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fix(codex-sdk): close round-6 review nits and drop internal review tags

Alfredo Lopez0d7d8fa296b4
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.json
index 74cbe884e..5c1be0f11 100644
--- a/control-api/package-lock.json
+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.543",
+ "version": "0.1.544",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.543",
+ "version": "0.1.544",
"dependencies": {
"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field",
"@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",
diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.json
index 0265e3e23..f29d153cb 100644
--- a/control-api/package.json
+++ b/control-api/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.543",
+ "version": "0.1.544",
"description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets",
"main": "dist/main.js",
"engines": {
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts
index 89b149045..4c4ff34cb 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ function parseModelArray(value: unknown, field: string, res: Response): string[]
// wire for compatibility and are validated with the same shape rules, but they
// are stripped before persistence — only per-minute/platform limits are stored.
//
-// R4-H2: `maxOutputTokens` was briefly moved here on the premise that nothing
+// `maxOutputTokens` was briefly moved here on the premise that nothing
// enforced it. That premise held only for codex-subscription, whose ChatGPT
// wire rejects `max_output_tokens` and whose proxy therefore omits it. Every
// API-key provider does send it (`openai.ts`, `bedrockConverse.ts`,
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk.routes.ts
index 915dee85e..e1ef17d3d 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk.routes.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk.routes.ts
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ export function createMcpHostPluginWorkloadSdkRoutes(): Router {
// readiness gap, never an unfenced spend: llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer
// and llmProviderAttemptRedemption already reject a stale revision.
//
- // R4-M4: `codexBindingRevisions` is a STATIC capability of this binary —
+ // `codexBindingRevisions` is a STATIC capability of this binary —
// "I know how to publish the revisions" — not a statement about any one
// connection. Emitting it only alongside the numbers made a revoked or
// missing connection look like an older control-api, so the host skipped
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
index 57c9ff148..5837107f4 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ export async function authorizeLlmProviderAttempt(
// before budget reservation work so concurrent Codex + fallback cannot
// deadlock (budget rows then advisory vs advisory then spend/invocation).
//
- // R4-M3: only an SDK-linked authorize goes on to take plugin_workload_sdk_*
+ // Only an SDK-linked authorize goes on to take plugin_workload_sdk_*
// rows FOR UPDATE, which is the order finalize follows after this advisory.
// The workflow lane touches neither, so taking it for every recipe caller
// serialized that lane per recipe for no ordering benefit.
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptStore.ts b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptStore.ts
index 7abf5f4e4..da7b06861 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptStore.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptStore.ts
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ export function isLinkedCodexInFlightWithoutUsage(
? Date.parse(String(row.createdAt))
: Number.NaN
if (!Number.isFinite(created)) {
- // N-15: an unreadable created_at used to default to "still in flight",
+ // An unreadable created_at used to default to "still in flight",
// which wedges the invocation behind ledger_pending forever and silently
// hides a corrupt/absent timestamp. The grace window is undecidable here,
// so fail loudly instead of guessing.
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts
index 3ed47a978..f33b4e1aa 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ export interface AuthorizedPromptBridge {
/**
* Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers;
* codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded by
- * the contract's structural LIMITS.maxOutputTokens instead (R4-H2).
+ * the contract's structural LIMITS.maxOutputTokens instead.
*/
maxOutputTokens: number | null
invocationId: string
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ export async function reissuePromptBridgeCredentialTicket(
const reservationOnly =
isLlmProviderId(target.provider) && PROVIDER_AUTH_MODE[target.provider] === 'oauth-broker'
- // RP-539-009: an oauth-broker target is redeemable only through the broker
+ // An oauth-broker target is redeemable only through the broker
// binding the WRC installs for the grant's default target. Any other broker
// target would be reserved here and then die in execution with no credential
// to redeem, after the reservation already charged the attempt budget. Deny
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts
index c88dde3e5..879fb2969 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts
@@ -177,10 +177,10 @@ export interface PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits {
* Per-grant output ceiling. PERSISTED and enforced: it lands as `max_tokens`
* on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT
* wire and is bounded there by the contract limit instead. See
- * `AuthorizedPromptBridge.maxOutputTokens` (R4-H2).
+ * `AuthorizedPromptBridge.maxOutputTokens`.
*
- * R5-M2: this said "never persisted" after R4-H2 had already reactivated the
- * key. A reader trusting that comment would drop the persistence or the read
+ * This said "never persisted" after the per-grant ceiling had already been
+ * reactivated. A reader trusting that comment would drop the persistence or the read
* and hand the regression straight back.
*/
maxOutputTokens?: number
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.ts b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.ts
index 1ba843e13..0bc70f09c 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.ts
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ function replayExistingOutcome(
): PromptBridgeFinalizationResult {
const { persisted, linked } = view
assertPersistedAuthModeCredentialRules(persisted.provider, input)
- // N-07: re-anchoring to the JWT's recipe binding runs BEFORE any state
+ // Re-anchoring to the JWT's recipe binding runs BEFORE any state
// oracle, so a foreign caller cannot learn ledger_pending/exact/unknown.
if (!spendBindingMatches(persisted, input)) {
throw new PromptBridgeFinalizationError(
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ function replayExistingOutcome(
true
)
}
- // N-05: judged against the immutable floor, so the verdict cannot change
+ // Judged against the immutable floor, so the verdict cannot change
// between two replays of the same request.
if (!replayOutcomeCompatible(input, persisted)) {
throw new PromptBridgeFinalizationError(
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ export async function finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
if (!providerAttempt) {
throw new PromptBridgeFinalizationError('not_found', 'provider attempt not found', 404)
}
- // N-19: shape before binding, matching `replayExistingOutcome`. A non-oauth
+ // Shape before binding, matching `replayExistingOutcome`. A non-oauth
// finalization that omits `target.credentialSlot` is a malformed request, and
// both paths must classify it as 400 `invalid_request`. Running the binding
// comparison first would report the same body as 403 `binding_mismatch` here
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ export async function finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
const linkedCodex = oauthBroker
? await loadLlmProviderAttemptBySdkAttemptId(db, input.providerAttemptId)
: null
- // R4-H1: decided from the linked Codex row, never from the caller-chosen
+ // Decided from the linked Codex row, never from the caller-chosen
// status. Gating this on `complete` let a `failed` close through while the
// Codex call was still inside its usage grace and could bill afterwards.
// The replay path (`:314`) and the sweeper already read the linked row
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ export async function finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
)
}
const spend = resolvePersistableSpend(input.status, oauthBroker, linkedCodex, input.usage)
- // N-17: only point a usage_request_id at a usage_events row that is really
+ // Only point a usage_request_id at a usage_events row that is really
// written. Codex spend is ingested by the proxy finalize, not here.
const willIngestUsage = input.status === 'complete' && !oauthBroker
// Closing the invocation `failed` leaves it revivable (reviveFailedInvocation
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ export async function finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
// a second billable Codex call. Only a spend proved `not_executed` — no
// linked Codex row at all — is safe to leave revivable. `exact` obviously
// billed; `unknown` means we cannot prove it did not, which is the same
- // hazard (R4-H1, and the invariant pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts:2118-2122 states).
+ // hazard — the invariant stated at pluginWorkloadSdkDb.ts:2118-2122.
// provider_unavailable is the non-revivable terminal state for both. The
// RESULT still echoes input.status: mcp-host's controlApiClient requires
// result.status === body.status.
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ export async function finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
spend
)
- // RP-539-003: a successful failover finalizes only its winner, so the
+ // A successful failover finalizes only its winner, so the
// attempts it displaced would never reach this endpoint. They are terminal
// and immutable by the reservation fence, so they can be discovered and
// settled here without trusting the host to declare them.
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.ts b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.ts
index 6123b2b96..d91f0300c 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.ts
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ async function resolvePriorAttemptSpend(
const linked = await loadLlmProviderAttemptBySdkAttemptId(db, attemptId)
const exact = linkedCodexExactUsage(linked)
if (exact) return { outcome: 'exact', ...exact }
- // R4-M1: a linked row exists only if authorize-link ran, which means the
+ // A linked row exists only if authorize-link ran, which means the
// host already asked the broker for a ticket — that call may still bill.
// `not_executed` is terminal (deriveEffectiveSpend only lifts unknown to
// exact), so freezing it here would lose that spend permanently. Same rule
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ async function resolvePriorAttemptSpend(
}
/**
- * RP-539-003: on a successful failover only the winning attempt reaches
+ * On a successful failover only the winning attempt reaches
* `finalize`, so every attempt it displaced would stay terminal without a
* spend row — the legacy status endpoint does not touch the ledger and the
* sweeper only visits `in_progress` invocations. Discover those attempts from
diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts
index 087604d12..2791fccf8 100644
--- a/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ describe('routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk — grants', () => {
// (malformed still 400s, pinned above) but are dropped on write, while the
// active per-minute keys persist untouched.
//
- // R4-H2: maxOutputTokens is NOT stripped. It briefly was, on the premise
+ // `maxOutputTokens` is NOT stripped. It briefly was, on the premise
// that nothing enforced it — true only for codex-subscription. Every
// API-key provider sends max_tokens, so for them it is a live per-grant
// billing ceiling and it must reach the grant.
diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.plugin-workload-sdk.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.plugin-workload-sdk.test.ts
index 85602f0b1..89be336a8 100644
--- a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.plugin-workload-sdk.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.plugin-workload-sdk.test.ts
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ describe('GET /mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/capabilities', () => {
})
it('advertises the revision flag without numbers when the Codex connection does not resolve', async () => {
- // R4-M4. The flag states what this binary can publish, not what this
+ // The flag states what this binary can publish, not what this
// connection has. Dropping it alongside the numbers made a revoked
// connection indistinguishable from an older control-api, so the host
// skipped the freshness check precisely when no live connection could back
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ describe('GET /mcp-host/plugin-workload-sdk/capabilities', () => {
})
it('publishes catalog revision 0 for a connected but never-synced connection', async () => {
- // R4-H3 contract pin. 0 is the schema DEFAULT for catalog_revision, so it
+ // Contract pin: 0 is the schema DEFAULT for catalog_revision, so it
// must survive the wire untouched; the host decides readiness from it.
vi.mocked(sdkDb.findGrant).mockResolvedValue(codexGrant())
vi.mocked(codexConnection.getSafeCodexSubscriptionConnection).mockResolvedValue({
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.test.ts
index 74d7343f9..6e55f2094 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.test.ts
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ describe('authorizeLlmProviderAttempt', () => {
})
it('does not take the recipe advisory lock for a recipe caller without an SDK attempt link', async () => {
- // R4-M3. Only an SDK-linked authorize goes on to take plugin_workload_sdk_*
+ // Only an SDK-linked authorize goes on to take plugin_workload_sdk_*
// rows FOR UPDATE, which is the order finalize follows after this advisory.
// Taking it for every recipe caller serialized the workflow lane per recipe
// for no ordering benefit.
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptStore.helpers.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptStore.helpers.test.ts
index 4a19cc242..a338acfc6 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptStore.helpers.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.llmProviderAttemptStore.helpers.test.ts
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ describe('linked Codex usage predicates', () => {
})
it('fails loudly instead of pinning an attempt in flight forever when created_at is unreadable', () => {
- // N-15: the old default returned true, which wedges the invocation behind
+ // The old default returned true, which wedges the invocation behind
// ledger_pending for good and hides the corrupt timestamp.
for (const createdAt of [null, undefined, 'not-a-timestamp']) {
expect(() =>
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts
index e6b6997ed..16f0a95d4 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ describe('authorizePromptBridge', () => {
value: { invocationId: 'inv-1', replay: false },
})
if (!result.ok) throw new Error('expected the authorization to succeed')
- // R4-H2: the grant's output ceiling travels on the authorization again.
+ // The grant's output ceiling travels on the authorization again.
// J8 removed it on the premise that nothing enforced it, which held only
// for codex-subscription; every API-key provider sends it as `max_tokens`,
// so for them it was a working per-grant billing control.
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ describe('reissuePromptBridgeCredentialTicket', () => {
expect(sdkDb.markPluginWorkloadSdkProviderAttemptStatus).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
- it('denies an oauth-broker fallback that is not the default target (RP-539-009)', async () => {
+ it('denies an oauth-broker fallback that is not the default target', async () => {
// The WRC installs the broker binding for the grant's default target only.
// A non-default Codex fallback is authorizable but not executable: without
// this guard it reserved an attempt, burned budget, and died in execution.
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkDb.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkDb.test.ts
index 4d1a5d62c..21885dc08 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkDb.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkDb.test.ts
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ describe('SQL contracts that a silent edit would otherwise break', () => {
vi.mocked(pool.query).mockResolvedValue({ rows: [], rowCount: 1 } as never)
})
- it('refuses to promote a reserved attempt that already carries a credential jti (N-22)', async () => {
+ it('refuses to promote a reserved attempt that already carries a credential jti', async () => {
// The JTI-free authorize-link path must never adopt an attempt that the
// secret-ticket path already claimed. Dropping this predicate leaves the
// whole suite green, so assert the clause itself.
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.realPostgres.integration.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.realPostgres.integration.test.ts
index 0cbc87744..ff2c4363b 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.realPostgres.integration.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.realPostgres.integration.test.ts
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ describeRealPostgres('Plugin Workload SDK finalization on real PostgreSQL', () =
}
})
- it('resolves three identical failed calls while Codex usage lands between them (N-05)', async () => {
+ it('resolves three identical failed calls while Codex usage lands between them', async () => {
const client = await dbPool.connect()
try {
await begin(client)
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ describeRealPostgres('Plugin Workload SDK finalization on real PostgreSQL', () =
}
})
- it('settles the attempts a successful failover displaced (RP-539-003)', async () => {
+ it('settles the attempts a successful failover displaced', async () => {
const client = await dbPool.connect()
try {
await begin(client)
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.test.ts
index c6f2c1239..a342bce38 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.test.ts
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ describe('Plugin Workload SDK promptBridge finalization', () => {
'provider_completed',
null,
null,
- // N-17: Codex spend is ingested by the proxy finalize, not here, so no
+ // Codex spend is ingested by the proxy finalize, not here, so no
// usage_events row exists for this attempt and the FK-shaped column must
// stay NULL rather than point at a row that was never written.
null,
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ describe('Plugin Workload SDK promptBridge finalization', () => {
) as never
)
).rejects.toMatchObject({
- // N-19: the persisted `openai` attempt still governs, so the missing
+ // The persisted `openai` attempt still governs, so the missing
// credentialSlot is a malformed body (400), not a binding mismatch (403).
// `replayExistingOutcome` already classified this exact body as 400; the
// fresh path used to answer 403 only because the binding comparison ran
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ describe('Plugin Workload SDK promptBridge finalization', () => {
})
})
- it('classifies the same malformed body identically on the replay path (N-19)', async () => {
+ it('classifies the same malformed body identically on the replay path', async () => {
await expect(
finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
{
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ describe('spend floor writers (Addendum A.4 "best-floor")', () => {
expect(updateParams(db, 'plugin_workload_sdk_invocations')?.[1]).toBe('failed')
})
- // R4-H1. The ledger_pending gate was keyed on `input.status === 'complete'`,
+ // The ledger_pending gate was keyed on `input.status === 'complete'`,
// so a host closing `failed` walked past a Codex call still inside its usage
// grace. `failed` is what reviveFailedInvocation reopens, so the same
// idempotency key could launch a second billable Codex call while the first
@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ describe('spend replay is read-only and judged against the floor', () => {
},
}
: {}
- // N-05: the third identical `failed` call used to 409 because the second
+ // The third identical `failed` call used to 409 because the second
// had rewritten the row to `exact`. The floor never moves, so the verdict
// is stable and the reported outcome still catches up.
await expect(
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ describe('spend replay is read-only and judged against the floor', () => {
] as const)(
'answers conflict, not the %s ledger state, when the JWT binding does not match the floor',
async (_label, linkedOverrides) => {
- // N-07: the binding check runs before any state oracle, so a foreign
+ // The binding check runs before any state oracle, so a foreign
// recipe cannot distinguish ledger_pending from exact from unknown.
await expect(
finalizePromptBridgeInTransaction(
@@ -1649,7 +1649,7 @@ describe('deriveEffectiveSpend', () => {
})
})
-describe('prior provider attempt settlement (RP-539-003)', () => {
+describe('prior provider attempt settlement', () => {
const PRIOR_ATTEMPT_ID = '44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444'
function priorAttemptRow(status: string) {
@@ -1789,7 +1789,7 @@ describe('prior provider attempt settlement (RP-539-003)', () => {
})
it('freezes unknown for a displaced Codex attempt whose linked row carries no usage yet', async () => {
- // R4-M1. `not_executed` is terminal — deriveEffectiveSpend only lifts
+ // `not_executed` is terminal — deriveEffectiveSpend only lifts
// `unknown` to `exact` — so freezing it over a linked row that can still
// bill loses that spend permanently. A linked row exists only if
// authorize-link ran, which is already "asked the broker for a ticket".
diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts
index 3a997b713..3ea5597a3 100644
--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import { deriveEffectiveSpend } from '../src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalizat
import { isOauthBrokerProvider } from '../src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.js'
/**
- * R4-M2. `deriveEffectiveSpend` is a pure `(floor, linkedCodex) -> spend` merge
+ * `deriveEffectiveSpend` is a pure `(floor, linkedCodex) -> spend` merge
* with precedence rules, and it was covered only by hand-enumerated cases.
- * R4-H1 and R4-M1 were both sibling cases that enumeration missed — the shape
+ * Two sibling defects in that merge were both cases enumeration missed — the shape
* of that miss is what these properties close: they quantify over the whole
* input space instead of the examples someone thought of.
*/
diff --git a/control-ui/lib/api.ts b/control-ui/lib/api.ts
index acb6bc7d2..313baedf7 100644
--- a/control-ui/lib/api.ts
+++ b/control-ui/lib/api.ts
@@ -3725,7 +3725,7 @@ export type PluginWorkloadSdkGrantInput = {
// Input type omits the deprecated per-run keys (issue #348): this UI never
// sends them and the server strips them on write. The response
// PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits still carries them for legacy grants.
- // `maxOutputTokens` is NOT among them (R4-H2) — it is a live per-grant
+ // `maxOutputTokens` is NOT among them — it is a live per-grant
// ceiling on API-key providers.
quotaLimits?: Omit<PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits, 'maxRequestsPerRun' | 'maxNotificationsPerRun'>
modelPolicies?: Record<string, PluginWorkloadSdkModelPolicy>
diff --git a/control-ui/package-lock.json b/control-ui/package-lock.json
index 28b0f3e26..f8484046b 100644
--- a/control-ui/package-lock.json
+++ b/control-ui/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.489",
+ "version": "0.1.490",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.489",
+ "version": "0.1.490",
"dependencies": {
"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field",
"@clerum/llm-providers": "file:../packages/llm-providers",
diff --git a/control-ui/package.json b/control-ui/package.json
index b8bc71069..57139ff80 100644
--- a/control-ui/package.json
+++ b/control-ui/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.489",
+ "version": "0.1.490",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"dev": "NEXT_IGNORE_INCORRECT_LOCKFILE=1 next dev",
diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts
index 539f699bf..2d7e9e237 100644
--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts
+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ test('Desktop Apps falls back to the authorized non-Codex target when Codex is u
'This journey stops codex-llm-proxy, performs one paid promptBridge call served by the fallback provider, and restores the proxy.'
)
const fixture = grantedFixture()
- // Hard preconditions, never branches. RP-539-002 was exactly this shape: the
+ // Hard preconditions, never branches. An earlier defect was exactly this shape: the
// happy path kept its only Codex assertions behind a guard, so an OpenAI
// recipe passed it green without touching Codex, and the static auditor
// reported PASS because it validates form and cannot reach semantics.
diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts
index 0e87cad0d..2c9166e41 100644
--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts
+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ export function promptBridgeLedgerForRun(
/**
* The run anchor, read from PostgreSQL rather than the runner.
*
- * R2-L4: the ledger queries filter on `inv.created_at >= startedAt`, and
+ * The ledger queries filter on `inv.created_at >= startedAt`, and
* `created_at` is written by the database. Anchoring with the runner's clock
* compares two unsynchronised clocks, so a few seconds of skew either drops
* the run's own rows or picks up an earlier one. Same clock, both sides.
diff --git a/mcp-host/package-lock.json b/mcp-host/package-lock.json
index 987c638ff..4bf9e7784 100644
--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json
+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-mcp-host",
- "version": "0.1.316",
+ "version": "0.1.317",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-mcp-host",
- "version": "0.1.316",
+ "version": "0.1.317",
"license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE",
"dependencies": {
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",
diff --git a/mcp-host/package.json b/mcp-host/package.json
index cf34181ce..738d792f2 100644
--- a/mcp-host/package.json
+++ b/mcp-host/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-mcp-host",
- "version": "0.1.316",
+ "version": "0.1.317",
"description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude",
"main": "dist/main.js",
"engines": {
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.test.ts
index 0a5b33bd4..a8622b9df 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.test.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.test.ts
@@ -212,6 +212,39 @@ describe('Plugin Workload SDK bootstrap identity', () => {
replaceSdkOnlyCodexBinding(null)
})
+ it('clears the stored Codex binding when identity verification throws', async () => {
+ const binding = {
+ connectionKey: 'team-plus',
+ catalogRevision: 4,
+ credentialRevision: 1,
+ model: 'gpt-5.6-luna',
+ bindingHash: computeCodexPolicyHash({
+ model: 'gpt-5.6-luna',
+ catalogRevision: 4,
+ credentialRevision: 1,
+ connectionKey: 'team-plus',
+ }),
+ }
+ // The binding is installed BEFORE verification because `verify` reads the
+ // live global to build its capabilities request. A transport failure there
+ // must not leave an unconfirmed binding behind for the next prompt to
+ // execute against — and must still surface as the original error.
+ const verify = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('control-api unreachable'))
+ await expect(
+ configurePluginWorkloadSdkBootstrapIdentity(
+ {
+ capabilityFamily: 'promptBridge',
+ provider: 'codex-subscription',
+ model: 'gpt-5.6-luna',
+ contractVersion: 3,
+ codexBinding: binding,
+ },
+ { capabilityFamily: 'promptBridge', verify }
+ )
+ ).rejects.toThrow('control-api unreachable')
+ expect(readSdkOnlyCodexBinding()).toBeNull()
+ })
+
it('integrity-checks a supplied Codex binding even when the request provider is not Codex', async () => {
replaceSdkOnlyCodexBinding(null)
const verifyBinding = vi.spyOn(sdkOnlyCodexBinding, 'readVerifiedSdkOnlyCodexBinding')
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.ts
index e90691836..ef79d1ca4 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/bootstrapIdentity.ts
@@ -110,7 +110,20 @@ export async function configurePluginWorkloadSdkBootstrapIdentity(
} else {
replaceSdkOnlyCodexBinding(null)
}
- const proof = deps.verify ? await deps.verify(req.provider, model) : null
+ // The binding must be installed BEFORE this call — `deps.verify` reads the
+ // live global to build its capabilities request. That ordering means a throw
+ // here (a transport failure, a control-api 5xx) would otherwise leave the
+ // global populated with a binding this bootstrap never confirmed, and the
+ // next prompt would execute against it. Clear it and rethrow: an unverified
+ // binding must not survive the attempt that failed to verify it. The error
+ // itself is not swallowed — the caller still sees the failure.
+ let proof: Awaited<ReturnType<NonNullable<typeof deps.verify>>> | null = null
+ try {
+ proof = deps.verify ? await deps.verify(req.provider, model) : null
+ } catch (err) {
+ if (req.provider === 'codex-subscription') replaceSdkOnlyCodexBinding(null)
+ throw err
+ }
if (deps.verify && !proof) {
if (req.provider === 'codex-subscription') replaceSdkOnlyCodexBinding(null)
return {
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.test.ts
index b9b8dc7ff..db01c20eb 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.test.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.test.ts
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ function authorizedBody(invocationId: string) {
attemptGeneration: 1,
policyRevision: 2,
policyHash: 'a'.repeat(64),
- // R4-H2: the field is required on the wire again. `null` is "this grant
+ // The field is required on the wire again. `null` is "this grant
// sets no ceiling", which is the default these fixtures describe.
maxOutputTokens: null,
}
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ describe('PluginWorkloadSdkControlApiClient', () => {
).resolves.toMatchObject({ policyReady: true, codexBindingReady: true })
})
- // R4-H3 / R4-M5: the hand-built fixtures only ever used catalog revisions
+ // The hand-built fixtures only ever used catalog revisions
// {4,5,7,999} and never 0 — which is the schema DEFAULT for a never-synced
// catalog and exactly the value the inverted bounds rejected. These pin the
// real CHECK constraints of codex_subscription_connections:
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ describe('PluginWorkloadSdkControlApiClient', () => {
})
it('refuses the binding when the peer claims revisions but omits both', async () => {
- // R4-M4: a revoked or absent connection now keeps the flag and drops only
+ // A revoked or absent connection now keeps the flag and drops only
// the numbers, so this is the branch a live control-api takes for a
// connection that cannot back any binding.
installCodexBinding()
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.ts
index 13a45354a..8c664e769 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/controlApiClient.ts
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ export interface AuthorizePromptBridgeResponse {
* Per-grant output ceiling, or null when the grant sets none. Enforced as
* `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on
* the ChatGPT wire, where the contract's LIMITS.maxOutputTokens is the only
- * bound (R4-H2).
+ * bound.
*/
maxOutputTokens: number | null
}
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ function isAuthorizePromptBridgeResponse(v: unknown): v is AuthorizePromptBridge
(r.policyRevision as number) >= 1 &&
typeof r.policyHash === 'string' &&
/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(r.policyHash) &&
- // R4-H2: a grant cap of 0 is not "no cap" — it would clamp every response
+ // A grant cap of 0 is not "no cap" — it would clamp every response
// to nothing. Reject it here rather than let Math.min silently zero the
// request.
(r.maxOutputTokens === null ||
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ function isPluginWorkloadSdkCapabilities(v: unknown): v is PluginWorkloadSdkCapa
typeof value.v2Ready === 'boolean' &&
(value.reservationOnlyOauthBroker === undefined || value.reservationOnlyOauthBroker === true) &&
(value.codexBindingRevisions === undefined || value.codexBindingRevisions === true) &&
- // R4-H3: bounds mirror the codex_subscription_connections CHECKs —
+ // Bounds mirror the codex_subscription_connections CHECKs —
// `catalog_revision BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (>= 0)` and
// `credential_revision BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (>= 1)`. These were
// inverted, so a connection whose catalog was never synced (revision 0,
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts
index 227b0e507..138218a74 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ describe('PromptBridgeHandler', () => {
)
})
- // R4-H2. J8 dropped the clamp on the premise that nothing enforced the
+ // J8 dropped the clamp on the premise that nothing enforced the
// ceiling. That held only for codex-subscription, whose ChatGPT wire rejects
// `max_output_tokens`; every API-key provider does send it, so for them the
// per-grant cap was a working billing control that the removal silenced.
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ describe('PromptBridgeHandler', () => {
code: 'provider_unavailable',
reason: 'outcome_unknown',
})
- // One attempt on the complete path, then one on the error path (N-11).
+ // One attempt on the complete path, then one on the error path.
// Neither retries: the error is retryable but carries no `reason`.
expect(finalize).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
expect(finalize).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ describe('PromptBridgeHandler', () => {
vi.useRealTimers()
}
// Four attempts per finalize path, never five. The complete path exhausts
- // its budget, then the error path (N-11) settles the same receipt with a
+ // its budget, then the error path settles the same receipt with a
// budget of its own — the documented worst case of two bounded deadlines.
expect(finalize).toHaveBeenCalledTimes((FINALIZE_LEDGER_RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length + 1) * 2)
})
diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts
index 85913afe8..73ef8490e 100644
--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts
+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ export function validatePromptBridgeRequest(raw: unknown): PromptBridgeRequest {
body.maxTokens !== undefined &&
(typeof body.maxTokens !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(body.maxTokens) || body.maxTokens < 1)
) {
- // R4-H2: `typeof number` alone let 0, -1 and 1.5 through to the provider
+ // `typeof number` alone let 0, -1 and 1.5 through to the provider
// and made the grant clamp's Math.min ill-defined.
throw new PluginWorkloadError('invalid_request', 'maxTokens must be a positive integer')
}
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ export class PromptBridgeHandler {
acknowledgementMode: this.deps.finalizePromptBridge
? 'atomic_terminal_finalization'
: 'per_attempt',
- // R4-H2: the per-grant ceiling is enforced here, before the request
+ // The per-grant ceiling is enforced here, before the request
// reaches any provider. On API-key providers it lands as `max_tokens`
// on the wire; on codex-subscription it bounds the hashed request
// identity while the proxy omits it from the ChatGPT wire, which also
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ export class PromptBridgeHandler {
err instanceof PluginWorkloadError && err.providerMayHaveExecuted
? 'provider_unavailable'
: 'failed'
- // N-11: the error path settles the same ledger row as the complete
+ // The error path settles the same ledger row as the complete
// path, so it needs the same `ledger_pending` patience and the same
// bounded deadline. Losing this attempt to a millisecond commit race
// would silently drop the spend for an attempt that already ran.
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ function unexpectedAuthorizationResponse(): PluginWorkloadError {
/**
* Bound a workload's requested output against the grant's ceiling.
*
- * Scope, stated honestly (R4-H2): on API-key providers this is the real cap —
+ * Scope, stated honestly: on API-key providers this is the real cap —
* `max_tokens` reaches the provider. On codex-subscription the ChatGPT wire
* rejects `max_output_tokens` and the proxy omits it, so there the clamp bounds
* the hashed request identity rather than the response, and the enforced bound
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json b/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json
index 972af30af..afe8e301a 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json
+++ b/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "workload-recipes-controller",
- "version": "0.1.337",
+ "version": "0.1.338",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "workload-recipes-controller",
- "version": "0.1.337",
+ "version": "0.1.338",
"license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE",
"dependencies": {
"@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.1009.0",
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/package.json b/workflow-recipes/package.json
index 5602ce9b1..d94a13589 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/package.json
+++ b/workflow-recipes/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "workload-recipes-controller",
- "version": "0.1.337",
+ "version": "0.1.338",
"description": "Workload Recipes Controller (WRC) - WorkloadRecipe lifecycle management and MCP server interface",
"main": "dist/main.js",
"engines": {
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts
index b03be713b..c31b83287 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ export interface OAuthClientDef {
export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSpec {
promptBridge?: {
allowedModels?: string[]
- /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead (R4-H2). */
+ /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead. */
maxOutputTokens?: number
/** @deprecated Accepted for compatibility; no longer enforced (issue #348). Platform per-minute rate limits apply. */
maxRequestsPerRun?: number
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSpec {
export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSnippetConfig {
promptBridge?: {
allowedModels?: string[]
- /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead (R4-H2). */
+ /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead. */
maxOutputTokens?: number
}
clientNotifications?: {
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.test.ts
index f2615f4cc..7d8cf60e4 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.test.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.test.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import type { CodexConfigMapView } from '@clerum/codex-catalog-projection'
import { computeCodexPolicyHash } from '@clerum/llm-provider-attempt-contract'
import type { WorkflowRecipeSpec } from '../types'
import {
@@ -6,15 +7,21 @@ import {
type CodexReconcileContext,
projectCodexRecipeVerdict,
} from './codexRecipeVerdict'
+import { parseAllowedModelsSnapshot, snapshotFromConfigMapError } from './llmAllowedModelsSnapshot'
/*
- * R5-B1. The Codex seam was fixed four times and each fix converged one more
+ * The Codex seam was fixed four times and each fix converged one more
* dimension: `readOk`, then `snapshotError`, while `provenance` stayed free to
* diverge. These tests pin the verdict as a whole, so a future dimension
* cannot be added on only one side.
*
* The last case in the file is the invariant sweep: it quantifies over every
* row rather than trusting that someone remembered to assert it per case.
+ *
+ * Views are built by the SAME producers the reconciler uses — a hand-written
+ * snapshot would let a ConfigMap-shape change break parsing in production
+ * while these stayed green, because the verdict only falls back to
+ * `view.snapshot` when it cannot re-derive from `view.configMap`.
*/
const MODEL = 'gpt-5.6-luna'
@@ -28,7 +35,7 @@ const codexSpec = (): WorkflowRecipeSpec =>
function eligibleConfigMap(overrides?: {
annotations?: Record<string, string>
models?: string[]
-}) {
+}): CodexConfigMapView {
return {
metadata: {
annotations: {
@@ -47,14 +54,16 @@ function eligibleConfigMap(overrides?: {
}
}
-const viewFrom = (
- configMap: ReturnType<typeof eligibleConfigMap> | undefined
-): CodexAllowlistView =>
- ({ configMap, snapshot: { flagEnabled: true } }) as unknown as CodexAllowlistView
+/** Exactly how `refreshCodexSnapshot` assembles the view it hands every consumer. */
+const viewFrom = (configMap: CodexConfigMapView | undefined): CodexAllowlistView => ({
+ configMap,
+ snapshot: parseAllowedModelsSnapshot(configMap),
+})
/** A view whose ConfigMap never arrived — the snapshot-error dimension. */
-const unreadableView = (): CodexAllowlistView =>
- ({ snapshot: { flagEnabled: false, snapshotError: 'missing' } }) as unknown as CodexAllowlistView
+const unreadableView = (): CodexAllowlistView => ({
+ snapshot: snapshotFromConfigMapError('missing'),
+})
function context(overrides?: Partial<CodexReconcileContext>): CodexReconcileContext {
return {
@@ -91,7 +100,7 @@ describe('projectCodexRecipeVerdict', () => {
expect(v.hostBinding).toBeNull()
})
- // R5-B1 proper: the two provenance-uncertain states. Both were `ineligible`
+ // The two provenance-uncertain states. Both were `ineligible`
// on the configure path while the scope path already called them uncertain,
// so a binding-less v3 configure wiped a live host binding over a transient
// condition.
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.ts
index 1d36ac7f2..d6690ec9e 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/codexRecipeVerdict.ts
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import {
/*
* ONE Codex verdict per reconcile pass.
*
- * This seam has been fixed four times — J4, N-08, R4-B1, R5-B1 — and every
+ * This seam has been fixed four times across four reviews, and every
* fix converged one more dimension while leaving another live. The shape of
* the bug never changed: two consumers answered the same question along
* different paths, so `readOk` disagreed with `eligibility`, and then
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ export type CodexReconcileContext = {
/**
* The allowlist refresh, captured once by the caller. Passing the view rather
* than reading `this.codexView` inside is what keeps a concurrently-refreshed
- * snapshot from splitting one pass across two views (N-08, scope dimension).
+ * snapshot from splitting one pass across two views (scope dimension).
*/
export type CodexAllowlistView = {
configMap?: CodexConfigMapView
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ export function projectCodexRecipeVerdict(input: {
} as const
if (projection.eligibility !== 'eligible') {
- // R5-B1 audit (R4): warn ONLY for a recipe that actually targets Codex, and
+ // Warn ONLY for a recipe that actually targets Codex, and
// only when the doubt is about provenance. An unreadable ConfigMap already
// produces three warns in `refreshCodexSnapshot`, and it makes EVERY recipe
// uncertain — including those with no Codex target — because the shared
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/modelConfigHandler.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/modelConfigHandler.ts
index 04fed8e7a..de1e97aab 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/modelConfigHandler.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/modelConfigHandler.ts
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ export class ModelConfigHandler {
// Shape alone is not proof: re-derive the policy hash and pin the model
// so a host cannot echo a well-formed binding for another model or with
// a hash that does not match its own five fields.
- // R4-L1: without a model there is no pin to apply, and an unpinned
+ // Without a model there is no pin to apply, and an unpinned
// binding could be for another model. Refuse it rather than accept it
// blind — the pin is the point of this call.
const verifiedCodexBinding = model
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.codexPolicy.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.codexPolicy.test.ts
index e23e8da2c..7a68aaa91 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.codexPolicy.test.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.codexPolicy.test.ts
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ function makeHarness(configureResult: unknown) {
} as unknown as PluginWorkloadSdkProvisionerDeps
const provisioner = new PluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner(deps)
- // R5-B1: the provisioner now takes ONE verdict instead of a binding plus a
+ // The provisioner now takes ONE verdict instead of a binding plus a
// derived boolean. These helpers keep each existing case's semantics: a
// minted binding means eligible+authoritative, and "undecidable" means the
// projection itself could not decide.
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ describe('eager Codex policy gate', () => {
})
it('discards a cached proof whose pod was replaced instead of reporting ready', async () => {
- // N-06: the proof is the pod's, not the recipe's. A replacement pod has
+ // The proof is the pod's, not the recipe's. A replacement pod has
// never been configured, so a snapshot outage must not let its predecessor's
// proof stand in for it.
const harness = makeHarness(readyBootstrapBody(MINTED))
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ describe('eager Codex policy gate', () => {
})
it('rejects a bootstrap that echoes a Codex binding other than the minted one', async () => {
- // N-14: a host answering with a different policy than the one WRC minted is
+ // A host answering with a different policy than the one WRC minted is
// a broken host, not a pending policy. Three consecutive rounds exhaust the
// configure budget and surface provider_unavailable.
const harness = makeHarness(
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.imageDrift.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.imageDrift.test.ts
index 61929e2ea..8996708bb 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.imageDrift.test.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.imageDrift.test.ts
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ describe('ensureEagerSdkMcpHost ConfigMap snapshot skip', () => {
RUNTIME,
{
mcpHostPhase: 'Running',
- // R5-B1: undecidable is now a field of the one verdict.
+ // Undecidable is now a field of the one verdict.
codexVerdict: {
provenance: 'uncertain',
provenanceReason: 'parent_spec_unavailable',
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.ts
index 3b71936c5..adef2d844 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.ts
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ export class PluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner {
opts: {
mcpHostPhase: string | undefined
/**
- * The caller's ONE Codex verdict for this pass (R5-B1). Required, and
+ * The caller's ONE Codex verdict for this pass. Required, and
* deliberately not a pair of optional derived fields: an optional
* `codexBindingUndecidable` defaulting to false is a flag a future
* caller can silently omit, which is precisely how a binding-less v3
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ export class PluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner {
}
// Both the skip decision above and this binding are fields of the SAME
// verdict the caller computed once for this pass. The provisioner never
- // re-derives either after its own awaits (R5-B1).
+ // re-derives either after its own awaits.
const resolvedCodexBinding = opts.codexVerdict.hostBinding
const capabilityFamily = promptBridge ? 'promptBridge' : 'clientNotifications'
const configureKey = `${readiness.uid}:${capabilityFamily}:${mcpHostAgent?.provider ?? 'none'}:${mcpHostAgent?.model ?? 'none'}:${resolvedCodexBinding?.bindingHash ?? 'none'}`
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.test.ts
index 2b11e96a2..5d09f61fe 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.test.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.test.ts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const HASH = computeCodexPolicyHash({
describe('readVerifiedSdkOnlyCodexBinding', () => {
// The derive/resolve suite moved to codexRecipeVerdict.test.ts along with
- // the functions themselves (R5-B1): those entry points were blind to
+ // the functions themselves: those entry points were blind to
// provenance and are deleted, not deprecated.
it('rebuilds a five-field proof and drops extra keys', () => {
const proof = {
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ describe('readVerifiedSdkOnlyCodexBinding', () => {
bindingHash: HASH,
extra: true,
}
- // R4-L1: the model is a required argument now. This call used to omit it,
+ // The model is a required argument now. This call used to omit it,
// which silently skipped the pin — the very gap the change closes.
expect(readVerifiedSdkOnlyCodexBinding(proof, MODEL)).toEqual({
connectionKey: 'team-plus',
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.ts
index 12e678f39..607664fc8 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/sdkOnlyCodexBinding.ts
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ export function sanitizePluginWorkloadSdkCodexBindingProof(
}
/**
- * R4-L1: `model` is REQUIRED. It used to be optional and the model pin was
+ * `model` is REQUIRED. It used to be optional and the model pin was
* skipped when omitted, so a caller that forgot it would accept a binding for
* another model. mcp-host's twin has always required it; the two now agree.
*/
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export function readVerifiedSdkOnlyCodexBinding(
* Deliberately NOT exported alongside a "derive from a ConfigMap" helper any
* more. Those helpers (`deriveSdkOnlyCodexBinding` / `resolveSdkOnlyCodexBinding`)
* were blind to provenance, so a caller could obtain a binding for a recipe
- * whose Codex authority could not be established — the R5-B1 wipe. The only
+ * whose Codex authority could not be established — the live-binding wipe. The only
* caller is `projectCodexRecipeVerdict`, which gates on provenance and
* eligibility first. Removed rather than deprecated, for the same reason
* `readOk` was removed: a reachable blind path invites the sibling back.
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.codexUncertainScope.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.codexUncertainScope.test.ts
index 017d4d1f1..8949f7c36 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.codexUncertainScope.test.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.codexUncertainScope.test.ts
@@ -29,8 +29,19 @@ const runtimeTokenIssuerMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
issueMcpHostWorkflowControlToken: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('mcp-host-control-token'),
}))
+/**
+ * Pass-through spy: the real projection still runs, so no behaviour changes.
+ * It exists only to count how many verdicts one reconcile derives.
+ */
+const codexVerdictMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({ project: vi.fn() }))
+
vi.mock('./crashRecovery', () => crashRecoveryMocks)
vi.mock('./mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient', () => runtimeTokenIssuerMocks)
+vi.mock('./codexRecipeVerdict', async importOriginal => {
+ const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import('./codexRecipeVerdict')>()
+ codexVerdictMocks.project.mockImplementation(actual.projectCodexRecipeVerdict)
+ return { ...actual, projectCodexRecipeVerdict: codexVerdictMocks.project }
+})
vi.mock('../gfsBinding', () => ({
mintRecipeHostGfsToken: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
['to'.concat('ken')]: 'gfs-runtime-value',
@@ -274,7 +285,7 @@ describe('Codex scope under an undecidable catalog', () => {
})
it('does not remint or roll when the allowlist read fails and the JWT already holds the scope', async () => {
- // N-04. An unreadable ConfigMap yields an empty derivedScopes, which is
+ // An unreadable ConfigMap yields an empty derivedScopes, which is
// indistinguishable from a revocation. Treating it as one remints with
// reason 'scope', which rolls the eager pod and drops its bootstrap proof —
// then rolls it a SECOND time when the ConfigMap comes back. No policy
@@ -304,7 +315,7 @@ describe('Codex scope under an undecidable catalog', () => {
it('still withdraws the scope and rolls the pod when a readable catalog revokes the grant', async () => {
// The other half of the same rule: `uncertain` preserves, but a decision
- // decides. If this ever stops rolling, N-04's fix has swallowed the
+ // decides. If this ever stops rolling, the preserve-on-unreadable fix has swallowed the
// revocation path it was explicitly required not to mask.
//
// The steady-state pass in the middle is the control: it runs against the
@@ -409,7 +420,7 @@ describe('Codex allowlist view across interleaved recipes', () => {
})
it('configures with its OWN binding when another recipe wipes the shared view mid-reconcile', async () => {
- // N-08. Recipe B captured a readable catalog; while B is inside
+ // Recipe B captured a readable catalog; while B is inside
// ensureEagerSdkMcpHost, recipe A's refresh fails and clears the shared
// state. Resolving the binding from that shared state after the awaits gave
// B a null binding while `codexBindingUndecidable` still said false — a
@@ -455,7 +466,7 @@ describe('Codex allowlist view across interleaved recipes', () => {
})
})
- // ── R5-M1 / R5-B1 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ // ── Reconciler-level wiring, not just its two ends ──────────────────────
// The previous round fixed the wiring but tested only its two ends: the
// helper (malformed -> uncertain) and the provisioner (given the flag as an
// input). Nothing drove the reconciler, so forcing the flag to `false` at
@@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ describe('Codex allowlist view across interleaved recipes', () => {
})
it('withholds configure when the runtime-scope parent spec is unavailable', async () => {
- // R5-B1 proper. The scope path already called this uncertain and kept the
+ // The scope path already called this uncertain and kept the
// live JWT scope; the configure path called it `ineligible` and shipped a
// null binding, wiping the live execution binding over a transient read.
const { reconciler, coreApi, configure } = createHarness()
@@ -573,7 +584,7 @@ describe('Codex allowlist view across interleaved recipes', () => {
})
it('agrees on binding and scope in the eligible case', async () => {
- // R5-B1's real invariant, asserted as a biconditional rather than as two
+ // The real invariant, asserted as a biconditional rather than as two
// independent facts: a configure that carries a binding must come with
// the scope, and vice versa.
const { reconciler, coreApi, configure } = createHarness()
@@ -588,5 +599,25 @@ describe('Codex allowlist view across interleaved recipes', () => {
expect(carriedBinding).toBe(true)
expect(carriedBinding).toBe(issuedScopes().includes(CODEX_SCOPE))
})
+
+ it('derives exactly one verdict per pass, including the eager configure', async () => {
+ // The structural half of the invariant. Every earlier fix converged one
+ // more dimension between two derivations; this asserts there is only one
+ // derivation to converge. A second call with today's arguments cannot
+ // disagree, but it is the seam each previous round grew back from — and
+ // it emitted the uncertain-provenance warning twice.
+ const { reconciler, coreApi, configure } = createHarness()
+ bindGrant(reconciler)
+ codexVerdictMocks.project.mockClear()
+
+ await reconcileRecipe(reconciler, codexSdkSpec())
+
+ // Positive evidence that the pass really reached eager provisioning —
+ // otherwise a count of one would be the count of a reconcile that
+ // never got far enough to derive a second verdict.
+ expect(builtMcpHostPodFrom(coreApi)).toBeDefined()
+ expect(configure).toHaveBeenCalled()
+ expect(codexVerdictMocks.project).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+ })
})
})
diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.ts
index 25de87bb6..1cb15fba2 100644
--- a/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.ts
+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/workflow/workflowReconciler.ts
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
* binding-less v3 configure that wipes a live mcp-host binding.
* Readers capture `this.codexView` once and use only that snapshot.
*
- * There is deliberately NO derived boolean here (R4-B1, R5-B1). Every
+ * There is deliberately NO derived boolean here. Every
* consumer reads a field of the ONE `CodexRecipeVerdict` a pass computes
* with `projectCodexRecipeVerdict`. Converging one dimension at a time —
* first `readOk`, then `snapshotError` — always left the next one free to
@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
* the caller must capture the allowlist refresh once and hand the same
* object to every consumer. Reading the live field here is exactly how the
* scope path and the configure path ended up on two different snapshots
- * within one pass (N-08, scope dimension).
+ * within one pass (scope dimension).
*/
private codexVerdictFor(
spec: WorkflowRecipeSpec,
@@ -1453,7 +1453,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
): Promise<WorkflowReconcileResult> {
const preflightError = this.validateWorkflowSpec(spec)
if (preflightError) return { phase: 'failed', message: preflightError, workflowPhase: 'failed' }
- // R5-B1 audit (R3): capture the allowlist refresh ONCE for this pass and
+ // Capture the allowlist refresh ONCE for this pass and
// compute the verdict from it. Every consumer below — eager configure, the
// run path's secrets, and the NetworkPolicy decision — reads this object
// instead of `this.codexView`, which a concurrent recipe can replace
@@ -1634,18 +1634,15 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
// (that PVC is provisioned by the triggered-run path). Mounting it
// here would wedge the pod in Pending — the PVC does not exist until a
// run starts. The triggered run later recreates the pod with the mount.
- // R5-N1: one verdict, computed from the view this pass captured.
+ // Reuse the verdict this pass already computed rather than deriving a
+ // second one from the same view. Two derivations cannot disagree here
+ // (identical arguments, `codexView` is const), but a second one is a
+ // seam waiting to drift the moment either call site's arguments move —
+ // and it emits the uncertain-provenance warning twice per pass.
// Resolving the binding inside the provisioner (after its own awaits)
// let a concurrently-reconciled recipe's failed refresh hand over a
// null binding that read as decidable — a binding-less v3 configure
// that wipes the live host binding.
- const eagerCodexVerdict = this.codexVerdictFor(
- spec,
- recipeUid,
- recipeName,
- runtimeScopeRecipeName,
- codexView
- )
const eagerStatus = await this.pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.ensureEagerSdkMcpHost(
recipeName,
recipeUid,
@@ -1653,7 +1650,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
runtimeScopeRecipeName,
spec,
runtime,
- { mcpHostPhase, codexVerdict: eagerCodexVerdict }
+ { mcpHostPhase, codexVerdict }
)
const eagerBootstrapProof =
this.pluginWorkloadSdkProvisioner.getBootstrapProof(recipeName)
@@ -2908,7 +2905,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
runtime: WorkflowRuntimePlan,
awaitsTriggeredRun: boolean,
/**
- * The pass's Codex projection. R5-B1 audit: recomputing it here read the
+ * The pass's Codex projection. Recomputing it here read the
* live allowlist view after this method's own awaits, so a NetworkPolicy
* decision could rest on a different snapshot than the binding did.
*/
@@ -3764,7 +3761,7 @@ export class WorkflowReconciler {
runtimeScopeRecipeName: string,
spec: WorkflowRecipeSpec,
recipeUid: string | undefined,
- // R5-B1: the SAME verdict the caller used for the configure decision.
+ // The SAME verdict the caller used for the configure decision.
// Recomputing it here read `this.codexView` live, so a concurrent refresh
// could give the binding one snapshot and the scopes another.
codexVerdict: CodexRecipeVerdict