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The modern link attribution platform. Loved by world-class engineering teams at Twilio, Zillow, Jobber, Vercel, Raycast, and more.

fix: use constant-time comparison for Shopify and HubSpot webhook signatures (#4449)

Kiran K6884316f5310
diff --git a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/hubspot/webhook/route.ts b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/hubspot/webhook/route.ts
index 7e2b4f49b7..1f1f814d93 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/hubspot/webhook/route.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/hubspot/webhook/route.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { DubApiError, handleAndReturnErrorResponse } from "@/lib/api/errors";
import { withAxiom } from "@/lib/axiom/server";
import { enqueueBatchJobs } from "@/lib/cron/enqueue-batch-jobs";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { APP_DOMAIN_WITH_NGROK } from "@dub/utils";
import crypto from "crypto";
import { logAndRespond } from "../../cron/utils";
@@ -35,8 +36,8 @@ export const POST = withAxiom(async (req) => {
.update(sourceString)
.digest("hex");
- // Compare with provided signature
- if (signature !== expectedHash) {
+ // Compare with provided signature using constant-time comparison
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(signature, expectedHash)) {
throw new DubApiError({
code: "unauthorized",
message: "Invalid webhook signature.",
diff --git a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/intercom/webhook/verify-webhook-signature.ts b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/intercom/webhook/verify-webhook-signature.ts
index eea0353851..9152b0136c 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/intercom/webhook/verify-webhook-signature.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/intercom/webhook/verify-webhook-signature.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { DubApiError } from "@/lib/api/errors";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import crypto from "crypto";
const INTERCOM_CLIENT_SECRET = process.env.INTERCOM_CLIENT_SECRET || "";
@@ -51,22 +52,7 @@ export async function verifyIntercomWebhookSignature(
});
}
- const providedBuffer = Buffer.from(providedSignature, "utf8");
- const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expectedSignature, "utf8");
-
- if (providedBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) {
- throw new DubApiError({
- code: "unauthorized",
- message: "Invalid webhook signature.",
- });
- }
-
- const isSignatureValid = crypto.timingSafeEqual(
- Uint8Array.from(providedBuffer),
- Uint8Array.from(expectedBuffer),
- );
-
- if (!isSignatureValid) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(providedSignature, expectedSignature)) {
throw new DubApiError({
code: "unauthorized",
message: "Invalid webhook signature.",
diff --git a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/shopify/integration/webhook/route.ts b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/shopify/integration/webhook/route.ts
index 41813984ed..7a41d1def6 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/shopify/integration/webhook/route.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/(ee)/api/shopify/integration/webhook/route.ts
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { captureWebhookLog } from "@/lib/api-logs/capture-webhook-log";
import { isLocalDev } from "@/lib/api/environment";
import { withAxiom } from "@/lib/axiom/server";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { waitUntil } from "@vercel/functions";
import { logAndRespond } from "app/(ee)/api/cron/utils";
import crypto from "crypto";
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ export const POST = withAxiom(async (req: Request) => {
.update(data, "utf8")
.digest("base64");
- if (generatedSignature !== signature) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(signature, generatedSignature)) {
return logAndRespond(
"Shopify webhook signature verification failed. Skipping...",
{
diff --git a/apps/web/app/api/dub/webhook/route.ts b/apps/web/app/api/dub/webhook/route.ts
index 9b2cfc974c..7dc78bf3be 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/api/dub/webhook/route.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/api/dub/webhook/route.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { withAxiom } from "@/lib/axiom/server";
import { webhookPayloadSchema } from "@/lib/webhook/schemas";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import crypto from "crypto";
import { leadCreated } from "./lead-created";
import { saleCreated } from "./sale-created";
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ export const POST = withAxiom(async (req: Request) => {
.update(JSON.stringify(body))
.digest("hex");
- if (webhookSignature !== computedSignature) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(webhookSignature, computedSignature)) {
return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 400 });
}
diff --git a/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/exchange-code-for-token.ts b/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/exchange-code-for-token.ts
index 97d38373f8..ea3d92aca7 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/exchange-code-for-token.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/exchange-code-for-token.ts
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth";
import { installIntegration } from "@/lib/integrations/install";
import { generateRandomName } from "@/lib/names";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { authCodeExchangeSchema } from "@/lib/zod/schemas/oauth";
import { waitUntil } from "@vercel/functions";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
@@ -100,7 +101,8 @@ export const exchangeAuthCodeForToken = async (
});
}
- if (app.hashedClientSecret !== (await hashToken(clientSecret))) {
+ const hashedClientSecret = await hashToken(clientSecret);
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(hashedClientSecret, app.hashedClientSecret)) {
throw new DubApiError({
code: "unauthorized",
message: "Invalid client_secret",
diff --git a/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/refresh-access-token.ts b/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/refresh-access-token.ts
index 9a98ce21ca..c19b029a9b 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/refresh-access-token.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/api/oauth/token/refresh-access-token.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { createToken } from "@/lib/api/oauth/utils";
import { hashToken } from "@/lib/auth";
import { generateRandomName } from "@/lib/names";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { refreshTokenSchema } from "@/lib/zod/schemas/oauth";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import * as z from "zod/v4";
@@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ export const refreshAccessToken = async (
});
}
- if (oAuthApp.hashedClientSecret !== (await hashToken(clientSecret))) {
+ const hashedClientSecret = await hashToken(clientSecret);
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(hashedClientSecret, oAuthApp.hashedClientSecret)) {
throw new DubApiError({
code: "unauthorized",
message: "Invalid client_secret",
diff --git a/apps/web/app/api/veriff/webhook/route.ts b/apps/web/app/api/veriff/webhook/route.ts
index b560aeb05d..54f71df5e3 100644
--- a/apps/web/app/api/veriff/webhook/route.ts
+++ b/apps/web/app/api/veriff/webhook/route.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { withAxiom } from "@/lib/axiom/server";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { logAndRespond } from "app/(ee)/api/cron/utils";
import crypto from "crypto";
import { handleDecisionEvent } from "./handle-decision-event";
@@ -18,17 +19,7 @@ export const POST = withAxiom(async (req: Request) => {
const expectedApiKey = process.env.VERIFF_API_KEY;
- if (!expectedApiKey || !authClient) {
- return logAndRespond("Invalid auth client.", { status: 401 });
- }
-
- const authClientBuffer = Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(authClient));
- const expectedApiKeyBuffer = Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(expectedApiKey));
-
- if (
- authClientBuffer.length !== expectedApiKeyBuffer.length ||
- !crypto.timingSafeEqual(authClientBuffer, expectedApiKeyBuffer)
- ) {
+ if (!expectedApiKey || !timingSafeCompare(authClient, expectedApiKey)) {
return logAndRespond("Invalid auth client.", { status: 401 });
}
@@ -43,16 +34,7 @@ export const POST = withAxiom(async (req: Request) => {
.update(rawBody)
.digest("hex");
- const computedSignatureBuffer = Uint8Array.from(
- Buffer.from(computedSignature),
- );
- const signatureBuffer = Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(signature));
-
- const isSignatureValid =
- computedSignatureBuffer.length === signatureBuffer.length &&
- crypto.timingSafeEqual(computedSignatureBuffer, signatureBuffer);
-
- if (!isSignatureValid) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(signature, computedSignature)) {
return logAndRespond("Invalid signature.", { status: 400 });
}
diff --git a/apps/web/lib/email/unsubscribe-token.ts b/apps/web/lib/email/unsubscribe-token.ts
index ce597e7b9e..c2ca8dd9d9 100644
--- a/apps/web/lib/email/unsubscribe-token.ts
+++ b/apps/web/lib/email/unsubscribe-token.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
+import { createHmac } from "crypto";
const TOKEN_SECRET =
process.env.UNSUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_SECRET || process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET;
@@ -41,12 +42,7 @@ export function verifyUnsubscribeToken(token: string): string | null {
.digest("hex")
.slice(0, 24);
- if (
- !timingSafeEqual(
- Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(signature)),
- Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(expectedSignature)),
- )
- ) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(signature, expectedSignature)) {
return null;
}
diff --git a/apps/web/lib/integrations/slack/verify-request.ts b/apps/web/lib/integrations/slack/verify-request.ts
index bbe2c342f8..bf51a60cf7 100644
--- a/apps/web/lib/integrations/slack/verify-request.ts
+++ b/apps/web/lib/integrations/slack/verify-request.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { timingSafeCompare } from "@/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare";
import { createHmac } from "crypto";
interface SlackRequestVerificationOptions {
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ export const verifySlackSignature = async (req: Request, body: string) => {
hmac.update(`${signatureVersion}:${requestTimestampSec}:${options.body}`);
const expectedSignature = hmac.digest("hex");
- if (!signatureHash || signatureHash !== expectedSignature) {
+ if (!timingSafeCompare(signatureHash, expectedSignature)) {
throw new Error(`${verifyErrorPrefix}: signature mismatch`);
}
};
diff --git a/apps/web/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare.ts b/apps/web/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc30d65d45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/web/lib/webhook/timing-safe-compare.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import crypto from "crypto";
+
+/**
+ * Performs constant-time comparison of two strings to prevent timing attacks.
+ *
+ * This function compares two strings in a way that takes the same amount of time
+ * regardless of where the strings differ, mitigating timing side-channel attacks
+ * (CWE-208).
+ *
+ * Use this for comparing security-sensitive values like:
+ * - Webhook signatures
+ * - HMAC digests
+ * - API keys
+ * - Authentication tokens
+ *
+ * @param provided - The value provided by the client/request
+ * @param expected - The expected/computed value
+ * @returns true if the strings match, false otherwise
+ */
+export function timingSafeCompare(
+ provided: string | null | undefined,
+ expected: string,
+): boolean {
+ if (!provided) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ const providedBuffer = Buffer.from(provided, "utf8");
+ const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expected, "utf8");
+
+ // Length check before constant-time comparison
+ if (providedBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return crypto.timingSafeEqual(
+ Uint8Array.from(providedBuffer),
+ Uint8Array.from(expectedBuffer),
+ );
+}