Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
fix(control-api): key MCP Secret delete limits on the admin principal
Alfredo Lopez4f91d758cc62
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 42e274bd2..f535df78c 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.633",+ "version": "0.1.634","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.633",+ "version": "0.1.634","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/grok-provider-attempt-contract": "file:../packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 69a52a844..a6d907f97 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.633",+ "version": "0.1.634","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.tsindex 3192fcbe3..6155fd06f 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts@@ -61,10 +61,15 @@ const mcpSecretDeleteEdgeRateLimit = rateLimit({limit: 60,standardHeaders: 'draft-7',legacyHeaders: false,+ // Keyed on `sub`, not `jti`: `signAdminToken` mints a fresh `jti` on every+ // login (utils/auth/adminAuthToken.ts:21), so a per-`jti` budget resets each+ // time the same admin re-authenticates. `sub` is the stable principal, which+ // is what the sibling admin buckets use (registry.ts:4420, :4556) and what+ // pluginWorkloadSdkRateLimits.ts:63-66 already did.keyGenerator: req => {- const sessionJti = (req as UiAuthedRequest).adminAuth?.jti- return sessionJti- ? `admin-session:${createHash('sha256').update(sessionJti).digest('hex')}`+ const adminSub = (req as UiAuthedRequest).adminAuth?.sub+ return adminSub+ ? `admin-session:${createHash('sha256').update(adminSub).digest('hex')}`: ipKeyGenerator(req.ip ?? '127.0.0.1')},})@@ -72,9 +77,11 @@ const mcpSecretDeleteEdgeRateLimit = rateLimit({const mcpSecretDeleteRateLimit = rateLimitMiddleware({bucketType: 'admin_mcp_secret_delete',maxPerMinute: 30,+ // Same reasoning as mcpSecretDeleteEdgeRateLimit: the stable principal, so+ // re-authenticating does not hand the caller a fresh delete budget.getBucketKey: req => {- const sessionJti = (req as UiAuthedRequest).adminAuth?.jti- const caller = sessionJti || req.ip || 'unknown-admin'+ const adminSub = (req as UiAuthedRequest).adminAuth?.sub+ const caller = adminSub || req.ip || 'unknown-admin'return `admin-mcp-secret-delete:${createHash('sha256').update(caller).digest('hex')}`},// Required by RateLimitEnforcerOptions since dev made the choice explicit; the@@ -932,9 +939,18 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(// Current clients send the identity returned by POST and retain the// established compare-and-delete contract.} else {- // Only the historical empty DELETE body can use the short-lived- // server-side permit issued during this admin session's successful- // create. Any other body must use the complete identity contract.+ // Only a body that carries no caller-supplied field can use the+ // short-lived server-side permit issued during this admin session's+ // successful create. Any other body must use the complete identity+ // contract.+ //+ // "No field" is what reaches this check, not what the client sent:+ // enforceNamespace (registered on this route above) deletes a+ // top-level `namespace` before the handler runs, so `{"namespace":…}`+ // arrives as `{}` and also takes the permit path. That grants nothing+ // — the namespace is server-determined, and the permit is bound to+ // this session's JTI, the name, and the configured namespace — but the+ // admitted set is wider than "the historical empty body" alone.if (!isLegacyMcpSecretDeleteBody(req.body)) {res.status(428).json({ error: 'secret_identity_precondition_required' })returndiff --git a/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts b/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.tsindex 08a93da70..61f5f25c0 100644--- a/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts@@ -59,10 +59,14 @@ describe('CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS ordering invariant', () => {expect(currentCollisions).toEqual([])})- it('requires 0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits to persist expiring rollback permits', async () => {+ it('requires 0116_mcp_secret_rollback_permits to persist expiring rollback permits', async () => {const { CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS } = await import('../src/db.js')+ // Renumbered twice while syncing onto dev: 0101 -> 0109 -> 0116. The earlier+ // names survive only in this migration's legacyVersions, and the test above+ // forbids an alias from colliding with a current version, so looking one up+ // here by its old name can only ever find nothing.const migration = CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS.find(- candidate => candidate.version === '0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits'+ candidate => candidate.version === '0116_mcp_secret_rollback_permits')expect(migration).toBeDefined()diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.recipeSecrets.ownership.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.recipeSecrets.ownership.test.tsindex a1fa3000a..c2bc24733 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.recipeSecrets.ownership.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.recipeSecrets.ownership.test.ts@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'import express from 'express'import request from 'supertest'+import { clerumErrorHandler } from '../src/http/errorHandler.js'import { createAdminSecretsRouter } from '../src/routes/admin/secrets.js'interface MockSecret {@@ -85,12 +86,11 @@ function makeApp(gateway: ReturnType<typeof createGateway>) {const app = express()app.use(express.json())app.use(createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway as never))- app.use(- (err: unknown, _req: express.Request, res: express.Response, _next: express.NextFunction) => {- const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'unknown'- res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal Server Error', message })- }- )+ // The production handler, not a local stand-in. A hand-written handler here+ // would let a test assert a response shape the real app never emits, so the+ // 500-propagation test below would be verifying this file instead of+ // src/http/errorHandler.ts.+ app.use(clerumErrorHandler)return app}diff --git a/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md b/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.mdindex 793699ec3..78825d096 100644--- a/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md+++ b/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ bodyless rollback path of `POST /admin/mcp-secrets` followed by## Deployment contract1. Run the Control API schema migration job before changing the pod image.-2. Verify migration `0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` and the runtime-access+2. Verify migration `0116_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` and the runtime-accessprofile before starting Control API.3. Deploy Control API with its repository-owned `Recreate` strategy and onereplica. Old and new API writers must not overlap.@@ -37,24 +37,24 @@ Run the database-migration job **before** rolling the Control API image. TheControl API deployment is `strategy: Recreate` with a single replica(`deploy/base/control-plane/control-api.yaml`), so the old pod is terminatedbefore the new one starts. A new image deployed against a database that has not-yet applied `0109` fails `assertDbReady` on startup with-`missing migrations 0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` — and because the previous+yet applied `0116` fails `assertDbReady` on startup with+`missing migrations 0116_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` — and because the previouspod is already gone, that is a full control-plane outage, not a stalledrollout. The CRD apply is independent of this ordering: control-api reads theSecret-reference contract from a compiled-in constant, not from the CRDannotation, so the charts may be applied before or after the image.-## Image rollback after migration 0109+## Image rollback after migration 0116Rollback is **image-only**:-1. Keep migration `0109`, the new table, and the current runtime-access profile.+1. Keep migration `0116`, the new table, and the current runtime-access profile.2. Use the current checkout's deployment and database-migration tooling.3. Change only the Control API image to the previously verified image.4. Re-run the current runtime-access reconciliation and exact privilege check.The previous Control API binary ignores the additive table. Do not run an old-checkout's exact-schema verifier after `0109`; it does not know the new public+checkout's exact-schema verifier after `0116`; it does not know the new publicrelation and will correctly refuse to certify it. Never drop the table as partof an application-image rollback.