Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
fix(np08): close low-risk evidence and auth follow-ups
Alfredo Lopez09421d02d84f
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-public.ymlindex 523f1dbf1..2f964e94d 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml@@ -511,6 +511,9 @@ jobs:- name: Test NP-08 Host clients have no v1 fallbackrun: bash scripts/tests/test-np08-v1-reference-inventory.sh+ - name: Test NP-08 evidence scanner fails closed+ run: bash scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh+- name: Test NP-08 deployed E2E cleanup and provenance guardsrun: bash scripts/tests/test-np08-e2e-guards.shdiff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 3aef21c65..2b3b57e0e 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.474",+ "version": "0.1.475","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.474",+ "version": "0.1.475","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex a9605158b..6c4b4cf04 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.474",+ "version": "0.1.475","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.tsindex 28fae32b8..e3f28922a 100644--- a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts+++ b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ const EXPIRED_REFRESH_REISSUE_GRACE_SECONDS = 5 * 60export const MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE = 'workflow-approvals'export const MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE = 'host-context-controller'export const MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY = 'mcp:credential:read'+/**+ * HCC's access-token verifier accepts at most ten minutes. Keep the issuer+ * fail-closed if an operator raises the shared workflow access TTL without+ * first changing the HCC security contract.+ */+export const MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS = 600const HCC_HOST_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$/type McpHostCredentialLineage = {@@ -214,6 +220,10 @@ function issueToken(if (hccCredential) {assertHccCredentialLineage(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs, hccCredential)}+ const effectiveTtlSec =+ hccCredential && scope === 'workflow:approval:request'+ ? Math.min(ttlSec, MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS)+ : ttlSecconst token = jwt.sign({sub: `${recipeNamespace}/${recipeName}`,@@ -237,10 +247,10 @@ function issueToken(? [MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE]: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,jwtid: randomUUID(),- expiresIn: ttlSec,+ expiresIn: effectiveTtlSec,})- return { token, expiresInSeconds: ttlSec }+ return { token, expiresInSeconds: effectiveTtlSec }}export function issueMcpHostAccessJwt(diff --git a/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts b/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.tsindex 9bc462266..b15474411 100644--- a/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { config } from '../src/config.js'import {ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES,MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,+ MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS,MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,type McpHostAccessClaims,@@ -74,6 +75,26 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {})})+ it('clamps an HCC access token to the verifier ceiling without changing WRC TTLs', () => {+ const previousAccessTtl = config.mcpHostJwtAccessTtlSec+ config.mcpHostJwtAccessTtlSec = MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS + 300+ try {+ const hcc = issueMcpHostAccessJwt(config.hostsNamespace, 'standalone', ['chatllm'], {+ hccCredential: { hostUid: 'host-uid-chatllm' },+ })+ const workflow = issueMcpHostAccessJwt('sandbox-recipes', 'recipe')+ const hccClaims = jwt.decode(hcc.token) as Record<string, unknown>++ expect(hcc.expiresInSeconds).toBe(MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS)+ expect((hccClaims.exp as number) - (hccClaims.iat as number)).toBe(+ MCP_HOST_HCC_ACCESS_MAX_TTL_SECONDS+ )+ expect(workflow.expiresInSeconds).toBe(previousAccessTtl + 300)+ } finally {+ config.mcpHostJwtAccessTtlSec = previousAccessTtl+ }+ })+it('rejects workflow-only tokens that inject HCC-only claims', () => {const token = jwt.sign({diff --git a/docs/testing/minikube-t2-runbook.md b/docs/testing/minikube-t2-runbook.mdindex 0d7211e35..bc3673c61 100644--- a/docs/testing/minikube-t2-runbook.md+++ b/docs/testing/minikube-t2-runbook.md@@ -91,18 +91,40 @@ use `CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL` unchanged.## T0, T1, and T2 boundaries-* **T0** — shell syntax/ShellCheck where available, contract tests, affected+- **T0** — shell syntax/ShellCheck where available, contract tests, affectedpackage builds/typechecks, and `git diff --check`.-* **T1** — the Real PostgreSQL suites execute against the validated local+- **T1** — the Real PostgreSQL suites execute against the validated local`control-postgres`; the lane reports `PASS`, `FAIL`, `SKIPPED`, and `NOT_RUN`separately and fails on an unavailable DSN or zero executed tests.-* **T2** — the exact worktree/`HEAD` is deployed to the owned profile, the+- **T2** — the exact worktree/`HEAD` is deployed to the owned profile, thecluster is healthy, readiness and health checks pass, and applicableControl UI/Desktop journeys are run through their user-visible paths.CI, static tests, T1, T2, and Playwright are separate evidence lanes. A greenCI job or unit suite is not proof of T2 runtime behavior.+## NP-08 security evidence gates++The NP-08 runtime conformance helpers are intentionally branch-owned, local+T2 adjuncts rather than shared CI jobs. They require an explicit Minikube+context and must never target GKE, Clerum-dev, Clerum-prod, or a shared+profile:++- `scripts/security/verify-np08-hcc-authz.sh` is the read-only deployment+ conformance check (Gate F). Invoke it with+ `--context <profile-context> --read-only --redact-identifiers`.+- `scripts/security/run-np08-synthetic-gate.sh` runs the repository-owned+ two-Context authorization matrix without Kubernetes writes (Gate E). Give it+ the same explicit context and a summary path below the ignored run directory.+- `scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh` scans already-redacted API/log+ evidence. Its fixture regression runs in public CI; production-like evidence+ is scanned only after a local T2 run and must never contain Secret values.++The canonical T2 journey remains+`scripts/e2e/e2e-np08-hcc-authorization.sh`; these helpers do not replace it.+Their manual status must be recorded as `PASS`, `FAIL`, or `NOT_RUN` in the+sanitized run evidence rather than inferred from unit or CI results.+## Recovery and retryEvery phase has a bounded timeout. Failures name the first failing precondition,@@ -136,3 +158,22 @@ or private PostgreSQL URLs as well as other sensitive runtime artifacts.If ownership, scope, or redaction cannot be proved, stop and preserve thereported code; do not widen the command to another cluster.++### Deferred NP-08 hardening++The following items are deliberately deferred because they change a security+contract or require a separate rollout. They remain tracked follow-ups and are+not evidence that PR1's credential disclosure fix is incomplete.++| Follow-up | Owner / scope | Required completion evidence |+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| Preserve HCC lineage through refresh/reissue without carrying `aud=host-context-controller` or `mcp:credential:read` on the longer-lived refresh token | Control API + HCC, separate auth-contract change | Issuance, refresh, reissue, expiry, and wrong-route negative tests; explicit rollout/rollback matrix; HCC accepts only the short-lived access credential. |+| Replace the anonymous global metadata inventory with an authenticated system principal for `mcp-proxy`, then retire the v1 route | HCC + gateway + mcp-proxy, PR2 | A dedicated service identity and least-privilege route; no Host access; destination-bound grant/revision; proxy migration and v1 tombstone tests; both rendered and live policy proofs. |+| Add bounded rate limiting to unauthenticated diagnostic/metadata routes without breaking readiness, metrics, or the retained proxy compatibility lane | HCC/gateway operations | Per-route load/availability tests, probe compatibility evidence, normalized 429 contract, and a rollback-safe gateway rollout. |++The first item is intentionally not a follow-up patch in PR1: changing refresh+claims changes token consumers and revocation semantics. The second is the+accepted PR2 residual: the current global response is metadata-only and must+not be described as a credential-disclosure path. The third is deferred rather+than guessed because an overly broad limiter could take down health probes or+the still-supported inventory consumer.diff --git a/mcp-host/package-lock.json b/mcp-host/package-lock.jsonindex 0bc895135..1d8ebec3c 100644--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.272",+ "version": "0.1.273","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.272",+ "version": "0.1.273","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",diff --git a/mcp-host/package.json b/mcp-host/package.jsonindex 2d6ed468f..e8f570de9 100644--- a/mcp-host/package.json+++ b/mcp-host/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.272",+ "version": "0.1.273","description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.tsindex c017def74..6374e33ca 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ export function isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation(error: unknown): booexport interface ContextMapperAuthentication {getAccessToken(): stringrefreshOnUnauthorized(): Promise<void>- onCallerAuthorizationFailure?(status: 401 | 403): void+ /** Required so every authenticated client has a synchronous revocation hook. */+ onCallerAuthorizationFailure(status: 401 | 403): void}export interface ContextMapperClientOptions {@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ export class ContextMapperClient {// revoke any already-published fleet before returning to the caller.}if (!token) {- this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(401)+ this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure(401)throw new ContextMapperRequestError(401, kind, true)}return token@@ -230,14 +231,14 @@ export class ContextMapperClient {try {await this.authentication.refreshOnUnauthorized()} catch {- this.authentication.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(401)+ this.authentication.onCallerAuthorizationFailure(401)throw new ContextMapperRequestError(401, kind, true)}continue}if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {- this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(response.status)+ this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure(response.status)throw new ContextMapperRequestError(response.status, kind, true)}if (!response.ok) {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorityLifecycle.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorityLifecycle.test.tsindex 3a3f0c2bf..9ed78b8a5 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorityLifecycle.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorityLifecycle.test.ts@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ describe('MCP authority lifecycle', () => {authentication: {getAccessToken: () => 'host-access-token',refreshOnUnauthorized: vi.fn(),+ onCallerAuthorizationFailure: vi.fn(),},})const error = await captureError(() => client.pollServers())diff --git a/scripts/e2e/e2e-hcc-mcp-context-readiness.sh b/scripts/e2e/e2e-hcc-mcp-context-readiness.shindex cccb17538..d4b0e6664 100755--- a/scripts/e2e/e2e-hcc-mcp-context-readiness.sh+++ b/scripts/e2e/e2e-hcc-mcp-context-readiness.sh@@ -716,19 +716,24 @@ function get(path) {}(async () => {const ready = await get('/ready');- const scoped = await get('/api/v1/mcpservers/context/' + encodeURIComponent(context));- const body = JSON.parse(scoped.body);- const fixture = body.servers?.find(server => server.name === expected);+ const inventory = await get('/api/v1/mcpservers');+ const body = JSON.parse(inventory.body);+ const fixture = body.servers?.find(+ server => server.name === expected && server.contextRef === context+ );if (ready.status !== 200 || JSON.parse(ready.body).ready !== true) {throw new Error('readiness regressed: ' + ready.status + ' ' + ready.body);}- if (scoped.status !== 200 || !fixture || fixture.status?.ready !== true) {- throw new Error('latest Context did not converge in discovery: ' + scoped.status + ' ' + scoped.body);+ if (inventory.status !== 200 || !fixture || fixture.status?.ready !== true) {+ throw new Error(+ 'latest Context did not converge in global metadata inventory: ' ++ inventory.status + ' ' + inventory.body+ );}console.log(JSON.stringify({readyStatus: ready.status,- scopedDiscoveryStatus: scoped.status,- contextRef: body.contextRef,+ globalInventoryStatus: inventory.status,+ contextRef: fixture.contextRef,fixture: fixture.name,fixtureReady: fixture.status.ready}));@@ -1773,10 +1778,10 @@ wait_until 300 "all peer MCP/Context runtimes to converge after releasing the hehcc_identity_is_stable ||die "HCC restarted instead of completing the released background convergence"final_probe="$(probe_hcc_final_context)" ||- die "HCC final Context-scoped discovery did not expose the converged fixture"+ die "HCC final global metadata inventory did not expose the converged fixture in its Context"echo "$final_probe" | jq -e \--arg fixture "$MCP_NAME" --arg context "$CONTEXT_NAME" '- .readyStatus == 200 and .scopedDiscoveryStatus == 200 and+ .readyStatus == 200 and .globalInventoryStatus == 200 and.fixture == $fixture and .fixtureReady == true and .contextRef == $context' >/dev/null ||die "HCC final probe returned an invalid result: ${final_probe}"diff --git a/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh b/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.shindex 6d5bd8985..d0152516f 100755--- a/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh+++ b/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ set -euo pipefail# lines. API/log inputs must already be redacted; rendered manifests are a# separate scope and may contain Secret references, but never credential values.+command -v rg >/dev/null 2>&1 || {+ echo 'FAIL: ripgrep (rg) is required for NP-08 evidence scanning' >&2+ exit 1+}+tmpdir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/np08-evidence.XXXXXX")"trap 'rm -rf "${tmpdir}"' EXIT@@ -61,8 +66,15 @@ scan_scope() {local inputfor input in "$@"; dolocal hits="${tmpdir}/${scope}-${count}.hits"+ local rg_statusif rg -n -I -i --no-messages -e "${pattern}" "${input}" >"${hits}"; thencount=$((count + $(wc -l <"${hits}")))+ else+ rg_status=$?+ if [[ "${rg_status}" -ne 1 ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: rg could not scan ${scope} evidence (exit ${rg_status})" >&2+ return 2+ fifidoneecho "${scope}_violations=${count}"diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-hcc-watch-recovery-gate.sh b/scripts/tests/test-hcc-watch-recovery-gate.shindex 379d362e6..5a2620513 100755--- a/scripts/tests/test-hcc-watch-recovery-gate.sh+++ b/scripts/tests/test-hcc-watch-recovery-gate.sh@@ -1613,6 +1613,24 @@ elsefail "MCP readiness gate duplicates ownership or retains a deadline, pod-absence, or port edge"fi+# The caller-selected v1 Context route is a 410 tombstone. This readiness gate+# may use the temporary PR 2 global metadata inventory, but it must bind the+# uniquely named fixture back to the expected Context before claiming success.+mcp_final_context_probe="$(+ sed -n '/^probe_hcc_final_context() {$/,/^probe_hcc_ready_pod() {$/p' \+ "$MCP_READINESS_GATE"+)"+# Literal source-code assertions.+# shellcheck disable=SC2016+if [[ "$mcp_final_context_probe" == *"get('/api/v1/mcpservers')"* ]] &&+ [[ "$mcp_final_context_probe" == *'server.contextRef === context'* ]] &&+ [[ "$mcp_final_context_probe" == *'fixture.status?.ready !== true'* ]] &&+ [[ "$mcp_final_context_probe" != *'/api/v1/mcpservers/context/'* ]]; then+ pass "MCP readiness final probe uses global metadata and binds the fixture to its Context"+else+ fail "MCP readiness final probe calls a retired route or loses Context binding"+fi+# A single held McpServer proves the minimal failure, but this gate must also# cross the controller's bounded worker width with independent, gate-owned# McpServer/Context pairs. Keep this as a static contract so future edits dodiff --git a/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh b/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.shindex 2a4fee539..8b5772da8 100755--- a/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh+++ b/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh@@ -5,6 +5,25 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"SCANNER="${ROOT}/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh"tmpdir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/np08-scan-test.XXXXXX")"trap 'rm -rf "${tmpdir}"' EXIT+BASH_BIN="$(command -v bash)"++if PATH="${tmpdir}/missing-tools" "${BASH_BIN}" "${SCANNER}" \+ --stdin-kind api </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ echo 'FAIL: scanner passed without ripgrep' >&2+ exit 1+fi++if (+ # Invoked indirectly by the scanner's child Bash process.+ # shellcheck disable=SC2329+ rg() { return 2; }+ export -f rg+ printf '%s\n' '{"Authorization":"Bearer abc.def.ghi"}' |+ bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind api >/dev/null 2>&1+); then+ echo 'FAIL: scanner passed when ripgrep returned an execution error' >&2+ exit 1+fiif ! printf '%s\n' '{"error":"authorization_unavailable"}' | bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind api >/dev/null; thenecho 'FAIL: sanitized authorization error was treated as a credential leak' >&2