Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
docs: correct CodeQL fixture topology details (R17-L1)
Josué3cb65205cfda
diff --git a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.mdindex c0aacc621..1eea0b16e 100644--- a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md+++ b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md@@ -93,28 +93,35 @@ contract; `external-rest-api/test/middleware.rateLimit.test.ts` verifies trustedAlert #1769 points to error-response handling in`control-api/test/passwordResetPayload.externalRest.realPostgres.integration.test.ts`. The test-mounts `requireInternalToken`, `requireInternalService('external-rest-api')`, and the real-`createExternalInvitationsRouter()` on a task-owned Control API Express app, then binds that app to-an ephemeral `127.0.0.1` port. It also starts the built External REST app in a child process on a-second ephemeral loopback port. Supertest sends HTTP requests to that child process; it does not-receive the Express app object directly. These are test-owned loopback listeners, not a public or-deployed service listener.+mounts `requireInternalToken` and the real `createExternalInvitationsRouter()` on a task-owned+Control API Express app, then binds that app to an ephemeral `127.0.0.1` port. The middleware+validates the bearer token against the service named by `x-service-token` and attaches that service+identity for downstream authorization. The test also starts its task-local Member Registration+service on a selected ephemeral port; the test addresses it through `127.0.0.1`, while the+producer app does not specify a host bind. The built External REST app runs in a separate child+process on its own ephemeral port explicitly bound to `127.0.0.1`. Supertest sends HTTP requests+to the External REST child; it does not receive the Express app object directly. These listeners+are test-owned, not deployed service listeners.The production External REST `POST /invitations/password` route retains its 10/minute`acceptRateLimit`. The Control API password-token route applies its external-client source limitersand 10/minute admission bucket, with the documented process-memory fallback when the limiter-backend is unavailable. The real mounted route is also behind the internal service authentication-in the test fixture. These controls support the test-only false-positive disposition; the alert-does not identify an unbounded deployed route.--Only the ambiguous-reset case uses `createDropResetResponseProxy`. For ordinary proxy responses it-copies the upstream status and body, sets a constant `application/json` content type, and forwards-no response headers, including `Retry-After` or `Set-Cookie`. For the one-use password-token POST it-consumes the upstream response and destroys the downstream connection to model a lost reset-acknowledgement. The public External REST route owns its bounded retry response and issues its own-session cookie only after a successful reset with a valid session token. Focused invitation and-trusted-source tests verify the public 429/`Retry-After` behavior; they do not assert that the-fault-injection proxy forwards those headers.+backend is unavailable. In production, the Control API mounts this router behind+`requireInternalService('external-rest-api')`. The composed test fixture mounts+`requireInternalToken` directly and does not exercise that expected-service gate; it does validate+the bearer token and exercise the real route and its limiter/admission behavior. These controls+support the test-only false-positive disposition; the alert does not identify an unbounded deployed+route.++The `createDropResetResponseProxy` helper is exercised both for ordinary response forwarding and+for the ambiguous-reset case. For ordinary proxy responses it copies the upstream status and body,+sets a constant `application/json` content type, and forwards no response headers, including+`Retry-After` or `Set-Cookie`. For the one-use password-token POST it consumes the upstream+response and destroys the downstream connection to model a lost reset acknowledgement. The public+External REST route owns its bounded retry response and issues its own session cookie only after a+successful reset with a valid session token. Focused invitation and trusted-source tests verify the+public 429/`Retry-After` behavior; they do not assert that the fault-injection proxy forwards those+headers.GitHub currently records alert #1769 as dismissed with reason `false positive`. Its 2026-10-12dismissal note relied on the earlier Supertest-only topology. This entry updates the repository's