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fix(control-api): harden admin workflow rate-limit isolation

Alfredo Lopez5274c736f570
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.json
index 514fcfe60..d6782a6cb 100644
--- a/control-api/package-lock.json
+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.487",
+ "version": "0.1.488",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.487",
+ "version": "0.1.488",
"dependencies": {
"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field",
"@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",
diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.json
index 3c2f3cd96..895f64295 100644
--- a/control-api/package.json
+++ b/control-api/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.487",
+ "version": "0.1.488",
"description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets",
"main": "dist/main.js",
"engines": {
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/grants.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/grants.routes.ts
index 9d7e99b6f..f6f409c12 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/grants.routes.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/grants.routes.ts
@@ -39,10 +39,12 @@ function withAdministrativeTraceContext<T>(req: Request, operatorSub: string, wo
// product contracts, even though both mutate workflow authorization policy.
export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
const router = Router()
+ const readRateLimits = workflowGrantReadRateLimits()
+ const writeRateLimits = workflowGrantWriteRateLimits()
router.get(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/grants`,
- ...workflowGrantReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)) return
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.put(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/grants`,
- ...workflowGrantWriteRateLimits(),
+ ...writeRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.get(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/team-grants`,
- ...workflowGrantReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)) return
@@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.put(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/team-grants`,
- ...workflowGrantWriteRateLimits(),
+ ...writeRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.get(
`/admin/workflow-recipes/:ns/:name/allowed-teams`,
- ...workflowGrantReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
if (!requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)) return
@@ -198,7 +200,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.put(
`/admin/workflow-recipes/:ns/:name/allowed-teams/:teamId`,
- ...workflowGrantWriteRateLimits(),
+ ...writeRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
@@ -238,7 +240,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowGrantRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.delete(
`/admin/workflow-recipes/:ns/:name/allowed-teams/:teamId`,
- ...workflowGrantWriteRateLimits(),
+ ...writeRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/read.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/read.routes.ts
index c3511645d..8c294a2d5 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/read.routes.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/read.routes.ts
@@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ const BASE = '/admin/workflows'
export function createAdminWorkflowReadRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
const router = Router()
+ const readRateLimits = workflowAdminReadRateLimits()
router.get(
BASE,
- ...workflowAdminReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowReadRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.get(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name`,
- ...workflowAdminReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowReadRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.get(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/health`,
- ...workflowAdminReadRateLimits(),
+ ...readRateLimits,
bindAdminWorkflowAuth,
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = requireBoundAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/trigger.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/trigger.routes.ts
index cbe74cb72..229457780 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/trigger.routes.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/workflows/trigger.routes.ts
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
triggerWorkflow,
} from '../../../services/workflows/workflowTriggerService.js'
import { requireAdminWorkflowCaller } from '../../workflows/shared/auth.js'
-import { workflowTriggerRateLimit } from '../../workflows/shared/rateLimit.js'
+import { adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit } from '../../workflows/shared/rateLimit.js'
const BASE = '/admin/workflows'
const logger = rootLogger.child({ module: 'admin-workflows' })
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ export function createAdminWorkflowTriggerRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {
router.post(
`${BASE}/:ns/:name/trigger`,
- workflowTriggerRateLimit(),
+ adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit(),
asyncHandler(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const caller = await requireAdminWorkflowCaller(req, res)
if (!caller) return
diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit.ts b/control-api/src/routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit.ts
index f7c1cd6c3..56474616a 100644
--- a/control-api/src/routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit.ts
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ export function adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential(req: Request): string | null {
return cookie || null
}
-/** Persist PG buckets only for cryptographically verified admin subjects. */
+/** Extract the signed administrator subject for direct callers. */
export function verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject(credential: string | null): string | null {
if (!credential) return null
const claims = verifyAdminToken(credential)
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ export function verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject(credential: string | null): string
function hashedAdminWorkflowCredentialBucket(prefix: string) {
return (req: Request): string | null => {
const credential = adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential(req)
- const subject = verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject(credential)
- if (subject) {
- const hash = createHash('sha256').update(subject).digest('hex').slice(0, 32)
+ const sessionIdentity = verifiedAdminRateLimitIdentity(credential)
+ if (sessionIdentity) {
+ const hash = createHash('sha256').update(sessionIdentity).digest('hex').slice(0, 32)
return `${prefix}:${hash}`
}
if (!credential) return null
@@ -55,13 +55,13 @@ export function shouldSkipWorkflowGrantEdgeRateLimit(req: Request): boolean {
/**
* Edge backstop key:
- * - Verified admin cookie/bearer → per-subject bucket (isolates Control UI admins)
+ * - Verified admin cookie/bearer → per-session bucket (isolates live sessions)
* - Unverified credential → IP bucket (rotation cannot mint fresh identities)
*/
export function workflowGrantEdgeRateLimitKey(prefix: string, req: Request): string {
- const subject = verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject(adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential(req))
- if (subject) {
- const hash = createHash('sha256').update(subject).digest('hex').slice(0, 32)
+ const sessionIdentity = verifiedAdminRateLimitIdentity(adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential(req))
+ if (sessionIdentity) {
+ const hash = createHash('sha256').update(sessionIdentity).digest('hex').slice(0, 32)
return `${prefix}:sub:${hash}`
}
return `${prefix}:ip:${ipKeyGenerator(req.ip ?? 'unknown')}`
@@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ function createWorkflowEdgeRateLimit(prefix: string, limit: number) {
}
/**
- * Fresh stack per call so route tests stay isolated. Shared MemoryStore
- * across grant-write registrations is a follow-up (Low 1), not this PR.
+ * Fresh stack per call so route factories and tests can scope their stores.
+ * Routers that own a rate-limit family instantiate the tuple once and reuse it.
*/
export function workflowGrantReadEdgeRateLimit() {
return createWorkflowEdgeRateLimit('workflow_grants_read_edge', WORKFLOW_GRANT_READ_PER_MINUTE)
@@ -130,6 +130,25 @@ export function adminOutputsReadRateLimits() {
return [adminOutputsReadEdgeRateLimit(), adminOutputsReadRateLimit()] as const
}
+function adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimitKey(req: Request): string | null {
+ const value = adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential(req)
+ if (!value) return null
+ const identity = verifiedAdminRateLimitIdentity(value)
+ if (identity) {
+ const hash = createHash('sha256').update(identity).digest('hex').slice(0, 32)
+ return `workflow_trigger_admin:${hash}`
+ }
+ return `workflow_trigger_admin:ip:${ipKeyGenerator(req.ip ?? 'unknown')}`
+}
+
+export function adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit() {
+ return rateLimitMiddleware({
+ bucketType: 'workflow_trigger',
+ maxPerMinute: WORKFLOW_TRIGGER_PER_MINUTE,
+ getBucketKey: adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimitKey,
+ })
+}
+
function workflowTriggerRateLimitCredential(req: Request): string | null {
const bearer = extractBearerToken(req)
if (bearer) {
@@ -191,3 +210,9 @@ export function workflowGrantWriteRateLimit() {
getBucketKey: hashedAdminWorkflowCredentialBucket('workflow_grants_write'),
})
}
+
+/** Keep distinct signed sessions in distinct pre-auth quota buckets. */
+export function verifiedAdminRateLimitIdentity(input: string | null): string | null {
+ if (!input || !verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject(input)) return null
+ return input
+}
diff --git a/control-api/test/workflows.shared.rateLimit.test.ts b/control-api/test/workflows.shared.rateLimit.test.ts
index 6b60ecc7d..be5b422f8 100644
--- a/control-api/test/workflows.shared.rateLimit.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/workflows.shared.rateLimit.test.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import request from 'supertest'
import {
adminOutputsReadRateLimits,
adminWorkflowRateLimitCredential,
+ adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit,
shouldSkipWorkflowGrantEdgeRateLimit,
verifiedAdminRateLimitSubject,
workflowAdminReadRateLimits,
@@ -101,6 +102,26 @@ describe('routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit', () => {
)
})
+ it('keeps rotated signed sessions in separate pre-auth buckets', () => {
+ mockVerifyAdminToken.mockImplementation((value: string) =>
+ value.startsWith('signed-') ? signedClaims('same-admin') : null
+ )
+ const reqA = {
+ ip: '203.0.113.10',
+ header: (name: string) =>
+ name.toLowerCase() === 'cookie' ? 'control_ui_admin_session=signed-admin-a' : undefined,
+ } as express.Request
+ const reqB = {
+ ip: '203.0.113.10',
+ header: (name: string) =>
+ name.toLowerCase() === 'cookie' ? 'control_ui_admin_session=signed-admin-b' : undefined,
+ } as express.Request
+
+ expect(workflowGrantEdgeRateLimitKey('workflow_grants_read_edge', reqA)).not.toBe(
+ workflowGrantEdgeRateLimitKey('workflow_grants_read_edge', reqB)
+ )
+ })
+
it('workflowGrantEdgeRateLimitKey aggregates unverified cookies on the same IP', () => {
const reqA = {
ip: '203.0.113.10',
@@ -333,6 +354,39 @@ describe('routes/workflows/shared/rateLimit', () => {
expect(mockCheckAndIncrement.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toMatch(/^workflow_trigger:[0-9a-f]{32}$/)
})
+ it('adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit isolates rotated signed sessions', async () => {
+ mockVerifyAdminToken.mockImplementation((value: string) =>
+ value.startsWith('signed-') ? signedClaims('same-admin') : null
+ )
+ mockCheckAndIncrement.mockReset()
+ mockCheckAndIncrement.mockResolvedValue({
+ allowed: true,
+ remaining: 9,
+ resetMs: Date.now() + 60_000,
+ windowStartMs: Date.now(),
+ count: 1,
+ })
+
+ const app = express()
+ app.post('/trigger', adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit(), (_req, res) => {
+ res.status(200).json({ ok: true })
+ })
+
+ await request(app)
+ .post('/trigger')
+ .set('Cookie', 'control_ui_admin_session=signed-admin-a')
+ .expect(200)
+ await request(app)
+ .post('/trigger')
+ .set('Cookie', 'control_ui_admin_session=signed-admin-b')
+ .expect(200)
+
+ expect(mockCheckAndIncrement).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
+ expect(mockCheckAndIncrement.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).not.toBe(
+ mockCheckAndIncrement.mock.calls[1]?.[0]
+ )
+ })
+
it('workflowGrantReadRateLimit meters cookie-only admin workflow callers', async () => {
mockCheckAndIncrement.mockReset()
mockCheckAndIncrement.mockResolvedValue({
diff --git a/control-ui/components/WorkflowAccessPanel/index.tsx b/control-ui/components/WorkflowAccessPanel/index.tsx
index 59430b77d..2d6fbd00f 100644
--- a/control-ui/components/WorkflowAccessPanel/index.tsx
+++ b/control-ui/components/WorkflowAccessPanel/index.tsx
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import {
allowWorkflowApprovalTeam,
getAdminTeams,
getAdminUsers,
+ isSilentApiError,
listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams,
listWorkflowGrants,
listWorkflowTeamGrants,
@@ -46,6 +47,21 @@ function uniqueIds(ids: string[]): string[] {
return [...new Set(ids.map(id => id.trim()).filter(Boolean))]
}
+function apiErrorStatus(error: unknown): number | null {
+ if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return null
+ const status = (error as { status?: unknown }).status
+ return typeof status === 'number' ? status : null
+}
+
+function apiErrorRetryAfterSeconds(error: unknown): number | null {
+ if (apiErrorStatus(error) !== 429 || !error || typeof error !== 'object') return null
+ const body = (error as { body?: unknown }).body
+ if (!body || typeof body !== 'object') return null
+ const raw = (body as Record<string, unknown>).retryAfterSeconds
+ const seconds = typeof raw === 'number' ? raw : typeof raw === 'string' ? Number(raw) : NaN
+ return Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 ? Math.ceil(seconds) : null
+}
+
function removeId(ids: string[], id: string): string[] {
return ids.filter(existing => existing !== id)
}
@@ -297,26 +313,54 @@ export function WorkflowAccessPanel(props: WorkflowAccessPanelProps): React.JSX.
const removed = current.filter(id => !nextTeamIds.includes(id))
setSectionPatch('approval-target-teams', { mutating: true, mutateError: null })
const errors: string[] = []
+ let rateLimited = false
+ let retryAfterSeconds: number | null = null
+ let appliedMutations = 0
+ const recordMutationError = (error: unknown): boolean => {
+ if (isSilentApiError(error)) throw error
+ if (apiErrorStatus(error) === 429) {
+ rateLimited = true
+ const retry = apiErrorRetryAfterSeconds(error)
+ retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(retryAfterSeconds ?? 0, retry ?? 0) || null
+ return true
+ }
+ errors.push(error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error))
+ return false
+ }
+ let stopMutations = false
try {
// Serialize allow/revoke so a shared 20/min grant-write bucket cannot
// leave a partial write behind a Promise.all rejection.
for (const teamId of added) {
try {
await allowWorkflowApprovalTeam(namespace, recipeName, teamId)
+ appliedMutations += 1
} catch (error) {
- errors.push(error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error))
+ stopMutations = recordMutationError(error)
+ if (stopMutations) break
}
}
- for (const teamId of removed) {
+ for (const teamId of stopMutations ? [] : removed) {
try {
await revokeWorkflowApprovalTeam(namespace, recipeName, teamId)
+ appliedMutations += 1
} catch (error) {
- errors.push(error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error))
+ stopMutations = recordMutationError(error)
+ if (stopMutations) break
}
}
await loadApprovalTeams()
- if (errors.length > 0) {
- throw new Error(errors.join('; '))
+ if (rateLimited || errors.length > 0) {
+ const messages = [...errors]
+ if (rateLimited) {
+ const partialPrefix = appliedMutations > 0 ? 'Some changes were saved. ' : ''
+ messages.unshift(
+ retryAfterSeconds === null
+ ? `${partialPrefix}Too many approval target team changes. Try again shortly.`
+ : `${partialPrefix}Too many approval target team changes. Try again in about ${retryAfterSeconds} seconds.`
+ )
+ }
+ throw new Error(messages.join('; '))
}
if (added.length > 0) {
showToast('Approval target team allowed.', { tone: 'success' })
@@ -326,7 +370,7 @@ export function WorkflowAccessPanel(props: WorkflowAccessPanelProps): React.JSX.
showToast('Approval target teams updated.', { tone: 'success' })
}
} catch (error) {
- if (!mountedRef.current) return
+ if (!mountedRef.current || isSilentApiError(error)) return
setSectionPatch('approval-target-teams', {
mutateError:
error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to save approval target teams',
diff --git a/control-ui/components/__tests__/WorkflowAccessPanel.test.tsx b/control-ui/components/__tests__/WorkflowAccessPanel.test.tsx
index 4d9fd3f97..125232631 100644
--- a/control-ui/components/__tests__/WorkflowAccessPanel.test.tsx
+++ b/control-ui/components/__tests__/WorkflowAccessPanel.test.tsx
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ import React, { useState } from 'react'
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { act, cleanup, fireEvent, render, screen, waitFor, within } from '@testing-library/react'
import {
+ allowWorkflowApprovalTeam,
getAdminTeams,
getAdminUsers,
listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams,
listWorkflowGrants,
listWorkflowTeamGrants,
+ revokeWorkflowApprovalTeam,
setWorkflowGrants,
setWorkflowTeamGrants,
} from '@lib/api'
@@ -19,6 +21,8 @@ vi.mock('@lib/api', () => ({
listWorkflowGrants: vi.fn(),
listWorkflowTeamGrants: vi.fn(),
listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams: vi.fn(),
+ isSilentApiError: (error: unknown) =>
+ Boolean(error && typeof error === 'object' && (error as { silent?: unknown }).silent),
setWorkflowGrants: vi.fn(),
setWorkflowTeamGrants: vi.fn(),
allowWorkflowApprovalTeam: vi.fn(),
@@ -77,6 +81,8 @@ const triggerTeamGrant = {
createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z',
}
const nextTeamGrant = { id: 'team-next', name: 'Next Team', createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z' }
+const finalTeamGrant = { id: 'team-final', name: 'Final Team', createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z' }
+const lastTeamGrant = { id: 'team-last', name: 'Last Team', createdAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z' }
beforeEach(() => {
vi.mocked(getAdminUsers).mockResolvedValue({
@@ -89,6 +95,8 @@ beforeEach(() => {
items: [
{ ...triggerTeamGrant, memberCount: 2 },
{ ...nextTeamGrant, memberCount: 2 },
+ { ...finalTeamGrant, memberCount: 2 },
+ { ...lastTeamGrant, memberCount: 2 },
],
})
vi.mocked(listWorkflowGrants).mockResolvedValue({ items: [] })
@@ -260,4 +268,80 @@ describe('WorkflowAccessPanel', () => {
])
)
})
+
+ it('serializes approval-team writes, reloads after a rate limit, and shows one retry message', async () => {
+ const firstAllow = createDeferred<{ teamId: string }>()
+ const rateLimitError = Object.assign(new Error('429 Too Many Requests'), {
+ status: 429,
+ body: { error: 'Too Many Requests', retryAfterSeconds: 12 },
+ })
+ vi.mocked(listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams).mockResolvedValue({ items: [triggerTeamGrant] })
+ vi.mocked(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam)
+ .mockReturnValueOnce(firstAllow.promise)
+ .mockRejectedValueOnce(rateLimitError)
+
+ render(<EditHarness />)
+
+ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('tab', { name: /Approval target teams/ }))
+ const section = screen.getByTestId('workflow-access-approval-target-teams')
+ await waitFor(() => expect(within(section).getByText('Trigger Team')).toBeInTheDocument())
+
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('option', { name: 'Next Team' }))
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('option', { name: 'Final Team' }))
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('option', { name: 'Last Team' }))
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('button', { name: 'Allow teams' }))
+
+ await waitFor(() => expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
+ expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+ 'sandbox-recipes',
+ 'installed-recipe',
+ 'team-next'
+ )
+ expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+
+ await act(async () => {
+ firstAllow.resolve({ teamId: 'team-next' })
+ })
+
+ await waitFor(() => expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
+ await waitFor(() => expect(listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
+ expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
+ 'sandbox-recipes',
+ 'installed-recipe',
+ 'team-final'
+ )
+ expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+ 'sandbox-recipes',
+ 'installed-recipe',
+ 'team-last'
+ )
+ expect(revokeWorkflowApprovalTeam).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+ expect(within(section).getByRole('alert')).toHaveTextContent(
+ 'Some changes were saved. Too many approval target team changes. Try again in about 12 seconds.'
+ )
+ expect(screen.queryByText('Approval target teams updated.')).not.toBeInTheDocument()
+ })
+
+ it('stops approval-team writes when the session expires', async () => {
+ const authExpired = Object.assign(new Error('Session expired'), {
+ status: 401,
+ silent: true,
+ })
+ vi.mocked(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).mockRejectedValueOnce(authExpired)
+
+ render(<EditHarness />)
+
+ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('tab', { name: /Approval target teams/ }))
+ const section = screen.getByTestId('workflow-access-approval-target-teams')
+ await waitFor(() =>
+ expect(within(section).getByRole('option', { name: 'Next Team' })).toBeInTheDocument()
+ )
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('option', { name: 'Next Team' }))
+ fireEvent.click(within(section).getByRole('button', { name: 'Allow team' }))
+
+ await waitFor(() => expect(allowWorkflowApprovalTeam).toHaveBeenCalledOnce())
+ expect(revokeWorkflowApprovalTeam).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+ expect(listWorkflowApprovalAllowedTeams).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+ expect(within(section).queryByRole('alert')).not.toBeInTheDocument()
+ })
})
diff --git a/control-ui/lib/api.ts b/control-ui/lib/api.ts
index 925383b5f..84ba05af0 100644
--- a/control-ui/lib/api.ts
+++ b/control-ui/lib/api.ts
@@ -225,20 +225,27 @@ export async function apiGet(
const text = await res.text().catch(() => '')
let message = `${res.status} ${res.statusText}`
let code: string | undefined
+ let body: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
try {
- const parsed = JSON.parse(text) as { error?: unknown; message?: unknown }
+ const parsed = JSON.parse(text) as unknown
if (parsed && typeof parsed === 'object') {
- if (typeof parsed.message === 'string' && parsed.message.trim()) {
- message = parsed.message
+ body = parsed as Record<string, unknown>
+ if (typeof body.message === 'string' && body.message.trim()) {
+ message = body.message
}
- if (typeof parsed.error === 'string') code = parsed.error
+ if (typeof body.error === 'string') code = body.error
}
} catch {
/* non-JSON error body: keep the status-text message */
}
- const error = new Error(message) as Error & { status?: number; code?: string }
+ const error = new Error(message) as Error & {
+ status?: number
+ code?: string
+ body?: Record<string, unknown>
+ }
error.status = res.status
if (code) error.code = code
+ if (body) error.body = body
throw error
}
return parseJsonResponse(res)
diff --git a/control-ui/package-lock.json b/control-ui/package-lock.json
index f82798ed4..285ef880b 100644
--- a/control-ui/package-lock.json
+++ b/control-ui/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.443",
+ "version": "0.1.444",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.443",
+ "version": "0.1.444",
"dependencies": {
"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field",
"@clerum/llm-providers": "file:../packages/llm-providers",
diff --git a/control-ui/package.json b/control-ui/package.json
index 930743b63..e63ae6c3c 100644
--- a/control-ui/package.json
+++ b/control-ui/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-ui",
- "version": "0.1.443",
+ "version": "0.1.444",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"dev": "NEXT_IGNORE_INCORRECT_LOCKFILE=1 next dev",
diff --git a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md
index 7099c959f..610df3038 100644
--- a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md
+++ b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md
@@ -18,41 +18,47 @@ may still alert until an `express-rate-limit` **edge backstop** is added (see
## Approved patterns
-| Pattern | Purpose |
-| -------- | -------- |
-| `rateLimitMiddleware` only | Production enforcement (cross-replica) |
-| PG + `express-rate-limit` backstop | Production + CodeQL/SAST visibility |
+| Pattern | Purpose |
+| ------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `rateLimitMiddleware` only | Production enforcement (cross-replica) |
+| PG + `express-rate-limit` backstop | Production + CodeQL/SAST visibility |
| Auth as Express middleware **before** business handler | Keeps authorization out of the final handler node CodeQL labels |
-Tier defaults (requests/minute, per admin credential hash unless noted):
+Tier defaults (requests/minute, per verified admin session identity unless noted):
-| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
-| ---- | ----- | ------------- |
-| Admin public token | 20 | `adminPublicTokenRlPerMin` |
-| Admin workflow grant read | 60 | `workflowGrantReadRateLimit` |
-| Admin workflow grant write | 20 | `workflowGrantWriteRateLimit` |
-| Registry identity voucher | 30 | inline in `registry.ts` |
-| Registry connect request | 3 | inline in `registryConnect.ts` |
+| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
+| ---------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Admin public token | 20 | `adminPublicTokenRlPerMin` |
+| Admin workflow grant read | 60 | `workflowGrantReadRateLimit` |
+| Admin workflow grant write | 20 | `workflowGrantWriteRateLimit` |
+| Registry identity voucher | 30 | inline in `registry.ts` |
+| Registry connect request | 3 | inline in `registryConnect.ts` |
| External GFS read / mutation | 120 / 30 | `externalGfsReadRlPerMin` / `externalGfsOperationRlPerMin` |
## PR #428 / F4 scope (fixed in branch)
-| Alert | Location | Resolution |
-| ----- | -------- | ---------- |
-| [#81](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/81) | `grants.routes.ts:173` | Fixed: cookie bucket + dual limiter + auth middleware |
-| [#82](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/82) | `grants.routes.ts:197` | Fixed: same |
-| [#83](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/83) | `grants.routes.ts:236` | Fixed: same |
-| [#63](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/63) | `outputs.ts:35` | Fixed: `adminOutputsReadRateLimits()` PG + edge backstop (30/min) |
-
-Edge backstop keys: **cookie hash** for Control UI sessions, **source IP** for bearer-only automation, **skipped** when no credential (anonymous). PG tiers remain per admin credential hash.
+| Alert | Location | Resolution |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| [#81](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/81) | `grants.routes.ts:173` | Fixed: cookie bucket + dual limiter + auth middleware |
+| [#82](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/82) | `grants.routes.ts:197` | Fixed: same |
+| [#83](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/83) | `grants.routes.ts:236` | Fixed: same |
+| [#63](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/63) | `outputs.ts:35` | Fixed: `adminOutputsReadRateLimits()` PG + edge backstop (30/min) |
+
+Edge backstop keys: a **verified admin session identity hash** for signed
+Control UI sessions/bearers and a **source-IP fallback** for credentials that
+fail verification; requests with no credential are **skipped** (anonymous).
+PG tiers use the same verified-session identity, with the source-IP fallback
+only for an unverified credential. Distinct signed sessions for one admin are
+kept separate so a revoked/stale session cannot consume the replacement
+session's quota.
Additional tiers shipped in PR #428:
-| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
-| ---- | ----- | ------------- |
-| Admin workflow read | 60 | `workflowAdminReadRateLimits` |
-| Admin outputs read | 30 | `adminOutputsReadRateLimits` |
-| Admin workflow trigger | 10 | `workflowTriggerRateLimit` |
+| Tier | Limit | Config anchor |
+| ---------------------- | ----- | ------------------------------- |
+| Admin workflow read | 60 | `workflowAdminReadRateLimits` |
+| Admin outputs read | 30 | `adminOutputsReadRateLimits` |
+| Admin workflow trigger | 10 | `adminWorkflowTriggerRateLimit` |
## Out-of-scope dispositions (Layer 3)
@@ -60,33 +66,33 @@ Follow-up implementation tracked separately (`fix/codeql-control-api-rate-limit-
### False positive — PG limiter or non-route sink present
-| Alert | Location | Evidence |
-| ----- | -------- | -------- |
-| [#57](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/57) | `app.ts:131` | Middleware mount only; per-route limiters apply downstream |
-| [#58](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/58) | `app.ts:219` | 404 guard for unknown `/gfs/*`; no expensive work |
-| [#60](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/60) | `auth.ts:572` | Handler under `publicAdminTokenRateLimit()` (`adminPublicTokenRlPerMin`) |
-| [#171](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/171) | `registry.ts:24` | `rateLimitMiddleware` 30/min at `:28-35` |
-| [#826](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/826) | `registryConnect.ts:321` | `rateLimitMiddleware` 3/min at `:329-336` |
-| [#803](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/803) | `gfs/grants.ts:849` | Internal DB helper, not an HTTP route handler |
+| Alert | Location | Evidence |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| [#57](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/57) | `app.ts:131` | Middleware mount only; per-route limiters apply downstream |
+| [#58](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/58) | `app.ts:219` | 404 guard for unknown `/gfs/*`; no expensive work |
+| [#60](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/60) | `auth.ts:572` | Handler under `publicAdminTokenRateLimit()` (`adminPublicTokenRlPerMin`) |
+| [#171](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/171) | `registry.ts:24` | `rateLimitMiddleware` 30/min at `:28-35` |
+| [#826](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/826) | `registryConnect.ts:321` | `rateLimitMiddleware` 3/min at `:329-336` |
+| [#803](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/803) | `gfs/grants.ts:849` | Internal DB helper, not an HTTP route handler |
### Won't fix (accepted) — real gap, follow-up backstop PR
Tracked for `fix/codeql-control-api-rate-limit-backstops`. No auth bypass; missing
SAST-visible backstop (and in some cases PG limiter — see Notes).
-| Alert | Location | Planned tier | Notes |
-| ----- | -------- | ------------ | ----- |
-| [#61](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/61) | `auth.ts:607` | 60/min session read | `/admin/auth/me` SPA hydration |
-| [#62](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/62) | `controlAdmins.ts:327` | 10/min write | Admin invitation POST |
-| [#70](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/70) | `registryConnect.ts:520` | 10/min write | Claim redemption |
-| [#71](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/71) | `registryConnect.ts:715` | 10/min write | Key rotation |
-| [#133](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/133) | `gfs/proxy.ts:31` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
-| [#138](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/138) | `gfs/resolve.ts:80` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
-| [#140](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/140) | `gfs/resolve.ts:89` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
-| [#144](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/144) | `gfs/token.ts:44` | 30 mutation | GFS token mint |
-| [#145](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/145) | `gfs/resources.ts:350` | 30 mutation | PATCH resource |
-| [#149](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/149) | `gfs/tree.ts:24` | 120 read | Tree browse |
-| [#150](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/150) | `gfs/tree.ts:51` | 120 read | Children paging |
+| Alert | Location | Planned tier | Notes |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------- | ------------------------------ |
+| [#61](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/61) | `auth.ts:607` | 60/min session read | `/admin/auth/me` SPA hydration |
+| [#62](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/62) | `controlAdmins.ts:327` | 10/min write | Admin invitation POST |
+| [#70](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/70) | `registryConnect.ts:520` | 10/min write | Claim redemption |
+| [#71](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/71) | `registryConnect.ts:715` | 10/min write | Key rotation |
+| [#133](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/133) | `gfs/proxy.ts:31` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
+| [#138](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/138) | `gfs/resolve.ts:80` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
+| [#140](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/140) | `gfs/resolve.ts:89` | 120 read | Control UI GFS |
+| [#144](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/144) | `gfs/token.ts:44` | 30 mutation | GFS token mint |
+| [#145](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/145) | `gfs/resources.ts:350` | 30 mutation | PATCH resource |
+| [#149](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/149) | `gfs/tree.ts:24` | 120 read | Tree browse |
+| [#150](https://github.com/evenfire-ai/evenfire/security/code-scanning/150) | `gfs/tree.ts:51` | 120 read | Children paging |
## Dismissal template (Security tab / API)