Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'
import { config } from '../config.js'
/**
* Sandbox-UI session cookie service. Cookie shape:
*
* {
* iss: "rpc-proxy",
* aud: "rpc-proxy-sandbox-ui",
* sub: <userId>,
* recipeNs, recipeName,
* scope: "sandbox:ui:view",
* iat, exp
* }
*
* Signed HS256 with `sandboxUiCookieSecret`. The `view/*` reverse proxy is
* the only verifier — it MUST also assert that the cookie's (recipeNs,
* recipeName) match the URL path so a path-scoping bug in a browser /
* proxy can't replay one recipe's cookie against another.
*
* The cookie's Path is scoped to the per-recipe view URL prefix
* (`/api/v1/sandbox-ui/<ns>/<name>/`) so the browser only sends it on
* those requests; the JWT claim check above is the second line of defence.
*/
const ISS = 'rpc-proxy'
const AUD = 'rpc-proxy-sandbox-ui'
const SCOPE = 'sandbox:ui:view'
export type SandboxUiSessionClaims = {
sub: string
recipeNs: string
recipeName: string
iss: string
aud: string
scope: string
iat: number
exp: number
}
export function createSandboxUiSession(
userId: string,
recipeNs: string,
recipeName: string
): string {
return jwt.sign(
{
sub: userId,
recipeNs,
recipeName,
scope: SCOPE,
},
config.sandboxUiCookieSecret,
{
algorithm: 'HS256',
issuer: ISS,
audience: AUD,
expiresIn: config.sandboxUiCookieMaxAgeSec,
}
)
}
/**
* Verify a cookie value, asserting that the recipeNs / recipeName claim
* matches what the caller resolved from the URL path. Returns the parsed
* claims on success or null on any failure (signature, expiry, mismatched
* issuer/audience/scope, claim-vs-URL mismatch, missing fields).
*/
export function verifySandboxUiSession(
cookieValue: string,
expectedNs: string,
expectedName: string
): SandboxUiSessionClaims | null {
let payload: jwt.JwtPayload
try {
payload = jwt.verify(cookieValue, config.sandboxUiCookieSecret, {
algorithms: ['HS256'],
issuer: ISS,
audience: AUD,
}) as jwt.JwtPayload
} catch {
return null
}
if (
typeof payload?.sub !== 'string' ||
payload.sub.length === 0 ||
typeof payload?.recipeNs !== 'string' ||
typeof payload?.recipeName !== 'string' ||
payload?.scope !== SCOPE ||
typeof payload?.iat !== 'number' ||
typeof payload?.exp !== 'number'
) {
return null
}
// Defence-in-depth: even though the cookie is path-scoped to
// /api/v1/sandbox-ui/<ns>/<name>/, refuse to honour a cookie minted for
// recipe A on a request for recipe B. Catches path-scoping bugs in any
// intermediate browser / proxy.
if (payload.recipeNs !== expectedNs || payload.recipeName !== expectedName) {
return null
}
return {
sub: payload.sub,
recipeNs: payload.recipeNs,
recipeName: payload.recipeName,
iss: ISS,
aud: AUD,
scope: SCOPE,
iat: payload.iat,
exp: payload.exp,
}
}
/**
* Build the Set-Cookie header value for `createSandboxUiSession`. Path is
* scoped to the per-recipe view URL prefix so browsers don't bleed the
* cookie to other recipes. `Secure` is appended in production so a network
* man-in-the-middle on a dev HTTPS-stripped session can't read the JWT.
*/
export function buildSandboxUiSetCookie(
cookieValue: string,
recipeNs: string,
recipeName: string
): string {
const path = `/api/v1/sandbox-ui/${encodeURIComponent(recipeNs)}/${encodeURIComponent(recipeName)}/`
const secure = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' ? '; Secure' : ''
return `${config.sandboxUiCookieName}=${cookieValue}; Path=${path}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict${secure}; Max-Age=${config.sandboxUiCookieMaxAgeSec}`
}