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CodeQL js/missing-rate-limiting — control-api and External REST disposition
This document records audited dispositions for CodeQL
js/missing-rate-limiting findings. It supports Security-tab dismissals
(dismissed_comment + reason) per
GitHub code scanning guidance.
Product invariant
Authenticated control-api routes that perform expensive work must be rate
limited. Enforcement uses the Postgres-backed rateLimitMiddleware
(services/rateLimiterService.ts) so limits are consistent across replicas.
CodeQL 2.x models express-rate-limit (and some framework plugins) but does
not model our custom PG limiter. Routes that only use rateLimitMiddleware
may still alert until an express-rate-limit edge backstop is added (see
control-api/src/routes/external/gfs.ts).
Approved patterns
| Pattern | Purpose |
|---|---|
rateLimitMiddleware only |
Production enforcement (cross-replica) |
PG + express-rate-limit backstop |
Production + CodeQL/SAST visibility |
| Auth as Express middleware before business handler | Keeps authorization out of the final handler node CodeQL labels |
Tier defaults (requests/minute, per verified admin session identity unless noted):
| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
|---|---|---|
| Admin public token | 20 | adminPublicTokenRlPerMin |
| Admin workflow grant read | 60 | workflowGrantReadRateLimit |
| Admin workflow grant write | 20 | workflowGrantWriteRateLimit |
| Registry identity voucher | 30 | inline in registry.ts |
| Registry connect request | 3 | inline in registryConnect.ts |
| External GFS read (resource, proxy, grants, shares) / mutation | 480, 480, 120, 120 / 90 | externalGfsClassRlPerMin |
PR #428 / F4 scope (fixed in branch)
| Alert | Location | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| #81 | grants.routes.ts:173 |
Fixed: cookie bucket + dual limiter + auth middleware |
| #82 | grants.routes.ts:197 |
Fixed: same |
| #83 | grants.routes.ts:236 |
Fixed: same |
| #63 | outputs.ts:35 |
Fixed: adminOutputsReadRateLimits() PG + edge backstop (30/min) |
| #1157 | llmProviderAttempts.routes.ts |
Fixed: express-rate-limit + PG before requireMcpHostJwt |
Edge backstop keys: a verified admin session identity hash for signed Control UI sessions/bearers and a source-IP fallback for credentials that fail verification; requests with no credential are skipped (anonymous). PG tiers use the same verified-session identity, with the source-IP fallback only for an unverified credential. Distinct signed sessions for one admin are kept separate so a revoked/stale session cannot consume the replacement session's quota.
Additional tiers shipped in PR #428:
| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
|---|---|---|
| Admin workflow read | 60 | workflowAdminReadRateLimits |
| Admin outputs read | 30 | adminOutputsReadRateLimits |
| Admin workflow trigger | 10 | adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit |
| Admin Codex read / write | 30 / 20 | adminCodexReadRateLimits / adminCodexWriteRateLimits |
| Codex OAuth callback | 20 | codexOAuthCallbackRateLimits (IP) |
| mcp-host attempt authorize | 60 | llmProviderAttemptAuthorizeRateLimits (edge before JWT) |
Out-of-scope dispositions (Layer 3)
Follow-up implementation tracked separately (fix/codeql-control-api-rate-limit-backstops).
False positive — PG limiter or non-route sink present
| Alert | Location | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| #57 | app.ts:131 |
Middleware mount only; per-route limiters apply downstream |
| #58 | app.ts:219 |
404 guard for unknown /gfs/*; no expensive work |
| #60 | auth.ts:572 |
Handler under publicAdminTokenRateLimit() (adminPublicTokenRlPerMin) |
| #171 | registry.ts:24 |
rateLimitMiddleware 30/min at :28-35 |
| #826 | registryConnect.ts:321 |
rateLimitMiddleware 3/min at :329-336 |
| #803 | gfs/grants.ts:849 |
Internal DB helper, not an HTTP route handler |
| #1767 | app.ts:73 |
False positive — invitation error-response middleware; evidence below |
| #1769 | passwordResetPayload.externalRest.realPostgres.integration.test.ts |
Test-only composition: Control API and External REST bind loopback; producer is task-local on an ephemeral port |
Alert #1767 is attached to the invitation error-response middleware mount, which maps upstream
failures to bounded public responses. External REST token lookup is limited to 30 requests/minute
per trusted req.ip; password setup and acceptance are limited to 10/minute. The Control API
applies external-client source limits to invitation routes and server-side 30/minute and 10/minute
admission buckets to token lookup and password-token setup, with its documented process-memory
fallback. Cost-12 password work remains behind the shared durable owner. CodeQL's authorization
dataflow points through error presentation and does not model this custom and cross-service limiter
chain. external-rest-api/test/routes.invitations.test.ts asserts the 429 and Retry-After
contract; external-rest-api/test/middleware.rateLimit.test.ts verifies trusted-source bucketing.
Alert #1769 points to error-response handling in
control-api/test/passwordResetPayload.externalRest.realPostgres.integration.test.ts. The test
mounts requireInternalToken and the real createExternalInvitationsRouter() on a task-owned
Control API Express app, then binds that app to an ephemeral 127.0.0.1 port. The middleware
validates the bearer token against the service named by x-service-token and attaches that service
identity for downstream authorization. The test also starts its task-local Member Registration
service on a selected ephemeral port; the test addresses it through 127.0.0.1, while the
producer app does not specify a host bind. The built External REST app runs in a separate child
process on its own ephemeral port explicitly bound to 127.0.0.1. Supertest sends HTTP requests
to the External REST child; it does not receive the Express app object directly. These listeners
are test-owned, not deployed service listeners.
The production External REST POST /invitations/password route retains its 10/minute
acceptRateLimit. The Control API password-token route applies its external-client source limiters
and 10/minute admission bucket, with the documented process-memory fallback when the limiter
backend is unavailable. In production, the Control API mounts this router behind
requireInternalService('external-rest-api'). The composed test fixture mounts
requireInternalToken directly and does not exercise that expected-service gate; it does validate
the bearer token and exercise the real route and its limiter/admission behavior. These controls
support the test-only false-positive disposition; the alert does not identify an unbounded deployed
route.
The createDropResetResponseProxy helper is exercised both for ordinary response forwarding and
for the ambiguous-reset case. For ordinary proxy responses it copies the upstream status and body,
sets a constant application/json content type, and forwards no response headers, including
Retry-After or Set-Cookie. For the one-use password-token POST it consumes the upstream
response and destroys the downstream connection to model a lost reset acknowledgement. The public
External REST route owns its bounded retry response and issues its own session cookie only after a
successful reset with a valid session token. Focused invitation and trusted-source tests verify the
public 429/Retry-After behavior; they do not assert that the fault-injection proxy forwards those
headers.
GitHub currently records alert #1769 as dismissed with reason false positive. Its 2026-10-12
dismissal note relied on the earlier Supertest-only topology. This entry updates the repository's
current evidence to the loopback child-service topology; the alert state and historical dismissal
were not changed.
Won't fix (accepted) — real gap, follow-up backstop PR
Tracked for fix/codeql-control-api-rate-limit-backstops. No auth bypass; missing
SAST-visible backstop (and in some cases PG limiter — see Notes).
| Alert | Location | Planned tier | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| #61 | auth.ts:607 |
60/min session read | /admin/auth/me SPA hydration |
| #62 | controlAdmins.ts:327 |
10/min write | Admin invitation POST |
| #70 | registryConnect.ts:520 |
10/min write | Claim redemption |
| #71 | registryConnect.ts:715 |
10/min write | Key rotation |
| #133 | gfs/proxy.ts:31 |
120 read | Control UI GFS |
| #138 | gfs/resolve.ts:80 |
120 read | Control UI GFS |
| #140 | gfs/resolve.ts:89 |
120 read | Control UI GFS |
| #144 | gfs/token.ts:44 |
30 mutation | GFS token mint |
| #145 | gfs/resources.ts:350 |
30 mutation | PATCH resource |
| #149 | gfs/tree.ts:24 |
120 read | Tree browse |
| #150 | gfs/tree.ts:51 |
120 read | Children paging |
Dismissal template (Security tab / API)
Documented in docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md (alert #<NUMBER>).
<One-line evidence from table above>.
Re-open triggers
Re-audit when:
rateLimitMiddlewaresignature or call pattern changes repo-wide- A listed route removes its PG limiter
- CodeQL adds modeling for our PG limiter (then remove redundant backstops)
- New authenticated route is added without an entry in this registry