Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'
import { createPublicKey, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import { config } from '../../config.js'
// Derive the SPKI PEM at module load, mirroring adminAuthToken.ts:6-8.
// WRC imports this PEM via jose.importSPKI() to verify delegation JWTs
// whose `iss` claim is "control-api".
const controlApiPublicKeyPem = createPublicKey(config.adminJwtPrivateKey)
.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' })
.toString()
export type WrcDelegationScope = 'artifact_read' | 'admin:artifact_read' | 'admin:artifact_delete'
export interface SignWrcDelegationTokenInput {
adminUserId: string
recipeName: string
// Required: the target namespace where the WorkflowRecipe CRD lives. WRC
// cross-checks this claim against the URL/state it resolves internally,
// and rejects tokens without the claim ("JWT missing required claim:
// recipeNamespace"). Callers should determine the namespace via the
// same canonical namespace lookup used by recipe GET/PUT/DELETE
// (findRecipeNamespace in routes/admin/recipes.ts).
recipeNamespace: string
runId?: string
artifactName?: string
subject?: string
scope: WrcDelegationScope
}
const DELEGATION_TTL_SECONDS = 60
const DELEGATION_ISSUER = 'control-api' as const
const DELEGATION_AUDIENCE = 'clerum-wrc' as const
/**
* Sign a short-lived RS256 delegation JWT that control-api presents to WRC
* (workflow-recipes) when proxying admin operations on a WorkflowRecipe —
* currently artifact downloads.
*
* The token is single-use in practice: 60s TTL, per-request signing, no caching.
* WRC verifies the signature with the control-api SPKI public key (emitted via
* {@link getControlApiPublicKeyPem}) and enforces the `recipeName` + `scopes`
* claims before re-signing a fresh WRC→mcp-host token for the downstream hop.
*
* Claim layout (aligns with the dual-issuer spec in §5.5.2 of the plan):
* - `iss: "control-api"` — identifies the signer
* - `aud: "clerum-wrc"` — constrains where the token is accepted
* - `sub: "admin:<userId>"` — carries admin attribution all the way to mcp-host audit logs
* - `recipeName` — binds the token to a single recipe (WRC cross-checks against URL path)
* - `scopes` — principle of least privilege; only artifact_read or artifact_delete
* - `exp: +60s`, `iat: now`, `jti: uuid` — ephemeral, uniquely identifiable
*/
export function signWrcDelegationToken(input: SignWrcDelegationTokenInput): string {
return jwt.sign(
{
sub: input.subject ?? `admin:${input.adminUserId}`,
recipeName: input.recipeName,
recipeNamespace: input.recipeNamespace,
...(input.runId ? { runId: input.runId } : {}),
...(input.artifactName ? { artifactName: input.artifactName } : {}),
scopes: [input.scope],
jti: randomUUID(),
},
config.adminJwtPrivateKey,
{
algorithm: 'RS256',
issuer: DELEGATION_ISSUER,
audience: DELEGATION_AUDIENCE,
expiresIn: DELEGATION_TTL_SECONDS,
}
)
}
/**
* Return the control-api SPKI public key in PEM format so deploy tooling can
* materialize it into a ConfigMap mounted by WRC. Reuses the same private key
* as the admin JWT path because control-api already owns the keypair and WRC
* only ever verifies — never signs — with this key.
*/
export function getControlApiPublicKeyPem(): string {
return controlApiPublicKeyPem
}