Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
test(host): pin the redaction guards the plain-text pass relies on
Alfredo Lopez0a3fd6685168
diff --git a/mcp-host/package-lock.json b/mcp-host/package-lock.jsonindex 0d8680d47..ae1cfe4e2 100644--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.500",+ "version": "0.1.501","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.500",+ "version": "0.1.501","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",diff --git a/mcp-host/package.json b/mcp-host/package.jsonindex 07d66f086..5f434642c 100644--- a/mcp-host/package.json+++ b/mcp-host/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.500",+ "version": "0.1.501","description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.tsindex a49b50cd0..201dea4cc 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts@@ -504,11 +504,16 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {const textPass = s.sanitizeFreeformContent(output, {secretWarning: 'Potential secret detected in mcp__config output',})+ // Precondition: the text pass broke the JSON.+ expect(() => JSON.parse(textPass.content)).toThrow()const result = s.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', output)// Witness: the configured rule matched.- expect(result.warnings).toContain('ConfigStore secret value redacted (S)')+ expect(result.warnings).toEqual([+ 'Potential secret detected in mcp__config output',+ 'ConfigStore secret value redacted (S)',+ ])+ expect(result.content).toBe('[{"a":"[REDACTED]b":1}]')expect(result.content).toBe(textPass.content)- expect(result.content).not.toContain('"},{"')})})@@ -606,36 +611,57 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {'password=hunter2hunter2password=pwd : S3cretValue1',],])('redacts the last value after %s', (_label, text) => {- const result = safety.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', text)- expect(result.was_modified).toBe(true)- expect(result.content).not.toContain('S3cretValue1')+ expect(safety.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', text).content).toBe('[REDACTED]')const output = JSON.stringify({ log: text })- const inJson = safety.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', output)- expect(inJson.was_modified).toBe(true)- expect(inJson.content).not.toContain('S3cretValue1')+ // Precondition: the text pass breaks the JSON, so the in-place path runs.+ const textPass = safety.sanitizeFreeformContent(output, { secretWarning: 'w' })+ expect(() => JSON.parse(textPass.content)).toThrow()+ expect(safety.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', output).content).toBe('{"log":"[REDACTED]"}')})it.each([- // `PASSWORD:` has a short value, so the value of `pwd :` that runs to- // the next separator swallows `passwd =`, whose value starts with a- // label of its own.- ['starts with a label', 'PASSWORD:pwd :Zq8Lm2Xvpasswd =pwd=Ab3x tail', 'Ab3x'],- ['starts with a label and a colon', 'PASSWORD:pwd :Zq8Lm2Xvpasswd =Pwd:7Kq2', '7Kq2'],+ // `PASSWORD:` has a short value, so the value of `pwd :` runs to the+ // space and swallows `passwd`, the start of the label `passwd =`, whose+ // value starts with a label of its own.+ [+ 'starts with a label',+ 'PASSWORD:pwd :Zq8Lm2Xvpasswd =pwd=Ab3x tail',+ 'PASSWORD:[REDACTED] tail',+ ],+ [+ 'starts with a label and a colon',+ 'PASSWORD:pwd :Zq8Lm2Xvpasswd =Pwd:7Kq2',+ 'PASSWORD:[REDACTED]',+ ],])('redacts the value of a label inside an earlier value when it %s',- (_label, text, secret) => {- const result = safety.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', text)- expect(result.was_modified).toBe(true)- expect(result.content).not.toContain(secret)+ (_label, text, redacted) => {+ expect(safety.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', text).content).toBe(redacted)const output = JSON.stringify({ log: text })- const inJson = safety.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', output)- expect(inJson.was_modified).toBe(true)- expect(inJson.content).not.toContain(secret)+ expect(safety.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', output).content).toBe(+ JSON.stringify({ log: redacted })+ )})+ it('joins password values that overlap before a later rule runs', () => {+ // `passwd =` and `PASSWORD:` both start a value that runs to the end.+ // Joined, they are one match; unjoined, the configured secret matches+ // inside the second replacement of an overlapping pair.+ const text = 'passwd =PASSWORD: xoxb-1'+ const s = new BasicSafety(() => [{ name: 'A', value: 'REDA' }])+ expect(s.sanitizeFreeformContent(text, { secretWarning: 'w' })).toEqual({+ content: '[REDACTED]',+ was_modified: true,+ warnings: ['w', 'w', 'ConfigStore secret value redacted (A)'],+ })+ expect(s.sanitizeOutput('mcp__config', JSON.stringify({ log: text })).content).toBe(+ '{"log":"[REDACTED]"}'+ )+ })+it('matches a long run of labels in linear time', () => {const content = 'pwd:'.repeat(250_000)const started = performance.now()@@ -648,13 +674,24 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {describe('a rule with many matches', () => {it('redacts 200,000 injection markers without exceeding the call stack', () => {- const content = '[INST] '.repeat(200_000)+ // The `<system>` match comes first, so the `[INST]` rule runs on a+ // rewritten copy and its 200,000 matches on the original text are+ // collected and checked against the replay's coverage. Without an+ // earlier match that step is skipped.+ const content = '<system> ' + '[INST] '.repeat(200_000)let result: ReturnType<BasicSafety['sanitizeOutput']> | undefined+ const started = performance.now()expect(() => {result = safety.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', content)}).not.toThrow()- expect(result?.content).toBe('[filtered] '.repeat(200_000))- expect(result?.warnings).toEqual(['Potential prompt injection pattern filtered'])+ const elapsedMs = performance.now() - started+ expect(result?.content).toBe('[filtered] ' + '[filtered] '.repeat(200_000))+ expect(result?.warnings).toEqual([+ 'Potential prompt injection pattern filtered',+ 'Potential prompt injection pattern filtered',+ ])+ // A coverage lookup that scans every range takes about 20 s here.+ expect(elapsedMs).toBeLessThan(2_000)}, 60_000)})@@ -726,6 +763,18 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {warnings: warned('A', 'C'),})})++ it('keeps the end of a joined range when a range inside it ends earlier', () => {+ // The password match covers the whole text and the Slack token match+ // inside it ends at `xoxb-1ED`, before the configured secret `ED:A`+ // ends. Joined, the two still cover `ED:A`, so the secret adds no+ // replacement and no warning of its own.+ expect(freeform([{ name: 'A', value: 'ED:A' }], 'PASSWORD:xoxb-1ED:A\\')).toEqual({+ content: '[REDACTED]',+ was_modified: true,+ warnings: ['w', 'w'],+ })+ })})describe('redaction patterns that can match nothing', () => {@@ -744,6 +793,22 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {'redaction pattern /x*/g matched an empty string')})++ it('refuses a filter whose replacement is empty', () => {+ const filter = (replacement: string) => ({+ secretWarning: 'unused',+ extraFilters: [{ pattern: /x+/g, replacement, warning: 'x filtered' }],+ })+ // Precondition: the same filter with a non-empty replacement is applied.+ expect(safety.sanitizeFreeformContent('axb', filter('-'))).toEqual({+ content: 'a-b',+ was_modified: true,+ warnings: ['x filtered'],+ })+ expect(() => safety.sanitizeFreeformContent('axb', filter(''))).toThrow(+ 'RedactionReplay: empty replacement'+ )+ })})describe('configured secrets written as JSON escapes', () => {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.tsindex 7a7df9b54..1294c7d80 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts@@ -103,8 +103,9 @@ function scanJsonStrings(text: string): {* Only the replacements are stored, as segments sorted along the copy: code* units `[textStart, textEnd)` stand for `[origStart, origEnd)`. The code* units between two segments are original and consecutive, and the first one- * after a segment stands for that segment's `origEnd`, so a replacement costs- * time in the number of segments, not in the length of the text.+ * after a segment stands for that segment's `origEnd`, so the bookkeeping of a+ * replacement costs time in the number of segments, not in the length of the+ * text. Rebuilding the copy itself still costs time in its length.*/class RedactionReplay {text: string@@ -643,8 +644,8 @@ export class BasicSafety implements Safety {/*** Tool-output redaction that keeps JSON output parseable. The text pass* (`sanitizeFreeformContent`) runs over the raw text, so a match can swallow- * JSON syntax: the password value class `[^\s,;]{8,}` eats a closing `"}`,- * and a raw `\n` escape is not whitespace to it. The text-pass result is+ * JSON syntax: a password value, which runs to the next whitespace, `,` or+ * `;`, eats a closing `"}`, and a raw `\n` escape is not whitespace to it. The text-pass result is* returned unchanged when it did not modify the output, when it still* parses, or when the original output does not parse.*