Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import { type Request, Router } from 'express'
import { controlApiPassthroughGet } from '../controlApiClient.js'
// Same shape control-api accepts for a remote MCP server name (a K8s resource
// name): lowercase RFC 1123 label, 1-63 chars, no leading/trailing hyphen.
const REMOTE_SERVER_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/
// Lowercase only: control-api mints the nonce with crypto.randomUUID(), which is
// always lowercase, so any other casing is not a redirect URI it ever registered.
const INSTALL_NONCE_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/
// Client ID Metadata Document (SEP-991) for the remote MCP-OAuth lane. Must equal
// control-api's CIMD_ROUTE_PATH (control-api/src/oauth/cimdIdentity.ts): the CIMD
// client_id is `<public origin>/api/v1` + this path, and a remote Authorization Server
// fetches that URL through this gateway.
const CIMD_ROUTE_PATH = '/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client'
function rawQueryOf(req: Request): string {
const queryStart = req.originalUrl.indexOf('?')
return queryStart >= 0 ? req.originalUrl.slice(queryStart) : ''
}
/**
* PUBLIC OAuth callback. The provider (Google, …) redirects the user's browser
* here after consent — there is no Clerum session or bearer token; authentication
* IS the signed `state`, which control-api re-verifies. We forward the request to
* control-api's stable callback endpoint verbatim — the raw query string is passed
* untouched so the signed `state` and `code` are never re-encoded — and relay its
* response, including the HTML success page that bounces to clerum://oauth-completed.
*
* These, together with the CIMD document below, are the only public, unauthenticated
* routes in this gateway, so they MUST stay thin passthroughs: never read or trust
* anything beyond the validated path segments and the opaque query string.
*/
export function createOauthCallbackRouter(): Router {
const router = Router()
// Per-server remote callback (/remote/<serverName>[/<installNonce>]). The forward
// carries this gateway's service token, so an unvalidated segment (e.g. a decoded
// `../admin`) would turn a public URL into an authenticated GET against any
// control-api path. Segments are therefore allow-listed before anything is sent,
// and the forwarded path is rebuilt only from them.
router.get('/oauth-callback/remote/:serverName/:installNonce?', async (req, res, next) => {
const serverName = String(req.params.serverName)
const installNonce = req.params.installNonce
if (
!REMOTE_SERVER_NAME_RE.test(serverName) ||
(installNonce !== undefined && !INSTALL_NONCE_RE.test(installNonce))
) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not Found' })
return
}
try {
const path =
`/oauth-callback/remote/${encodeURIComponent(serverName)}` +
(installNonce !== undefined ? `/${encodeURIComponent(installNonce)}` : '')
const result = await controlApiPassthroughGet(path, rawQueryOf(req))
res.status(result.status).type(result.contentType).send(result.body)
} catch (err) {
next(err)
}
})
router.get('/oauth-callback/:oauthClientId', async (req, res, next) => {
try {
const result = await controlApiPassthroughGet(
`/oauth-callback/${encodeURIComponent(String(req.params.oauthClientId))}`,
rawQueryOf(req)
)
res.status(result.status).type(result.contentType).send(result.body)
} catch (err) {
next(err)
}
})
// PUBLIC CIMD document: a remote Authorization Server fetches our OAuth client
// identity here. Fixed path, no caller-controlled segment and no query string are
// forwarded (the forward carries this gateway's service token). Express answers
// HEAD through this GET handler.
router.get(CIMD_ROUTE_PATH, async (_req, res, next) => {
try {
const result = await controlApiPassthroughGet(CIMD_ROUTE_PATH, '')
res.status(result.status).type(result.contentType).send(result.body)
} catch (err) {
next(err)
}
})
return router
}