Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import { Router } from 'express'
import { config } from '../../config.js'
import { pool } from '../../db.js'
import { asyncHandler } from '../../http/asyncHandler.js'
import { RFC1123_RE } from '../../http/rfc1123.js'
import { UiAuthedRequest } from '../../middleware/controlUIAuth.js'
import { deleteOAuthGrant, listUserGrantsForServer } from '../../oauth/store.js'
import { rootLogger } from '../../observability/logger.js'
/**
* Admin oversight for mcp-server OAuth user-grants (spec 04 U3) — the mirror of
* the recipe lane (`recipeOauth.ts`) for `owner_kind='mcpserver'`. Mounted under
* `/admin/*`, so `requireAuthForControlUI` (app.ts) has already authenticated the
* caller as a control-ui admin.
*
* DEC-R2 (re-scope): a remote grant's coordinate (`oauth.id` = self-URL / base64
* client_id) is NOT an RFC1123 label and is not even representable as a URL path
* segment. So — unlike the recipe lane, where the client id is an RFC1123 path
* param — the force-revoke takes the `oauthClientId` in the JSON BODY. Only the
* server `:name` (a real RFC1123 label) stays in the path.
*
* The server namespace is always forced to `config.mcpServersNamespace`, never
* taken from the request.
*/
const MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE = config.mcpServersNamespace
const BASE = '/admin/mcp-servers'
function dbClient() {
return { query: (text: string, values?: unknown[]) => pool.query(text, values) }
}
export function createAdminMcpServerOauthRouter(): Router {
const router = Router()
const log = rootLogger.child({ module: 'admin-mcpserver-oauth' })
// GET /admin/mcp-servers/:name/oauth/user-grants
// Read-only list of every user with a grant for this server (across clients).
// Namespace is forced to MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE — never taken from the request.
router.get(
`${BASE}/:name/oauth/user-grants`,
asyncHandler(async (req: UiAuthedRequest, res) => {
const { name } = req.params
if (!RFC1123_RE.test(name)) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_request' })
return
}
const users = await listUserGrantsForServer(dbClient(), {
namespace: MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE,
name,
})
res.status(200).json({
users: users.map(u => ({ ...u, updatedAt: u.updatedAt.toISOString() })),
})
})
)
// DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name/oauth/user-grants/:userId body: { oauthClientId }
// Force-revoke one user's grant (admin oversight). The client id is arbitrary
// (self-URL / base64), so it rides in the body and is NOT RFC1123-validated.
// Namespace is forced to MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE. Idempotent: 204 whether or not a
// row existed.
//
// Force-revoke deletes ONLY this user's grant row. It does NOT delete
// `dynamic_clients` (per-server-CR, shared across users); that teardown lives
// in the server-CR uninstall (DEC-R2 §3).
router.delete(
`${BASE}/:name/oauth/user-grants/:userId`,
asyncHandler(async (req: UiAuthedRequest, res) => {
const { name, userId } = req.params
if (!RFC1123_RE.test(name)) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_request' })
return
}
if (typeof userId !== 'string' || userId.length === 0) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_request' })
return
}
const { oauthClientId } = (req.body ?? {}) as { oauthClientId?: unknown }
if (typeof oauthClientId !== 'string' || oauthClientId.length === 0) {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_request' })
return
}
const adminUserId = req.adminAuth?.sub
if (!adminUserId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' })
return
}
await deleteOAuthGrant(dbClient(), {
grantKind: 'user',
ownerKind: 'mcpserver',
recipeNamespace: MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE,
recipeName: name,
userId,
oauthClientId,
})
// Audit trail (sensitive: a revocation). Structured, pino-redacted; the
// same event the recipe lane emits, parameterised with owner_kind mcpserver.
log.info(
{
event: 'oauth_user_grant_force_revoked',
ownerKind: 'mcpserver',
mcpServerNamespace: MCP_SERVER_NAMESPACE,
mcpServerName: name,
oauthClientId,
targetUserId: userId,
adminUserId,
},
'force-revoked user grant'
)
res.status(204).end()
})
)
return router
}