Self-hosted MCP server + dashboard giving Claude Code, Cursor & Hermes agents shared long-term memory over a git-backed markdown vault. Agent-native, Obsidian-compatible second brain — markdown RAG, no vector DB.
Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability). That opens a private thread with the maintainers.
Please include what you can: what you found, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker gets out of it. A rough report sent early beats a polished one sent late.
You can expect an initial response within 72 hours, and an assessment within 7 days. If a fix is warranted you'll be credited in the release notes unless you'd rather not be.
Supported versions
Engram is pre-1.0 and moves fast. Only the latest release and main receive fixes. If you're
self-hosting an older image, upgrading is the fix.
What this project handles
Engram is self-hosted and holds credentials, so it's worth being specific about the surface:
- Dashboard auth — Google OAuth, with a session cookie signed by
AUTH_SECRET, gated on an email allowlist (ALLOWED_EMAILS) or GitHub login allowlist (ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINS). - MCP auth — per-agent bearer tokens, stored as SHA-256 hashes and shown in plaintext once.
Each carries a
readorwritescope; a read-only token never sees the write tools. - OAuth 2.0 server — Dynamic Client Registration + PKCE, so Claude.ai can connect as a custom
connector. Served whenever
AUTH_SECRETis set. - GitHub tokens — used to clone and push vault repos. Encrypted at rest, keyed off
AUTH_SECRET. - Vault content — your notes. When the Curator is enabled, note content is sent to the Anthropic API. It is off by default.
Things that are intended behaviour, not vulnerabilities
- An instance with no
AUTH_SECRETand no tokens is open. That's local dev mode, and the README and DEPLOY.md both say so. Deploying it to a public URL that way is a misconfiguration. AUTH_DISABLED=truedisables dashboard auth. Documented, and labelled never-in-production.- A
write-scoped token can write anywhere in the vault. Scopes are read/write, not per-folder. If you need narrower isolation, run a separate instance against a separate vault. brain_deletedeletes a note. It's recoverable from git history, and the tool description steers toward archiving instead.
Hardening a deployment
- Set
AUTH_SECRETto a real random value (openssl rand -base64 32). - Set
ALLOWED_EMAILS(orALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINS) — an empty allowlist is not a filter. - Give every agent its own token, scoped
readunless it genuinely needs to write, and revoke tokens you no longer recognise on the Connect page. - Keep
ENGRAM_DATA_DIRon a volume you control; it holds token hashes and encrypted git tokens. - Leave the Curator off unless you intend note content to reach the Anthropic API.