Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: control-api-config
namespace: control-plane
labels:
app: control-api
data:
CONTROL_API_PORT: '8090'
CONTROL_API_JSON_BODY_LIMIT: 150mb
CONTROL_API_PG_CONNECTION_STRING: postgres://postgres:[email protected]:5432/profiles
CONTROL_API_NAMESPACE: mcp-server
CONTROL_API_HOSTS_NAMESPACE: mcp-host
CONTROL_API_CONTEXTS_NAMESPACE: mcp-server
CONTROL_API_MCP_SERVERS_NAMESPACE: mcp-server
CONTROL_API_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS_NAMESPACE: channels
CONTROL_API_SECRETS_NAMESPACE: mcp-host
CONTROL_API_JWT_ISSUER: control-api
CONTROL_API_JWT_AUDIENCE: dev-profile-ui
CONTROL_API_RPC_JWT_ISSUER: control-api
CONTROL_API_RPC_JWT_AUDIENCE: rpc-proxy
CONTROL_API_RPC_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS: '300'
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_ISSUER: control-api
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_AUDIENCE: control-ui
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_TTL_SECONDS: '3600'
CONTROL_API_CODEX_SUBSCRIPTION_ENABLED: 'false'
CONTROL_API_GROK_SUBSCRIPTION_ENABLED: 'false'
# ClusterIP admin port only. NetworkPolicy admits Control API, not siblings.
CODEX_LLM_PROXY_ADMIN_URL: http://codex-llm-proxy.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8081
GROK_LLM_PROXY_ADMIN_URL: http://grok-llm-proxy.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8081
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_USERNAME: admin
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_EMAIL: ''
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_AUTH_MAX_FAILURES: '5'
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_AUTH_LOCK_MINUTES: '15'
CONTROL_API_POLICY_AUTH_AUDIENCE: control-api
TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_ENABLED: 'false'
TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_MAX_BYTES: '16384'
TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_RETENTION_DAYS: '30'
TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_KEY_VERSION: 'v1'
CONTROL_API_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID: replace-with-google-client-id.apps.googleusercontent.com
# member-registration-service runs as an extracted sibling in the `registration`
# namespace locally (and centrally at https://registration.evenfire.ai — the
# gcp overlays override this BASE_URL to the hub). control-api authenticates
# with a per-tenant HMAC JWT (HMAC secret + kid + tenant id), so there is no
# static SERVICE_TOKEN/SERVICE_NAME for this hop anymore.
CONTROL_API_MEMBER_REGISTRATION_SERVICE_BASE_URL: http://member-registration-service.registration.svc.cluster.local:8092/api/v1
CONTROL_API_DESKTOP_EXTERNAL_REST_API_BASE_URL: http://127.0.0.1:8091
CONTROL_API_DESKTOP_RPC_PROXY_BASE_URL: http://127.0.0.1:8094
CONTROL_API_DESKTOP_PROFILE_UI_BASE_URL: http://127.0.0.1:3001
CONTROL_API_DESKTOP_APP_NAME: Evenfire
# Inter-service tokens were removed from this ConfigMap on purpose: they now
# live in the `control-api-internal-tokens` Secret (base canary + patched
# out-of-band). The member-registration HMAC secret
# (CONTROL_API_MEMBER_REGISTRATION_HMAC_SECRET) is patched there too.
# Kustomize overlays no longer need to patch those token keys.
# See `deploy/base/control-plane/secrets-canary.yaml`.
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_ACCESS_TTL_SEC: '600'
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_REFRESH_TTL_SEC: '3600'
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_DEFAULT_TTL_SEC: '86400'
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_NOTIFICATION_DELIVERY_ENABLED: "true"
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_NOTIFICATION_DELIVERY_INTERVAL_MS: "5000"
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_NOTIFICATION_DELIVERY_BATCH_SIZE: "10"
APPROVAL_RL_REQUEST_PER_MIN: "600"
APPROVAL_RL_REFRESH_PER_MIN: "100"
APPROVAL_RL_REISSUE_PER_MIN: "25"
CONTROL_API_OAUTH_BROKER_RL_PER_MIN: "300"
CONTROL_API_HOST_WAKE_RL_PER_MIN: "150"
# Plugin Workload SDK platform rate limits (issue #348). Per-run SDK quotas
# (maxRequestsPerRun / maxNotificationsPerRun) are deprecated and ignored;
# Method quotas use their existing trailing 60s window. Authenticated request
# and edge budgets use the PG calendar minute; anonymous IP backstops retain
# first-hit windows. Defaults below mirror control-api/src/config.ts.
# Healthy static prompts cost three credential operations and six/seven SDK
# API requests; the 1800/6000 defaults keep the prompt600 allowance reachable
# without removing fresh capability proof, either Secret check or redemption.
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_NOTIFICATIONS_PER_MIN: "750"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_PROMPTBRIDGE_PER_MIN: "600"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_REQUEST_BUCKET_PER_MIN: "6000"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_PREAUTH_PER_MIN: "600"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_AUTHENTICATED_PREAUTH_PER_MIN: "6000"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_ADMIN_PER_MIN: "600"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_INTERNAL_PER_MIN: "600"
CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_CREDENTIAL_PER_MIN: "1800"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_WORKFLOW_READ_PER_MIN: "300"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_WORKFLOW_GRANT_READ_PER_MIN: "300"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_WORKFLOW_GRANT_WRITE_PER_MIN: "100"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_WORKFLOW_TRIGGER_PER_MIN: "50"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_OUTPUTS_READ_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_LLM_PROVIDER_ATTEMPT_AUTHORIZE_PER_MIN: "300"
CONTROL_API_LLM_PROVIDER_ATTEMPT_AUTHORIZE_ANONYMOUS_IP_PER_MIN: "60"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_REGISTRY_KEYS_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_REGISTRY_GRANTS_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_REGISTRY_CONNECT_STATUS_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_REGISTRY_CONNECT_REQUEST_PER_MIN: "15"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_REGISTRY_CONNECT_RECOVERY_PER_MIN: "50"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_CONNECTOR_DELETE_EDGE_PER_MIN: "300"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_CONNECTOR_DELETE_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_GFS_GRANTS_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_GFS_SHARES_PER_MIN: "150"
CONTROL_API_ADMIN_GFS_LEGACY_GRANT_REPORT_PER_MIN: "150"
# Hard ceiling for caller-provided ttlSeconds. Defaults to 48h so a client
# asking for ttlSeconds=604800 (code default) can't freeze a workflow step
# for a full week. Overlays may tighten further for stricter environments.
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_MAX_TTL_SEC: '172800'
WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_EXPIRY_INTERVAL_MS: '60000'
# Terminal approvals are retained in the live table for 180 days, then
# copied to workflow_approval_requests_archive by the daily archive cron.
APPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS: '180'
APPROVAL_ARCHIVE_BATCH_SIZE: '500'
# TTL for mcpHostJwt control tokens used by runtime mcp-host workflow triggers.
MCP_HOST_JWT_CONTROL_TTL_SEC: '600'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_WORKLOADS_PER_RECIPE: '25'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_UI_EGRESS_INTERNAL_MAX_ITEMS: '25'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_STEPS: '100'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_DEPENDS_ON_MAX_ITEMS: '100'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_ALLOWED_TOOLS_MAX_ITEMS: '50'
CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_MCP_SERVERS_MAX_ITEMS: '20'
CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_BYTES: '52428800'
# Plugin image-host allowlist (Phase 2.3) — audit mode by default. Base ships a
# vendor-neutral default; environment overlays override this with the image
# prefixes for their own registry.
CONTROL_API_ALLOWED_IMAGE_PREFIXES: "ghcr.io/evenfire-ai/,mongodb/,mcr.microsoft.com/,clerum/"
CONTROL_API_ENFORCE_IMAGE_ALLOWLIST: "false"
# LLM catalog discovery sync cron (spec 09 Fase 4). Non-destructive; code
# default off. Enabled here: the first sync runs a few seconds after
# control-api starts (fills image_input evidence), then every interval.
# Interval + plausibility floors keep their code defaults.
LLM_CATALOG_SYNC_CRON_ENABLED: "true"
# Subscription catalog reconciliation cron. A grant's catalog is written at
# sign-in and never refreshed on its own, so a model the vendor publishes
# afterwards stays invisible to that subscription until an operator syncs it
# from the Hub. This cron re-runs that same per-connection sync periodically.
# Off by default: unlike the discovery sync above (one call to models.dev per
# tick), each tick calls the broker once PER CONNECTED GRANT, and a Grok
# refresh inside the token skew rotates the refresh token. Turn it on
# deliberately, per deployment.
SUBSCRIPTION_CATALOG_SYNC_CRON_ENABLED: "false"
# Floor is 15 minutes (control-api refuses to boot below it). The code default
# is 6h; the key is declared here so the interval is visible where it is set.
SUBSCRIPTION_CATALOG_SYNC_INTERVAL_MS: "21600000"
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: control-api-rpc-gateway
namespace: control-plane
labels:
app: control-api-rpc-gateway
data:
nginx.conf: |
pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
worker_processes auto;
events {
worker_connections 1024;
}
http {
client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
access_log /dev/stdout;
error_log /dev/stderr warn;
upstream control_api_upstream {
server control-api.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8090;
}
server {
listen 8090;
server_name _;
location = /health {
return 200 '{"status":"ok"}';
add_header Content-Type application/json;
}
# G1-10 (#720): a 502 generated here means control-api produced no
# valid response (connect refused, closed before a response, invalid
# header). In the last two cases control-api may already have
# processed the request, so the code means "no response", not "never
# received". A 502 control-api returns passes through, because
# `proxy_intercept_errors` is off. Only the redeem locations, whose
# failure reaches the user, map it.
location @control_plane_unavailable {
default_type application/json;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 503 '{"error":"control_plane_unavailable"}';
}
# G1-12 (#820): nginx generates a 504 for a connect timeout and for a
# read or send timeout. During a control-api restart the Service has
# no endpoint and the SYN is dropped, so the connect times out. nginx
# sets $upstream_connect_time only once the connection is made
# (ngx_http_upstream_send_request), so "-" here means control-api
# never received the request; only then is it mapped. A read or send
# timeout keeps nginx's own 504: control-api may be alive and slow.
location @control_plane_connect_timeout {
default_type application/json;
if ($upstream_connect_time = "-") {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 503 '{"error":"control_plane_unavailable"}';
}
return 504;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/rpc/access/users/[^/]+/mcp-servers$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# spec 11 U1: proactive connectors panel — tri-state read model.
# rpc-proxy forwards the caller's rpc access token; control-api
# authorizes via requireRpcTokenUserMatch. Must be allowlisted here or
# rpc-proxy is 403'd at the edge (sibling of mcp-servers above).
location ~ ^/api/v1/rpc/access/users/[^/]+/mcp-connectors$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/rpc/access/users/[^/]+/mcp-hosts/[^/]+$ {
limit_except GET POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# Stateless Agents — wake trigger for a suspended/draining host.
# rpc-proxy forwards the caller's rpc access token; control-api
# authorizes via requireRpcTokenHostMatch before any mutation.
location ~ ^/api/v1/rpc/hosts/[^/]+/wake$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# Spec §9.2 — sandbox-ui app picker (rpc-proxy fans out per-user
# ACL lookup). control-api authenticates the call via
# requireInternalService('rpc-proxy').
location = /api/v1/internal/sandbox-ui/apps {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# Spec §10 — sandbox-ui registry resolution; rpc-proxy hits
# this on /session mint to resolve recipe → upstream Service.
location ~ ^/api/v1/internal/sandbox-ui/registry/[^/]+/[^/]+$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# Per-user OAuth background-consent bridge (rpc-proxy → control-api), all
# gated server-side by requireInternalService('rpc-proxy'). The sandbox-ui
# "Connect" embed POSTs authorize-url to start consent, POSTs token to
# exchange the code, and DELETEs grant to disconnect. Each MUST be
# allowlisted here or rpc-proxy is 403'd at the edge. The control-api test
# `network/gateway intent` derives this list from the routes and fails CI
# if a requireInternalService('rpc-proxy') route lacks a location.
location = /api/v1/internal/sandbox-ui/oauth/authorize-url {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/sandbox-ui/oauth/token {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/sandbox-ui/oauth/grant {
limit_except DELETE {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# U5: mint a fresh authorize-URL for an OAuth mcp-server (reactive
# consent). rpc-proxy is the sole caller; requireInternalService('rpc-proxy')
# gates it at control-api.
location = /api/v1/internal/mcp-oauth/authorize-url {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/llm/provider-attempts/redeem {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
error_page 502 = @control_plane_unavailable;
error_page 504 = @control_plane_connect_timeout;
# Shorter than the proxy's 15 s redeem abort
# (CONTROL_API_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS), so the proxy sees this answer.
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
# spec 11 U4: revoke an OAuth mcp-server grant (desktop "Disconnect").
# rpc-proxy is the sole caller; requireInternalService('rpc-proxy') gates
# it at control-api.
location = /api/v1/internal/mcp-oauth/grant {
limit_except DELETE {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/llm/provider-attempts/finalize {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/llm/grok/provider-attempts/redeem {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
error_page 502 = @control_plane_unavailable;
error_page 504 = @control_plane_connect_timeout;
# Shorter than the proxy's 15 s redeem abort
# (CONTROL_API_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS), so the proxy sees this answer.
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/llm/grok/provider-attempts/finalize {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location / {
return 403;
}
}
}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: nginx-workflow-approval-gateway
namespace: control-plane
labels:
app: nginx-workflow-approval-gateway
data:
nginx.conf: |
pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
worker_processes auto;
events {
worker_connections 1024;
}
http {
client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
log_format workflow_gateway_json escape=json
'{"gateway":"workflow-approval","request_id":"$request_id","method":"$request_method","uri":"$uri","status":$status,"upstream_status":"$upstream_status","request_time":$request_time,"upstream_response_time":"$upstream_response_time"}';
access_log /dev/stdout workflow_gateway_json;
error_log /dev/stderr warn;
upstream control_api_upstream {
server control-api.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8090;
}
server {
listen 8092;
server_name _;
proxy_connect_timeout 5s;
proxy_read_timeout 30s;
proxy_send_timeout 30s;
location = /health {
return 200 '{"status":"ok"}';
add_header Content-Type application/json;
}
# G1-10 (#720): a 502 generated here means control-api produced no
# valid response (connect refused, closed before a response, invalid
# header). In the last two cases control-api may already have
# processed the request, so the code means "no response", not "never
# received". A 502 control-api returns passes through, because
# `proxy_intercept_errors` is off. Only the authorize location, whose
# failure reaches the user, maps it.
location @control_plane_unavailable {
default_type application/json;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 503 '{"error":"control_plane_unavailable"}';
}
# G1-12 (#820): nginx generates a 504 for a connect timeout (this
# server's proxy_connect_timeout) and for a read or send timeout.
# During a control-api restart the Service has no endpoint and the SYN
# is dropped, so the connect times out. nginx sets
# $upstream_connect_time only once the connection is made
# (ngx_http_upstream_send_request), so "-" here means control-api
# never received the request; only then is it mapped. A read or send
# timeout keeps nginx's own 504: control-api may be alive and slow.
location @control_plane_connect_timeout {
default_type application/json;
if ($upstream_connect_time = "-") {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 503 '{"error":"control_plane_unavailable"}';
}
return 504;
}
# Runtime gateway only; provisioner issuance bypasses this route.
location = /api/v1/workflow-approval-mediums/resolve {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-approval-mediums/link-sessions/confirm {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-approval-notifications/deliveries {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-approvals/pending/resolve {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-approval-mediums/telegram/challenges/confirm-provider-event {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflow-approval-notifications/deliveries/[^/]+/(ack|fail)$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-auth/refresh {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header x-service-token $http_x_service_token;
}
# Runtime token recovery, not provisioner issuance.
location = /api/v1/workflow-auth/reissue {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header x-service-token $http_x_service_token;
}
# OAuth mcp-server broker (mcp-host → control-api), spec 06 §5.1/§10.6
# decision B: reach the broker by reusing THIS gateway instead of opening
# a direct mcp-host → control-api:8090 egress. L7-scoped to POST-only on
# this single path — the DENY-by-omission of every other control-api path
# (incl. direct :8090) is preserved. mcp-host forwards its control JWT
# (typ:service, scope oauth:user-token) in Authorization; no x-service-token.
location = /api/v1/mcp-oauth/user-token {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# OAuth grant-existence sweep (mcp-host → control-api), spec 06 mini-spec 13.
# mcp-host polls whether its live per-user OAuth partitions still have a
# grant and evicts the revoked ones. Mirrors the user-token block: same
# gateway, POST-only, L7-scoped to this single path (DENY-by-omission of
# every other control-api path preserved). Same control JWT
# (typ:service, scope oauth:user-token) in Authorization; no x-service-token.
# Read-only: control-api answers booleans only, never a token.
location = /api/v1/mcp-oauth/grants/exists {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflow-approvals/request {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header x-service-token $http_x_service_token;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflow-approvals/[^/]+/status$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header x-service-token $http_x_service_token;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflow-approvals/[^/]+/cancel$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header x-service-token $http_x_service_token;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflow-approvals/[^/]+/provider-decision$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── LLM usage events ingest ──
# mcp-host pods POST batched LLM usage events here. Same RS256
# access JWT that the workflow-approvals endpoints accept.
location = /api/v1/internal/usage/llm/events {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Governed agent-run tracing ingest ──
# Shared and workflow mcp-host pods POST bounded event batches here
# using the same RS256 runtime access JWT as usage and approvals.
location = /api/v1/internal/tracing/agent-run-events {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Protected approval prompt-history capture ──
# mcp-host pods POST one bounded prompt capture for an existing
# approval using the same RS256 runtime access JWT as tracing ingest.
location = /api/v1/internal/tracing/approval-prompt-history {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Token budget check + reservation release ──
# mcp-host pods POST here once per task (pre-task budget enforcement)
# and to release danger-zone reservations on task terminal. Same RS256
# runtime access JWT that the workflow-approvals + usage endpoints accept.
location = /api/v1/internal/budgets/check {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/internal/budgets/release {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Plugin Workload SDK runtime endpoints ──
# Recipe mcp-host pods proxy plugin-workload SDK calls (promptBridge +
# clientNotifications) to control-api through this gateway. Same RS256
# runtime access JWT that the workflow-approvals endpoints accept;
# control-api authorizes each call against the recipe grant.
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/capabilities {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/prompt-bridge/v2 {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/prompt-bridge {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# JIT credential tickets are issued immediately before each
# provider attempt (including an ordered fallback target). Keep this
# route on the same mcp-host JWT gateway as the initial authorization;
# otherwise promptBridge authorizes successfully and then fails at
# the gateway before the provider or credential broker is reached.
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/prompt-bridge/credential-ticket {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/client-notification {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# Read-only: list the clientNotifications grant's allowed recipients so a
# recipe sandbox UI can populate its notify dropdown. POST carries the
# recipe binding in the body (same contract as the send path above).
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/client-notification/recipients {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/invocations/[^/]+/status$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# SDK-only promptBridge finalization is the atomic accounting boundary:
# it closes the physical provider attempt, logical invocation, and
# exact/unknown spend outcome in one control-api transaction. Keep it
# behind the same mcp-host JWT gateway as invocation status; omitting
# this route lets the provider execute while the runtime can only
# surface provider_unavailable after the result is already billable.
location ~ ^/api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/invocations/[^/]+/finalize$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# Provider-attempt status is part of the promptBridge audit contract.
# It must remain behind the same mcp-host JWT gateway as invocation
# status; otherwise the provider call can be authorized and issued a
# JIT ticket, but the runtime cannot close the attempt lease.
location ~ ^/api/v1/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/provider-attempts/[^/]+/status$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Stateless lifecycle heartbeat ──
# mcp-host pods POST D8 activity snapshots here. Same RS256 runtime
# access JWT that the workflow-approvals endpoints accept; control-api
# binds identity to the token's hostRefs[0] claim (never the path) and
# answers {drain} from Host.status.lifecycle.
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/hosts/heartbeat {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/mcp-host/llm/provider-attempts/authorize {
# V2 carries bounded inline images; keep the larger body allowance
# on this authenticated authorization route, not the whole gateway.
# The route is shared by both providers, so the value is the larger
# visual envelope: Grok 36700160 (#784) over Codex 25165824 (#660).
# It also covers the #731 non-image request cap (8 MiB) plus
# control-api's 16 KiB authorize envelope allowance, which nginx's
# 1m default would refuse before control-api sees it. nginx refuses
# to start when a location repeats this directive.
client_max_body_size 36700160;
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
error_page 502 = @control_plane_unavailable;
error_page 504 = @control_plane_connect_timeout;
# control-api answers queue_wait or authorize_timeout itself; the
# server's 30 s would turn those answers into nginx's own 504. Each
# timer bounds the gap between two writes or reads, not the whole
# request: control-api pauses a queued body, so the send timer covers
# the queue wait (40 s), and the read timer covers the work deadline
# (30 s) once the body is sent.
proxy_read_timeout 90s;
proxy_send_timeout 90s;
# This exact location matches the normalized URI, but a proxy_pass
# without a URI part forwards the raw one. Aliases such as
# %61uthorize or ./authorize would then reach control-api with the
# 35 MiB allowance on a path its parser exemption does not know.
# The URI part makes nginx send the canonical path (query kept).
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream/api/v1/mcp-host/llm/provider-attempts/authorize;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
# ── Workflow broker runtime endpoints ──
location = /api/v1/workflows {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location = /api/v1/workflows/effective-targets/resolve {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+/health$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/runs/[^/]+/artifacts$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/runs/[^/]+/artifacts/[^/]+/download$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+/runs/latest/artifacts$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+/runs/latest/artifacts/[^/]+/content$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+/runs/latest/artifacts/[^/]+/download$ {
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/workflows/[^/]+/[^/]+/trigger$ {
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header Idempotency-Key $http_idempotency_key;
}
location / {
return 403;
}
}
}
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: host-context-controller-api-gateway
namespace: control-plane
labels:
app: host-context-controller-api-gateway
data:
nginx.conf: |
pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
worker_processes auto;
events {
worker_connections 1024;
}
http {
client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
map $uri $hcc_route_class {
default denied;
~^/health$ health;
~^/ready$ ready;
~^/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers$ host_inventory;
~^/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential$ host_credential;
~^/api/v1/mcpservers$ legacy_system_inventory;
~^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/ legacy_host_tombstone;
~^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ legacy_host_tombstone;
~^/api/v1/desktop/ desktop;
}
log_format hcc_gateway_json escape=json
'{"gateway":"hcc","request_id":"$request_id","route_class":"$hcc_route_class","method":"$request_method","status":$status,"upstream_status":"$upstream_status","request_time":$request_time,"upstream_response_time":"$upstream_response_time"}';
access_log /dev/stdout hcc_gateway_json;
error_log /dev/stderr warn;
upstream host_context_controller_upstream {
server host-context-controller.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8081;
}
server {
listen 8081;
server_name _;
default_type application/json;
# Normalize errors generated by nginx itself. Upstream errors remain
# HCC-owned (`proxy_intercept_errors` is off), preserving HCC's generic
# WWW-Authenticate and authorization-unavailable semantics.
error_page 400 = @hcc_bad_request;
error_page 405 = @hcc_method_not_allowed;
error_page 413 = @hcc_payload_too_large;
location @hcc_bad_request {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 400 '{"error":"bad_request"}';
}
location @hcc_method_not_allowed {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 405 '{"error":"method_not_allowed"}';
}
location @hcc_payload_too_large {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 413 '{"error":"payload_too_large"}';
}
location = /health {
add_header Content-Type application/json;
return 200 '{"status":"ok"}';
}
location = /ready {
proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;
proxy_pass_request_headers off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
}
location = /api/v1/mcpservers {
proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;
proxy_pass_request_headers off;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
}
# The retained proxy poller is the only PR 1 compatibility exception
# above. Caller-selected legacy Context and credential routes are
# closed locally so a stale mcp-host cannot bypass the v2 Host binding.
location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/[^/]+$ {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 410 '{"error":"gone"}';
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
return 410 '{"error":"gone"}';
}
location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers {
if ($request_method != GET) { return 405; }
proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;
proxy_pass_request_headers off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
proxy_set_header Connection "";
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
}
location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential {
if ($request_method != POST) { return 405; }
client_max_body_size 1k;
proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;
proxy_pass_request_headers off;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;
proxy_set_header Content-Type $http_content_type;
proxy_set_header Content-Length $content_length;
proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
proxy_set_header Connection "";
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;
add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
}
location ~ ^/api/v1/desktop/[^/]+$ {
proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
location / {
return 403;
}
}
}