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TypeScript

fix: admit a cap-sized request on the LLM authorize route (#731)

Alfredo Lopez59ce5d3c29a7
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.json
index f64de5231..716800e60 100644
--- a/control-api/package-lock.json
+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.600",
+ "version": "0.1.601",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.600",
+ "version": "0.1.601",
"dependencies": {
"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field",
"@clerum/grok-provider-attempt-contract": "file:../packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract",
diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.json
index 20033d94b..a4c6f4544 100644
--- a/control-api/package.json
+++ b/control-api/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "clerum-control-api",
- "version": "0.1.600",
+ "version": "0.1.601",
"description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets",
"main": "dist/main.js",
"engines": {
diff --git a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
index e428f1a88..287e71bc3 100644
--- a/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/services/llmProviderAttemptAuthorizer.ts
@@ -150,6 +150,16 @@ export { computeCodexPolicyHash }
// body root, and may itself nest maxNestingDepth containers.
const MAX_AUTHORIZE_BODY_DEPTH = Math.max(LIMITS.maxNestingDepth, GROK_LIMITS.maxNestingDepth) + 6
+/**
+ * #731 — room for the authorize envelope around the contract-capped `request`:
+ * ids, revisions, hashes and recipe names, a few hundred bytes in practice.
+ * The whole-body check bounds serialization cost before parsing; the request
+ * itself is held to maxRequestBodyBytes by the contract parser, so a request
+ * at the cap is never refused for its envelope. The gateway's
+ * client_max_body_size on this route is the cap plus this allowance.
+ */
+export const AUTHORIZE_ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE_BYTES = 16 * 1024
+
/**
* Reject an over-deep body before anything serializes it. Iterative, so an
* attacker-controlled nesting depth cannot overflow the stack here; without it
@@ -253,7 +263,10 @@ async function authorizeGrokProviderAttempt(
}
assertBodyNestingWithinLimit(body)
const serialized = JSON.stringify(body)
- if (Buffer.byteLength(serialized, 'utf8') > GROK_LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes) {
+ if (
+ Buffer.byteLength(serialized, 'utf8') >
+ GROK_LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes + AUTHORIZE_ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE_BYTES
+ ) {
throw new LlmProviderAttemptAuthorizeError('invalid_request', 'request body exceeds the limit')
}
const unknown = firstUnknownKey(body)
@@ -612,7 +625,10 @@ export async function authorizeLlmProviderAttempt(
}
assertBodyNestingWithinLimit(body)
const serialized = JSON.stringify(body)
- if (Buffer.byteLength(serialized, 'utf8') > LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes) {
+ if (
+ Buffer.byteLength(serialized, 'utf8') >
+ LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes + AUTHORIZE_ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE_BYTES
+ ) {
throw new LlmProviderAttemptAuthorizeError('invalid_request', 'request body exceeds the limit')
}
const unknown = firstUnknownKey(body)
diff --git a/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml b/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml
index 1323bf289..8d96f13e1 100644
--- a/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml
+++ b/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml
@@ -802,6 +802,10 @@ data:
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
+ # #731: the contract request cap (8 MiB) plus control-api's 16 KiB
+ # authorize envelope allowance. Without it nginx's 1m default refuses
+ # a contract-valid request before control-api sees it.
+ client_max_body_size 8404992;
proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;