Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
Merge commit 'e4f4f939b' into HEAD
Jose Gabriel Ramirez Encinas878c123bbdde
diff --cc docs/crds/llmhook.mdindex b117a0a1c,b54916cec..1e4e12cad--- a/docs/crds/llmhook.md+++ b/docs/crds/llmhook.md@@@ -32,27 -30,27 +33,27 @@@ either at runtime## Spec Fields-| Field | Type | Required | Description |-| -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |-| `spec.target` | object | yes | Exactly one of `image`, `service`, `remote`. |-| `spec.target.image.ref` | string | yes (image) | Container image. Must be digest-pinned at install; the image allowlist is checked only when `CONTROL_API_ENFORCE_IMAGE_ALLOWLIST` is on (default off). |-| `spec.target.image.port` | int | yes (image) | Port the hook HTTP server listens on (1–65535). |-| `spec.target.image.imagePullSecrets` | string[] | no | Pull secret names in `llm-hooks`. |-| `spec.target.image.envSecret` | string | no | The hook's own credential Secret in `llm-hooks`. It can never reference a Host or LLM-key Secret. |-| `spec.target.image.egressBindings[]` | object[] | no | Allowed external egress: `toFQDN` or `cidr`, plus `ports`. host-context-controller rejects private, metadata, link-local and reserved destinations at reconcile (reason `InvalidEgress`) and fails the hook pod closed; unlike McpServer, this is not checked at admission. |-| `spec.target.image.security.addCapabilities` | string[] | no | Subset of `CHOWN`, `FOWNER`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `NET_BIND_SERVICE`. |-| `spec.target.service` | object | yes (service) | Existing in-cluster Service: `name`, `namespace`, `port`. |-| `spec.target.remote.baseUrl` | string | yes (remote) | External endpoint mcp-host dials directly. Must be `https://`; SSRF-validated at dial time. |-| `spec.target.remote.authHeadersSecret` | string | no | Secret supplying auth headers for the remote endpoint. |-| `spec.path` | string | no (default `/`) | Calls go to `{endpoint}{path}/v1/{point}`. Co-located image hooks must use distinct paths. |-| `spec.lifecyclePoints` | string[] | yes (1–6) | LLM lane: `preCall`, `moderate`, `postCallSuccess`, `onError`. Tool lane: `preToolUse`, `postToolUse`. |-| `spec.contentAccess` | `metadata` \| `content` | no | What the hook receives. **Omitting it means `content`.** Only a `preCall`-only hook may declare `metadata` (model, params and usage, no message bodies). |-| `spec.order` | int | no (default 100) | Order within a phase; lower runs first. |-| `spec.failMode` | `open` \| `closed` | no (default `closed`) | Behaviour when the hook is unavailable. A hook with `may_deny` must fail closed. |-| `spec.timeoutMs` | int | no (default 5000) | Per-call timeout. |-| `spec.onUnavailable` | object | no | Circuit breaker: `mode` (`strict` \| `breaker`, default `strict`), `failureThreshold` (default 5), `cooldownMs` (default 30000). |-| `spec.capabilities` | string[] | no | Admin-granted: `may_deny`, `may_rewrite`, `may_substitute_result`, `may_add_context`. Must fall within the Host's `guardrails.capabilityCeiling`, and is re-checked on every hook response. |-| `spec.config` | object | no | Opaque hook settings. Never used as a trust input. |+| Field | Type | Required | Description |+| -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |+| `spec.target` | object | yes | Exactly one of `image`, `service`, `remote`. |- | `spec.target.image.ref` | string | yes (image) | Container image. Validated against the image allowlist and digest-pinned at install. |++| `spec.target.image.ref` | string | yes (image) | Container image. Must be digest-pinned at install; the image allowlist is checked only when `CONTROL_API_ENFORCE_IMAGE_ALLOWLIST` is on (default off). |+| `spec.target.image.port` | int | yes (image) | Port the hook HTTP server listens on (1–65535). |+| `spec.target.image.imagePullSecrets` | string[] | no | Pull secret names in `llm-hooks`. |+| `spec.target.image.envSecret` | string | no | The hook's own credential Secret in `llm-hooks`. It can never reference a Host or LLM-key Secret. |- | `spec.target.image.egressBindings[]` | object[] | no | Allowed external egress: `toFQDN` or `cidr`, plus `ports`. host-context-controller rejects private, metadata, link-local and reserved destinations at reconcile (condition `InvalidEgress`) and fails the hook pod closed; unlike McpServer, this is not checked at admission. |++| `spec.target.image.egressBindings[]` | object[] | no | Allowed external egress: `toFQDN` or `cidr`, plus `ports`. host-context-controller rejects private, metadata, link-local and reserved destinations at reconcile (reason `InvalidEgress`) and fails the hook pod closed; unlike McpServer, this is not checked at admission. |+| `spec.target.image.security.addCapabilities` | string[] | no | Subset of `CHOWN`, `FOWNER`, `DAC_OVERRIDE`, `NET_BIND_SERVICE`. |+| `spec.target.service` | object | yes (service) | Existing in-cluster Service: `name`, `namespace`, `port`. |+| `spec.target.remote.baseUrl` | string | yes (remote) | External endpoint mcp-host dials directly. Must be `https://`; SSRF-validated at dial time. |+| `spec.target.remote.authHeadersSecret` | string | no | Secret supplying auth headers for the remote endpoint. |+| `spec.path` | string | no (default `/`) | Calls go to `{endpoint}{path}/v1/{point}`. Co-located image hooks must use distinct paths. |+| `spec.lifecyclePoints` | string[] | yes (1–6) | LLM lane: `preCall`, `moderate`, `postCallSuccess`, `onError`. Tool lane: `preToolUse`, `postToolUse`. |+| `spec.contentAccess` | `metadata` \| `content` | no | What the hook receives. **Omitting it means `content`.** Only a `preCall`-only hook may declare `metadata` (model, params and usage, no message bodies). |+| `spec.order` | int | no (default 100) | Order within a phase; lower runs first. |+| `spec.failMode` | `open` \| `closed` | no (CRD default `closed`) | Behaviour when the hook is unavailable. A hook with `may_deny` must fail closed. The Control UI install form preselects the hook author's suggested fail mode, or `open`; granting `may_deny` forces `closed`. |+| `spec.timeoutMs` | int | no (default 5000) | Accepted but not used today; the transport timeout is the Host's `guardrails.limits.maxHookTimeoutMs` (default 5000). LLM-lane calls also stop at a fixed 15000 ms hard deadline. |+| `spec.onUnavailable` | object | no | Circuit breaker: `mode` (`strict` \| `breaker`, default `strict`), `failureThreshold` (default 5), `cooldownMs` (default 30000). |+| `spec.capabilities` | string[] | no | Admin-granted: `may_deny`, `may_rewrite`, `may_substitute_result`, `may_add_context`. Checked against the Host's `guardrails.capabilityCeiling` at install time; mcp-host ignores response actions the hook was not granted. |+| `spec.config` | object | no | Opaque hook settings. Never used as a trust input. |### Admission and install rules@@@ -67,12 -65,12 +68,12 @@@## Status Fields-| Field | Description |-| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |-| `status.observedDigest` | Image digest actually running. mcp-host binds `Host.spec.guardrails.hooks[].digest` against this, and fails closed (or skips with an alert) on mismatch. |-| `status.readyReplicas` | Ready replicas (image targets only). |-| `status.lastReconciled` | Timestamp of the last successful reconcile. |-| `status.conditions[]` | A single `Ready` condition with `observedGeneration`; its `reason` is one of `NoWorkload`, `Deploying`, `Ready`, `DuplicatePath`, `SecretNotFound`, `InvalidEgress`, `ReconcileError`. |+| Field | Description |+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |+| `status.observedDigest` | Image digest actually running. For `image` targets whose Host reference pins `Host.spec.guardrails.hooks[].digest`, mcp-host compares the two. On a mismatch the hook is quarantined at LLM-lane points: calls are treated as unavailable, so a `may_deny` hook denies and an advisory hook contributes nothing. Tool-lane points are not quarantined. |+| `status.readyReplicas` | Ready replicas (image targets only). |+| `status.lastReconciled` | Timestamp of the last successful reconcile. |- | `status.conditions[]` | Standard conditions (`Deployed`, `Ready`) with `observedGeneration`. |++| `status.conditions[]` | A single `Ready` condition with `observedGeneration`; its `reason` is one of `NoWorkload`, `Deploying`, `Ready`, `DuplicatePath`, `SecretNotFound`, `InvalidEgress`, `ReconcileError`. |`kubectl get llmhooks -n llm-hooks` shows Path, Order, FailMode, Digest, and Ready.