Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import type { PinnedRawResponse, PinnedTransportInput } from '../src/http/pinnedFetch.js'
import {
type CallbackDeps,
type CallbackInput,
type McpServerOAuthReader,
type McpServerOAuthSubject,
handleOAuthCallback,
} from '../src/oauth/callback.js'
import { deriveOAuthEncryptionKey } from '../src/oauth/encryption.js'
import { resolveServerOAuthSubject } from '../src/oauth/mcpServerOAuthSpec.js'
import { signOAuthState } from '../src/oauth/state.js'
/**
* C4/DEC-17 — the REMOTE auth-code exchange goes through the IP-pinned
* `pinnedFetch`, never `fetchFn`, closing the H2 DNS-rebinding TOCTOU on the
* discovery-derived token endpoint. Baked stays on `fetchFn`, byte-identical.
*
* T3 (rebinding): the remote path resolves+validates the token host ONCE and pins
* the socket to that IP. This test asserts the connected IP equals the validated
* IP AND that `pinnedTransport` (not `fetchFn`) was used. Against `baf12e1fa` the
* remote exchange DOES NOT EXIST (`resolveServerOAuthSubject` returns null for
* `source:'remote'`, so the callback returns `server_not_found`), so the pinned
* transport is never invoked and this assertion fails.
*
* The remote CR bytes are inline (not from `buildRemoteOAuthSpec`) ON PURPOSE:
* this file must compile+run against the parent SHA where that producer export
* does not exist. The producer-derived T1 coverage lives in
* `oauth.mcpServerOAuthSpec.remote.test.ts`; here the REAL producers exercised are
* `resolveServerOAuthSubject` (the decl) and `pinnedFetch` (the pin).
*/
const STATE_SECRET = 'test-state-hmac-secret-32-bytes-padding'
const ENCRYPTION_KEY = deriveOAuthEncryptionKey(
'00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
)
const MCP_NS = 'mcp-server'
const VALIDATED_IP = '93.184.216.34'
const TOKEN_ENDPOINT = 'https://mcp.sentry.dev/oauth/token'
// Shape `buildRemoteOAuthSpec` emits for a CIMD-public remote server (kept inline
// so this file runs against the parent SHA — see file docstring). Modeled on SENTRY
// (test/fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.ts): its REAL AS metadata advertises
// `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported`, so `issForCallback` is a shape
// the discovery producer actually emits. Notion does NOT advertise RFC 9207 (see
// oauth.discovery.test.ts) — a Notion CR with issForCallback is impossible, and the
// remote install now rejects such servers (R3F-H1), so this fixture uses Sentry.
function remoteServerCr() {
return {
metadata: { name: 'sentry-remote', namespace: MCP_NS },
spec: {
contextRef: 'ctx-A',
auth: { type: 'oauth' },
oauth: {
source: 'remote',
id: 'https://control.example.com/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client',
clientMode: 'public',
authorizationEndpoint: 'https://mcp.sentry.dev/oauth/authorize',
tokenEndpoint: TOKEN_ENDPOINT,
issuer: 'https://mcp.sentry.dev',
// Pinned RFC 9207 issuer: Sentry's real AS advertises it, and the shared
// remote callback fails closed without it (R3-H2).
issForCallback: 'https://mcp.sentry.dev',
resource: 'https://mcp.sentry.dev/mcp',
grantScope: 'user',
scopes: ['read'],
bearerInBody: false,
supportsRefresh: true,
},
},
}
}
const REMOTE_CLIENT_ID = remoteServerCr().spec.oauth.id
/** Real reader → real `resolveServerOAuthSubject` (null at parent for remote). */
function remoteReader(): McpServerOAuthReader {
return {
read: vi.fn(async () => {
const resolved = resolveServerOAuthSubject(remoteServerCr(), 'consent')
if (!resolved) return null
return { namespace: MCP_NS, ...resolved } as McpServerOAuthSubject
}),
}
}
/** A pinned transport that records the URL + the IP the socket would connect to. */
function recordingTransport(responseJson: string, status = 200) {
const calls: {
url: string
connectedIP?: string
body?: string
headers: Record<string, string>
}[] = []
const transport = async (input: PinnedTransportInput): Promise<PinnedRawResponse> => {
let connectedIP: string | undefined
input.lookup(
'mcp.sentry.dev',
{ all: true } as never,
((err, addrs) => {
if (!err && Array.isArray(addrs)) connectedIP = addrs[0]?.address
}) as never
)
calls.push({ url: input.url, connectedIP, body: input.body, headers: input.headers })
return { status, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, bodyText: responseJson }
}
return { transport, calls }
}
function remoteState() {
// The signed state binds the REAL client id; the URL segment is the reserved
// stable `remote` (CIMD/DCR register one fixed redirect_uri).
return signOAuthState(STATE_SECRET, {
subjectKind: 'mcp',
mcpServerName: 'sentry-remote',
userId: 'user-9',
oauthClientId: REMOTE_CLIENT_ID,
grantKind: 'user',
background: false,
} as Parameters<typeof signOAuthState>[1])
}
function remoteInput(): CallbackInput {
return {
target: { kind: 'remote-shared', origin: 'https://control.example.com' },
code: 'AUTH_CODE',
state: remoteState(),
// RFC 9207 issuer echoed by the authorization response; matches the pinned
// `issForCallback` so the mix-up defence passes and the exchange proceeds.
iss: 'https://mcp.sentry.dev',
}
}
describe('handleOAuthCallback — remote exchange is IP-pinned (DEC-17, T3)', () => {
it('exchanges via pinnedTransport, connects to the validated IP, never touches fetchFn', async () => {
const db = { query: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ rows: [], rowCount: 1 }) }
const fetchFn = vi.fn(async () => {
throw new Error('remote lane must NOT use fetchFn (DEC-17)')
})
const { transport, calls } = recordingTransport(
JSON.stringify({ access_token: 'REMOTE-AT', refresh_token: 'REMOTE-RT', expires_in: 3600 })
)
const deps: CallbackDeps = {
db: db as unknown as CallbackDeps['db'],
recipeReader: { read: vi.fn(async () => null) },
mcpServerReader: remoteReader(),
userContextsReader: vi.fn(async () => ({ contextIds: ['ctx-A'] })),
userServerAccessReader: vi.fn(async () => true),
secretReader: { read: vi.fn(async () => ({})) } as unknown as CallbackDeps['secretReader'],
fetchFn: fetchFn as unknown as typeof fetch,
stateSecret: STATE_SECRET,
encryptionKey: ENCRYPTION_KEY,
resolveDns: async () => [VALIDATED_IP],
pinnedTransport: transport,
}
const result = await handleOAuthCallback(remoteInput(), deps)
// Observable outcome: a grant was persisted with provider 'remote'.
expect(result.kind).toBe('ok')
expect(fetchFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(calls).toHaveLength(1)
// T3 core: the socket connected to the IP the kernel validated — no re-resolve.
expect(calls[0].url).toBe(TOKEN_ENDPOINT)
expect(calls[0].connectedIP).toBe(VALIDATED_IP)
// Public client → form body carries client_id + PKCE verifier, no client_secret.
expect(calls[0].headers['content-type']).toBe('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
expect(calls[0].headers['content-length']).toBe(String(Buffer.byteLength(calls[0].body ?? '')))
expect(calls[0].body).toContain(`client_id=${encodeURIComponent(REMOTE_CLIENT_ID)}`)
expect(calls[0].body).toContain('code_verifier=')
expect(calls[0].body).not.toContain('client_secret=')
const [sql, params] = db.query.mock.calls[0] as [string, unknown[]]
expect(sql).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')
expect(params[0]).toBe('mcpserver')
expect(params[4]).toBe(REMOTE_CLIENT_ID)
expect(params[5]).toBe('remote') // provider label
})
})
describe('baked mcp exchange stays on fetchFn (byte-identical, T5c)', () => {
it('uses fetchFn and never the pinned transport for a baked server', async () => {
const bakedServer = {
metadata: { name: 'gdrive', namespace: MCP_NS },
spec: {
contextRef: 'ctx-A',
auth: { type: 'oauth' },
oauth: {
id: 'google-drive',
provider: 'google',
clientIdRef: { name: 'google-creds', key: 'client-id' },
clientSecretRef: { name: 'google-creds', key: 'client-secret' },
scopes: ['drive'],
backgroundAccess: false,
},
},
}
const resolved = resolveServerOAuthSubject(bakedServer, 'consent')
if (!resolved) throw new Error('fixture: baked resolve returned null')
const subject = { namespace: MCP_NS, ...resolved } as McpServerOAuthSubject
const db = { query: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ rows: [], rowCount: 1 }) }
const fetchFn = vi.fn(async () => ({
ok: true,
status: 200,
json: async () => ({ access_token: 'AT', refresh_token: 'RT', expires_in: 3600 }),
text: async () => '',
}))
const pinnedTransport = vi.fn(async () => {
throw new Error('baked lane must NOT use pinnedTransport')
})
const deps: CallbackDeps = {
db: db as unknown as CallbackDeps['db'],
recipeReader: { read: vi.fn(async () => null) },
mcpServerReader: { read: vi.fn(async () => subject) },
userContextsReader: vi.fn(async () => ({ contextIds: ['ctx-A'] })),
userServerAccessReader: vi.fn(async () => true),
secretReader: {
read: vi.fn(async () => ({ 'client-id': 'CID', 'client-secret': 'CSEC' })),
} as unknown as CallbackDeps['secretReader'],
fetchFn: fetchFn as unknown as typeof fetch,
stateSecret: STATE_SECRET,
encryptionKey: ENCRYPTION_KEY,
pinnedTransport,
}
const input: CallbackInput = {
target: {
kind: 'client',
id: 'google-drive',
redirectUri: 'https://control.example.com/api/v1/oauth-callback/google-drive',
},
code: 'AUTH_CODE',
state: signOAuthState(STATE_SECRET, {
subjectKind: 'mcp',
mcpServerName: 'gdrive',
userId: 'user-9',
oauthClientId: 'google-drive',
grantKind: 'user',
background: false,
} as Parameters<typeof signOAuthState>[1]),
}
const result = await handleOAuthCallback(input, deps)
expect(result.kind).toBe('ok')
expect(fetchFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(pinnedTransport).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})