Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import { Router } from 'express'
import { config } from '../../config.js'
import { pool } from '../../db.js'
import { createExternalClientRateLimiters } from '../../middleware/externalClientIdentity.js'
import {
type ExternalAuthedRequest,
requireValidExternalSessionToken,
} from '../../middleware/externalSessionAuth.js'
import { type OAuthOwnerKind, deleteOAuthGrant, listUserOAuthGrants } from '../../oauth/store.js'
function dbClient() {
return { query: (text: string, values?: unknown[]) => pool.query(text, values) }
}
/**
* The exact wire shape Profile UI parses (frozen contract, spec 04 U2). Built by
* an explicit allowlist — never a blind spread of the store row — so a new
* `UserGrantSummary` column can never leak to the browser as public API.
* `recipeNamespace`/`recipeName` keep their historical names (additive change:
* only `ownerKind` + optional `mcpServerName` are new), so the recipe parsing in
* profile-ui keeps working unchanged.
*/
interface GrantView {
ownerKind: OAuthOwnerKind
recipeNamespace: string
recipeName: string
oauthClientId: string
provider: string
background: boolean
updatedAt: string
mcpServerName?: string
}
/**
* User-facing OAuth grant management (Profile UI → external-rest-api → here).
*
* Identity comes ONLY from the verified session token (req.externalAuth.userId);
* a user can only ever see or revoke their own grants. Revocation is fail-closed:
* the per-user broker returns 404 after the row is deleted.
*
* [SEC] userId is never taken from body or path params.
*/
export function createExternalOauthGrantsRouter(): Router {
const router = Router()
const externalOauthGrantsRateLimits = createExternalClientRateLimiters(
'oauth-grants',
config.approvalRlExternalClientIpPerMin,
config.approvalRlExternalEdgePerMin
)
// GET /external/oauth/grants
// Returns all grants for the authenticated user.
router.get(
'/external/oauth/grants',
...externalOauthGrantsRateLimits,
requireValidExternalSessionToken,
(req: ExternalAuthedRequest, res, next) => {
void (async () => {
try {
const userId = req.externalAuth?.userId
if (!userId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' })
return
}
// 'all' — surface both recipe and mcp-server owned grants; the client
// routes each DELETE by its ownerKind.
const grants = await listUserOAuthGrants(dbClient(), userId, 'all')
res.status(200).json({
grants: grants.map((g): GrantView => {
const view: GrantView = {
ownerKind: g.ownerKind,
recipeNamespace: g.recipeNamespace,
recipeName: g.recipeName,
oauthClientId: g.oauthClientId,
provider: g.provider,
background: g.background,
updatedAt: g.updatedAt.toISOString(),
}
if (g.mcpServerName !== undefined) view.mcpServerName = g.mcpServerName
return view
}),
})
} catch (err) {
next(err)
}
})()
}
)
// DELETE /external/oauth/grants/:recipeNamespace/:recipeName/:oauthClientId?ownerKind=
// Revokes one grant for the authenticated user. Idempotent: 204 whether or not a
// row existed (no information leak). `ownerKind` (default 'recipe') routes the
// delete to the recipe or mcp-server domain.
//
// The revocation deletes ONLY this user's grant row (deleteOAuthGrant). It does
// NOT delete `dynamic_clients` (per-server-CR, shared across users); that
// teardown lives in the server-CR uninstall (DEC-R2 §3 / aligns with H-3).
router.delete(
'/external/oauth/grants/:recipeNamespace/:recipeName/:oauthClientId',
...externalOauthGrantsRateLimits,
requireValidExternalSessionToken,
(req: ExternalAuthedRequest, res, next) => {
void (async () => {
try {
const userId = req.externalAuth?.userId
if (!userId) {
res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' })
return
}
const ownerKindRaw =
req.query.ownerKind === undefined ? 'recipe' : String(req.query.ownerKind)
if (ownerKindRaw !== 'recipe' && ownerKindRaw !== 'mcpserver') {
res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_request' })
return
}
const ownerKind: OAuthOwnerKind = ownerKindRaw
// Force the owner namespace server-side by ownerKind (D-2, invariant 7),
// mirroring the internal lane (internal/oauth.ts): never trust the
// path-supplied namespace for the delete coordinate. The delete stays
// scoped to the session userId, so a user can only ever revoke their own
// grant, and only within the correct owner namespace.
const recipeNamespace =
ownerKind === 'mcpserver' ? config.mcpServersNamespace : config.sandboxNamespace
await deleteOAuthGrant(dbClient(), {
grantKind: 'user',
ownerKind,
recipeNamespace,
recipeName: String(req.params.recipeName),
userId,
oauthClientId: String(req.params.oauthClientId),
})
res.status(204).end()
} catch (err) {
next(err)
}
})()
}
)
return router
}