Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
test(control-api): pin token-subject binding on mcp-connectors route (R1-H3)
Diego Zacarias0834423eb8f0
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 53fde9aec..73cd7fa1f 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.506",+ "version": "0.1.507","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.506",+ "version": "0.1.507","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 190e8d55c..7e2fe6f5d 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.506",+ "version": "0.1.507","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.rpcAccessUsersMcpConnectors.auth.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.rpcAccessUsersMcpConnectors.auth.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..d7e9920b2--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/test/routes.rpcAccessUsersMcpConnectors.auth.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import express from 'express'+import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from 'express'+import request from 'supertest'+import type { K8sGateway } from '../src/k8s.js'+import { createRpcAccessUsersRouter } from '../src/routes/rpc-access/users.js'++// H3 — the route documents that `userId` is authoritative because+// `requireRpcTokenUserMatch()` binds it to the RPC token subject, and never+// flows from a body/query. The sibling wiring test+// (routes.rpcAccessUsersMcpConnectors.test.ts) mocks that middleware to a+// pass-through, so it cannot catch a refactor that removes the guard or makes+// `userId` client-controlled. Here we keep `requireRpcTokenUserMatch` REAL and+// stub only token *validation*, injecting `req.rpcAuth` ourselves the way+// `requireValidRpcAccessToken` would. Deleting the guard from the route, or+// sourcing `userId` from the query, must turn one of these red.++const svc = vi.hoisted(() => ({+ getUserAgents: vi.fn(),+ getUserContexts: vi.fn(),+ getCurrentTeam: vi.fn(),+ getTeamAgents: vi.fn(),+}))+const resolvers = vi.hoisted(() => ({+ resolveConnectorsForAgents: vi.fn(),+ resolveInvocableMcpServersForContexts: vi.fn(),+}))++vi.mock('../src/services/directory/index.js', () => svc)+vi.mock('../src/services/access/mcpInvocable.js', () => resolvers)++// Keep requireRpcTokenUserMatch REAL; stub only the token-validity gates.+vi.mock('../src/middleware/rpcAccessAuth.js', async importActual => {+ const actual = await importActual<typeof import('../src/middleware/rpcAccessAuth.js')>()+ return {+ ...actual,+ requireValidRpcAccessToken: () => (_req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction) => next(),+ requireValidRpcAccessTokenAny: () => (_req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction) =>+ next(),+ }+})++function buildApp(tokenSubject: string) {+ const app = express()+ app.use(express.json())+ // Emulate requireValidRpcAccessToken: attach verified claims for `tokenSubject`.+ app.use((req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {+ ;(req as Request & { rpcAuth?: unknown }).rpcAuth = {+ sub: tokenSubject,+ typ: 'user',+ accessScope: 'team',+ teamId: 'team-1',+ scopes: ['mcp:servers:list'],+ hostRefs: [],+ jti: 'j1',+ iat: 1,+ exp: 9999999999,+ }+ next()+ })+ app.use(+ createRpcAccessUsersRouter({} as unknown as K8sGateway, {+ bindingService: { bind: vi.fn() },+ })+ )+ return app+}++beforeEach(() => {+ svc.getUserAgents.mockReset()+ resolvers.resolveConnectorsForAgents.mockReset()+ svc.getUserAgents.mockResolvedValue({ userId: 'alice', agentNames: [] })+ resolvers.resolveConnectorsForAgents.mockResolvedValue([])+})++describe('GET /rpc/access/users/:userId/mcp-connectors — token-subject binding (H3)', () => {+ it('403s when the token subject does not match the path user', async () => {+ const res = await request(buildApp('alice')).get('/rpc/access/users/bob/mcp-connectors')+ expect(res.status).toBe(403)+ // The guard runs before the handler: no directory lookup for the other user.+ expect(svc.getUserAgents).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('200s when the token subject matches, keyed by the PATH user', async () => {+ const res = await request(buildApp('alice')).get('/rpc/access/users/alice/mcp-connectors')+ expect(res.status).toBe(200)+ expect(svc.getUserAgents).toHaveBeenCalledWith('alice')+ })++ it('a ?userId= override cannot change the effective subject (still 403 cross-user)', async () => {+ // A client tries to smuggle its own id via the query string. The route keys+ // off the PATH param — bound to the token by the middleware — so the query+ // is inert and the mismatch still 403s.+ const res = await request(buildApp('alice')).get(+ '/rpc/access/users/bob/mcp-connectors?userId=alice'+ )+ expect(res.status).toBe(403)+ expect(svc.getUserAgents).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })+})