Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
docs(connectors): record tri-state scope decision, has-grant not works (R1-SM1, R1-SM2)
Diego Zacarias5d28cce2f754
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 73cd7fa1f..ef2da0e91 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.507",+ "version": "0.1.508","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.507",+ "version": "0.1.508","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 7e2fe6f5d..1d80aea3f 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.507",+ "version": "0.1.508","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/services/access/mcpInvocable.ts b/control-api/src/services/access/mcpInvocable.tsindex 6255b991e..14f8f3796 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/access/mcpInvocable.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/access/mcpInvocable.ts@@ -472,6 +472,21 @@ function deriveNonOauthAuthKind(server: McpServerCR): 'static' | undefined {* `no_oauth`, never `authorized`; an OAuth server absent from `grantPresent`* (no grant OR a grant-read error, both swallowed fail-closed upstream) is* `requires_setup`, never `authorized`.+ *+ * SCOPE OF THE TRI-STATE (review R1-SM1/SM2, owner decision): the answer is+ * "does this connector have a grant?", NOT "can it run right now?". By design+ * this classifier does NOT apply the viability gates `filterInvocable` uses on+ * the invocation rail — `spec.enabled === false`, the auth-type allowlist, and+ * a resolvable transport URL. A disabled or static-auth server stays in the+ * admin-curated `Context.spec.mcpServers` allowlist (disabling does not prune+ * it — only deleting does), so it is classified and returned with its real+ * authorization state rather than dropped. Consequence, accepted here: the+ * classified set is a strict SUPERSET of `/rpc/servers` (the invocable set), so+ * the shared `mcp:servers:list` scope now spans two result-sets. This is not a+ * privilege escalation — it is the caller's own fleet, carrying only non-secret+ * policy — and the panel exists precisely to show the full fleet with its state+ * before the user runs anything. A green connector may still be non-invocable;+ * the panel reports grant state, not runnability.*/function classifyConnector(server: McpServerCR, grantPresent: ReadonlySet<string>): ConnectorEntry {const name = String(server.metadata?.name)diff --git a/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts b/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.tsindex 5bf3423ed..60e2c4d2a 100644--- a/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts+++ b/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ export type ReleaseManifest = {export const releaseManifest: ReleaseManifest = {releaseId: 'v0.7.0',externalRestApiVersion: '0.1.81',- rpcProxyVersion: '0.1.70',+ rpcProxyVersion: '0.1.71',desktopVersion: '0.7.0',minimumDesktopVersion: '0.1.252',}diff --git a/rpc-proxy/package-lock.json b/rpc-proxy/package-lock.jsonindex 394884333..cd3d293ac 100644--- a/rpc-proxy/package-lock.json+++ b/rpc-proxy/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-rpc-proxy",- "version": "0.1.70",+ "version": "0.1.71","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-rpc-proxy",- "version": "0.1.70",+ "version": "0.1.71","dependencies": {"cors": "^2.8.5","express": "^4.21.2",diff --git a/rpc-proxy/package.json b/rpc-proxy/package.jsonindex 0d68e267d..2d3cf2e39 100644--- a/rpc-proxy/package.json+++ b/rpc-proxy/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-rpc-proxy",- "version": "0.1.70",+ "version": "0.1.71","description": "External-facing RPC proxy for tenant-scoped MCP access","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/rpc-proxy/src/routes/rpc.ts b/rpc-proxy/src/routes/rpc.tsindex 2b42a30f3..3ca854768 100644--- a/rpc-proxy/src/routes/rpc.ts+++ b/rpc-proxy/src/routes/rpc.ts@@ -229,6 +229,14 @@ export function createRpcRouter(): Router {// rail as `/rpc/servers`, so it REUSES the `mcp:servers:list` scope (no new// scope minted). `userId` is the signed session subject (`auth.sub`), never a// body/query param.+ //+ // SCOPE NOTE (review R1-SM2, owner decision): `mcp:servers:list` now spans two+ // result-sets. `/rpc/servers` returns the INVOCABLE set (control-api's+ // classifier filters via `filterInvocable`); this route returns the CLASSIFIED+ // set, a strict SUPERSET — it also lists disabled and static-auth servers, with+ // their authorization state. Not an escalation (the caller's own fleet,+ // non-secret policy only), but anyone granting this scope should know it now+ // covers both. See classifyConnector in control-api mcpInvocable.ts.router.get('/rpc/connectors',requireRpcAuth,