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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev' into pr252-sync-20260905

Alfredo Lopez61c5217a0f6b
diff --cc control-api/src/db.ts
index 1a4b716b5,d2c282feb..ce5db6654
--- a/control-api/src/db.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/db.ts
@@@ -5963,9 -5969,51 +5999,64 @@@ export const CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS: Db
},
},
{
- version: '0101_mcp_secret_rollback_permits',
+ version: '0101_codex_multi_connection',
+ apply: applyCodexMultiConnectionSchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0102_codex_catalog_models',
+ apply: applyCodexCatalogModelsSchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0103_llm_provider_attempts_connection_id',
+ apply: applyLlmProviderAttemptConnectionIdSchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0104_codex_grant_default_model',
+ apply: applyCodexGrantDefaultModelSchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0105_codex_reusable_connection_key',
+ apply: applyCodexReusableConnectionKeySchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0106_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',
+ // Renamed repeatedly while rebasing onto dev: 0091 -> 0100 -> 0101 -> 0106
+ // (each dev sync collided with a migration dev landed at the same number; the
+ // latest sync brought dev's 0101–0105 codex migrations, so 0101 is now taken
+ // by 0101_codex_multi_connection). Environments where the feature branch
+ // already deployed recorded it under an earlier name (the dev cluster most
+ // likely as 0100_...). legacyVersions lets the runner mark 0106 applied from
+ // that prior row instead of re-running the DDL and leaving an orphan
+ // schema_migrations entry. Every prior name is unique to this migration, so
+ // there is no false-skip.
+ legacyVersions: [
+ '0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',
+ '0100_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',
+ '0091_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',
+ ],
+ apply: applyOAuthGrantsOwnerGeneralization,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0107_llm_provider_attempts_sdk_link',
+ apply: applyLlmProviderAttemptSdkLinkSchema,
+ },
+ {
+ version: '0108_llm_provider_attempts_sdk_link_on_delete_set_null',
+ apply: applyLlmProviderAttemptSdkLinkOnDeleteSetNullSchema,
+ },
++ {
++ version: '0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits',
++ // Renamed while syncing onto dev: 0101 -> 0109. This branch introduced the
++ // migration as 0101, and the sync brought dev's 0101–0108 (codex multi-
++ // connection through the SDK-link FK), so 0101 is now taken by
++ // 0101_codex_multi_connection. Environments where this feature branch was
++ // already deployed recorded it under the earlier name. legacyVersions lets
++ // the runner mark 0109 applied from that prior row instead of re-running
++ // the DDL and leaving an orphan schema_migrations entry. The prior name is
++ // unique to this migration, so there is no false-skip.
++ legacyVersions: ['0101_mcp_secret_rollback_permits'],
+ apply: applyMcpSecretRollbackPermitSchema,
+ },
]
async function consolidateWorkflowAllowedUsersToTriggers(db: DbClient): Promise<void> {
diff --cc control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts
index 920faed74,a244c464c..f31582c12
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts
@@@ -11,9 -11,7 +11,8 @@@ import { enforceNamespace } from '../..
import { validateCommunicationChannelSpec } from '../../http/validateCommunicationChannelSpec.js'
import { validateMcpServerSpecPreflight } from '../../http/validateMcpServerSpec.js'
import { K8sGateway } from '../../k8s.js'
+import { rootLogger } from '../../observability/logger.js'
import { stripHookRefFromHosts } from '../../services/hostGuardrailRefs.js'
- import { getModelAllowlistState, isModelAllowed } from '../../services/llmAllowedModels.js'
import {
K8sConflictError,
K8sNotFoundError,
diff --cc control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts
index fe3186c91,0169b7062..6ead505d2
--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts
+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts
@@@ -594,55 -522,38 +603,90 @@@ export function createAdminSecretsRoute
stringData: data,
}
- const created = await gateway.createSecret(secretReq)
+ // Key NAMES are safe to log; values never are. Emit after the write
+ // succeeds (a create that happened must never go unlogged) and on the
+ // failed write path so operators can still reconstruct the attempt.
+ const createdKeys = Object.keys(data).sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b))
++ let created: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof gateway.createSecret>>
+ try {
- await gateway.createSecret(secretReq)
++ created = await gateway.createSecret(secretReq)
+ } catch (err) {
+ logger.warn(
+ {
+ module: 'admin-secrets',
+ event: 'mcp-secret-create-failed',
+ name: name.trim(),
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ createdKeys,
+ err: auditErrorFields(err),
+ },
+ 'MCP Secret create failed'
+ )
+ throw err
+ }
+
++ // The Secret now exists in the cluster. Log it before any fail-closed
++ // return below, so a 503 on identity or permit persistence never hides a
++ // write that actually landed.
+ logger.info(
+ {
+ module: 'admin-secrets',
+ event: 'mcp-secret-created',
+ name: name.trim(),
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ createdKeys,
+ },
+ 'MCP Secret created'
+ )
- res.status(201).json({ name: name.trim(), namespace: targetNs, created: true })
++
+ const identity = secretIdentityPreconditions(created)
+ const completeIdentity =
+ identity?.uid && identity.resourceVersion
+ ? { uid: identity.uid, resourceVersion: identity.resourceVersion }
+ : null
+ if (!completeIdentity) {
+ res.status(503).json({ error: 'secret_identity_unavailable', outcome: 'repair_required' })
+ return
+ }
+ const rollbackPermit: McpSecretRollbackPermit = {
+ sessionJti: (req as UiAuthedRequest).adminAuth?.jti ?? '',
+ name: secretReq.name,
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ uid: completeIdentity.uid,
+ resourceVersion: completeIdentity.resourceVersion,
+ }
+ try {
+ await rollbackPermits.issue(rollbackPermit)
+ } catch (err) {
+ logger.error(
+ {
+ err,
+ module: 'admin-secrets',
+ event: 'mcp-secret-create-rollback-permit-repair-required',
+ name: secretReq.name,
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ },
+ 'MCP Secret create could not persist its rollback permit'
+ )
+ res.status(503).json({
+ error: 'mcp_secret_rollback_permit_unavailable',
+ outcome: 'repair_required',
+ created: {
+ name: secretReq.name,
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ uid: completeIdentity.uid,
+ resourceVersion: completeIdentity.resourceVersion,
+ },
+ })
+ return
+ }
+ res.status(201).json({
+ name: name.trim(),
+ namespace: targetNs,
+ uid: completeIdentity.uid,
+ resourceVersion: completeIdentity.resourceVersion,
+ created: true,
+ })
})
)
diff --cc control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts
index bf84c27a1,151aec60f..08a93da70
--- a/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts
+++ b/control-api/test/db.migrationsOrder.test.ts
@@@ -58,41 -58,4 +58,41 @@@ describe('CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS orderi
expect(duplicates).toEqual([])
expect(currentCollisions).toEqual([])
})
+
- it('requires 0101_mcp_secret_rollback_permits to persist expiring rollback permits', async () => {
++ it('requires 0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits to persist expiring rollback permits', async () => {
+ const { CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS } = await import('../src/db.js')
+ const migration = CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS.find(
- candidate => candidate.version === '0101_mcp_secret_rollback_permits'
++ candidate => candidate.version === '0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits'
+ )
+
+ expect(migration).toBeDefined()
+ if (!migration) return
+
+ const query = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ rows: [], rowCount: 0 })
+ await migration.apply({ query } as never)
+
+ const sql = query.mock.calls.map(([statement]) => String(statement)).join('\n')
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_secret_rollback_permits/i)
+ for (const column of [
+ 'session_hash',
+ 'namespace',
+ 'name',
+ 'uid',
+ 'resource_version',
+ 'expires_at',
+ 'claim_token',
+ 'claim_expires_at',
+ ]) {
+ expect(sql).toMatch(new RegExp(`\\b${column}\\b`, 'i'))
+ }
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/session_hash\s+BYTEA/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/octet_length\s*\(\s*session_hash\s*\)\s*=\s*32/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/expires_at\s*<=\s*created_at\s*\+\s*INTERVAL\s*'120 seconds'/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/claim_token\s+UUID/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/claim_expires_at\s+TIMESTAMPTZ/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(/claim_token IS NULL[\s\S]+claim_expires_at IS NULL/i)
+ expect(sql).toMatch(
+ /CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS[\s\S]+?ON mcp_secret_rollback_permits\s*\(\s*expires_at\s*\)/i
+ )
+ })
})
diff --cc control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx
index 14b65e8a0,2f9f2f9a3..130ba6baa
--- a/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx
+++ b/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx
@@@ -12,20 -12,19 +12,27 @@@ import
createMcpSecret,
createMcpServer,
deleteMcpSecret,
+ deleteMcpServer,
+ getAgentTeams,
+ getAgentUsers,
getContext,
- getContextTeams,
- getContextUsers,
- getContexts,
getHosts,
+ getMcpSecretRollbackRepairIdentity,
listOrgImages,
updateContext,
} from '@/lib/api'
- import type { EnvSecretKeyMapping, EnvVar, OrgImage } from '@/lib/api'
- import type { EgressBinding } from '@/lib/api'
- import type { SecretIdentity } from '@/lib/api'
-import type { EgressBinding, EnvSecretKeyMapping, EnvVar, HostResource, OrgImage } from '@/lib/api'
++import type {
++ EgressBinding,
++ EnvSecretKeyMapping,
++ EnvVar,
++ HostResource,
++ OrgImage,
++ SecretIdentity,
++} from '@/lib/api'
+ import { connectorContextAssignmentError } from '@/lib/connectorOAuthAccess'
import { buildContextUpdatePayload } from '@/lib/contextMutation'
import type { EgressEditorStatus } from '@/lib/egressModel'
+ import { createPrivateContext } from '@/lib/privateContext'
import { EgressEditor } from '../EgressEditor'
import { DEFAULT_REGISTRY_HOST, buildImageCoordinate } from '../PublisherView/dockerCredential'
import { MCP_SERVER_NAME_PATTERN, TRANSPORT_TYPES } from './constants'
@@@ -534,44 -571,81 +579,87 @@@ export function CreateMcpServerForm(
const willCreateSecret =
useEnvSecret && envSecretName.trim().length > 0 && Object.keys(secretData).length > 0
- let secretCreated = false
+ let createdSecretName: string | null = null
+ let createdSecretIdentity: SecretIdentity | undefined
try {
if (willCreateSecret) {
- await createMcpSecret(envSecretName.trim(), secretData)
- secretCreated = true
+ const secretName = envSecretName.trim()
+ const created = await createMcpSecret(secretName, secretData)
+ createdSecretName = secretName
+ if (created.uid && created.resourceVersion) {
+ createdSecretIdentity = { uid: created.uid, resourceVersion: created.resourceVersion }
+ }
}
- await createMcpServer({
+ const createdServer = await createMcpServer({
metadata: { name },
spec,
})
- try {
- const context = await getContext(contextRef)
- const existingServers = context.spec?.mcpServers ?? []
-
- if (!existingServers.includes(name)) {
- await updateContext(
- contextRef,
- buildContextUpdatePayload(context.metadata?.resourceVersion, {
- contextId: context.spec?.contextId ?? contextRef,
- description: context.spec?.description,
- mcpServers: [...existingServers, name],
- sharedFileSystems: context.spec?.sharedFileSystems ?? [],
- })
- )
+ const oauthScopeError = connectorContextAssignmentError(
+ createdServer.spec,
+ selectedContextRefs
+ )
+ if (oauthScopeError) {
+ const rollbackFailures: string[] = []
+ try {
+ await deleteMcpServer(name)
+ } catch {
+ rollbackFailures.push('connector')
}
- } catch (contextError) {
- if (secretCreated) {
++ if (createdSecretName) {
+ try {
- await deleteMcpSecret(envSecretName.trim())
- secretCreated = false
++ await deleteMcpSecret(createdSecretName, createdSecretIdentity)
++ createdSecretName = null
++ createdSecretIdentity = undefined
+ } catch {
+ rollbackFailures.push('Secret')
+ }
+ }
+ setError(
+ rollbackFailures.length === 0
+ ? oauthScopeError
+ : `${oauthScopeError} Automatic cleanup failed for the ${rollbackFailures.join(
+ ' and '
+ )}; remove it before retrying.`
+ )
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Give the selected agents access. Each agent's private scope gets an
+ // additive write with its own loaded resourceVersion; failures are
+ // collected so the operator knows the connector itself was created.
+ const failedAgents: string[] = []
+ await Promise.all(
+ selectedContextRefs.map(async contextRef => {
+ try {
+ const context = await getContext(contextRef)
+ const existingServers = context.spec?.mcpServers ?? []
+
+ if (!existingServers.includes(name)) {
+ await updateContext(
+ contextRef,
+ buildContextUpdatePayload(context.metadata?.resourceVersion, {
+ contextId: context.spec?.contextId ?? contextRef,
+ description: context.spec?.description,
+ mcpServers: [...existingServers, name],
+ sharedFileSystems: context.spec?.sharedFileSystems ?? [],
+ })
+ )
+ }
+ } catch {
+ const affected = selectedTargets
+ .filter(target => target.contextRef === contextRef)
+ .map(target => target.label)
+ failedAgents.push(...affected)
+ }
+ })
+ )
+
+ if (failedAgents.length > 0) {
setError(
- `Connector created, but failed to add it to Context "${contextRef}" allowlist. ` +
- `Please add "${name}" to the Context manually. (${
- contextError instanceof Error ? contextError.message : String(contextError)
- })`
+ `Connector created, but we couldn't give access to ${failedAgents.join(', ')}. ` +
+ `Grant "${name}" to those agents from the Installed Connectors list.`
)
setSubmitting(false)
return
diff --cc control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx
index f4d21a497,ed82878f0..5caf974a2
--- a/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx
+++ b/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx
@@@ -6,31 -6,21 +6,31 @@@ import { CreateMcpServerForm } from '..
import { ToastProvider } from '../Toast'
// vi.mock is hoisted before imports; factory runs lazily so references to `api` are safe.
-vi.mock('../../lib/api', async () => {
+vi.mock('../../lib/api', async importOriginal => {
+ const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import('../../lib/api')>()
- const { buildContextList, buildContextResource } =
- await import('../../test/fixtures/contextResource')
+ const { buildContextResource } = await import('../../test/fixtures/contextResource')
const context1 = buildContextResource({
metadata: { name: 'context1', resourceVersion: 'rv-context1' },
})
return {
++ // Spread the real module so helpers the form imports directly (e.g.
++ // getMcpSecretRollbackRepairIdentity) keep their real behaviour; every
++ // network-touching export below is then overridden explicitly.
+ ...actual,
+ apiSend: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
createMcpServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ metadata: { name: 'test-server' } }),
- createMcpSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ name: 'test-credentials' }),
+ createMcpSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+ name: 'test-credentials',
+ namespace: 'mcp-server',
+ uid: 'uid-test-credentials',
+ resourceVersion: '1',
+ }),
deleteMcpSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ name: 'test-credentials' }),
- getContexts: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
- buildContextList([
- context1,
- buildContextResource({
- metadata: { name: 'research', resourceVersion: 'rv-research' },
- }),
- ])
- ),
+ deleteMcpServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ name: 'test-server' }),
+ getAgentTeams: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ items: [] }),
+ getAgentUsers: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ items: [] }),
+ // The form no longer reads the context list; kept as a spy to lock that contract.
+ getContexts: vi.fn(),
getContext: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(context1),
getContextTeams: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ items: [] }),
getContextUsers: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ items: [] }),
diff --cc control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts
index 51b40a404,69637c878..c43aecb16
--- a/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts
+++ b/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts
@@@ -1,11 -1,12 +1,13 @@@
// control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts
//
- // MUTATING journey: creates a context + stdio discovery connector (reusing the
- // spec-2 creation flow inline), then edits the connector to add external CIDR
- // egress. Guarded by QA_RECORDER_CONFIRM_MUTATIONS; connector then context are
- // deleted via the Control API in a finally.
+ // MUTATING journey: stages a context through the Control API, creates a stdio
+ // discovery connector through the create-connector wizard (which also
+ // provisions the connector's own private access scope), then edits the
+ // connector to add external CIDR egress. Guarded by
+ // QA_RECORDER_CONFIRM_MUTATIONS; the connector and both contexts are deleted
+ // via the Control API in a finally.
import { type Page, expect, test } from '@playwright/test'
+import { type SecretIdentity, requireSecretIdentity } from '../test-utils/secretIdentity'
import {
CONTROL_API_URL,
CONTROL_UI_URL,
@@@ -25,48 -25,32 +27,35 @@@
// or non-existent image would never converge, only time out.
const MOCK_MCP_IMAGE = process.env.TEST_MOCK_MCP_IMAGE ?? 'clerum/mock-mcp-server:test'
-// The connector-form selects are not label-associated (no htmlFor/id), so scope
-// to the wrapping `.cu-field` by its visible label text and drive its <select>.
+// The connector-form's Transport Type and Managed selects are not label-associated,
+// so use their visible field label as the stable local scope for those controls.
async function fieldSelect(page: Page, fieldLabelText: string, value: string): Promise<void> {
- const field = page.locator('.cu-field', { hasText: fieldLabelText }).first()
- await field.locator('select').selectOption(value)
+ await page
+ .getByText(fieldLabelText, { exact: true })
+ .locator('..')
+ .getByRole('combobox')
+ .selectOption(value)
}
+ // The /contexts UI is gone; stage the context out-of-band through the Control
+ // API (same pattern as the rotation test below).
async function createEmptyContext(page: Page, contextName: string): Promise<void> {
- await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Contexts', exact: true }).click()
- await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/contexts$/, { timeout: 20_000 })
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create context', exact: true }).click()
- await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/contexts\/new$/, { timeout: 20_000 })
- await page.getByLabel('Context name').fill(contextName)
- await page
- .getByPlaceholder('Human-readable context description')
- .fill('QA recorder temporary context')
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue', exact: true }).click()
- await expect(
- page
- .getByText('No connectors found.', { exact: true })
- .or(page.getByPlaceholder('Search connectors...'))
- ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create context', exact: true }).click()
- await expect(page).toHaveURL(new RegExp(`/contexts/${contextName}$`), { timeout: 20_000 })
- await expect(
- page.getByText('Review details, manage connectors, agents, teams, and members.', {
- exact: true,
- })
- ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })
+ const res = await api(page.request, 'POST', '/api/v1/admin/contexts', {
+ metadata: { name: contextName },
+ spec: {
+ contextId: contextName,
+ description: 'QA recorder temporary context',
+ mcpServers: [],
+ },
+ })
+ expect(res.status, `create context: ${JSON.stringify(res.data)}`).toBeLessThan(300)
}
- async function createDiscoveryConnector(
- page: Page,
- connectorName: string,
- contextName: string
- ): Promise<void> {
+ async function createDiscoveryConnector(page: Page, connectorName: string): Promise<void> {
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Installed Connectors', exact: true }).click()
await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/connectors$/, { timeout: 20_000 })
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Connector actions', exact: true }).click()
+ // Creation lives behind the "Connector actions" kebab (lowercase c menuitem).
+ await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Connector actions' }).click()
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Create connector', exact: true }).click()
await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/connectors\/new$/, { timeout: 20_000 })
@@@ -134,9 -108,22 +121,22 @@@ test.describe('optional QA recorder: Co
await loginThroughUi(page, credentials)
await createEmptyContext(page, contextName)
- await createDiscoveryConnector(page, connectorName, contextName)
+ await createDiscoveryConnector(page, connectorName)
+
+ // The wizard provisions the connector's private access scope out of
+ // band; capture its name so the finally can tear it down too.
+ const createdRes = await api(
+ page.request,
+ 'GET',
+ `/api/v1/admin/mcp-servers/${encodeURIComponent(connectorName)}`
+ )
+ expect(createdRes.status, `read connector: ${JSON.stringify(createdRes.data)}`).toBe(200)
+ connectorContextName = String(
+ (createdRes.data.spec as { contextRef?: string } | undefined)?.contextRef || ''
+ )
+ expect(connectorContextName).toMatch(new RegExp(`^${connectorName}-[0-9]{5}$`))
- await page.goto(`${CONTROL_UI_URL}/connectors/${encodeURIComponent(connectorName)}/edit`)
+ await openConnectorEditor(page, connectorName)
await expect(
page.getByRole('heading', { name: `Edit Connector: ${connectorName}`, exact: true })
).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })
@@@ -155,17 -161,22 +174,18 @@@
const meta = page.locator('.cu-connector-edit-meta')
await expect(meta).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })
await expect(meta.getByText('qa-recorder/example:dev')).toBeVisible()
- await expect(meta.getByText(contextName)).toBeVisible()
+ // The private scope slug must NOT surface anywhere on this page.
+ await expect(meta.getByText(connectorContextName)).toHaveCount(0)
+ // The connector starts closed, so the following persistence check proves a
+ // real edit rather than re-reading setup data.
+ await expect(page.getByLabel('Egress mode')).toHaveValue('none')
+
// External Egress: switch to exact-CIDR mode and add one public CIDR + port.
// 8.8.8.8/32 is a valid public target; the model rejects private/doc ranges.
- await fieldSelect(page, 'Egress mode', 'exact-cidr')
- await page
- .locator('.cu-field', { hasText: 'Allowed CIDRs/IPs' })
- .first()
- .locator('textarea')
- .fill('8.8.8.8/32')
- await page
- .locator('.cu-field', { hasText: 'Allowed ports' })
- .first()
- .locator('input')
- .fill('443')
+ await page.getByLabel('Egress mode').selectOption('exact-cidr')
+ await page.getByLabel('Allowed CIDRs/IPs').fill('8.8.8.8/32')
+ await page.getByLabel('Allowed ports').fill('443')
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save egress', exact: true }).click()
await expect(
@@@ -280,13 -275,12 +303,17 @@@
).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })
// The connector edit screen is split into tabs; the rotation flow lives
- // on the Credentials tab — navigate there via the tab link.
+ // on the Credentials tab — navigate there via the visible tab.
await page.getByRole('tab', { name: 'Credentials', exact: true }).click()
+ await expect(page).toHaveURL(
+ new RegExp(`/connectors/${encodeURIComponent(connectorName)}/edit(/credentials)?$`),
+ { timeout: 20_000 }
+ )
+ await expect(
+ page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Update credentials', exact: true })
+ ).toBeVisible({
+ timeout: 20_000,
+ })
// The section names the Secret and the key -> env var mapping — names
// only, never the stored value.
diff --cc control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts
index dc21c07a3,7239ee48b..005adacea
--- a/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts
+++ b/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts
@@@ -553,12 -553,9 +553,9 @@@ async function submitRegistryInstallFor
await installForm.locator('#ri-name').clear()
await installForm.locator('#ri-name').fill(serverName)
await installForm.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
- await installForm.locator('#ri-context').click()
- await installForm.getByRole('option', { name: 'context1', exact: true }).click()
- await installForm.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
const credentialInputs = installForm.locator('fieldset input')
- for (let i = 0; i < (await credentialInputs.count()); i += 1) {
- await credentialInputs.nth(i).fill('e2e-test-value')
+ for (const credentialInput of await credentialInputs.all()) {
+ await credentialInput.fill('e2e-test-value')
}
await installForm.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
await expect(
@@@ -1776,18 -1766,11 +1771,13 @@@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Edito
await page
.getByPlaceholder('us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/my-project/repo/mcp-server:latest')
.fill('clerum/mock-mcp-server:test')
- await expect(page.getByRole('button', { name: 'context1' })).toBeVisible({
- timeout: 15_000,
- })
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
- await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Runtime settings' })).toBeVisible()
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
- await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Network egress' })).toBeVisible()
+ // Egress lives in the Advanced options disclosure on the Connector step.
+ await page.getByText('Advanced options').click()
const egressSection = page.locator('section', { hasText: 'External Egress' })
- await egressSection.locator('select').first().selectOption('exact-host')
+ const exactHostMode = egressSection.getByRole('combobox')
+ await expect(exactHostMode).toHaveCount(1)
+ await exactHostMode.selectOption('exact-host')
await egressSection
.locator('textarea[placeholder="api.example.com, auth.example.com"]')
.fill('api.github.com')
@@@ -1835,18 -1823,11 +1830,13 @@@
await page
.getByPlaceholder('us-central1-docker.pkg.dev/my-project/repo/mcp-server:latest')
.fill('clerum/mock-mcp-server:test')
- await expect(page.getByRole('button', { name: 'context1' })).toBeVisible({
- timeout: 15_000,
- })
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
- await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Runtime settings' })).toBeVisible()
- await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click()
- await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Network egress' })).toBeVisible()
+ // Egress lives in the Advanced options disclosure on the Connector step.
+ await page.getByText('Advanced options').click()
const egressSection = page.locator('section', { hasText: 'External Egress' })
- await egressSection.locator('select').first().selectOption('public-web')
+ const publicWebMode = egressSection.getByRole('combobox')
+ await expect(publicWebMode).toHaveCount(1)
+ await publicWebMode.selectOption('public-web')
await expect(egressSection.getByRole('alert')).toContainText('Public web egress allows')
await expect(egressSection.getByRole('status')).toContainText('1 public-web binding')
diff --cc deploy/scripts/control-api-runtime-access-profiles.tsv
index 6a1d61f75,07c4f9c27..62512b3cd
--- a/deploy/scripts/control-api-runtime-access-profiles.tsv
+++ b/deploy/scripts/control-api-runtime-access-profiles.tsv
@@@ -33,8 -36,9 +36,10 @@@ llm_allowed_models legacy_dm
llm_allowed_models_audit append
llm_catalog_sync_runs append
llm_model_prices legacy_dml
+ llm_provider_attempt_tickets upsert
+ llm_provider_attempts upsert
member_registration_credentials upsert
+mcp_secret_rollback_permits legacy_dml
notification_deliveries legacy_dml
oauth_grants legacy_dml
plugin_workload_sdk_credential_ticket_jtis legacy_dml
diff --cc docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md
index 109d157c7,000000000..683ee08cc
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md
+++ b/docs/how-to/control-api-mcp-secret-rollback-permits.md
@@@ -1,65 -1,0 +1,65 @@@
+# Control API MCP Secret rollback permits
+
+This runbook covers the short-lived PostgreSQL permits used only by the legacy
+bodyless rollback path of `POST /admin/mcp-secrets` followed by
+`DELETE /admin/mcp-secrets/:name`.
+
+## Deployment contract
+
+1. Run the Control API schema migration job before changing the pod image.
- 2. Verify migration `0101_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` and the runtime-access
++2. Verify migration `0109_mcp_secret_rollback_permits` and the runtime-access
+ profile before starting Control API.
+3. Deploy Control API with its repository-owned `Recreate` strategy and one
+ replica. Old and new API writers must not overlap.
+4. Verify a current client can create and explicitly delete with
+ UID/resourceVersion, and that a bodyless legacy rollback consumes a
+ server-side permit.
+
+The migration is additive and forward-only. It creates no foreign keys and
+does not alter existing rows or tables.
+
+## Runtime invariants
+
+- The browser receives no rollback proof or nonce cookie.
+- PostgreSQL stores a domain-separated SHA-256 digest of the admin session JTI,
+ never the raw JTI.
+- Permits bind namespace, name, UID, and resourceVersion and expire after at
+ most 120 seconds according to the PostgreSQL clock.
+- A 15-second claim lease serializes replicas. Transient failures release the
+ claim; a crashed process becomes retryable after the lease expires.
+- Terminal absence or identity change finalizes the permit. Kubernetes deletion
+ always carries UID and resourceVersion preconditions.
+- Expired rows are authorization-inert even before bounded physical cleanup.
+
+## Image rollback after migration 0101
+
+Rollback is **image-only**:
+
+1. Keep migration `0101`, the new table, and the current runtime-access profile.
+2. Use the current checkout's deployment and database-migration tooling.
+3. Change only the Control API image to the previously verified image.
+4. Re-run the current runtime-access reconciliation and exact privilege check.
+
+The previous Control API binary ignores the additive table. Do not run an old
+checkout's exact-schema verifier after `0101`; it does not know the new public
+relation and will correctly refuse to certify it. Never drop the table as part
+of an application-image rollback.
+
+## Failure outcomes
+
+- Permit persistence failure after Kubernetes create: `503 repair_required`
+ includes the created UID/resourceVersion so the current UI can perform an
+ explicit CAS cleanup. The API never deletes by name as compensation.
+- Missing, expired, already claimed, or wrong-session permit: `428` and no
+ Kubernetes read or mutation.
+- PostgreSQL claim failure: `503 repair_required` and no Kubernetes read or
+ mutation.
+- Live identity change or Kubernetes CAS conflict: `409 repair_required`.
+- Reference graph unavailable: `503 repair_required`; the claim is released so
+ the legacy caller can retry within the original 120-second permit window.
+
+## Re-open triggers
+
+Re-audit this design if Control API changes from one replica plus `Recreate`,
+the permit or claim TTL changes, a caller can bypass admin-session binding, or
+any delete path stops carrying both UID and resourceVersion.
diff --cc scripts/tests/test-control-api-runtime-access-contract.sh
index df2986cb3,89dfb3238..6545e77c3
--- a/scripts/tests/test-control-api-runtime-access-contract.sh
+++ b/scripts/tests/test-control-api-runtime-access-contract.sh
@@@ -9,7 -9,7 +9,7 @@@ relation_count="$(awk -F '\t' '!/^[[:sp
duplicate_count="$(awk -F '\t' '!/^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/ { seen[$1]++ } END { for (name in seen) if (seen[name] > 1) count++ } END { print count + 0 }' "$PROFILE_FILE")"
invalid_count="$(awk -F '\t' '!/^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/ && (NF != 2 || $1 !~ /^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$/ || $2 !~ /^(legacy_dml|upsert|append|read|link_lifecycle|none)$/) { count++ } END { print count + 0 }' "$PROFILE_FILE")"
- [[ "$relation_count" == "85" ]]
-[[ "$relation_count" == "88" ]]
++[[ "$relation_count" == "90" ]]
[[ "$duplicate_count" == "0" ]]
[[ "$invalid_count" == "0" ]]
grep -qx $'gfs_desktop_operator_links\tlink_lifecycle' "$PROFILE_FILE"
diff --cc scripts/tests/test-gcp-scripts.sh
index 9ec3173e6,2aa971418..31111c09a
--- a/scripts/tests/test-gcp-scripts.sh
+++ b/scripts/tests/test-gcp-scripts.sh
@@@ -1466,7 -1466,7 +1466,7 @@@ assert_control_api_runtime_access_contr
sequence_duplicate_count="$(awk -F '\t' '!/^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/ { seen[$1]++ } END { for (name in seen) if (seen[name] > 1) count++ } END { print count + 0 }' "$sequence_profile_file")"
sequence_invalid_count="$(awk -F '\t' '!/^[[:space:]]*(#|$)/ && (NF != 2 || $1 !~ /^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$/ || $2 !~ /^(legacy_rw|consume)$/) { count++ } END { print count + 0 }' "$sequence_profile_file")"
- if [[ "$relation_count" == "85" && "$duplicate_count" == "0" && "$invalid_count" == "0" ]] && \
- if [[ "$relation_count" == "88" && "$duplicate_count" == "0" && "$invalid_count" == "0" ]] && \
++ if [[ "$relation_count" == "90" && "$duplicate_count" == "0" && "$invalid_count" == "0" ]] && \
grep -qx $'gfs_upload_parts\tnone' "$profile_file" && \
grep -qx $'gfs_upload_sessions\tnone' "$profile_file" && \
grep -qx $'llm_allowed_models\tlegacy_dml' "$profile_file" && \