,18 @@ const buildCspHeader = ({ nonce, kind }: { nonce: string; kind: CspPathKind }) =
// Embeds inject customer-supplied CSS via runtime-created `<style>`
// elements (see apps/remix/app/utils/css-vars.ts). Nonce-stamping those
// would be brittle for white-label customers, so we accept
- // `'unsafe-inline'` on the embed scope only. Auth pages do NOT load
- // customer CSS and keep the strict nonced policy.
+ // `'unsafe-inline'` on the embed scope only. Frameable (auth/signing)
+ // pages do NOT load customer CSS and keep the strict nonced policy.
if (kind === 'embed') {
directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'unsafe-inline'`);
} else {
directives.push(`style-src-elem 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}'`);
}
- // Embed and auth routes are both reachable from inside a customer's
- // iframe and therefore need `frame-ancestors *`. Every other page gets
- // clickjacking protection.
- if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'auth') {
+ // Embed, signing, and auth routes are all reachable from inside a
+ // customer's iframe and therefore need `frame-ancestors *`. Every other
+ // page gets clickjacking protection.
+ if (kind === 'embed' || kind === 'frameable') {
directives.push(`frame-ancestors *`);
} else {
directives.push(`frame-ancestors 'self'`);
@@ -112,8 +121,8 @@ const classifyPath = (path: string): CspPathKind => {
return 'embed';
}
- if (AUTH_FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
- return 'auth';
+ if (FRAMEABLE_PATH_REGEX.test(path)) {
+ return 'frameable';
}
return 'default';
@@ -130,13 +139,16 @@ const classifyPath = (path: string): CspPathKind => {
* Router for `<ServerRouter nonce>` and `<Scripts nonce>` etc.
*
* Path-aware classification:
- * - `embed` — wildcard `frame-ancestors`, `'unsafe-inline'` style-src-elem
- * (white-label CSS injection), strict nonced script-src.
- * - `auth` — wildcard `frame-ancestors` only; needed because the embed
- * reauth flow redirects the iframe to `/signin` etc. Strict
- * nonced script-src and style-src-elem otherwise.
- * - default — strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem,
- * `frame-ancestors 'self'` for clickjacking protection.
+ * - `embed` — wildcard `frame-ancestors`, `'unsafe-inline'`
+ * style-src-elem (white-label CSS injection), strict
+ * nonced script-src.
+ * - `frameable` — wildcard `frame-ancestors` only; needed because the
+ * embed reauth flow redirects the iframe to `/signin` etc,
+ * and because some customers iframe `/sign/:token` and
+ * `/d/:token` directly without using `EmbedSignDocument`.
+ * Strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem otherwise.
+ * - default — strict nonced script-src and style-src-elem,
+ * `frame-ancestors 'self'` for clickjacking protection.
*/
export const securityHeadersMiddleware = createMiddleware<HonoEnv>(async (c, next) => {
const nonce = generateNonce();