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TypeScript
fix(np-08): bind HCC MCP credentials to live Host context
Alfredo Lopez8c296a9708e1
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-public.ymlindex 18daf933c..f480a5818 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci-public.yml@@ -468,6 +468,9 @@ jobs:- name: Test pre-gate runtime assertionsrun: bash scripts/tests/test-minikube-pre-gate-runtime.sh+ - name: Test NP-08 Host clients have no v1 fallback+ run: bash scripts/tests/test-np08-v1-reference-inventory.sh+# ADMIN_PASSWORD is a required precondition of full-setup.sh Step 1 on the# default (minimal) seed profile. Two cases in this harness execute the# script against stubbed docker/minikube/kubectl, so without it they abortdiff --git a/control-api/src/routes/auth/mcp-host/issue.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/auth/mcp-host/issue.routes.tsindex 82a651655..59f7dcb42 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/auth/mcp-host/issue.routes.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/auth/mcp-host/issue.routes.ts@@ -62,10 +62,23 @@ function resolveHostName(body: unknown): { hostName: string } | { error: stringif (typeof raw !== 'string') return { error: 'host_required' }const trimmed = raw.trim()if (!trimmed) return { error: 'host_required' }- if (trimmed.length > 63 || !HOST_NAME_RE.test(trimmed)) return { error: 'invalid_host_name' }+ if (trimmed !== raw || trimmed.length > 63 || !HOST_NAME_RE.test(trimmed)) {+ return { error: 'invalid_host_name' }+ }return { hostName: trimmed }}+function resolveHostUid(body: unknown): { hostUid: string } | { error: string } {+ if (!body || typeof body !== 'object') return { error: 'host_uid_required' }+ const raw = (body as { hostUid?: unknown }).hostUid+ if (typeof raw !== 'string') return { error: 'host_uid_required' }+ const trimmed = raw.trim()+ if (!trimmed || trimmed !== raw || trimmed.length > 128 || /[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]/.test(trimmed)) {+ return { error: 'invalid_host_uid' }+ }+ return { hostUid: trimmed }+}+function resolveIssueTarget(req: {params: { namespace?: string; name?: string; recipe?: string }}): { namespace: string; name: string } | { error: string } {@@ -114,27 +127,39 @@ export function createAuthMcpHostIssueRoutes(): Router {return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_issuance_namespace' })}+ if (provisioner.iss === 'hcc' && recipeName !== 'standalone') {+ return res.status(403).json({ error: 'provisioner_target_mismatch' })+ }+// 1st-party (hcc): hostRefs[0] is the actual Host CRD name so per-event// identity binding can verify the bearer pod is acting on its own behalf.// 3rd-party (wrc): hostRefs[0] keeps the recipe-binding shape — recipe// pods don't run on a single named host. Authorization for recipe tokens// uses recipeNamespace/recipeName instead.let hostRefs: string[]+ let hccCredential: { hostUid: string } | undefinedif (provisioner.iss === 'hcc') {const hostResolved = resolveHostName(req.body)if ('error' in hostResolved) {return res.status(400).json({ error: hostResolved.error })}+ const uidResolved = resolveHostUid(req.body)+ if ('error' in uidResolved) {+ return res.status(400).json({ error: uidResolved.error })+ }hostRefs = [hostResolved.hostName]+ hccCredential = { hostUid: uidResolved.hostUid }} else {hostRefs = [`${recipeNamespace}/${recipeName}`]}const access = issueMcpHostAccessJwt(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs, {workflowControlScopes: controlScopes.scopes,+ hccCredential,})const refresh = issueMcpHostRefreshJwt(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs, {workflowControlScopes: controlScopes.scopes,+ hccCredential,})const control = issueMcpHostControlJwt(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs, {scopes: controlScopes.scopes,@@ -142,15 +167,11 @@ export function createAuthMcpHostIssueRoutes(): Router {req.log?.info({event: 'mcp_host_credentials_issued',- recipeNamespace,- recipeName,provisioner: provisioner.iss,- sub: provisioner.sub,- jti: provisioner.jti,accessTtlSec: access.expiresInSeconds,controlTtlSec: control.expiresInSeconds,- hostRefs,- workflowControlScopes: controlScopes.scopes,+ workflowControlScopeCount: controlScopes.scopes.length,+ hccQualified: hccCredential !== undefined,},'mcpHost credentials issued')diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/refresh.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/refresh.routes.tsindex 00dcf419d..0a710a645 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/refresh.routes.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/refresh.routes.ts@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {mcpHostJwtRefreshTotal,} from '../../../observability/metrics.js'import {+ MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,consumeMcpHostRefreshJwt,getMcpHostRefreshRateLimitKey,issueMcpHostAccessJwt,@@ -58,19 +59,23 @@ export function createMcpHostRefreshRoutes(): Router {return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' })}+ const hccCredential = claims.mcpCapabilities.includes(MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY)+ ? { hostUid: claims.host_uid! }+ : undefined+// Preserve hostRefs from the incoming refresh token so the host// identity binding (1st-party hostRefs[0]) survives rotation.const access = issueMcpHostAccessJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,claims.recipeName,claims.hostRefs,- { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes }+ { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes, hccCredential })const refresh = issueMcpHostRefreshJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,claims.recipeName,claims.hostRefs,- { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes }+ { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes, hccCredential })const control = issueMcpHostControlJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/reissue.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/reissue.routes.tsindex ca3b160bc..afb7bdbac 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/reissue.routes.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/renewal/reissue.routes.ts@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { mcpHostHttpMetrics } from '../../../middleware/mcpHostHttpMetrics.js'import { rateLimitMiddleware } from '../../../middleware/rateLimitMiddleware.js'import { mcpHostJwtReissueTotal } from '../../../observability/metrics.js'import {+ MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,consumeExpiredRefreshJti,getMcpHostExpiredRefreshRateLimitKey,issueMcpHostAccessJwt,@@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {reason: 'recipe_name_mismatch',route: 'workflow_auth_reissue',mode,- jwtRecipe: claims.recipeName,},'auth denied')@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {reason: 'missing_host_ref',route: 'workflow_auth_reissue',mode,- recipeNamespace: claims.recipeNamespace,},'auth denied')@@ -133,8 +132,6 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {reason: 'host_ref_mismatch',route: 'workflow_auth_reissue',mode,- hostRef,- recipeNamespace: claims.recipeNamespace,},'auth denied')@@ -147,7 +144,6 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {event: 'auth_denied',reason: 'unsupported_reissue_namespace',route: 'workflow_auth_reissue',- recipeNamespace: claims.recipeNamespace,},'auth denied')@@ -164,19 +160,23 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthorized' })}+ const hccCredential = claims.mcpCapabilities.includes(MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY)+ ? { hostUid: claims.host_uid! }+ : undefined+// Preserve hostRefs from the incoming (expired) refresh token so// the host identity binding survives the recovery re-issue.const access = issueMcpHostAccessJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,claims.recipeName,claims.hostRefs,- { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes }+ { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes, hccCredential })const refresh = issueMcpHostRefreshJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,claims.recipeName,claims.hostRefs,- { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes }+ { workflowControlScopes: claims.workflowControlScopes, hccCredential })const control = issueMcpHostControlJwt(claims.recipeNamespace,@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ export function createMcpHostReissueRoutes(): Router {{event: 'workflow_auth_reissued',mode,- recipeNamespace: claims.recipeNamespace,- recipeName: claims.recipeName,- hostRef,+ hccQualified: hccCredential !== undefined,},'workflow auth re-issued')diff --git a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.tsindex eaa376d62..28fae32b8 100644--- a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts+++ b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts@@ -14,12 +14,27 @@ const revokedRefreshJtis = new Set<string>()const MAX_CACHED_JTIS = 10_000const EXPIRED_REFRESH_REISSUE_GRACE_SECONDS = 5 * 60-/**- * jsonwebtoken normalizes a single `aud` to a string and multiple to an array.- * Our claims model carries a single audience string, so unwrap consistently.- */-function firstAudience(aud: jwt.JwtPayload['aud']): string {- return Array.isArray(aud) ? aud[0] : (aud as string)+export const MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE = 'workflow-approvals'+export const MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE = 'host-context-controller'+export const MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY = 'mcp:credential:read'+const HCC_HOST_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$/++type McpHostCredentialLineage = {+ hostUid: string+}++function normalizeAudienceClaim(aud: jwt.JwtPayload['aud']): string[] | null {+ const values = typeof aud === 'string' ? [aud] : Array.isArray(aud) ? aud : null+ if (!values || values.length === 0 || values.some(value => typeof value !== 'string')) {+ return null+ }+ if (new Set(values).size !== values.length) return null++ const actual = new Set(values)+ const workflowOnly = actual.size === 1 && actual.has(MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE)+ const hccQualified =+ actual.size === 2 && actual.has(MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE) && actual.has(MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE)+ return workflowOnly || hccQualified ? values : null}// Eviction is FIFO (Set iterator is insertion-ordered), not LRU. At@@ -108,8 +123,10 @@ export type McpHostAccessClaims = {hostRefs: string[]scope: 'workflow:approval:request'workflowControlScopes: McpHostControlScope[]+ mcpCapabilities: string[]+ host_uid?: stringiss: string- aud: string+ aud: string | string[]jti: stringexp: number}@@ -121,8 +138,10 @@ export type McpHostRefreshClaims = {hostRefs: string[]scope: 'workflow:approval:refresh'workflowControlScopes: McpHostControlScope[]+ mcpCapabilities: string[]+ host_uid?: stringiss: string- aud: string+ aud: string | string[]jti: stringexp: number}@@ -189,8 +208,12 @@ function issueToken(scope: 'workflow:approval:request' | 'workflow:approval:refresh',ttlSec: number,hostRefs: string[],- workflowControlScopes: McpHostControlScope[] = []+ workflowControlScopes: McpHostControlScope[] = [],+ hccCredential?: McpHostCredentialLineage): { token: string; expiresInSeconds: number } {+ if (hccCredential) {+ assertHccCredentialLineage(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs, hccCredential)+ }const token = jwt.sign({sub: `${recipeNamespace}/${recipeName}`,@@ -199,12 +222,20 @@ function issueToken(hostRefs,scope,workflowControlScopes,+ ...(hccCredential+ ? {+ host_uid: hccCredential.hostUid,+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ }+ : {}),},config.adminJwtPrivateKey,{algorithm: 'RS256',issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: hccCredential+ ? [MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE]+ : MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,jwtid: randomUUID(),expiresIn: ttlSec,}@@ -216,7 +247,10 @@ export function issueMcpHostAccessJwt(recipeNamespace: string,recipeName: string,hostRefs?: string[],- options: { workflowControlScopes?: McpHostControlScope[] } = {}+ options: {+ workflowControlScopes?: McpHostControlScope[]+ hccCredential?: McpHostCredentialLineage+ } = {}): { token: string; expiresInSeconds: number } {const refs = normalizeIssuedMcpHostHostRefs(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs)const workflowControlScopes = normalizeMcpHostControlScopes(options.workflowControlScopes ?? [])@@ -227,7 +261,8 @@ export function issueMcpHostAccessJwt('workflow:approval:request',config.mcpHostJwtAccessTtlSec,refs,- workflowControlScopes+ workflowControlScopes,+ options.hccCredential)mcpHostJwtIssueTotal.inc({ kind: 'access' }, 1)return out@@ -237,7 +272,10 @@ export function issueMcpHostRefreshJwt(recipeNamespace: string,recipeName: string,hostRefs?: string[],- options: { workflowControlScopes?: McpHostControlScope[] } = {}+ options: {+ workflowControlScopes?: McpHostControlScope[]+ hccCredential?: McpHostCredentialLineage+ } = {}): { token: string; expiresInSeconds: number } {const refs = normalizeIssuedMcpHostHostRefs(recipeNamespace, recipeName, hostRefs)const workflowControlScopes = normalizeMcpHostControlScopes(options.workflowControlScopes ?? [])@@ -248,7 +286,8 @@ export function issueMcpHostRefreshJwt('workflow:approval:refresh',config.mcpHostJwtRefreshTtlSec,refs,- workflowControlScopes+ workflowControlScopes,+ options.hccCredential)mcpHostJwtIssueTotal.inc({ kind: 'refresh' }, 1)return out@@ -315,6 +354,63 @@ function normalizeMcpHostHostRefs(value: unknown): string[] | null {return hostRefs}+function normalizeHostUid(value: unknown): string | null {+ if (typeof value !== 'string') return null+ const normalized = value.trim()+ if (!normalized || normalized !== value || normalized.length > 128) return null+ if (/[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]/.test(normalized)) return null+ return normalized+}++function assertHccCredentialLineage(+ recipeNamespace: string,+ recipeName: string,+ hostRefs: string[],+ lineage: McpHostCredentialLineage+): void {+ if (+ recipeNamespace !== config.hostsNamespace ||+ recipeName !== 'standalone' ||+ hostRefs.length !== 1 ||+ hostRefs[0].length > 63 ||+ !HCC_HOST_NAME_RE.test(hostRefs[0]) ||+ !normalizeHostUid(lineage.hostUid)+ ) {+ throw new Error('invalid HCC mcp-host credential lineage')+ }+}++function validateMcpCredentialLineage(+ payload: jwt.JwtPayload,+ audiences: string[],+ recipeNamespace: string,+ recipeName: string,+ hostRefs: string[]+): { hostUid?: string; capabilities: string[] } | null {+ const hccQualified = audiences.includes(MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE)+ if (!hccQualified) {+ if (payload.host_uid !== undefined || payload.mcpCapabilities !== undefined) return null+ return { capabilities: [] }+ }++ const hostUid = normalizeHostUid(payload.host_uid)+ const capabilities = payload.mcpCapabilities+ if (+ recipeNamespace !== config.hostsNamespace ||+ recipeName !== 'standalone' ||+ hostRefs.length !== 1 ||+ hostRefs[0].length > 63 ||+ !HCC_HOST_NAME_RE.test(hostRefs[0]) ||+ !hostUid ||+ !Array.isArray(capabilities) ||+ capabilities.length !== 1 ||+ capabilities[0] !== MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY+ ) {+ return null+ }+ return { hostUid, capabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY] }+}+function normalizeIssuedMcpHostHostRefs(recipeNamespace: string,recipeName: string,@@ -331,18 +427,33 @@ function validateClaims(): McpHostAccessClaims | McpHostRefreshClaims | null {const hostRefs = normalizeMcpHostHostRefs(payload?.hostRefs)const workflowControlScopes = normalizeMcpHostControlScopes(payload?.workflowControlScopes ?? [])+ const audiences = normalizeAudienceClaim(payload?.aud)if (typeof payload?.sub !== 'string' ||typeof payload?.recipeNamespace !== 'string' ||typeof payload?.recipeName !== 'string' ||+ payload.recipeNamespace.trim() !== payload.recipeNamespace ||+ payload.recipeName.trim() !== payload.recipeName ||+ !payload.recipeNamespace ||+ !payload.recipeName ||+ payload.sub !== `${payload.recipeNamespace}/${payload.recipeName}` ||!hostRefs ||!workflowControlScopes ||+ !audiences ||payload?.scope !== expectedScope ||typeof payload?.jti !== 'string' ||typeof payload?.exp !== 'number') {return null}+ const lineage = validateMcpCredentialLineage(+ payload,+ audiences,+ payload.recipeNamespace,+ payload.recipeName,+ hostRefs+ )+ if (!lineage) return nullreturn {sub: payload.sub,recipeNamespace: payload.recipeNamespace,@@ -350,8 +461,10 @@ function validateClaims(hostRefs,scope: expectedScope as 'workflow:approval:request' | 'workflow:approval:refresh',workflowControlScopes,+ mcpCapabilities: lineage.capabilities,+ ...(lineage.hostUid ? { host_uid: lineage.hostUid } : {}),iss: payload.iss as string,- aud: firstAudience(payload.aud),+ aud: audiences.length === 1 ? audiences[0] : audiences,jti: payload.jti,exp: payload.exp,}@@ -362,7 +475,7 @@ export function verifyMcpHostAccessJwt(token: string): McpHostAccessClaims | nulconst payload = jwt.verify(token, getWorkflowJwtPublicKey(), {algorithms: ['RS256'],issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,}) as jwt.JwtPayloadreturn validateClaims(payload, 'workflow:approval:request') as McpHostAccessClaims} catch {@@ -408,7 +521,7 @@ export function verifyMcpHostControlJwt(token: string): McpHostControlClaims | ntyp: 'service',scopes,iss: payload.iss as string,- aud: firstAudience(payload.aud),+ aud: 'mcp-host',jti,exp,}@@ -426,7 +539,7 @@ export function getMcpHostRefreshRateLimitKey(const payload = jwt.verify(token, getWorkflowJwtPublicKey(), {algorithms: ['RS256'],issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,ignoreExpiration: expiredGraceSeconds > 0,}) as jwt.JwtPayload@@ -468,7 +581,7 @@ export async function verifyMcpHostRefreshJwt(token: string): Promise<McpHostRefconst payload = jwt.verify(token, getWorkflowJwtPublicKey(), {algorithms: ['RS256'],issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,}) as jwt.JwtPayloadconst claims = validateClaims(@@ -520,7 +633,7 @@ export async function verifyExpiredMcpHostRefreshJwtDetailed(payload = jwt.verify(token, getWorkflowJwtPublicKey(), {algorithms: ['RS256'],issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,// Critical: do NOT let jsonwebtoken reject expiration here. This route// applies its own bounded grace window after normal claim validation.ignoreExpiration: true,@@ -573,7 +686,7 @@ export async function consumeMcpHostRefreshJwt(const payload = jwt.verify(token, getWorkflowJwtPublicKey(), {algorithms: ['RS256'],issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,}) as jwt.JwtPayloadconst claims = validateClaims(diff --git a/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts b/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.tsindex 23f1d980f..ac31aebcf 100644--- a/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/mcpHostJwtToken.hostRefs.test.ts@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'import { config } from '../src/config.js'import {ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES,+ MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,+ MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,+ MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,type McpHostAccessClaims,getMcpHostCallerKey,getMcpHostExpiredRefreshRateLimitKey,@@ -54,6 +57,75 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {})})+ describe('HCC-qualified credential lineage', () => {+ it('issues and verifies the existing access form with exact HCC authority claims', () => {+ const { token } = issueMcpHostAccessJwt(config.hostsNamespace, 'standalone', ['chatllm'], {+ hccCredential: { hostUid: 'host-uid-chatllm' },+ })+ const decoded = jwt.decode(token) as Record<string, unknown>+ expect(decoded.aud).toEqual([MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE])+ expect(decoded.host_uid).toBe('host-uid-chatllm')+ expect(decoded.mcpCapabilities).toEqual([MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY])++ expect(verifyMcpHostAccessJwt(token)).toMatchObject({+ hostRefs: ['chatllm'],+ host_uid: 'host-uid-chatllm',+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ })+ })++ it('rejects workflow-only tokens that inject HCC-only claims', () => {+ const token = jwt.sign(+ {+ sub: `${config.hostsNamespace}/standalone`,+ recipeNamespace: config.hostsNamespace,+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: ['chatllm'],+ host_uid: 'forged-host-uid',+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ },+ config.adminJwtPrivateKey,+ {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,+ audience: MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,+ jwtid: 'workflow-only-injected-hcc-claims',+ expiresIn: 300,+ }+ )++ expect(verifyMcpHostAccessJwt(token)).toBeNull()+ })++ it('rejects duplicate and third-party audience values even with a valid signature', () => {+ const base = {+ sub: `${config.hostsNamespace}/standalone`,+ recipeNamespace: config.hostsNamespace,+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: ['chatllm'],+ host_uid: 'host-uid-chatllm',+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ }+ for (const audience of [+ [MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE],+ [MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE, 'unrelated-service'],+ ]) {+ const token = jwt.sign(base, config.adminJwtPrivateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,+ audience,+ jwtid: `bad-audience-${audience.length}-${audience.at(-1)}`,+ expiresIn: 300,+ })+ expect(verifyMcpHostAccessJwt(token)).toBeNull()+ }+ })+ })+describe('getMcpHostRefreshRateLimitKey', () => {it('derives the rate-limit key only from a signed refresh JWT', () => {const { token } = issueMcpHostRefreshJwt('sandbox-recipes', 'rate-limited-recipe')@@ -390,6 +462,8 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {recipeName: 'recipe1',hostRefs: ['ns1/recipe1'],scope: 'workflow:approval:request' as const,+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: [],iss: 'test',aud: 'test',jti: 'test-jti',@@ -405,6 +479,8 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {recipeName: 'recipe1',hostRefs: ['ns1/recipe1'],scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: [],iss: 'test',aud: 'test',jti: 'test-jti',@@ -420,6 +496,8 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {recipeName: 'recipe1',hostRefs: ['ns1/recipe1', 'ns2/recipe2'],scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: [],iss: 'test',aud: 'test',jti: 'test-jti',@@ -436,6 +514,8 @@ describe('mcpHostJwtToken — hostRefs JWT claim', () => {recipeName: 'recipe1',hostRefs: ['ns1/*'],scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: [],iss: 'test',aud: 'test',jti: 'test-jti',diff --git a/control-api/test/network.gateway.intent.test.ts b/control-api/test/network.gateway.intent.test.tsindex a3a77802e..c44f7cd2d 100644--- a/control-api/test/network.gateway.intent.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/network.gateway.intent.test.ts@@ -355,13 +355,13 @@ describe('network/gateway intent (manifest-level)', () => {// hard-413s while the client-side cap says it should have worked.const hccDeployment = read(`${BASE}/control-plane/host-context-controller.yaml`)const gfscCapMatch = hccDeployment.match(- /GFS_MAX_WRITE_BODY_BYTES[\s\S]{0,80}?value:\s*"?(\d+)"?/+ /GFS_MAX_WRITE_BODY_BYTES[\s\S]{0,80}?value:\s*(["']?)(\d+)\1/)expect(gfscCapMatch,'GFS_MAX_WRITE_BODY_BYTES env must be set on the HCC deployment').not.toBeNull()- expect(Number(gfscCapMatch![1])).toBe(GFSC_WRITE_CAP)+ expect(Number(gfscCapMatch![2])).toBe(GFSC_WRITE_CAP)// 2. Both clients advertise the same hard binary part cap and product cap.const parseClientCaps = (relPath: string): { product: number; part: number } => {diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.auth.mcp-host.issue.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.auth.mcp-host.issue.test.tsindex 56c6c089a..1f21cd810 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.auth.mcp-host.issue.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.auth.mcp-host.issue.test.ts@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'import request from 'supertest'import { createApp } from '../src/app.js'import { config } from '../src/config.js'-import { ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES } from '../src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.js'+import {+ ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES,+ MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,+ MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,+ MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,+} from '../src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.js'import { MockGateway } from './mockGateway.js'vi.mock('../src/services/notificationEmitter.js', () => ({@@ -114,7 +119,7 @@ describe('routes/auth/mcp-host issue', () => {const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('hcc')}`)- .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'trader' })+ .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'trader', hostUid: 'host-uid-trader' })expect(res.status).toBe(200)expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('mcpHostAccessToken')@@ -124,10 +129,20 @@ describe('routes/auth/mcp-host issue', () => {expect(res.body.hostRefs).toEqual(['trader'])const controlClaims = jwt.decode(res.body.mcpHostControlToken) as Record<string, unknown>+ const accessClaims = jwt.decode(res.body.mcpHostAccessToken) as Record<string, unknown>+ const refreshClaims = jwt.decode(res.body.mcpHostRefreshToken) as Record<string, unknown>expect(controlClaims.scopes).toEqual(ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES)expect(controlClaims.scope).toBeUndefined()expect(controlClaims.aud).toBe('mcp-host')expect(controlClaims.hostRefs).toEqual(['trader'])+ for (const claims of [accessClaims, refreshClaims]) {+ expect(claims.aud).toEqual([MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE])+ expect(claims.host_uid).toBe('host-uid-trader')+ expect(claims.mcpCapabilities).toEqual([MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY])+ expect(claims.hostRefs).toEqual(['trader'])+ }+ expect(controlClaims.host_uid).toBeUndefined()+ expect(controlClaims.mcpCapabilities).toBeUndefined()})it('uses the workflowControlScopes declared by the trusted provisioner', async () => {@@ -201,6 +216,47 @@ describe('routes/auth/mcp-host issue', () => {expect(res.body.error).toBe('invalid_host_name')})+ it('rejects a non-canonical HCC Host name instead of normalizing caller input', async () => {+ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('hcc')}`)+ .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: ' trader ' })++ expect(res.status).toBe(400)+ expect(res.body.error).toBe('invalid_host_name')+ })++ it('rejects HCC issuance without the live Host UID', async () => {+ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('hcc')}`)+ .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'trader' })++ expect(res.status).toBe(400)+ expect(res.body.error).toBe('host_uid_required')+ })++ it('does not let a WRC body upgrade a workflow token into HCC credential authority', async () => {+ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/sandbox-recipes/test-recipe/tokens')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('wrc')}`)+ .send({+ ...ISSUE_BODY,+ host: 'trader',+ hostUid: 'forged-host-uid',+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ audience: MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,+ })++ expect(res.status).toBe(200)+ for (const encoded of [res.body.mcpHostAccessToken, res.body.mcpHostRefreshToken]) {+ const claims = jwt.decode(encoded) as Record<string, unknown>+ expect(claims.aud).toBe(MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE)+ expect(claims.host_uid).toBeUndefined()+ expect(claims.mcpCapabilities).toBeUndefined()+ }+ })+it('rejects HCC issuance with an empty / whitespace host', async () => {const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens')@@ -241,6 +297,16 @@ describe('routes/auth/mcp-host issue', () => {expect(res.body.error).toBe('provisioner_namespace_mismatch')})+ it('rejects a non-standalone HCC issuance target before signing', async () => {+ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/other-recipe/tokens')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('hcc')}`)+ .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'trader', hostUid: 'host-uid-trader' })++ expect(res.status).toBe(403)+ expect(res.body.error).toBe('provisioner_target_mismatch')+ })+it('rejects WRC for mcp-host namespace', async () => {const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens')@@ -281,7 +347,7 @@ describe('routes/auth/mcp-host issue', () => {const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/agents/standalone/tokens').set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signInternalControlJwt('hcc')}`)- .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'chatllm' })+ .send({ ...ISSUE_BODY, host: 'chatllm', hostUid: 'host-uid-chatllm' })expect(res.status).toBe(200)expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('mcpHostAccessToken')diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.renewal.reissue.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.renewal.reissue.test.tsindex eda98d3ca..52737fbfd 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.renewal.reissue.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.renewal.reissue.test.ts@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'import request from 'supertest'import { createApp } from '../src/app.js'import { config } from '../src/config.js'-import { issueMcpHostAccessJwt } from '../src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.js'+import {+ MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY,+ MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,+ MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,+ issueMcpHostAccessJwt,+} from '../src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.js'import { MockGateway } from './mockGateway.js'// Preserve the real mcpHostJwtToken helpers — we want the full RS256 sign@@ -88,7 +93,8 @@ function issueExpiredRefreshToken(recipe = RECIPE,expiredSeconds = 60,hostRefs = [`${ns}/${recipe}`],- workflowControlScopes = ['workflow:list', 'workflow:read']+ workflowControlScopes = ['workflow:list', 'workflow:read'],+ hccCredential?: { hostUid: string }): string {// Use the real private key but override expiresIn to a past timestamp via// the `exp` claim directly. `jwt.sign` with a numeric `exp` bypasses the@@ -102,13 +108,21 @@ function issueExpiredRefreshToken(hostRefs,scope: 'workflow:approval:refresh',workflowControlScopes,+ ...(hccCredential+ ? {+ host_uid: hccCredential.hostUid,+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ }+ : {}),exp: now - expiredSeconds,},config.adminJwtPrivateKey,{algorithm: 'RS256',issuer: config.adminJwtIssuer,- audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ audience: hccCredential+ ? [MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE]+ : MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,jwtid: `jti-expired-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}`,})@@ -180,6 +194,33 @@ describe('POST /api/v1/workflow-auth/reissue', () => {expect(res.status).toBe(200)})+ it('preserves HCC audience, Host UID, and capability through bounded reissue', async () => {+ const token = issueExpiredRefreshToken(+ HOST_NS,+ STANDALONE_RECIPE,+ 60,+ [HOST_REF],+ ['workflow:list'],+ { hostUid: 'signed-host-uid' }+ )+ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/workflow-auth/reissue')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`)+ .send({+ host_ref: HOST_REF,+ hostUid: 'body-controlled-uid',+ mcpCapabilities: [],+ })++ expect(res.status).toBe(200)+ for (const encoded of [res.body.accessToken, res.body.refreshToken]) {+ const claims = jwt.decode(encoded) as Record<string, unknown>+ expect(claims.aud).toEqual([MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE])+ expect(claims.host_uid).toBe('signed-host-uid')+ expect(claims.mcpCapabilities).toEqual([MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY])+ }+ })+it('returns 401 when the Authorization header is missing', async () => {const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/workflow-auth/reissue')diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.user-approval-requests.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.user-approval-requests.test.tsindex 3ee094f82..b76350597 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.user-approval-requests.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.mcp-host.user-approval-requests.test.ts@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'import request from 'supertest'import { createApp } from '../src/app.js'import * as notificationDeliveryQueueService from '../src/services/notificationDeliveryQueueService.js'@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ describe('User Approval Request Routes', () => {hostRefs: [`${NS}/${RECIPE}`],scope: 'workflow:approval:refresh',workflowControlScopes: ['workflow:list', 'workflow:read'],+ mcpCapabilities: [],iss: 'test-issuer',aud: 'workflow-approvals',jti: 'jti-1',@@ -227,6 +229,43 @@ describe('User Approval Request Routes', () => {expect(res.body).toHaveProperty('controlExpiresInSeconds')})+ it('preserves HCC authority only from verified refresh lineage and ignores body upgrades', async () => {+ const { refreshToken } = issueTestTokens()+ vi.mocked(mcpHostJwt.consumeMcpHostRefreshJwt).mockResolvedValueOnce({+ sub: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ recipeNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: ['chatllm'],+ host_uid: 'signed-host-uid',+ scope: 'workflow:approval:refresh',+ workflowControlScopes: ['workflow:list'],+ mcpCapabilities: [mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY],+ iss: 'control-api',+ aud: [mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE, mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE],+ jti: 'hcc-refresh-jti',+ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600,+ })++ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/api/v1/workflow-auth/refresh')+ .set('Authorization', `Bearer ${refreshToken}`)+ .send({ hostUid: 'body-controlled-uid', mcpCapabilities: [] })++ expect(res.status).toBe(200)+ for (const encoded of [res.body.accessToken, res.body.refreshToken]) {+ const claims = jwt.decode(encoded) as Record<string, unknown>+ expect(claims.aud).toEqual([+ mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_WORKFLOW_AUDIENCE,+ mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_HCC_AUDIENCE,+ ])+ expect(claims.host_uid).toBe('signed-host-uid')+ expect(claims.mcpCapabilities).toEqual([mcpHostJwt.MCP_HOST_CREDENTIAL_CAPABILITY])+ }+ const control = jwt.decode(res.body.mcpHostControlToken) as Record<string, unknown>+ expect(control.host_uid).toBeUndefined()+ expect(control.mcpCapabilities).toBeUndefined()+ })+it('rejects invalid refresh token', async () => {vi.mocked(mcpHostJwt.consumeMcpHostRefreshJwt).mockResolvedValueOnce(null)const res = await request(app)diff --git a/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml b/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yamlindex 0559df810..74ac59f13 100644--- a/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml+++ b/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml@@ -70,26 +70,26 @@ data:# Hard ceiling for caller-provided ttlSeconds. Defaults to 48h so a client# asking for ttlSeconds=604800 (code default) can't freeze a workflow step# for a full week. Overlays may tighten further for stricter environments.- WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_MAX_TTL_SEC: "172800"- WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_EXPIRY_INTERVAL_MS: "60000"+ WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_MAX_TTL_SEC: '172800'+ WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_EXPIRY_INTERVAL_MS: '60000'# Terminal approvals are retained in the live table for 180 days, then# copied to workflow_approval_requests_archive by the daily archive cron.- APPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS: "180"- APPROVAL_ARCHIVE_BATCH_SIZE: "500"+ APPROVAL_RETENTION_DAYS: '180'+ APPROVAL_ARCHIVE_BATCH_SIZE: '500'# TTL for mcpHostJwt control tokens used by runtime mcp-host workflow triggers.- MCP_HOST_JWT_CONTROL_TTL_SEC: "600"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_WORKLOADS_PER_RECIPE: "25"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_UI_EGRESS_INTERNAL_MAX_ITEMS: "25"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_STEPS: "100"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_DEPENDS_ON_MAX_ITEMS: "100"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_ALLOWED_TOOLS_MAX_ITEMS: "50"- CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_MCP_SERVERS_MAX_ITEMS: "20"- CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_BYTES: "52428800"+ MCP_HOST_JWT_CONTROL_TTL_SEC: '600'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_WORKLOADS_PER_RECIPE: '25'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_UI_EGRESS_INTERNAL_MAX_ITEMS: '25'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_MAX_STEPS: '100'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_DEPENDS_ON_MAX_ITEMS: '100'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_ALLOWED_TOOLS_MAX_ITEMS: '50'+ CLERUM_WORKFLOW_STEP_MCP_SERVERS_MAX_ITEMS: '20'+ CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_BYTES: '52428800'# Plugin image-host allowlist (Phase 2.3) — audit mode by default. Base ships a# vendor-neutral default; environment overlays override this with the image# prefixes for their own registry.- CONTROL_API_ALLOWED_IMAGE_PREFIXES: "ghcr.io/evenfire-ai/,mongodb/,mcr.microsoft.com/,clerum/"- CONTROL_API_ENFORCE_IMAGE_ALLOWLIST: "false"+ CONTROL_API_ALLOWED_IMAGE_PREFIXES: 'ghcr.io/evenfire-ai/,mongodb/,mcr.microsoft.com/,clerum/'+ CONTROL_API_ENFORCE_IMAGE_ALLOWLIST: 'false'---apiVersion: v1kind: ConfigMap@@ -802,7 +802,20 @@ data:uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;- access_log /dev/stdout;+ map $uri $hcc_route_class {+ default denied;+ ~^/health$ health;+ ~^/ready$ ready;+ ~^/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers$ host_inventory;+ ~^/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential$ host_credential;+ ~^/api/v1/mcpservers$ legacy_system_inventory;+ ~^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/ legacy_host_tombstone;+ ~^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ legacy_host_tombstone;+ ~^/api/v1/desktop/ desktop;+ }+ log_format hcc_gateway_json escape=json+ '{"gateway":"hcc","request_id":"$request_id","route_class":"$hcc_route_class","method":"$request_method","status":$status,"upstream_status":"$upstream_status","request_time":$request_time,"upstream_response_time":"$upstream_response_time"}';+ access_log /dev/stdout hcc_gateway_json;error_log /dev/stderr warn;upstream host_context_controller_upstream {@@ -812,6 +825,33 @@ data:server {listen 8081;server_name _;+ default_type application/json;++ # Normalize errors generated by nginx itself. Upstream errors remain+ # HCC-owned (`proxy_intercept_errors` is off), preserving HCC's generic+ # WWW-Authenticate and authorization-unavailable semantics.+ error_page 400 = @hcc_bad_request;+ error_page 405 = @hcc_method_not_allowed;+ error_page 413 = @hcc_payload_too_large;++ location @hcc_bad_request {+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;+ return 400 '{"error":"bad_request"}';+ }+ location @hcc_method_not_allowed {+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;+ return 405 '{"error":"method_not_allowed"}';+ }+ location @hcc_payload_too_large {+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;+ return 413 '{"error":"payload_too_large"}';+ }location = /health {add_header Content-Type application/json;@@ -820,34 +860,64 @@ data:location = /ready {proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;+ proxy_pass_request_headers off;proxy_set_header Host $host;- proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;}location = /api/v1/mcpservers {proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;+ proxy_pass_request_headers off;proxy_set_header Host $host;- proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;}+ # The retained proxy poller is the only PR 1 compatibility exception+ # above. Caller-selected legacy Context and credential routes are+ # closed locally so a stale mcp-host cannot bypass the v2 Host binding.location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/[^/]+$ {+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;+ return 410 '{"error":"gone"}';+ }++ location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;+ return 410 '{"error":"gone"}';+ }++ location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers {+ if ($request_method != GET) { return 405; }proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;+ proxy_pass_request_headers off;+ proxy_http_version 1.1;proxy_set_header Host $host;- proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;+ proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;+ proxy_set_header Connection "";+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;}- location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {+ location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential {+ if ($request_method != POST) { return 405; }+ client_max_body_size 1k;proxy_pass http://host_context_controller_upstream;+ proxy_pass_request_headers off;+ proxy_http_version 1.1;proxy_set_header Host $host;- proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;- proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;+ proxy_set_header Content-Type $http_content_type;+ proxy_set_header Content-Length $content_length;+ proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;+ proxy_set_header Connection "";+ add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;+ add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;}location ~ ^/api/v1/desktop/[^/]+$ {diff --git a/deploy/base/control-plane/host-context-controller.yaml b/deploy/base/control-plane/host-context-controller.yamlindex df8126a53..5e9ea557a 100644--- a/deploy/base/control-plane/host-context-controller.yaml+++ b/deploy/base/control-plane/host-context-controller.yaml@@ -116,6 +116,25 @@ spec:value: CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY- name: HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACEvalue: mcp-host+ # Existing Control API RS256 public key used to verify the first-party+ # mcp-host access-token family on HCC v2 Host routes. The audience is a+ # fixed HCC code contract; the issuer is read from the same ConfigMap+ # key consumed by Control API so signer and verifier cannot drift.+ - name: HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY+ valueFrom:+ configMapKeyRef:+ name: control-api-public-key+ key: CONTROL_API_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM+ - name: HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_ISSUER+ valueFrom:+ configMapKeyRef:+ name: control-api-config+ key: CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_ISSUER+ - name: HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS+ valueFrom:+ configMapKeyRef:+ name: control-api-config+ key: WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_ACCESS_TTL_SEC- name: CONTROL_API_BASE_URLvalue: http://control-api.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8090# URL of the nginx gateway that mediates mcp-host → control-apidiff --git a/deploy/overlays/minikube/configmaps/mcp-host-config.yaml b/deploy/overlays/minikube/configmaps/mcp-host-config.yamlindex 18786ed96..e9f55075b 100644--- a/deploy/overlays/minikube/configmaps/mcp-host-config.yaml+++ b/deploy/overlays/minikube/configmaps/mcp-host-config.yaml@@ -6,44 +6,45 @@ metadata:labels:app: mcp-hostdata:- CLERUM_HOST_NAME: "chatllm"- CLERUM_SERVER_PORT: "8080"- CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_URL: "http://host-context-controller-api-gateway.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8081"- CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_POLL_INTERVAL: "30000"- MCP_PROXY_ENABLED: "false"- MCP_PROXY_URL: "http://mcp-proxy.mcp-server.svc.cluster.local:8083"- CLERUM_AGENT_TASK_DELAY: "3"- CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_TASK_DURATION: "1800000"- CLERUM_SHELL_TIMEOUT: "600000"- CLERUM_TOOL_TIMEOUT: "660000"- CLERUM_MCP_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"- CLERUM_MCP_TOOL_MAX_TOTAL_TIMEOUT_MS: "3600000"- CLERUM_TOOL_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS: "5000"- CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS: "100"- CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE: "100"- CLERUM_BUDGETS_ENABLED: "true"- TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_ENABLED: "false"- TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_MAX_BYTES: "16384"- TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_RETENTION_DAYS: "30"- TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_KEY_VERSION: "v1"+ CLERUM_HOST_NAME: 'chatllm'+ CLERUM_SERVER_PORT: '8080'+ CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_URL: 'http://host-context-controller-api-gateway.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8081'+ CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_POLL_INTERVAL: '30000'+ MCP_PROXY_ENABLED: 'false'+ HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS: '60000'+ MCP_PROXY_URL: 'http://mcp-proxy.mcp-server.svc.cluster.local:8083'+ CLERUM_AGENT_TASK_DELAY: '3'+ CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_TASK_DURATION: '1800000'+ CLERUM_SHELL_TIMEOUT: '600000'+ CLERUM_TOOL_TIMEOUT: '660000'+ CLERUM_MCP_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS: '3600000'+ CLERUM_MCP_TOOL_MAX_TOTAL_TIMEOUT_MS: '3600000'+ CLERUM_TOOL_PROGRESS_INTERVAL_MS: '5000'+ CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_CALLS: '100'+ CLERUM_AGENT_MAX_QUEUE_SIZE: '100'+ CLERUM_BUDGETS_ENABLED: 'true'+ TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_ENABLED: 'false'+ TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_MAX_BYTES: '16384'+ TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_RETENTION_DAYS: '30'+ TRACING_APPROVAL_PROMPT_HISTORY_KEY_VERSION: 'v1'CLERUM_APPROVAL_CONFIG: '{"defaultPolicy":"channel_users","channels":{"telegram":{"enabled":true}}}'- CLERUM_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: "0"- CLERUM_MEMORY_ENABLED: "true"- CLERUM_SESSION_STORE: "sqlite"- CLERUM_SESSION_SEARCH_ENABLED: "true"- CLERUM_SESSION_TTL_DAYS: "90"- CLERUM_SEARCH_RETENTION_DAYS: "90"- CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAX_TOKENS: "100000"- CLERUM_ENABLE_RESPONSE_ATTACHMENTS: "true"- CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT: "3"- CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_BYTES: "52428800"- CLERUM_PERSONALIZATION_ENABLED: "false"+ CLERUM_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT: '0'+ CLERUM_MEMORY_ENABLED: 'true'+ CLERUM_SESSION_STORE: 'sqlite'+ CLERUM_SESSION_SEARCH_ENABLED: 'true'+ CLERUM_SESSION_TTL_DAYS: '90'+ CLERUM_SEARCH_RETENTION_DAYS: '90'+ CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAX_TOKENS: '100000'+ CLERUM_ENABLE_RESPONSE_ATTACHMENTS: 'true'+ CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_COUNT: '3'+ CLERUM_ATTACHMENT_MAX_BYTES: '52428800'+ CLERUM_PERSONALIZATION_ENABLED: 'false'# --- Auth configuration ---# Enabled for defense in depth: runtimeEdgeGuard validates trusted edge caller# headers, and HCC-managed NetworkPolicies restrict pod reachability.- CLERUM_ENABLE_AUTH: "true"- CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_ISSUER: "control-api"- CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: "rpc-proxy"+ CLERUM_ENABLE_AUTH: 'true'+ CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_ISSUER: 'control-api'+ CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_AUDIENCE: 'rpc-proxy'# Public key must match CONTROL_API_RPC_JWT_PRIVATE_KEY pair (from jwt-signing-keys.yaml)# and RPC_PROXY_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY (from rpc-proxy-secrets). All three must be the same key pair.CLERUM_AUTH_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY: |diff --git a/docs/architecture/overview.md b/docs/architecture/overview.mdindex 61acc0058..7df555478 100644--- a/docs/architecture/overview.md+++ b/docs/architecture/overview.md@@ -749,13 +749,22 @@ Both support Bearer token authentication via `Authorization` header.#### Server Discovery (Production)-mcp-host polls host-context-controller REST API to discover MCP servers:+mcp-host polls the host-context-controller REST API with its existing+caller-bound access JWT. HCC resolves the live Host and its Context from that+identity; the caller never supplies a Context selector:```-mcp-host ──GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/{contextRef}──▶ host-context-controller- ◀──── { servers: McpServerInfo[], timestamp }────+mcp-host ──GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers + Bearer Host JWT──▶ HCC gateway+ ◀──── Host-scoped { servers: McpServerInfo[], timestamp }────```+When an authenticated McpServer needs a credential, mcp-host posts the server+name to `/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential` with the same JWT. HCC+checks the live Host → Context grant before reading the referenced Secret.+The former caller-selected Context and global `/auth` routes are retired with+HTTP 410; the remaining global v1 inventory is metadata-only transitional+surface for the separately reviewed mcp-proxy PR2 and is not used by mcp-host.+Polling interval: 30 seconds (configurable via `CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_POLL_INTERVAL`)On each poll, mcp-host compares new server list with previous state and:@@ -1012,13 +1021,15 @@ One policy per (context, server) pair. Only allows traffic from the mcp-host nam### REST API-| Method | Path | Description |-| ------ | ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |-| `GET` | `/` | API information |-| `GET` | `/health` | Health check |-| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers` | List ALL MCP servers |-| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers/context/{contextRef}` | List servers filtered by Context CRD |-| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers/{name}/auth` | Get auth token for a server |+| Method | Path | Description |+| ------ | ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| `GET` | `/` | API information |+| `GET` | `/health` | Health check |+| `GET` | `/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers` | List MCP servers granted to the authenticated Host |+| `POST` | `/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential` | Return a credential only after the live Host → Context → McpServer check |+| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers` | Transitional metadata-only system inventory; no Secret fields; PR2 review required |+| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers/context/{contextRef}` | Retired caller-selected route; HTTP 410 |+| `GET` | `/api/v1/mcpservers/{name}/auth` | Retired unbound credential route; HTTP 410 |**Server info response**:@@ -1028,23 +1039,25 @@ One policy per (context, server) pair. Only allows traffic from the mcp-host nam{"name": "mongodb-server","description": "MongoDB MCP server",- "contextRef": "context1","transport": { "type": "streamableHttp", "url": "http://...:3000/mcp" },- "auth": { "type": "bearer", "secretRef": "...", "secretKey": "..." },"enabled": true,+ "authRequired": true,+ "credentialRevision": "opaque-revision","status": {"deployed": true,"ready": true,- "message": "1/1 replicas ready"+ "message": "ready"}}],- "contextRef": "context1","timestamp": "2024-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"}```-**Context-based filtering**: Reads the Context CRD's `mcpServers` allowlist and only returns servers that appear in that list.+**Host-based authorization**: HCC derives the current Host's Context from the+verified JWT and live Host object, checks the Context's `mcpServers` allowlist,+and returns only the sanitized v2 DTO. Context names, auth selectors, and+Secret references never appear in the Host response.**Deployment status**: The reconciler checks the actual Deployment status (`readyReplicas`) to populate the `deployed` and `ready` fields.diff --git a/docs/architecture/platform-topology.md b/docs/architecture/platform-topology.mdindex d120a5739..13af8a7e2 100644--- a/docs/architecture/platform-topology.md+++ b/docs/architecture/platform-topology.md@@ -574,8 +574,8 @@ flowchart TD| **2. Intent Decomposition** | WRC (watches WorkflowRecipe CRDs) | Validates recipe, decomposes into 3 intent classes: MCP Intent → McpServer CRDs, Sandbox Intent → non-MCP workloads, Access-Policy Intent → Context patches + binding annotations | control-plane → mcp-server, sandbox-recipes || **3. Sanitization Gate** | HCC: MCP Server Sync | **`managed: true` only** (stdio recipe servers, control-api servers). Coerces the McpServer CRD (imagePullPolicy, non-root gid/fsGroup, capability + env stripping, unit-naive resource clamping), then runs the two blocking checks — Secret validation and the image allowlist (audit-only unless enforce mode). Blocked → no Deployment, `status.conditions[Ready]=False`. `managed: false` servers (WRC's HTTP/SSE recipe workloads) skip the gate entirely — HCC only validates the Secret and marks them Ready. See §5.1 | control-plane → mcp-server || **4. NetworkPolicy Generation** | HCC + WRC + static deploy overlays | HCC watches Context/McpServer intent and generates Context/MCP policies; WRC generates policies only for WRC-owned workflow runtime pods; static deploy owns platform infrastructure policies such as GKE mcp-host API egress | control-plane → mcp-host, mcp-server, sandbox-recipes |-| **5. Discovery** | HCC REST API | Internal cache updates when MCP server Deployment is running. mcp-host polls Discovery API (`GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/{contextRef}`) | control-plane (8081) → mcp-host |-| **6. Tool Availability** | mcp-host | Agent discovers new MCP server tools. L2 NetworkPolicy allows traffic. Auth token from Discovery API authenticates the agent to the MCP server | mcp-host → mcp-server |+| **5. Discovery** | HCC REST API | Internal cache updates when MCP server Deployment is running. mcp-host polls `GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers` with its caller-bound access JWT; HCC derives the live Host and Context and returns only the granted set. | control-plane (8081) → mcp-host |+| **6. Tool Availability** | mcp-host | Agent discovers new MCP server tools. L2 NetworkPolicy allows traffic. For an authenticated server, mcp-host posts the server name to the v2 credential route; HCC authorizes the live Host → Context grant before reading the Secret. | mcp-host → mcp-server |### 7.4 Trust Behavior Propertiesdiff --git a/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md b/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.mdindex f421cec34..7d8fbdec8 100644--- a/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md+++ b/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ Workloads with a `transport` field are automatically registered as MCP servers.- Non-MCP workloads (StatefulSets, CronJobs, Jobs, PVCs, Secrets, ConfigMaps) → created directly with `ownerRef → WorkflowRecipe`- MCP workloads (those with `transport` field) → creates McpServer CRDs with `ownerRef → WorkflowRecipe`. The `managed` flag is **transport-dependent**: `managed: true` only for `transport.type: stdio`; `streamableHttp` and `sse` workloads get `managed: false` and the WRC creates their Deployment + Service itself.2. **MCP Server Sync** (within HCC) watches McpServer CRDs and creates Deployment + Service for each `managed: true` McpServer — i.e. for stdio recipe workloads (where it also injects the stdio-bridge sidecar) and for standalone managed servers. `managed: false` McpServer CRDs are registration/discovery records only; their runtime is owned by whoever created it (the WRC, for HTTP transport workloads).-3. **Discovery**: mcp-host discovers ALL MCP servers (standalone, recipe-based, and infrastructure) through HCC's Discovery API+3. **Discovery**: mcp-host discovers only the MCP servers granted to its authenticated Host through HCC's Host-scoped v2 Discovery API; the caller does not select a Context. The global v1 inventory is a metadata-only transitional system surface under separate PR2 review.See [Architecture Reference §13](../architecture/platform-topology.md#13-deployment-responsibility-matrix) for the complete deployment responsibility matrix.@@ -325,16 +325,16 @@ flowchart TB| Red (security) | Security resources | NetworkPolicies || Gray (storage) | Supporting resources | PVCs, Secrets, ConfigMaps |-| Node | Detail |-| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |-| **WRC** | WorkflowRecipe Reconciler — its own `workflow-recipes` Deployment in `control-plane` |-| **MCP Server Sync** | McpServer Reconciler — watches McpServer CRDs, creates Deployments + Services |-| **MCPAccessCtrl Sync** | Context Reconciler — manages access NetworkPolicies |-| **MCP Host Sync** | Host CRD lifecycle management |-| **Discovery API** | REST endpoint: `GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/{ref}` |-| **MCP Server Pool** | All MCP servers: recipe-created, standalone, and infrastructure |-| **McpServer CRDs** | Created by the WRC for MCP workloads (`ownerRef → WorkflowRecipe`; `managed: true` only for stdio) |-| **MCP Server A/B** | Standalone or recipe-created MCP servers (MongoDB, Airtable, etc.) |+| Node | Detail |+| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| **WRC** | WorkflowRecipe Reconciler — its own `workflow-recipes` Deployment in `control-plane` |+| **MCP Server Sync** | McpServer Reconciler — watches McpServer CRDs, creates Deployments + Services |+| **MCPAccessCtrl Sync** | Context Reconciler — manages access NetworkPolicies |+| **MCP Host Sync** | Host CRD lifecycle management |+| **Discovery API** | Host-scoped REST endpoints: `GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers` and `POST /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential`; v1 Context/auth routes are HTTP 410 tombstones |+| **MCP Server Pool** | All MCP servers: recipe-created, standalone, and infrastructure |+| **McpServer CRDs** | Created by the WRC for MCP workloads (`ownerRef → WorkflowRecipe`; `managed: true` only for stdio) |+| **MCP Server A/B** | Standalone or recipe-created MCP servers (MongoDB, Airtable, etc.) |> **WRC reconciliation model**: Recipes are deployed either by creating WorkflowRecipe CRDs (via control-api or `kubectl apply`) or through the WRC's MCP `deploy_recipe` tool. Either way, the WRC watches the resulting CRDs and reconciles them — it produces declarative intent (McpServer CRDs, workloads, Context patches), and the HCC's other synchronizers materialize them into runtime state.diff --git a/host-context-controller/README.md b/host-context-controller/README.mdindex 8ee40e981..e42a7cd5c 100644--- a/host-context-controller/README.md+++ b/host-context-controller/README.md@@ -156,7 +156,10 @@ On startup, a full host reconciliation pass runs and deletes orphaned host runti## REST API-The host-context-controller returns curated `McpServerInfo` objects that strip deployment-specific fields and include operator-managed status.+The Host-facing MCP contract is authenticated and Host-scoped. HCC verifies the+runtime bearer, resolves the live Host and its live Context server-side, and+checks the Context grant before it reads credential material. Callers do not+supply a Context reference.### Health Check@@ -170,7 +173,7 @@ GET /healthThe server also exposes `GET /` (API information), `GET /ready` (readiness; 503 until the controller has started), `GET /metrics` (Prometheus), and `GET /api/v1/desktop/:hostRef` (desktop status; requires the `CONTEXT_MAPPER_DESKTOP_API_TOKEN` bearer token — the check is skipped when that variable is empty).-### List All McpServers+### Temporary system inventory (PR 2 compatibility)```GET /api/v1/mcpservers@@ -181,19 +184,13 @@ GET /api/v1/mcpservers"servers": [{"name": "mongodb-server",- "description": "MongoDB MCP Server","contextRef": "context1","transport": {"type": "sse","url": "http://mongodb-server.mcp-server.svc.cluster.local:3000/sse"},- "auth": {- "type": "bearer",- "secretRef": "mcp-mongodb-credentials",- "secretKey": "auth-token"- },"enabled": true,- "status": { "deployed": true, "ready": true, "message": "Running" }+ "status": { "deployed": true, "ready": true }}],"contextRef": "*",@@ -201,36 +198,85 @@ GET /api/v1/mcpservers}```-### List McpServers by Context+This anonymous, metadata-only route is retained temporarily for the existing+`mcp-proxy` poller. It is not the mcp-host discovery contract and exposes no+auth selector or Secret metadata. Its removal or authentication belongs to the+separate PR 2 migration.++### Authenticated Host inventory```-GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef+GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers+Authorization: Bearer <mcp-host-runtime-token>```-Returns only McpServers that are listed in the specified Context CRD's `spec.mcpServers` array and are enabled. If the Context CRD does not exist, returns an empty list.+The response contains only enabled McpServers granted by the authenticated+Host's live Context. It omits `contextRef`, auth selectors, and Secret metadata.+An authenticated server includes an opaque `credentialRevision` so mcp-host can+retire a credential before admitting a changed revision.++The verifier accepts only RS256 tokens from the configured Control API issuer+with an exact HCC audience set (HCC-only, or the bounded HCC + workflow+migration pair), one `hostRefs` entry, the matching `host_uid`, and the single+`mcp:credential:read` capability. The historical workflow scope/standalone+recipe claims identify the reused runtime-token family; they do not grant a+Context. HCC derives that authorization from the live Host and Context objects.++```json+{+ "servers": [+ {+ "name": "mongodb-server",+ "transport": {+ "type": "sse",+ "url": "http://mongodb-server.mcp-server.svc.cluster.local:3000/sse"+ },+ "enabled": true,+ "status": { "deployed": true, "ready": true },+ "authRequired": true,+ "credentialRevision": "opaque-revision"+ }+ ],+ "timestamp": "2026-02-14T15:11:12.000Z"+}+```-### Get Auth Token+### Authenticated Host credential```-GET /api/v1/mcpservers/:name/auth+POST /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential+Authorization: Bearer <mcp-host-runtime-token>+Content-Type: application/json++{ "serverName": "mongodb-server" }```Response (with auth):```json-{ "token": "secret-token-value" }+{ "token": "credential-value", "credentialRevision": "opaque-revision" }```Response (no auth configured):```json-{ "token": null, "message": "No auth configured for this server" }+{ "token": null, "credentialRevision": "opaque-revision" }```+HCC returns the same opaque `404 {"error":"not_found"}` for an ungranted,+missing, disabled, or cross-Context server name. It performs the grant check+before any Secret value read and revalidates the live authority snapshot after+the read. Protected responses are non-cacheable.++The legacy caller-selected routes+`GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef` and+`GET /api/v1/mcpservers/:name/auth` are tombstoned with a generic HTTP 410 at+both the gateway and HCC application layers; there is no v1 fallback.+## Environment Variables-HCC reads **60** environment variables (`src/config.ts`, `src/gfsConfig.ts`,-`src/logger.ts`, `src/k8sApiCidrs.ts`). Defaults below are the literal fallbacks+HCC reads environment variables from `src/config.ts`, `src/gfsConfig.ts`,+`src/logger.ts`, and `src/k8sApiCidrs.ts`. Defaults below are the literal fallbacksin code; where the deploy manifest overrides one, that is noted.**Parsing semantics.** `getEnv(key, default)` uses `process.env[key] ?? default`,@@ -254,16 +300,16 @@ a permissive policy — see the NetworkPolicy and GFS tables:### Namespaces-| Variable | Default | Description |-| ---------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-server` | Where `McpServer` / `Context` CRDs live and managed server workloads are created. |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_CONTROL_PLANE_NAMESPACE` | `control-plane` | Where control-plane gateway services live. |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-host` | Where mcp-host pods run (drives NetworkPolicy generation). |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_GFS_NAMESPACE` | `gfs` | Where the GlobalFileSystem controller (gfsc) runs. |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_RPC_PROXY_NAMESPACE` | `rpc-proxy` | Where rpc-proxy runs (L2 egress policy generation). |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_CHANNELS_NAMESPACE` | `channels` | Per-Host channel-reader Deployments/Services. |-| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_SANDBOX_NAMESPACE` | `sandbox-recipes` | Workflow-recipe namespace. Read only by the GFS factory. |-| `HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-host` | Namespace HCC names when asking control-api for shared 1st-party mcp-host credentials. **Exits 1** if it resolves empty; warns if outside mcp-host/sandbox-recipes. |+| Variable | Default | Description |+| ---------------------------------------- | ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-server` | Where `McpServer` / `Context` CRDs live and managed server workloads are created. |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_CONTROL_PLANE_NAMESPACE` | `control-plane` | Where control-plane gateway services live. |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-host` | Where mcp-host pods run (drives NetworkPolicy generation). |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_GFS_NAMESPACE` | `gfs` | Where the GlobalFileSystem controller (gfsc) runs. |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_RPC_PROXY_NAMESPACE` | `rpc-proxy` | Where rpc-proxy runs (L2 egress policy generation). |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_CHANNELS_NAMESPACE` | `channels` | Per-Host channel-reader Deployments/Services. |+| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_SANDBOX_NAMESPACE` | `sandbox-recipes` | Workflow-recipe namespace. Read only by the GFS factory. |+| `HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE` | `mcp-host` | Namespace HCC names when asking control-api for caller-bound 1st-party mcp-host credentials. It must exactly equal `CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE`; HCC exits 1 otherwise. |### MCP server provisioning@@ -298,6 +344,15 @@ a permissive policy — see the NetworkPolicy and GFS tables:| `CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_RESYNC_SEC` | `300` | Periodic Host `fullReconcile` (seconds); guards against dropped watch events and drives auth-degraded self-heal. `0` disables. || `HCC_MCP_HOST_RUNTIME_BOOTSTRAP_REFRESH_BEFORE_SEC` | `900` | How long before expiry HCC refreshes the mcp-host bootstrap credential Secret. |+### mcp-host API authorization++| Variable | Default | Description |+| ---------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |+| `HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` | `` (empty) | RS256 public key used to verify protected v2 Host MCP requests. HCC fails startup when it is absent, malformed, private, or a placeholder. |+| `HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_ISSUER` | `control-api` | Exact issuer accepted for protected v2 Host MCP requests. |+| `HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS` | `600` | Maximum accepted `exp - iat`; the deploy manifest sources this from Control API's access-token TTL contract. |+| `HCC_MCP_HOST_API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | Per verified Host UID and action fixed-window limit for inventory and credential requests. |+### Desktop (Host CRD `spec.desktop`)| Variable | Default | Description |@@ -393,11 +448,11 @@ Read by `src/gfsConfig.ts`. Invalid values **throw at startup** rather than sileParsed only when `CLERUM_DEV_MODE` is truthy. A JSON parse failure logs an error and yields an empty result rather than crashing.-| Variable | Default | Description |-| -------------------- | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |-| `CLERUM_MCP_SERVERS` | `[]` | JSON array of McpServer objects. |-| `CLERUM_CONTEXTS` | `[]` | JSON array of Context objects. When set, `GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef` filters by the Context's `mcpServers` allow-list; when unset it falls back to matching `spec.contextRef`. |-| `CLERUM_MCP_AUTH` | `{}` | JSON object mapping MCP server name → auth token. |+| Variable | Default | Description |+| -------------------- | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| `CLERUM_MCP_SERVERS` | `[]` | JSON array of McpServer objects. |+| `CLERUM_CONTEXTS` | `[]` | JSON array of Context objects used by the development provider. Caller-selected Context discovery is not exposed. |+| `CLERUM_MCP_AUTH` | `{}` | JSON object mapping MCP server name → auth token for development-provider fixtures. |## Kubernetes RBAC@@ -433,10 +488,18 @@ In `mcp-host` (`deploy/base/mcp-host/rbac.yaml`), the controller additionally maRun host-context-controller locally without Kubernetes by providing MCP servers via environment variables. In dev mode, no reconciliation occurs (no Deployments, Services, or NetworkPolicies are created).+Startup still requires a real trusted Control API RS256 public key in+`HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY`, including in dev mode. Export it from the+approved local public-key source before either command below. `.env.example`+deliberately does not include a placeholder key, and HCC has no insecure+verifier fallback.+```bash# Install dependenciesnpm install+# Load HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY from the trusted Control API public-key source.+# Option 1: Use .env file (recommended)cp .env.example .env# Edit .env with your servers@@ -455,18 +518,21 @@ CLERUM_CONTEXTS='[{"name":"dev-context","namespace":"dev","spec":{"contextId":"dCLERUM_MCP_AUTH='{"github":"ghp_your_token_here"}'```-In dev mode, `GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef` uses `CLERUM_CONTEXTS` when it is set: it returns the enabled servers named in the matching Context's `mcpServers` list, and returns an empty list if no Context with that name was loaded. When `CLERUM_CONTEXTS` is unset, it falls back to returning the enabled servers whose own `spec.contextRef` matches.+Dev mode retains the metadata-only global v1 inventory for local `mcp-proxy`+compatibility. It does not restore either caller-selected v1 Host route. The+protected v2 contract requires live Kubernetes Host/Context authority and+therefore fails closed when that authority is unavailable.### Production Mode (with Kubernetes)-Run against the cluster in your current kubeconfig (watches K8s for McpServer and Context CRDs) with `CLERUM_DEV_MODE` unset. Outside dev mode the process also requires `INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET` — without it, startup aborts with `[HCC] FATAL: INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET env var is required` and exit code 1:+Run against the cluster in your current kubeconfig (watches K8s for McpServer and Context CRDs) with `CLERUM_DEV_MODE` unset. Production startup requires both the existing `INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET` signing material and the real Control API public key in `HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY`. Load both from their approved sources before starting; missing or invalid verifier material fails startup closed.```bashmake build-INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET=<hmac-secret> npm start+npm start```-`make dev` also works, but only if a `.env` file exists (see above) — it is the same target, so it aborts when `.env` is absent. Leave `CLERUM_DEV_MODE` out of that `.env` and set `INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET` in it to run against a real cluster.+`make dev` also works, but only if a `.env` file exists (see above) — it is the same target, so it aborts when `.env` is absent. Leave `CLERUM_DEV_MODE` out of that `.env` and load both required values through the approved local configuration path to run against a real cluster.## Deploymentdiff --git a/host-context-controller/package-lock.json b/host-context-controller/package-lock.jsonindex e9b28c157..a30df3efb 100644--- a/host-context-controller/package-lock.json+++ b/host-context-controller/package-lock.json@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@"@clerum/network-policy-core": "file:../packages/network-policy-core","@clerum/workflow-recipe-capability-policy": "file:../packages/workflow-recipe-capability-policy","@kubernetes/client-node": "^1.0.0",+ "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3","prom-client": "^15.1.3"},"devDependencies": {+ "@types/jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.10","@types/node": "^20.10.0","ts-node": "^10.9.2","typescript": "^5.3.0",@@ -580,6 +582,24 @@"integrity": "sha512-k4MGaQl5TGo/iipqb2UDG2UwjXziSWkh0uysQelTlJpX1qGlpUZYm8PnO4DxG1qBomtJUdYJ6qR6xdIah10JLg==","license": "MIT"},+ "node_modules/@types/jsonwebtoken": {+ "version": "9.0.10",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/jsonwebtoken/-/jsonwebtoken-9.0.10.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-asx5hIG9Qmf/1oStypjanR7iKTv0gXQ1Ov/jfrX6kS/EO0OFni8orbmGCn0672NHR3kXHwpAwR+B368ZGN/2rA==",+ "dev": true,+ "license": "MIT",+ "dependencies": {+ "@types/ms": "*",+ "@types/node": "*"+ }+ },+ "node_modules/@types/ms": {+ "version": "2.1.0",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/ms/-/ms-2.1.0.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-GsCCIZDE/p3i96vtEqx+7dBUGXrc7zeSK3wwPHIaRThS+9OhWIXRqzs4d6k1SVU8g91DrNRWxWUGhp5KXQb2VA==",+ "dev": true,+ "license": "MIT"+ },"node_modules/@types/node": {"version": "20.19.39","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@types/node/-/node-20.19.39.tgz",@@ -896,6 +916,12 @@"integrity": "sha512-VOMgTMwjAaUG580SXn3LacVgjurrbMme7ZZNYGSSV7mmtY6QQRh0Eg3pwIcntQ77DErK1L0NxkbetjcoXzVwKw==","license": "MIT"},+ "node_modules/buffer-equal-constant-time": {+ "version": "1.0.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/buffer-equal-constant-time/-/buffer-equal-constant-time-1.0.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-zRpUiDwd/xk6ADqPMATG8vc9VPrkck7T07OIx0gnjmJAnHnTVXNQG3vfvWNuiZIkwu9KrKdA1iJKfsfTVxE6NA==",+ "license": "BSD-3-Clause"+ },"node_modules/call-bind-apply-helpers": {"version": "1.0.2","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/call-bind-apply-helpers/-/call-bind-apply-helpers-1.0.2.tgz",@@ -1005,6 +1031,15 @@"node": ">= 0.4"}},+ "node_modules/ecdsa-sig-formatter": {+ "version": "1.0.11",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ecdsa-sig-formatter/-/ecdsa-sig-formatter-1.0.11.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-nagl3RYrbNv6kQkeJIpt6NJZy8twLB/2vtz6yN9Z4vRKHN4/QZJIEbqohALSgwKdnksuY3k5Addp5lg8sVoVcQ==",+ "license": "Apache-2.0",+ "dependencies": {+ "safe-buffer": "^5.0.1"+ }+ },"node_modules/end-of-stream": {"version": "1.4.5","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/end-of-stream/-/end-of-stream-1.4.5.tgz",@@ -1332,6 +1367,49 @@"node": ">=18.0.0"}},+ "node_modules/jsonwebtoken": {+ "version": "9.0.3",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jsonwebtoken/-/jsonwebtoken-9.0.3.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-MT/xP0CrubFRNLNKvxJ2BYfy53Zkm++5bX9dtuPbqAeQpTVe0MQTFhao8+Cp//EmJp244xt6Drw/GVEGCUj40g==",+ "license": "MIT",+ "dependencies": {+ "jws": "^4.0.1",+ "lodash.includes": "^4.3.0",+ "lodash.isboolean": "^3.0.3",+ "lodash.isinteger": "^4.0.4",+ "lodash.isnumber": "^3.0.3",+ "lodash.isplainobject": "^4.0.6",+ "lodash.isstring": "^4.0.1",+ "lodash.once": "^4.0.0",+ "ms": "^2.1.1",+ "semver": "^7.5.4"+ },+ "engines": {+ "node": ">=12",+ "npm": ">=6"+ }+ },+ "node_modules/jwa": {+ "version": "2.0.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jwa/-/jwa-2.0.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-hRF04fqJIP8Abbkq5NKGN0Bbr3JxlQ+qhZufXVr0DvujKy93ZCbXZMHDL4EOtodSbCWxOqR8MS1tXA5hwqCXDg==",+ "license": "MIT",+ "dependencies": {+ "buffer-equal-constant-time": "^1.0.1",+ "ecdsa-sig-formatter": "1.0.11",+ "safe-buffer": "^5.0.1"+ }+ },+ "node_modules/jws": {+ "version": "4.0.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/jws/-/jws-4.0.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-EKI/M/yqPncGUUh44xz0PxSidXFr/+r0pA70+gIYhjv+et7yxM+s29Y+VGDkovRofQem0fs7Uvf4+YmAdyRduA==",+ "license": "MIT",+ "dependencies": {+ "jwa": "^2.0.1",+ "safe-buffer": "^5.0.1"+ }+ },"node_modules/lightningcss": {"version": "1.32.0","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lightningcss/-/lightningcss-1.32.0.tgz",@@ -1593,6 +1671,48 @@"url": "https://opencollective.com/parcel"}},+ "node_modules/lodash.includes": {+ "version": "4.3.0",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.includes/-/lodash.includes-4.3.0.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-W3Bx6mdkRTGtlJISOvVD/lbqjTlPPUDTMnlXZFnVwi9NKJ6tiAk6LVdlhZMm17VZisqhKcgzpO5Wz91PCt5b0w==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.isboolean": {+ "version": "3.0.3",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.isboolean/-/lodash.isboolean-3.0.3.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-Bz5mupy2SVbPHURB98VAcw+aHh4vRV5IPNhILUCsOzRmsTmSQ17jIuqopAentWoehktxGd9e/hbIXq980/1QJg==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.isinteger": {+ "version": "4.0.4",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.isinteger/-/lodash.isinteger-4.0.4.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-DBwtEWN2caHQ9/imiNeEA5ys1JoRtRfY3d7V9wkqtbycnAmTvRRmbHKDV4a0EYc678/dia0jrte4tjYwVBaZUA==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.isnumber": {+ "version": "3.0.3",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.isnumber/-/lodash.isnumber-3.0.3.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-QYqzpfwO3/CWf3XP+Z+tkQsfaLL/EnUlXWVkIk5FUPc4sBdTehEqZONuyRt2P67PXAk+NXmTBcc97zw9t1FQrw==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.isplainobject": {+ "version": "4.0.6",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.isplainobject/-/lodash.isplainobject-4.0.6.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-oSXzaWypCMHkPC3NvBEaPHf0KsA5mvPrOPgQWDsbg8n7orZ290M0BmC/jgRZ4vcJ6DTAhjrsSYgdsW/F+MFOBA==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.isstring": {+ "version": "4.0.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.isstring/-/lodash.isstring-4.0.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-0wJxfxH1wgO3GrbuP+dTTk7op+6L41QCXbGINEmD+ny/G/eCqGzxyCsh7159S+mgDDcoarnBw6PC1PS5+wUGgw==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/lodash.once": {+ "version": "4.1.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash.once/-/lodash.once-4.1.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-Sb487aTOCr9drQVL8pIxOzVhafOjZN9UU54hiN8PU3uAiSV7lx1yYNpbNmex2PK6dSJoNTSJUUswT651yww3Mg==",+ "license": "MIT"+ },"node_modules/magic-string": {"version": "0.30.21","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/magic-string/-/magic-string-0.30.21.tgz",@@ -1846,6 +1966,38 @@"@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.1.5"}},+ "node_modules/safe-buffer": {+ "version": "5.2.1",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/safe-buffer/-/safe-buffer-5.2.1.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-rp3So07KcdmmKbGvgaNxQSJr7bGVSVk5S9Eq1F+ppbRo70+YeaDxkw5Dd8NPN+GD6bjnYm2VuPuCXmpuYvmCXQ==",+ "funding": [+ {+ "type": "github",+ "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/feross"+ },+ {+ "type": "patreon",+ "url": "https://www.patreon.com/feross"+ },+ {+ "type": "consulting",+ "url": "https://feross.org/support"+ }+ ],+ "license": "MIT"+ },+ "node_modules/semver": {+ "version": "7.8.5",+ "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/semver/-/semver-7.8.5.tgz",+ "integrity": "sha512-Y7/KDsb8LjooZpwaqGyulO6DQlksgCncchHGk+sZIY4SBvUocMBEFH5Ur1fI4dV+Jvl0w6cjvucaIi40puRioA==",+ "license": "ISC",+ "bin": {+ "semver": "bin/semver.js"+ },+ "engines": {+ "node": ">=10"+ }+ },"node_modules/siginfo": {"version": "2.0.0","resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/siginfo/-/siginfo-2.0.0.tgz",diff --git a/host-context-controller/package.json b/host-context-controller/package.jsonindex 17c98b81a..63c6499b6 100644--- a/host-context-controller/package.json+++ b/host-context-controller/package.json@@ -27,9 +27,11 @@"@clerum/network-policy-core": "file:../packages/network-policy-core","@clerum/workflow-recipe-capability-policy": "file:../packages/workflow-recipe-capability-policy","@kubernetes/client-node": "^1.0.0",+ "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.3","prom-client": "^15.1.3"},"devDependencies": {+ "@types/jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.10","@types/node": "^20.10.0","ts-node": "^10.9.2","typescript": "^5.3.0",diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/hostReconciler.mounts.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/hostReconciler.mounts.test.tsindex 8200f6c2e..83a9eba9c 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/hostReconciler.mounts.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/hostReconciler.mounts.test.ts@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ function makeHost(): HostCRD {return {name: 'team-mission',namespace: 'mcp-host',+ uid: 'team-mission-uid',spec: {host: 'team-mission',contextRef: 'team-mission-ctx',@@ -178,10 +179,11 @@ function runtimeSecretAnnotations(host = makeHost(), refreshBefore = '2999-01-01'clerum.io/runtime-token-host-binding-hash': helper.runtimeTokenHostBindingHash(host),'clerum.io/runtime-token-scope-hash': helper.runtimeTokenScopeHash(host),'clerum.io/runtime-token-issuer': 'control-api',- 'clerum.io/runtime-token-audience': 'workflow-approvals',- 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '2',+ 'clerum.io/runtime-token-audience': 'host-context-controller,workflow-approvals',+ 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '3','clerum.io/gfs-token-expected-subject': `host:1st:${host.namespace}/${host.name}`,'clerum.io/gfs-token-capability-set-hash': helper.gfsCapabilitySetHash(),+ 'clerum.io/gfs-token-host-uid': host.uid!,'clerum.io/runtime-token-refresh-before': refreshBefore,'clerum.io/gfs-token-refresh-before': '2999-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',}@@ -348,7 +350,7 @@ describe('HostReconciler runtime credential Secret revision', () => {expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)expect(result.revision).not.toBe(legacyRevision)expect(replacedRuntimeSecret(coreApi).metadata?.annotations).toMatchObject({- 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '2',+ 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '3','clerum.io/runtime-token-rollout-required': 'true',})})@@ -690,8 +692,8 @@ describe('HostReconciler runtime credential Secret revision', () => {const replaceBody = replacedRuntimeSecret(coreApi)expect(replaceBody.metadata?.annotations).toMatchObject({'clerum.io/runtime-token-issuer': 'control-api',- 'clerum.io/runtime-token-audience': 'workflow-approvals',- 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '2',+ 'clerum.io/runtime-token-audience': 'host-context-controller,workflow-approvals',+ 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-version': '3',})})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/config.ts b/host-context-controller/src/config.tsindex 7b7632b75..f4869b291 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/config.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/config.ts@@ -147,6 +147,12 @@ export interface Config {// 1st-party mcp-host credentials.hccTargetNamespace: string+ // Control API RS256 verifier contract for Host-scoped MCP API routes.+ mcpHostJwtPublicKey: string+ mcpHostJwtIssuer: string+ mcpHostJwtMaxTtlSeconds: number+ mcpHostApiRateLimitPerMinute: number+// URL of the nginx gateway that mediates mcp-host → control-api traffic.// Injected into mcp-host pods as MCP_HOST_GATEWAY_URL. Per the architecture// diagram this is the "nginx (only /mcp-host)" allowlist-proxy.@@ -674,6 +680,14 @@ export const config: Config = {// HCC provisions the shared 1st-party mcp-host credentials by default.hccTargetNamespace: getEnv('HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE')?.trim() || 'mcp-host',+ mcpHostJwtPublicKey: getEnv('HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY', '')!,+ mcpHostJwtIssuer: getEnv('HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_ISSUER', 'control-api')!,+ mcpHostJwtMaxTtlSeconds: Math.max(1, getEnvInt('HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS', 600)),+ mcpHostApiRateLimitPerMinute: Math.max(+ 1,+ getEnvInt('HCC_MCP_HOST_API_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE', 120)+ ),+// URL of the nginx gateway that mediates mcp-host → control-api traffic.// Injected into mcp-host pods as MCP_HOST_GATEWAY_URL. Per the architecture// diagram this is the "nginx (only /mcp-host)" allowlist-proxy.diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.ts b/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.tsindex 5730e5553..f433685e4 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.ts@@ -212,11 +212,12 @@ const RUNTIME_TOKEN_SCHEMA_VERSION_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/runtime-token-schema-const RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/runtime-token-bootstrap-state'const RUNTIME_TOKEN_ROLLOUT_REQUIRED_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/runtime-token-rollout-required'const RUNTIME_TOKEN_ISSUER = 'control-api'-const RUNTIME_TOKEN_AUDIENCE = 'workflow-approvals'-// v2 binds the GFS token to the concrete Host CRD instead of the historical-// fleet-wide `mcp-host/standalone` sentinel. The version change makes existing-// Secrets fail the contract check so HCC rotates them and rolls each Host.-const RUNTIME_TOKEN_SCHEMA_VERSION = '2'+const RUNTIME_TOKEN_AUDIENCE = 'host-context-controller,workflow-approvals'+// v3 extends the existing first-party access/refresh token material with the+// exact HCC audience, immutable MCP credential capability, and live Host UID.+// Existing Secrets therefore fail the contract check and rotate onto the+// caller-bound contract instead of remaining workflow-only.+const RUNTIME_TOKEN_SCHEMA_VERSION = '3'const RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_FRESH = 'fresh'const RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_CONSUMED = 'consumed'// Deployments affected by the historical stringData/data hashing bug can carry@@ -1268,6 +1269,7 @@ export class HostReconciler {const tokens = await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(host.name,+ host.uid ?? '',this.resolveWorkflowControlScopesForHost(host, hasChannelIngress))const gfs = await mintHostGfsToken({ name: host.name, namespace: host.namespace })diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.tsindex 2aa0ccea4..c96d63ccd 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ import { HostFleetReconcileError } from './hostReconciler'import { HostK8sRequestTimeoutError } from './k8s/hostK8sApiClient'import {McpServerWatcher,+ createMcpAuthorizationStore,+ getContext,+ isMcpAuthorizationNotFound,externalEgressResyncDelayMs,listAllCommunicationChannels,listAllHosts,@@ -25,6 +28,10 @@ function deferred<T = void>(): {const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => {const listNamespacedCustomObject = vi.fn()+ const getNamespacedCustomObject = vi+ .fn()+ .mockRejectedValue(Object.assign(new Error('not found'), { code: 404 }))+ const readNamespacedSecret = vi.fn()const ensureDefaultPolicies = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)const netPolFullReconcile = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)const serverFullReconcile = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)@@ -36,6 +43,8 @@ const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => {const createAdministrativeOutcomeReporter = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined)return {listNamespacedCustomObject,+ getNamespacedCustomObject,+ readNamespacedSecret,ensureDefaultPolicies,netPolFullReconcile,serverFullReconcile,@@ -88,6 +97,7 @@ vi.mock('@kubernetes/client-node', () => {makeApiClient(api: unknown): unknown {if (api === CustomObjectsApi) {return {+ getNamespacedCustomObject: mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject,listNamespacedCustomObject: async (request: { plural?: string }, options?: unknown) => {if (request.plural === 'hosts') mocks.hostListCallOptions(options)const response = await mocks.listNamespacedCustomObject(request)@@ -109,6 +119,9 @@ vi.mock('@kubernetes/client-node', () => {},}}+ if (api === CoreV1Api) {+ return { readNamespacedSecret: mocks.readNamespacedSecret }+ }return {}}}@@ -207,6 +220,56 @@ beforeEach(() => {mocks.hostReconcileHosts.mockReset().mockResolvedValue(undefined)})+describe('MCP authorization store Kubernetes 404 normalization', () => {+ const provider = {+ getAllServerInfos: () => [],+ } as unknown as Parameters<typeof createMcpAuthorizationStore>[0]++ beforeEach(() => {+ mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject.mockReset()+ mocks.readNamespacedSecret.mockReset()+ })++ it('treats ApiException.code=404 as absent for every CR authority read', async () => {+ mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject.mockRejectedValue({ code: 404 })+ const store = createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider)++ await expect(store.readHost('host-a')).resolves.toBeNull()+ await expect(store.readContext('context-a')).resolves.toBeNull()+ await expect(store.readMcpServer('server-a')).resolves.toBeNull()+ })++ it('treats ApiException.code=404 as absent for metadata and full Secret reads', async () => {+ mocks.readNamespacedSecret.mockRejectedValue({ code: 404 })+ const store = createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider)++ await expect(store.readSecretMetadata('server-token')).resolves.toBeNull()+ await expect(store.readSecret('server-token')).resolves.toBeNull()+ })++ it('projects only Secret identity metadata for inventory even when Kubernetes returns data', async () => {+ mocks.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValue({+ metadata: {+ name: 'server-token',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'secret-uid',+ resourceVersion: '42',+ },+ data: { token: 'credential-bytes-must-not-cross-this-boundary' },+ })+ const store = createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider)++ const metadata = await store.readSecretMetadata('server-token')+ expect(metadata).toEqual({+ name: 'server-token',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: { uid: 'secret-uid', resourceVersion: '42' },+ })+ expect(metadata).not.toHaveProperty('data')+ expect(JSON.stringify(metadata)).not.toContain('credential-bytes-must-not-cross-this-boundary')+ })+})+describe('McpServerWatcher startup', () => {beforeEach(() => {vi.clearAllMocks()@@ -448,6 +511,43 @@ describe('McpServerWatcher startup', () => {})})+describe('getContext error semantics', () => {+ beforeEach(() => {+ vi.clearAllMocks()+ })++ it('preserves not-found semantics only for an authoritative 404', async () => {+ mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject.mockRejectedValueOnce(+ Object.assign(new Error('context absent'), { code: 404 })+ )++ await expect(getContext('missing-context')).resolves.toBeNull()+ })++ it('propagates non-404 API failures instead of converting discovery to an empty fleet', async () => {+ const unavailable = Object.assign(new Error('apiserver unavailable'), {+ response: { statusCode: 503 },+ })+ mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject.mockRejectedValueOnce(unavailable)++ await expect(getContext('production-context')).rejects.toBe(unavailable)+ })+})++describe('MCP authorization Kubernetes not-found classification', () => {+ it.each([{ code: 404 }, { response: { statusCode: 404 } }])(+ 'recognizes Kubernetes 404 shape %#',+ error => {+ expect(isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)).toBe(true)+ }+ )++ it('does not classify authority failures as not-found', () => {+ expect(isMcpAuthorizationNotFound({ code: 403 })).toBe(false)+ expect(isMcpAuthorizationNotFound({ response: { statusCode: 503 } })).toBe(false)+ })+})+describe('McpServerWatcher external egress retries', () => {const serverObject = {metadata: { name: 'redis-tools', namespace: 'mcp-server' },diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.tsindex 7fe7ceaec..c54215f07 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ import { K8sGfsApi } from './k8s/gfsK8sApi'import { makeHostK8sApiClient } from './k8s/hostK8sApiClient'import { pvcName as sfsPvcName } from './k8s/sharedFileSystemFactory'import { hostDeleteCleanupTotal, hostFleetRequestsTotal, hostWatchRecoverySeconds } from './metrics'+import type {+ AuthorityContext,+ AuthorityHost,+ AuthorityMcpServer,+ AuthoritySecret,+ AuthoritySecretMetadata,+ McpAuthorizationStore,+} from './mcpAuthorization'import { NetworkPolicyReconciler } from './networkPolicyReconciler'import { McpServerReconciler } from './reconciler'import { SharedFileSystemReconciler } from './sharedFileSystemReconciler'@@ -194,8 +202,6 @@ export interface McpServerProvider {getAllServerInfos(): McpServerInfo[]/** Get curated server info filtered by context (API consumers). Reads the Context CRD to determine allowed servers. */getServerInfosByContext(contextRef: string): Promise<McpServerInfo[]>- /** Get auth token for a server from K8s secret. */- getAuthToken(serverName: string): Promise<string | undefined>/** Set callback for when servers change. */onChange(callback: () => void): voidstart(): Promise<void>@@ -350,50 +356,6 @@ export async function listAllHosts(): Promise<HostCRD[]> {return (await listHostSnapshot()).hosts}-/**- * Get auth token from a secret.- */-export async function getAuthToken(- secretRef: string,- secretKey?: string-): Promise<string | undefined> {- if (!coreApi) {- throw new Error('K8s client not initialized - are you in dev mode?')- }-- try {- console.log(`[K8s] Getting auth token from secret: ${secretRef}`)-- const response = await coreApi.readNamespacedSecret({- name: secretRef,- namespace: config.namespace,- })-- const data = response.data || {}-- // Try the specified key, or common key names- const keys = secretKey ? [secretKey] : ['token', 'api-key', 'apiKey', 'password']-- for (const key of keys) {- if (data[key]) {- const token = Buffer.from(data[key], 'base64').toString('utf-8')- console.log(`[K8s] Found auth token in secret (key: ${key})`)- return token- }- }-- console.warn(`[K8s] No auth token found in secret ${secretRef}`)- return undefined- } catch (error) {- if ((error as { response?: { statusCode?: number } }).response?.statusCode === 404) {- console.warn(`[K8s] Secret not found: ${secretRef}`)- return undefined- }- console.error(`[K8s] Failed to get auth token:`, error)- return undefined- }-}-/*** List all SharedFileSystem CRDs in the mcp-host namespace (the only namespace* SharedFileSystems are allowed to live in, per CRD validation).@@ -1636,17 +1598,6 @@ export class McpServerWatcher implements McpServerProvider {.map(s => this.toServerInfo(s))}- /**- * Get auth token for a server from K8s secret.- */- async getAuthToken(serverName: string): Promise<string | undefined> {- const server = this.servers.get(serverName)- if (!server?.spec.auth?.secretRef) {- return undefined- }- return getAuthToken(server.spec.auth.secretRef, server.spec.auth.secretKey)- }-/*** Set callback for when servers change.*/@@ -2813,13 +2764,8 @@ export class McpServerWatcher implements McpServerProvider {export class DevMcpServerProvider implements McpServerProvider {private servers: Map<string, McpServerCRD> = new Map()private contexts: Map<string, ContextCRD> = new Map()- private authTokens: Map<string, string>private changeCallback?: () => void- constructor() {- this.authTokens = config.devAuthTokens- }-getAllServers(): McpServerCRD[] {return [...this.servers.values()]}@@ -2873,10 +2819,6 @@ export class DevMcpServerProvider implements McpServerProvider {.map(s => this.toServerInfo(s))}- async getAuthToken(serverName: string): Promise<string | undefined> {- return this.authTokens.get(serverName)- }-onChange(callback: () => void): void {this.changeCallback = callback}@@ -2940,11 +2882,6 @@ export class DevMcpServerProvider implements McpServerProvider {this.contexts.delete(contextId)this.changeCallback?.()}-- /** Set auth token for a server (useful for testing). */- setAuthToken(serverName: string, token: string): void {- this.authTokens.set(serverName, token)- }}/**@@ -2959,3 +2896,186 @@ export function createMcpServerProvider(): McpServerProvider {return new McpServerWatcher()}}++function authorizationMetadata(metadata: {+ uid?: string+ resourceVersion?: string+ deletionTimestamp?: string | Date+}): { uid: string; resourceVersion: string; deletionTimestamp?: string } {+ return {+ uid: metadata.uid ?? '',+ resourceVersion: metadata.resourceVersion ?? '',+ ...(metadata.deletionTimestamp+ ? { deletionTimestamp: new Date(metadata.deletionTimestamp).toISOString() }+ : {}),+ }+}++export function isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error: unknown): boolean {+ return getErrorCode(error) === 404+}++/**+ * Live Kubernetes authority used only by the protected v2 Host MCP routes.+ * Reads are deliberately not served from watch caches: every successful+ * credential operation is fenced against current object UIDs/resourceVersions.+ */+export function createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider: McpServerProvider): McpAuthorizationStore {+ if (config.devMode || !customObjectsApi || !hostCustomObjectsApi || !coreApi) {+ return {+ async readHost() {+ return null+ },+ async readContext() {+ return null+ },+ async readMcpServer() {+ return null+ },+ async readSecretMetadata() {+ return null+ },+ async readSecret() {+ return null+ },+ }+ }++ return {+ async readHost(name: string): Promise<AuthorityHost | null> {+ try {+ const object = (await hostCustomObjectsApi!.getNamespacedCustomObject({+ group: GROUP,+ version: VERSION,+ namespace: config.hostNamespace,+ plural: PLURAL_HOSTS,+ name,+ })) as {+ metadata: {+ name: string+ namespace?: string+ uid?: string+ resourceVersion?: string+ deletionTimestamp?: string+ }+ spec: HostSpec+ }+ return {+ name: object.metadata.name,+ namespace: object.metadata.namespace ?? config.hostNamespace,+ metadata: authorizationMetadata(object.metadata),+ contextRef: object.spec.contextRef,+ }+ } catch (error) {+ if (isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)) return null+ throw error+ }+ },++ async readContext(name: string): Promise<AuthorityContext | null> {+ try {+ const object = (await customObjectsApi!.getNamespacedCustomObject({+ group: GROUP,+ version: VERSION,+ namespace: config.namespace,+ plural: PLURAL_CONTEXTS,+ name,+ })) as {+ metadata: {+ name: string+ namespace?: string+ uid?: string+ resourceVersion?: string+ deletionTimestamp?: string+ }+ spec: ContextSpec+ }+ return {+ name: object.metadata.name,+ namespace: object.metadata.namespace ?? config.namespace,+ metadata: authorizationMetadata(object.metadata),+ mcpServers: [...object.spec.mcpServers],+ }+ } catch (error) {+ if (isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)) return null+ throw error+ }+ },++ async readMcpServer(name: string): Promise<AuthorityMcpServer | null> {+ try {+ const object = (await customObjectsApi!.getNamespacedCustomObject({+ group: GROUP,+ version: VERSION,+ namespace: config.namespace,+ plural: PLURAL_MCPSERVERS,+ name,+ })) as McpServerWatchObject & {+ metadata: McpServerWatchObject['metadata'] & {+ resourceVersion?: string+ deletionTimestamp?: string+ }+ }+ const status = provider.getAllServerInfos().find(server => server.name === name)+ ?.status ?? {+ deployed: false,+ ready: false,+ }+ return {+ name: object.metadata.name,+ namespace: object.metadata.namespace ?? config.namespace,+ metadata: authorizationMetadata(object.metadata),+ description: object.spec.description,+ transport: { ...object.spec.transport },+ auth: object.spec.auth ? { ...object.spec.auth } : undefined,+ enabled: object.spec.enabled !== false,+ status,+ }+ } catch (error) {+ if (isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)) return null+ throw error+ }+ },++ async readSecretMetadata(name: string): Promise<AuthoritySecretMetadata | null> {+ try {+ // CoreV1Api returns a Secret object, but this boundary intentionally+ // drops `data` immediately. Inventory authorization can therefore use+ // UID/resourceVersion without making credential bytes available to the+ // service layer or its DTO/logging path.+ const object = await coreApi!.readNamespacedSecret({ name, namespace: config.namespace })+ return {+ name: object.metadata?.name ?? name,+ namespace: object.metadata?.namespace ?? config.namespace,+ metadata: authorizationMetadata({+ uid: object.metadata?.uid,+ resourceVersion: object.metadata?.resourceVersion,+ deletionTimestamp: object.metadata?.deletionTimestamp,+ }),+ }+ } catch (error) {+ if (isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)) return null+ throw error+ }+ },++ async readSecret(name: string): Promise<AuthoritySecret | null> {+ try {+ const object = await coreApi!.readNamespacedSecret({ name, namespace: config.namespace })+ return {+ name: object.metadata?.name ?? name,+ namespace: object.metadata?.namespace ?? config.namespace,+ metadata: authorizationMetadata({+ uid: object.metadata?.uid,+ resourceVersion: object.metadata?.resourceVersion,+ deletionTimestamp: object.metadata?.deletionTimestamp,+ }),+ data: { ...(object.data ?? {}) },+ }+ } catch (error) {+ if (isMcpAuthorizationNotFound(error)) return null+ throw error+ }+ },+ }+}diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/main.ts b/host-context-controller/src/main.tsindex 0e1502aa5..b898e0414 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/main.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/main.ts@@ -15,9 +15,12 @@ import { SecretInformer } from './informers/secretInformer'import {McpServerProvider,McpServerWatcher,+ createMcpAuthorizationStore,createMcpServerProvider,getKubeConfig,} from './k8sClient'+import { McpApiAuthenticator } from './mcpApiAuthentication'+import { McpAuthorizationService } from './mcpAuthorization'import { ContextMapperServer } from './server'import { StatelessLifecycleTracker } from './statelessLifecycleTracker'import {@@ -88,12 +91,28 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {console.error('[HCC] FATAL: HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE must not be empty')process.exit(1)}- if (!['mcp-host', 'sandbox-recipes'].includes(config.hccTargetNamespace)) {- console.warn(- `[HCC] WARNING: HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE=${config.hccTargetNamespace} is outside the default issuance namespaces`+ if (config.hccTargetNamespace !== config.hostNamespace) {+ console.error(+ '[HCC] FATAL: HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE must equal CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE for caller-bound Host credentials')+ process.exit(1)}+ let mcpAuthenticator: McpApiAuthenticator+ try {+ mcpAuthenticator = new McpApiAuthenticator({+ publicKey: config.mcpHostJwtPublicKey,+ issuer: config.mcpHostJwtIssuer,+ hostNamespace: config.hostNamespace,+ maxTokenLifetimeSeconds: config.mcpHostJwtMaxTtlSeconds,+ })+ } catch (err) {+ console.error(+ `[HCC] FATAL: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'MCP JWT verifier configuration failed'}`+ )+ process.exit(1)+ return+ }if (!config.devMode) {console.log(`[Main] Namespace: ${config.namespace}`)console.log(`[Main] Reconciler: ENABLED (will manage Deployments + Services)`)@@ -145,7 +164,15 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {`target=${config.controlApiBaseUrl})`)}- server = new ContextMapperServer(provider, config.port, hostReconciler, hasDesktopFn)+ const mcpAuthorization = new McpAuthorizationService(createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider))+ server = new ContextMapperServer(+ provider,+ config.port,+ hostReconciler,+ hasDesktopFn,+ mcpAuthenticator,+ mcpAuthorization+ )await server.start()// One-shot legacy sweep: delete the static `clerum-channel-reader`diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..290e954e2--- /dev/null+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'+import { generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto'+import {+ HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ MCP_CREDENTIAL_READ_CAPABILITY,+ McpApiAuthenticationError,+ McpApiAuthenticator,+ McpApiVerifierConfigurationError,+ WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE,+} from './mcpApiAuthentication'++const pair = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', {+ modulusLength: 2048,+ publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'spki', format: 'pem' },+ privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' },+})++const authenticator = new McpApiAuthenticator({+ publicKey: pair.publicKey,+ issuer: 'control-api',+ hostNamespace: 'mcp-host',+})++function tokenClaims(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}): Record<string, unknown> {+ return {+ sub: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ recipeNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: ['host-a'],+ host_uid: 'uid-a',+ scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: [MCP_CREDENTIAL_READ_CAPABILITY],+ ...overrides,+ }+}++function sign(+ overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {},+ audience: string | string[] = [WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE, HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE]+): string {+ return jwt.sign(tokenClaims(overrides), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience,+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: `test-${Math.random()}`,+ })+}++function authenticate(token: string) {+ return authenticator.authenticate({ authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, [+ 'Authorization',+ `Bearer ${token}`,+ ])+}++describe('McpApiAuthenticator', () => {+ it('accepts the exact migration audience pair and returns only the Host principal', () => {+ expect(authenticate(sign())).toMatchObject({+ subject: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ hostName: 'host-a',+ hostUid: 'uid-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-host',+ audiences: [WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE, HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE],+ })+ })++ it('accepts the exact HCC-only audience', () => {+ expect(authenticate(sign({}, HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE)).audiences).toEqual([HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE])+ })++ it.each([+ [WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE],+ [[HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE, WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE, 'third-resource']],+ [[HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE, HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE]],+ ])('rejects a non-exact audience set', audience => {+ expect(() => authenticate(sign({}, audience as string | string[]))).toThrow(+ McpApiAuthenticationError+ )+ })++ it.each([+ { mcpCapabilities: [] },+ { mcpCapabilities: [MCP_CREDENTIAL_READ_CAPABILITY, 'extra'] },+ { host_uid: undefined },+ { hostRefs: ['host-a', 'host-b'] },+ { recipeName: 'recipe-a', hostRefs: ['sandbox-recipes/recipe-a'] },+ { scope: 'workflow:approval:refresh' },+ ])('rejects a malformed or non-Host access contract', overrides => {+ expect(() => authenticate(sign(overrides))).toThrow(McpApiAuthenticationError)+ })++ it('rejects duplicate Authorization fields before verification', () => {+ const token = sign()+ expect(() =>+ authenticator.authenticate({ authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, [+ 'Authorization',+ `Bearer ${token}`,+ 'authorization',+ `Bearer ${token}`,+ ])+ ).toThrow(McpApiAuthenticationError)+ })++ it('rejects wrong algorithm, issuer, expiration, and excessive lifetime', () => {+ const invalidTokens = [+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims(), 'attacker-secret', {+ algorithm: 'HS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: 'wrong-algorithm',+ }),+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims(), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'other-issuer',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: 'wrong-issuer',+ }),+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims(), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: -10,+ jwtid: 'expired',+ }),+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims(), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: 601,+ jwtid: 'excessive-lifetime',+ }),+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims({ iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60 }), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: 'future-issued-at',+ }),+ jwt.sign(tokenClaims(), pair.privateKey, {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE,+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: ' non-canonical-jti ',+ }),+ ]+ for (const token of invalidTokens) {+ expect(() => authenticate(token)).toThrow(McpApiAuthenticationError)+ }+ })++ it('fails closed on absent, malformed, or placeholder public keys', () => {+ expect(+ () =>+ new McpApiAuthenticator({ publicKey: '', issuer: 'control-api', hostNamespace: 'mcp-host' })+ ).toThrow(McpApiVerifierConfigurationError)+ expect(+ () =>+ new McpApiAuthenticator({+ publicKey: 'not-a-pem',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ hostNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ })+ ).toThrow(McpApiVerifierConfigurationError)+ expect(+ () =>+ new McpApiAuthenticator({+ publicKey: pair.privateKey,+ issuer: 'control-api',+ hostNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ })+ ).toThrow(McpApiVerifierConfigurationError)+ })+})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..d069b5f67--- /dev/null+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpApiAuthentication.ts@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'+import { createPublicKey } from 'node:crypto'+import type { IncomingHttpHeaders } from 'node:http'++export const HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE = 'host-context-controller'+export const WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE = 'workflow-approvals'+export const MCP_CREDENTIAL_READ_CAPABILITY = 'mcp:credential:read'++const HOST_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$/++export interface VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal {+ subject: string+ hostName: string+ hostUid: string+ namespace: string+ jti: string+ issuedAt: number+ expiresAt: number+ audiences: readonly string[]+}++export class McpApiAuthenticationError extends Error {+ readonly code = 'unauthorized'++ constructor() {+ super('unauthorized')+ this.name = 'McpApiAuthenticationError'+ }+}++export class McpApiVerifierConfigurationError extends Error {+ constructor(message: string) {+ super(message)+ this.name = 'McpApiVerifierConfigurationError'+ }+}++export interface McpApiAuthenticatorOptions {+ publicKey: string+ issuer: string+ hostNamespace: string+ clockToleranceSeconds?: number+ maxTokenLifetimeSeconds?: number+}++function exactAudiences(value: unknown): string[] | null {+ const audiences = typeof value === 'string' ? [value] : Array.isArray(value) ? value : null+ if (+ !audiences ||+ audiences.length === 0 ||+ audiences.some(item => typeof item !== 'string') ||+ new Set(audiences).size !== audiences.length+ ) {+ return null+ }+ const values = new Set(audiences as string[])+ const hccOnly = values.size === 1 && values.has(HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE)+ const migrationPair =+ values.size === 2 && values.has(HCC_MCP_AUDIENCE) && values.has(WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_AUDIENCE)+ return hccOnly || migrationPair ? (audiences as string[]) : null+}++function canonicalHostUid(value: unknown): string | null {+ if (typeof value !== 'string') return null+ const normalized = value.trim()+ if (!normalized || normalized !== value || normalized.length > 128) return null+ return /[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]/.test(normalized) ? null : normalized+}++function bearerFromHeaders(headers: IncomingHttpHeaders, rawHeaders: readonly string[]): string {+ let authorizationCount = 0+ for (let index = 0; index < rawHeaders.length; index += 2) {+ if (rawHeaders[index]?.toLowerCase() === 'authorization') authorizationCount += 1+ }+ if (authorizationCount > 1 || Array.isArray(headers.authorization)) {+ throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ }+ const header = headers.authorization+ if (typeof header !== 'string') throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ const match = /^Bearer ([^\s,]+)$/.exec(header)+ if (!match) throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ return match[1]+}++export class McpApiAuthenticator {+ private readonly publicKey: string+ private readonly issuer: string+ private readonly hostNamespace: string+ private readonly clockToleranceSeconds: number+ private readonly maxTokenLifetimeSeconds: number++ constructor(options: McpApiAuthenticatorOptions) {+ const key = options.publicKey.trim()+ if (!key) throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT public key is required')+ if (/placeholder|replace[-_ ]?me|your[-_ ]?key/i.test(key)) {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT public key contains a placeholder')+ }+ if (/PRIVATE KEY/.test(key)) {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT verifier requires a public key')+ }+ try {+ const publicKey = createPublicKey(key)+ if (+ publicKey.asymmetricKeyType !== 'rsa' ||+ (publicKey.asymmetricKeyDetails?.modulusLength ?? 0) < 2048+ ) {+ throw new Error('unsupported RSA key')+ }+ } catch {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT public key is malformed')+ }+ if (!options.issuer.trim()) {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT issuer is required')+ }+ if (!options.hostNamespace.trim()) {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC Host namespace is required')+ }+ this.publicKey = key+ this.issuer = options.issuer.trim()+ this.hostNamespace = options.hostNamespace.trim()+ this.clockToleranceSeconds = options.clockToleranceSeconds ?? 5+ this.maxTokenLifetimeSeconds = options.maxTokenLifetimeSeconds ?? 600+ if (!Number.isSafeInteger(this.maxTokenLifetimeSeconds) || this.maxTokenLifetimeSeconds <= 0) {+ throw new McpApiVerifierConfigurationError('HCC MCP JWT maximum lifetime is invalid')+ }+ }++ authenticate(+ headers: IncomingHttpHeaders,+ rawHeaders: readonly string[] = []+ ): VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal {+ const token = bearerFromHeaders(headers, rawHeaders)+ let payload: jwt.JwtPayload+ try {+ const verified = jwt.verify(token, this.publicKey, {+ algorithms: ['RS256'],+ issuer: this.issuer,+ clockTolerance: this.clockToleranceSeconds,+ })+ if (typeof verified === 'string') throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ payload = verified+ } catch {+ throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ }++ const audiences = exactAudiences(payload.aud)+ const hostRefs = payload.hostRefs+ const capabilities = payload.mcpCapabilities+ const hostUid = canonicalHostUid(payload.host_uid)+ const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)+ if (+ !audiences ||+ payload.scope !== 'workflow:approval:request' ||+ payload.recipeNamespace !== this.hostNamespace ||+ payload.recipeName !== 'standalone' ||+ payload.sub !== `${this.hostNamespace}/standalone` ||+ !Array.isArray(hostRefs) ||+ hostRefs.length !== 1 ||+ typeof hostRefs[0] !== 'string' ||+ hostRefs[0].length > 63 ||+ !HOST_NAME_RE.test(hostRefs[0]) ||+ !hostUid ||+ !Array.isArray(capabilities) ||+ capabilities.length !== 1 ||+ capabilities[0] !== MCP_CREDENTIAL_READ_CAPABILITY ||+ typeof payload.jti !== 'string' ||+ !payload.jti.trim() ||+ payload.jti.trim() !== payload.jti ||+ payload.jti.length > 128 ||+ /[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]/.test(payload.jti) ||+ !Number.isSafeInteger(payload.iat) ||+ !Number.isSafeInteger(payload.exp) ||+ (payload.iat as number) > now + this.clockToleranceSeconds ||+ (payload.exp as number) <= (payload.iat as number) ||+ (payload.exp as number) - (payload.iat as number) > this.maxTokenLifetimeSeconds+ ) {+ throw new McpApiAuthenticationError()+ }++ return {+ subject: payload.sub,+ hostName: hostRefs[0],+ hostUid,+ namespace: payload.recipeNamespace,+ jti: payload.jti,+ issuedAt: payload.iat as number,+ expiresAt: payload.exp as number,+ audiences,+ }+ }+}diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..009fb1b83--- /dev/null+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import type { VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal } from './mcpApiAuthentication'+import {+ type AuthorityContext,+ type AuthorityHost,+ type AuthorityMcpServer,+ type AuthoritySecret,+ McpAuthorizationService,+ type McpAuthorizationStore,+ toPublicMcpTransport,+} from './mcpAuthorization'++const meta = (uid: string, resourceVersion: string) => ({ uid, resourceVersion })+const principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal = {+ subject: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ hostName: 'host-a',+ hostUid: 'host-uid-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-host',+ jti: 'jti-a',+ issuedAt: 1,+ expiresAt: 4_000_000_000,+ audiences: ['host-context-controller'],+}+const host: AuthorityHost = {+ name: 'host-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-host',+ metadata: meta('host-uid-a', '10'),+ contextRef: 'context-a',+}+const context: AuthorityContext = {+ name: 'context-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: meta('context-uid-a', '20'),+ mcpServers: ['server-a'],+}+const server: AuthorityMcpServer = {+ name: 'server-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: meta('server-uid-a', '30'),+ transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', url: 'http://server-a/mcp' },+ auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'server-a-auth', secretKey: 'token' },+ enabled: true,+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true, authoritative: false },+}+const secret: AuthoritySecret = {+ name: 'server-a-auth',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: meta('secret-uid-a', '40'),+ data: { token: Buffer.from('credential-value').toString('base64') },+}++class FakeStore implements McpAuthorizationStore {+ secretMetadataReads = 0+ secretValueReads = 0+ secretMetadataSequence: Array<AuthoritySecret | null> = [secret]+ secretSequence: Array<AuthoritySecret | null> = [secret]+ hostSequence: Array<AuthorityHost | null> | null = null+ contextSequence: Array<AuthorityContext | null> | null = null+ serverSequence: Array<AuthorityMcpServer | null> | null = null+ hostReads = 0+ contextReads = 0+ serverReads = 0+ hostObject: AuthorityHost | null = host+ contextObject: AuthorityContext | null = context+ serverObject: AuthorityMcpServer | null = server++ async readHost() {+ this.hostReads += 1+ return this.hostSequence+ ? this.hostSequence[Math.min(this.hostReads - 1, this.hostSequence.length - 1)]+ : this.hostObject+ }+ async readContext() {+ this.contextReads += 1+ return this.contextSequence+ ? this.contextSequence[Math.min(this.contextReads - 1, this.contextSequence.length - 1)]+ : this.contextObject+ }+ async readMcpServer() {+ this.serverReads += 1+ return this.serverSequence+ ? this.serverSequence[Math.min(this.serverReads - 1, this.serverSequence.length - 1)]+ : this.serverObject+ }+ async readSecretMetadata() {+ this.secretMetadataReads += 1+ const value =+ this.secretMetadataSequence[+ Math.min(this.secretMetadataReads - 1, this.secretMetadataSequence.length - 1)+ ]+ return value ? { name: value.name, namespace: value.namespace, metadata: value.metadata } : null+ }+ async readSecret() {+ this.secretValueReads += 1+ return this.secretSequence[Math.min(this.secretValueReads - 1, this.secretSequence.length - 1)]+ }+}++describe('McpAuthorizationService', () => {+ it('projects only valid TCP ports into the public transport contract', () => {+ expect(toPublicMcpTransport({ type: 'streamableHttp', port: 65_535 })).toEqual({+ type: 'streamableHttp',+ port: 65_535,+ })+ for (const port of [0, -1, 65_536, 1.5]) {+ expect(toPublicMcpTransport({ type: 'streamableHttp', port })).toEqual({+ type: 'streamableHttp',+ })+ }+ })++ it('returns only the current Context inventory and an opaque Secret-aware revision', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const inventory = await service.listServers(principal)+ expect(inventory).toEqual([+ expect.objectContaining({+ name: 'server-a',+ authRequired: true,+ credentialRevision: expect.any(String),+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true, authoritative: false },+ }),+ ])+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('contextRef')+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('auth')+ expect(JSON.stringify(inventory)).not.toContain('credential-value')+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(1)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('authorizes before Secret read and returns the same revision for a stable credential', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const inventory = await service.listServers(principal)+ const credential = await service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')+ expect(credential).toEqual({+ token: 'credential-value',+ credentialRevision: inventory[0].credentialRevision,+ })+ })++ it('performs zero Secret reads for a cross-Context or unknown target', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-b')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('uses the same opaque denial for a cross-Context and an unknown target', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const denied = await Promise.allSettled([+ service.getCredential(principal, 'server-b'),+ service.getCredential(principal, 'unknown-server'),+ ])+ expect(+ denied.map(result => (result.status === 'rejected' ? result.reason.code : null))+ ).toEqual(['not_found', 'not_found'])+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('does not read Secret metadata or values for a disabled or deleting server', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = { ...server, enabled: false }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.listServers(principal)).resolves.toEqual([])+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)++ store.serverObject = { ...server, metadata: { ...server.metadata, deletionTimestamp: 'now' } }+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('returns a null token without reading a Secret when the server has no auth', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = { ...server, auth: { type: 'none' } }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).resolves.toEqual({+ token: null,+ credentialRevision: expect.any(String),+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('changes the credential revision when the McpServer secretKey changes', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = { ...server, auth: { ...server.auth!, secretKey: 'rotated' } }+ store.secretSequence = [+ {+ ...secret,+ data: {+ token: Buffer.from('old').toString('base64'),+ rotated: Buffer.from('new').toString('base64'),+ },+ },+ ]+ store.secretMetadataSequence = [store.secretSequence[0]]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const first = await service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')+ store.serverObject = { ...server, auth: { ...server.auth!, secretKey: 'token' } }+ store.secretMetadataReads = 0+ store.secretValueReads = 0+ const second = await service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')+ expect(first.credentialRevision).not.toBe(second.credentialRevision)+ expect(first.token).toBe('new')+ expect(second.token).toBe('old')+ })++ it('enumerates no foreign server and performs zero Secret reads outside the Context grant', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.contextObject = { ...context, mcpServers: [] }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.listServers(principal)).resolves.toEqual([])+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('performs zero Secret reads when an old JWT is rebound to a recreated Host name', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.hostObject = { ...host, metadata: meta('replacement-uid', '11') }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'unauthorized',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it.each([+ ['missing', null],+ ['deleting', { ...host, metadata: { ...host.metadata, deletionTimestamp: 'now' } }],+ ])('performs zero Secret reads when the authenticated Host is %s', async (_state, value) => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.hostObject = value+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'unauthorized',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it.each([+ ['missing', null],+ ['deleting', { ...context, metadata: { ...context.metadata, deletionTimestamp: 'now' } }],+ ])('performs zero Secret reads when the live Context is %s', async (_state, value) => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.contextObject = value+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('discards inventory when the Host binding changes before the response', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.hostSequence = [host, { ...host, metadata: meta('host-uid-a', '11') }]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.listServers(principal)).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(1)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('discards inventory when the Context allowlist changes before the response', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.contextSequence = [+ context,+ { ...context, metadata: meta('context-uid-a', '21'), mcpServers: [] },+ ]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.listServers(principal)).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(1)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('discards a credential when the Secret changes during the post-read fence', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.secretMetadataSequence = [secret, { ...secret, metadata: meta('secret-uid-a', '41') }]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(2)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('discards a credential when the McpServer changes during the post-read fence', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverSequence = [server, { ...server, metadata: meta('server-uid-a', '31') }]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(2)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('fails closed when the McpServer disappears during the post-read fence', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverSequence = [server, null]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(1)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('discards a credential when the McpServer is recreated under the same name', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverSequence = [server, { ...server, metadata: meta('replacement-server-uid', '1') }]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(2)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('fails closed when the Secret disappears during the post-read fence', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.secretMetadataSequence = [secret, null]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)++ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'authorization_unavailable',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(2)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('fails closed when the Context disappears during the post-read fence', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.contextSequence = [context, null]+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'not_found',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(1)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('rejects an expired principal before any Kubernetes authority read', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store, () => principal.expiresAt)+ await expect(service.getCredential(principal, 'server-a')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'unauthorized',+ })+ expect(store.secretMetadataReads).toBe(0)+ expect(store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })+})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..1d19d53d6--- /dev/null+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.ts@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'+import type { VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal } from './mcpApiAuthentication'+import type { McpServerAuth, McpServerStatus, McpServerTransport } from './types'++export interface AuthorityMetadata {+ uid: string+ resourceVersion: string+ deletionTimestamp?: string+}++export interface AuthorityHost {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ metadata: AuthorityMetadata+ contextRef: string+}++export interface AuthorityContext {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ metadata: AuthorityMetadata+ mcpServers: readonly string[]+}++export interface AuthorityMcpServer {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ metadata: AuthorityMetadata+ description?: string+ transport: McpServerTransport+ auth?: McpServerAuth+ enabled: boolean+ status: McpServerStatus+}++export interface AuthoritySecretMetadata {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ metadata: AuthorityMetadata+}++export interface AuthoritySecret extends AuthoritySecretMetadata {+ data: Readonly<Record<string, string>>+}++export interface McpAuthorizationStore {+ readHost(name: string): Promise<AuthorityHost | null>+ readContext(name: string): Promise<AuthorityContext | null>+ readMcpServer(name: string): Promise<AuthorityMcpServer | null>+ readSecretMetadata(name: string): Promise<AuthoritySecretMetadata | null>+ readSecret(name: string): Promise<AuthoritySecret | null>+}++export interface AuthorizedMcpServerInfo {+ name: string+ description?: string+ transport: McpServerTransport+ enabled: boolean+ status: Pick<McpServerStatus, 'deployed' | 'ready'> &+ Partial<Pick<McpServerStatus, 'authoritative'>>+ authRequired: boolean+ credentialRevision?: string+}++export interface AuthorizedCredential {+ token: string | null+ credentialRevision: string+}++/** Project only the transport keys that are part of the mcp-host wire contract. */+export function toPublicMcpTransport(transport: McpServerTransport): McpServerTransport {+ return {+ type: transport.type,+ ...(typeof transport.url === 'string' ? { url: transport.url } : {}),+ ...(Number.isSafeInteger(transport.port) &&+ (transport.port ?? 0) > 0 &&+ (transport.port ?? 0) <= 65_535+ ? { port: transport.port }+ : {}),+ }+}++export type McpAuthorizationFailureCode =+ | 'unauthorized'+ | 'not_found'+ | 'authorization_unavailable'+ | 'credential_unavailable'++export class McpAuthorizationError extends Error {+ constructor(readonly code: McpAuthorizationFailureCode) {+ super(code)+ this.name = 'McpAuthorizationError'+ }+}++type AuthorizedHostContext = {+ principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal+ host: AuthorityHost+ context: AuthorityContext+}++type AuthorizedMcpServerGrant = AuthorizedHostContext & {+ server: AuthorityMcpServer+ secretMetadata: AuthoritySecretMetadata | null+ credentialRevision: string+}++const FALLBACK_SECRET_KEYS = ['token', 'api-key', 'apiKey', 'password'] as const++function isLive(metadata: AuthorityMetadata): boolean {+ return Boolean(metadata.uid && metadata.resourceVersion && !metadata.deletionTimestamp)+}++function selectSecretKey(secret: AuthoritySecret | null, configured?: string): string | null {+ if (!secret) return null+ const keys = configured ? [configured] : FALLBACK_SECRET_KEYS+ return (+ keys.find(key => Object.hasOwn(secret.data, key) && typeof secret.data[key] === 'string') ??+ null+ )+}++function decodeBase64Credential(value: unknown): string | null {+ if (+ typeof value !== 'string' ||+ value.length === 0 ||+ value.length % 4 !== 0 ||+ !/^(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$/.test(value)+ ) {+ return null+ }+ const decoded = Buffer.from(value, 'base64')+ if (decoded.length === 0 || decoded.toString('base64') !== value) return null+ const token = decoded.toString('utf8')+ return Buffer.from(token, 'utf8').equals(decoded) && token.length > 0 ? token : null+}++function revisionFor(server: AuthorityMcpServer, secret: AuthoritySecretMetadata | null): string {+ const material = JSON.stringify({+ serverUid: server.metadata.uid,+ serverResourceVersion: server.metadata.resourceVersion,+ serverDeleting: server.metadata.deletionTimestamp ?? null,+ authType: server.auth?.type ?? 'none',+ authSecretRef: server.auth?.secretRef ?? null,+ authSecretKey: server.auth?.secretKey ?? null,+ secretUid: secret?.metadata.uid ?? null,+ secretResourceVersion: secret?.metadata.resourceVersion ?? null,+ secretDeleting: secret?.metadata.deletionTimestamp ?? null,+ })+ return createHash('sha256').update(material).digest('base64url')+}++function sameHostContext(left: AuthorizedHostContext, right: AuthorizedHostContext): boolean {+ return (+ left.principal.subject === right.principal.subject &&+ left.principal.hostName === right.principal.hostName &&+ left.principal.hostUid === right.principal.hostUid &&+ left.principal.jti === right.principal.jti &&+ left.principal.issuedAt === right.principal.issuedAt &&+ left.principal.expiresAt === right.principal.expiresAt &&+ left.host.name === right.host.name &&+ left.host.namespace === right.host.namespace &&+ left.host.metadata.uid === right.host.metadata.uid &&+ left.host.metadata.resourceVersion === right.host.metadata.resourceVersion &&+ left.host.contextRef === right.host.contextRef &&+ left.context.name === right.context.name &&+ left.context.namespace === right.context.namespace &&+ left.context.metadata.uid === right.context.metadata.uid &&+ left.context.metadata.resourceVersion === right.context.metadata.resourceVersion &&+ left.context.mcpServers.join('\u0000') === right.context.mcpServers.join('\u0000')+ )+}++function sameGrant(left: AuthorizedMcpServerGrant, right: AuthorizedMcpServerGrant): boolean {+ return (+ sameHostContext(left, right) &&+ left.server.metadata.uid === right.server.metadata.uid &&+ left.server.metadata.resourceVersion === right.server.metadata.resourceVersion &&+ left.credentialRevision === right.credentialRevision+ )+}++export class McpAuthorizationService {+ constructor(+ private readonly store: McpAuthorizationStore,+ private readonly nowEpochSeconds: () => number = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)+ ) {}++ private assertPrincipalLive(principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal): void {+ if (principal.expiresAt <= this.nowEpochSeconds()) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('unauthorized')+ }+ }++ private async resolveHostContext(+ principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal+ ): Promise<AuthorizedHostContext> {+ this.assertPrincipalLive(principal)+ let host: AuthorityHost | null+ let context: AuthorityContext | null+ try {+ host = await this.store.readHost(principal.hostName)+ if (+ !host ||+ host.name !== principal.hostName ||+ host.namespace !== principal.namespace ||+ !isLive(host.metadata) ||+ host.metadata.uid !== principal.hostUid ||+ !host.contextRef+ ) {+ // A missing/recreated/deleting Host invalidates the authenticated+ // principal itself. Surface 401 so mcp-host revokes the whole retained+ // authority set instead of treating this as one missing MCP target.+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('unauthorized')+ }+ context = await this.store.readContext(host.contextRef)+ } catch (error) {+ if (error instanceof McpAuthorizationError) throw error+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ if (+ !context ||+ context.name !== host.contextRef ||+ !context.namespace ||+ !isLive(context.metadata)+ ) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('not_found')+ }+ return { principal, host, context }+ }++ private async resolveServerGrant(+ binding: AuthorizedHostContext,+ serverName: string+ ): Promise<AuthorizedMcpServerGrant> {+ if (!binding.context.mcpServers.includes(serverName)) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('not_found')+ }++ let server: AuthorityMcpServer | null+ try {+ server = await this.store.readMcpServer(serverName)+ } catch {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ if (+ !server ||+ server.name !== serverName ||+ server.namespace !== binding.context.namespace ||+ !server.enabled ||+ !isLive(server.metadata)+ ) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('not_found')+ }++ const authRequired = Boolean(server.auth && server.auth.type !== 'none')+ let secretMetadata: AuthoritySecretMetadata | null = null+ if (authRequired && server.auth?.secretRef) {+ try {+ secretMetadata = await this.store.readSecretMetadata(server.auth.secretRef)+ } catch {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ }+ if (+ secretMetadata &&+ (secretMetadata.name !== server.auth?.secretRef ||+ secretMetadata.namespace !== server.namespace ||+ !isLive(secretMetadata.metadata))+ ) {+ secretMetadata = null+ }+ return {+ ...binding,+ server,+ secretMetadata,+ credentialRevision: revisionFor(server, secretMetadata),+ }+ }++ async listServers(principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal): Promise<AuthorizedMcpServerInfo[]> {+ const binding = await this.resolveHostContext(principal)+ const names = [...new Set(binding.context.mcpServers)]+ const servers: AuthorizedMcpServerInfo[] = []+ for (const name of names) {+ let grant: AuthorizedMcpServerGrant+ try {+ grant = await this.resolveServerGrant(binding, name)+ } catch (error) {+ if (error instanceof McpAuthorizationError && error.code === 'not_found') continue+ throw error+ }+ const authRequired = Boolean(grant.server.auth && grant.server.auth.type !== 'none')+ servers.push({+ name: grant.server.name,+ ...(grant.server.description ? { description: grant.server.description } : {}),+ transport: toPublicMcpTransport(grant.server.transport),+ enabled: grant.server.enabled,+ status: {+ deployed: grant.server.status.deployed,+ ready: grant.server.status.ready,+ ...(typeof grant.server.status.authoritative === 'boolean'+ ? { authoritative: grant.server.status.authoritative }+ : {}),+ },+ authRequired,+ ...(authRequired ? { credentialRevision: grant.credentialRevision } : {}),+ })+ }+ const revalidated = await this.resolveHostContext(principal)+ if (!sameHostContext(binding, revalidated)) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ return servers+ }++ async getCredential(+ principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal,+ serverName: string+ ): Promise<AuthorizedCredential> {+ const binding = await this.resolveHostContext(principal)+ const grant = await this.resolveServerGrant(binding, serverName)+ const authRequired = Boolean(grant.server.auth && grant.server.auth.type !== 'none')+ if (!authRequired) {+ const revalidated = await this.resolveServerGrant(+ await this.resolveHostContext(principal),+ serverName+ )+ if (!sameGrant(grant, revalidated)) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ this.assertPrincipalLive(principal)+ return { token: null, credentialRevision: grant.credentialRevision }+ }++ if (!grant.server.auth?.secretRef || !grant.secretMetadata) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('credential_unavailable')+ }+ let secret: AuthoritySecret | null+ try {+ secret = await this.store.readSecret(grant.server.auth.secretRef)+ } catch {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ if (+ !secret ||+ secret.name !== grant.secretMetadata.name ||+ secret.namespace !== grant.secretMetadata.namespace ||+ !isLive(secret.metadata) ||+ secret.metadata.uid !== grant.secretMetadata.metadata.uid ||+ secret.metadata.resourceVersion !== grant.secretMetadata.metadata.resourceVersion ||+ secret.metadata.deletionTimestamp !== grant.secretMetadata.metadata.deletionTimestamp+ ) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ const selectedSecretKey = selectSecretKey(secret, grant.server.auth.secretKey)+ if (!selectedSecretKey) throw new McpAuthorizationError('credential_unavailable')+ const token = decodeBase64Credential(secret.data[selectedSecretKey])+ if (!token) throw new McpAuthorizationError('credential_unavailable')++ const revalidated = await this.resolveServerGrant(+ await this.resolveHostContext(principal),+ serverName+ )+ if (!sameGrant(grant, revalidated)) {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('authorization_unavailable')+ }+ this.assertPrincipalLive(principal)+ return { token, credentialRevision: grant.credentialRevision }+ }+}diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.tsindex 219d928db..9037ec36d 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.ts@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@/**- * HCC provisions the shared 1st-party mcp-host credentials.- * All 1st-party hosts share the sentinel binding `<target namespace>`/`standalone`;- * per-host authorization is still enforced by Host/User bindings elsewhere.+ * HCC provisions first-party mcp-host credentials through the existing+ * `<target namespace>`/`standalone` token family. Each credential is additionally+ * bound to the canonical live Host name and UID.*/import { config } from './config'import { hccLogger } from './logger'+import { McpApiAuthenticator } from './mcpApiAuthentication'import type { HostWorkflowControlScope } from './types'import { signInternalControlJwt } from './utils/internalControlSigner'@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ export interface McpHostRuntimeTokenResponse {const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000const SENTINEL_RECIPE_NAME = 'standalone'+const HOST_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]*[a-z0-9])?$/const log = hccLogger.child({ module: 'mcp-host-runtime-token-issuer' })type CanonicalMcpHostTokenResponse = {@@ -32,16 +34,53 @@ type CanonicalMcpHostTokenResponse = {}}+function isBoundedCompactJwt(value: unknown): value is string {+ return (+ typeof value === 'string' &&+ value.length <= 16_384 &&+ /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(value)+ )+}++function positiveInteger(value: unknown): number | null {+ return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value > 0 ? value : null+}+/*** `hostName` is sent as `host` in the body so control-api can populate* the JWT's `hostRefs[0]` with the actual Host CRD name (not the sentinel- * recipe pair). Per-event identity binding (e.g. usage ingest) uses this- * to verify the bearer pod is acting on its own behalf.+ * recipe pair). The sentinel recipe pair is only the internal issuance+ * transport contract; the returned access JWT is cryptographically verified+ * below for the actual Host name, UID, HCC audience, and MCP capability before+ * any credential is persisted.*/export async function issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(hostName: string,+ hostUid: string,workflowControlScopes: HostWorkflowControlScope[] = []): Promise<McpHostRuntimeTokenResponse> {+ if (+ typeof hostName !== 'string' ||+ !hostName ||+ hostName.length > 63 ||+ !HOST_NAME_RE.test(hostName)+ ) {+ throw new Error('mcpHost runtime token issuance requires a canonical Host name')+ }+ if (+ typeof hostUid !== 'string' ||+ !hostUid.trim() ||+ hostUid.trim() !== hostUid ||+ hostUid.length > 128 ||+ /[^A-Za-z0-9._:-]/.test(hostUid)+ ) {+ throw new Error('mcpHost runtime token issuance requires a live Host UID')+ }+ if (config.hccTargetNamespace !== config.hostNamespace) {+ throw new Error(+ 'HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE must equal CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE for caller-bound Host credentials'+ )+ }const recipeNamespace = config.hccTargetNamespaceconst url = `${config.controlApiBaseUrl}/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/${encodeURIComponent(recipeNamespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(SENTINEL_RECIPE_NAME)}/tokens`@@ -58,39 +97,55 @@ export async function issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(body: JSON.stringify({includeMcpHostControlToken: true,host: hostName,+ hostUid,workflowControlScopes,}),signal: controller.signal,})if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(- `mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP ${response.status} for host "${hostName}"`- )+ throw new Error(`mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP ${response.status}`)}const data = (await response.json()) as CanonicalMcpHostTokenResponseif (- typeof data.mcpHostAccessToken !== 'string' ||- typeof data.mcpHostRefreshToken !== 'string' ||- typeof data.mcpHostControlToken !== 'string'+ !isBoundedCompactJwt(data.mcpHostAccessToken) ||+ !isBoundedCompactJwt(data.mcpHostRefreshToken) ||+ !isBoundedCompactJwt(data.mcpHostControlToken)) {- throw new Error(`mcpHost credential response missing required fields for host "${hostName}"`)+ throw new Error('mcpHost credential response missing required fields')+ }+ const accessTtl = positiveInteger(data.expiresInSeconds?.access)+ const refreshTtl = positiveInteger(data.expiresInSeconds?.refresh)+ const controlTtl = positiveInteger(data.expiresInSeconds?.control)+ if (accessTtl === null || refreshTtl === null || controlTtl === null) {+ throw new Error('mcpHost credential response has invalid expiry fields')+ }++ // The issuer response is an authorization boundary, not merely a shape+ // check. A stale/old Control API during a rolling update could otherwise+ // return workflow-only credentials which the reconciler would persist and+ // later mount. Verify the access token with the same strict HCC verifier+ // used by the request routes before accepting the response.+ const issuedPrincipal = new McpApiAuthenticator({+ publicKey: config.mcpHostJwtPublicKey,+ issuer: config.mcpHostJwtIssuer,+ hostNamespace: config.hostNamespace,+ maxTokenLifetimeSeconds: config.mcpHostJwtMaxTtlSeconds,+ }).authenticate({ authorization: `Bearer ${data.mcpHostAccessToken}` }, [+ 'Authorization',+ `Bearer ${data.mcpHostAccessToken}`,+ ])+ if (issuedPrincipal.hostName !== hostName || issuedPrincipal.hostUid !== hostUid) {+ throw new Error('mcpHost credential response identity does not match the live Host')}- const accessTtl =- typeof data.expiresInSeconds?.access === 'number' ? data.expiresInSeconds.access : 0- const refreshTtl =- typeof data.expiresInSeconds?.refresh === 'number' ? data.expiresInSeconds.refresh : 0- const controlTtl =- typeof data.expiresInSeconds?.control === 'number' ? data.expiresInSeconds.control : 0- log.info('Issued mcpHost credentials for host', {- hostName,+ log.info('Issued mcpHost credentials', {accessTtlSeconds: accessTtl,refreshTtlSeconds: refreshTtl,controlTtlSeconds: controlTtl,- workflowControlScopes,+ workflowControlScopeCount: workflowControlScopes.length,})return {@@ -103,9 +158,7 @@ export async function issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(}} catch (err) {if (err instanceof DOMException && err.name === 'AbortError') {- throw new Error(- `mcpHost runtime token issuance timed out after ${REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS}ms for host "${hostName}"`- )+ throw new Error(`mcpHost runtime token issuance timed out after ${REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`)}throw err} finally {diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/metrics.ts b/host-context-controller/src/metrics.tsindex 75b8cc5f0..bb2a839fe 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/metrics.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/metrics.ts@@ -149,6 +149,14 @@ export const administrativeOutcomeReporterTotal = counter({labelNames: ['result'] as const,})+// Low-cardinality Host-scoped MCP API decisions. Resource names, JWT IDs,+// Contexts, and Secret selectors must never become metric labels.+export const mcpHostApiRequestsTotal = counter({+ name: 'clerum_hcc_mcp_host_api_requests_total',+ help: 'Host-scoped MCP API requests by route class, outcome, and bounded reason.',+ labelNames: ['action', 'outcome', 'reason'] as const,+})+// ── Host reconciliation scheduler telemetry (issue #791 follow-up) ──// Low-cardinality labels only — never host names, users, teams, or session IDs.diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/server.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/server.test.tsindex 633a48992..d8227f713 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/server.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/server.test.ts@@ -1,24 +1,34 @@-import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import { Readable } from 'node:stream'import { McpServerProvider } from './k8sClient'-import { ContextMapperServer } from './server'+import { McpApiAuthenticator, type VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal } from './mcpApiAuthentication'+import {+ type AuthorityContext,+ type AuthorityHost,+ type AuthorityMcpServer,+ type AuthoritySecret,+ McpAuthorizationError,+ McpAuthorizationService,+ type McpAuthorizationStore,+} from './mcpAuthorization'+import { ContextMapperServer, McpHostApiRateLimiter } from './server'+import type { McpServerInfo } from './types'class FakeProvider implements McpServerProvider {+ constructor(private readonly infos: McpServerInfo[] = []) {}+getAllServers() {return []}getAllServerInfos() {- return []+ return this.infos}async getServerInfosByContext() {return []}- async getAuthToken() {- return undefined- }-onChange() {}async start() {}@@ -39,37 +49,121 @@ class MockResponse {writeHead(status: number, headers?: Record<string, string>): void {this.statusCode = statusthis.headersSent = true- if (headers) {- Object.assign(this.headers, headers)- }+ if (headers) Object.assign(this.headers, headers)}end(chunk?: string): void {- if (chunk) {- this.body += chunk- }+ if (chunk) this.body += chunk}}-async function invoke(server: ContextMapperServer, path: string) {- const req = {- method: 'GET',+async function invoke(+ server: ContextMapperServer,+ path: string,+ options: { method?: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; body?: string } = {}+) {+ const headers = options.headers ?? {}+ const req = Readable.from(options.body === undefined ? [] : [options.body])+ Object.assign(req, {+ method: options.method ?? 'GET',url: path,- headers: {},- }+ headers,+ rawHeaders: Object.entries(headers).flatMap(([name, value]) => [name, value]),+ })const res = new MockResponse()await (server as unknown as {- handleRequest: (- req: { method: string; url: string; headers: Record<string, string> },- res: MockResponse- ) => Promise<void>+ handleRequest: (req: Readable, res: MockResponse) => Promise<void>}).handleRequest(req, res)return res}-describe('ContextMapperServer readiness', () => {+const principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal = {+ subject: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ hostName: 'host-a',+ hostUid: 'host-uid-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-host',+ jti: 'jti-a',+ issuedAt: 1,+ expiresAt: 4_000_000_000,+ audiences: ['host-context-controller'],+}++class FakeAuthorityStore implements McpAuthorizationStore {+ secretValueReads = 0+ private readonly host: AuthorityHost = {+ name: 'host-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-host',+ metadata: { uid: 'host-uid-a', resourceVersion: '1' },+ contextRef: 'context-a',+ }+ private readonly context: AuthorityContext = {+ name: 'context-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: { uid: 'context-uid-a', resourceVersion: '2' },+ mcpServers: ['server-a'],+ }+ private readonly mcpServer: AuthorityMcpServer = {+ name: 'server-a',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: { uid: 'server-uid-a', resourceVersion: '3' },+ transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', url: 'http://server-a/mcp' },+ auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'server-a-auth', secretKey: 'token' },+ enabled: true,+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true },+ }+ private readonly secret: AuthoritySecret = {+ name: 'server-a-auth',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ metadata: { uid: 'secret-uid-a', resourceVersion: '4' },+ data: { token: Buffer.from('credential-value').toString('base64') },+ }++ async readHost() {+ return this.host+ }++ async readContext() {+ return this.context+ }++ async readMcpServer() {+ return this.mcpServer+ }++ async readSecretMetadata() {+ return {+ name: this.secret.name,+ namespace: this.secret.namespace,+ metadata: this.secret.metadata,+ }+ }++ async readSecret() {+ this.secretValueReads += 1+ return this.secret+ }+}++function protectedServer(store = new FakeAuthorityStore()): {+ server: ContextMapperServer+ store: FakeAuthorityStore+} {+ const authenticator = { authenticate: () => principal } as unknown as McpApiAuthenticator+ const server = new ContextMapperServer(+ new FakeProvider(),+ 0,+ undefined,+ undefined,+ authenticator,+ new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ )+ server.setReady(true)+ return { server, store }+}++describe('ContextMapperServer', () => {let server: ContextMapperServer | null = nullafterEach(async () => {@@ -86,26 +180,207 @@ describe('ContextMapperServer readiness', () => {response = await invoke(server, '/ready')expect(response.statusCode).toBe(503)- expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ status: 'starting', ready: false })response = await invoke(server, '/api/v1/mcpservers')expect(response.statusCode).toBe(503)- expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({- error: 'Service Unavailable',- message: 'Context mapper is still starting',- })server.setReady(true)+ response = await invoke(server, '/api/v1/mcpservers')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(200)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toMatchObject({ servers: [], contextRef: '*' })+ })- response = await invoke(server, '/ready')+ it('keeps the temporary global v1 inventory metadata-only and non-cacheable', async () => {+ server = new ContextMapperServer(+ new FakeProvider([+ {+ name: 'server-a',+ description: 'must not be exposed by the legacy system inventory',+ contextRef: 'context-a',+ transport: {+ type: 'streamableHttp',+ url: 'http://server-a/mcp',+ secretRef: 'nested-secret-must-not-leak',+ } as McpServerInfo['transport'],+ auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'server-a-auth', secretKey: 'token' },+ enabled: true,+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true, message: 'internal status detail' },+ },+ ]),+ 0+ )+ server.setReady(true)++ const response = await invoke(server, '/api/v1/mcpservers')expect(response.statusCode).toBe(200)- expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ status: 'ready', ready: true })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body).servers[0]).not.toHaveProperty('auth')+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body).servers[0]).not.toHaveProperty('description')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('secretRef')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('secretKey')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('nested-secret-must-not-leak')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('internal status detail')+ })- response = await invoke(server, '/api/v1/mcpservers')+ it.each(['/api/v1/mcpservers/context/context-a', '/api/v1/mcpservers/server-a/auth'])(+ 'returns an application-level 410 tombstone for legacy route %s',+ async path => {+ server = new ContextMapperServer(new FakeProvider(), 0)+ server.setReady(true)+ const response = await invoke(server, path)+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(410)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'gone' })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ }+ )++ it('tombstones legacy Host-selected routes for every method before readiness and CORS', async () => {+ server = new ContextMapperServer(new FakeProvider(), 0)++ for (const [path, method] of [+ ['/api/v1/mcpservers/context/context-a', 'OPTIONS'],+ ['/api/v1/mcpservers/server-a/auth', 'POST'],+ ] as const) {+ const response = await invoke(server, path, { method })+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(410)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'gone' })+ expect(response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin']).toBeUndefined()+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ }+ })++ it('serves scoped v2 inventory without wildcard browser CORS or Secret values', async () => {+ const protectedRoute = protectedServer()+ server = protectedRoute.server+ const response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(200)+ expect(response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin']).toBeUndefined()+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ const body = JSON.parse(response.body)+ expect(body.servers).toEqual([+ expect.objectContaining({ name: 'server-a', authRequired: true }),+ ])+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('context-a')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('server-a-auth')+ expect(response.body).not.toContain('credential-value')+ expect(protectedRoute.store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('keeps direct protected-route startup and not-found errors generic and non-cacheable', async () => {+ server = new ContextMapperServer(new FakeProvider(), 0)++ let response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(503)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'authorization_unavailable' })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')++ server.setReady(true)+ response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/unknown')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(404)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'not_found' })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ })++ it('accepts only the exact credential body and returns the fenced token DTO', async () => {+ const protectedRoute = protectedServer()+ server = protectedRoute.server+ const response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential', {+ method: 'POST',+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },+ body: JSON.stringify({ serverName: 'server-a' }),+ })expect(response.statusCode).toBe(200)- expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toMatchObject({- servers: [],- contextRef: '*',+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({+ token: 'credential-value',+ credentialRevision: expect.any(String),+ })+ expect(protectedRoute.store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)++ const invalid = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential', {+ method: 'POST',+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },+ body: JSON.stringify({ serverName: 'server-a', contextRef: 'context-b' }),+ })+ expect(invalid.statusCode).toBe(400)+ expect(protectedRoute.store.secretValueReads).toBe(1)+ })++ it('normalizes protected route method, media-type, and body-limit failures without a Secret read', async () => {+ const protectedRoute = protectedServer()+ server = protectedRoute.server++ let response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers', { method: 'POST' })+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(405)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'method_not_allowed' })+ expect(response.headers.Allow).toBe('GET')++ response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential', {+ method: 'POST',+ headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' },+ body: '{}',+ })+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(415)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'unsupported_media_type' })++ response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential', {+ method: 'POST',+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },+ body: JSON.stringify({ serverName: 'a'.repeat(1_025) }),+ })+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(413)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'payload_too_large' })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ expect(protectedRoute.store.secretValueReads).toBe(0)+ })++ it('fails closed when the protected Host verifier is not configured', async () => {+ server = new ContextMapperServer(new FakeProvider(), 0)+ server.setReady(true)++ const response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(503)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'authorization_unavailable' })+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ })++ it('maps a rebound Host identity to a generic non-cacheable 401', async () => {+ const authenticator = { authenticate: () => principal } as unknown as McpApiAuthenticator+ const authorization = {+ listServers: async () => {+ throw new McpAuthorizationError('unauthorized')+ },+ } as unknown as McpAuthorizationService+ server = new ContextMapperServer(+ new FakeProvider(),+ 0,+ undefined,+ undefined,+ authenticator,+ authorization+ )+ server.setReady(true)++ const response = await invoke(server, '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers')+ expect(response.statusCode).toBe(401)+ expect(JSON.parse(response.body)).toEqual({ error: 'unauthorized' })+ expect(response.headers['WWW-Authenticate']).toBe('Bearer realm="host-context-controller"')+ expect(response.headers['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store, private')+ expect(response.headers.Pragma).toBe('no-cache')+ })+})++describe('McpHostApiRateLimiter', () => {+ it('limits each signed Host identity/action independently and resets after one minute', () => {+ let now = 1_000+ const limiter = new McpHostApiRateLimiter(1, () => now)+ expect(limiter.consume('host-uid-a', 'credential')).toEqual({ allowed: true })+ expect(limiter.consume('host-uid-a', 'inventory')).toEqual({ allowed: true })+ expect(limiter.consume('host-uid-b', 'credential')).toEqual({ allowed: true })+ expect(limiter.consume('host-uid-a', 'credential')).toEqual({+ allowed: false,+ retryAfterSeconds: 60,})+ now += 60_000+ expect(limiter.consume('host-uid-a', 'credential')).toEqual({ allowed: true })})})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/server.ts b/host-context-controller/src/server.tsindex 7be800a8e..6fa2393d7 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/server.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/server.ts@@ -5,8 +5,73 @@ import * as http from 'http'import { config } from './config'import { HostReconciler } from './hostReconciler'import { McpServerProvider } from './k8sClient'-import { registry } from './metrics'-import { ErrorResponse, McpServersResponse } from './types'+import { hccLogger } from './logger'+import {+ McpApiAuthenticationError,+ McpApiAuthenticator,+ type VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal,+} from './mcpApiAuthentication'+import {+ McpAuthorizationError,+ McpAuthorizationService,+ toPublicMcpTransport,+} from './mcpAuthorization'+import { mcpHostApiRequestsTotal, registry } from './metrics'+import { McpServersResponse } from './types'++const MCP_SELECTOR_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9.]*[a-z0-9])?$/+const MCP_REQUEST_BODY_LIMIT = 1024+const mcpApiLog = hccLogger.child({ module: 'mcp-host-api' })+type McpHostApiAction = 'inventory' | 'credential'++type RateLimitEntry = { windowStartMs: number; count: number }++/** Per-Host, per-action fixed-window limiter applied only after JWT validation. */+export class McpHostApiRateLimiter {+ private readonly entries = new Map<string, RateLimitEntry>()++ constructor(+ private readonly maxPerMinute: number,+ private readonly now: () => number = Date.now+ ) {}++ consume(+ hostUid: string,+ action: McpHostApiAction+ ): { allowed: true } | { allowed: false; retryAfterSeconds: number } {+ const nowMs = this.now()+ const key = `${hostUid}\u0000${action}`+ const existing = this.entries.get(key)+ if (!existing || nowMs - existing.windowStartMs >= 60_000) {+ this.entries.set(key, { windowStartMs: nowMs, count: 1 })+ this.prune(nowMs)+ return { allowed: true }+ }+ if (existing.count >= this.maxPerMinute) {+ return {+ allowed: false,+ retryAfterSeconds: Math.max(+ 1,+ Math.ceil((60_000 - (nowMs - existing.windowStartMs)) / 1000)+ ),+ }+ }+ existing.count += 1+ return { allowed: true }+ }++ private prune(nowMs: number): void {+ if (this.entries.size <= 10_000) return+ for (const [key, entry] of this.entries) {+ if (nowMs - entry.windowStartMs >= 60_000) this.entries.delete(key)+ }+ while (this.entries.size > 10_000) {+ const oldest = this.entries.keys().next()+ if (oldest.done) break+ this.entries.delete(oldest.value)+ }+ }+}export class ContextMapperServer {private server: http.Server | null = null@@ -14,18 +79,26 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {private port: numberprivate hostReconciler: HostReconciler | nullprivate hasDesktopFn: ((hostRef: string) => boolean) | null+ private mcpAuthenticator: McpApiAuthenticator | null+ private mcpAuthorization: McpAuthorizationService | null+ private mcpRateLimiter: McpHostApiRateLimiterprivate ready = falseconstructor(provider: McpServerProvider,port: number = config.port,hostReconciler?: HostReconciler,- hasDesktopFn?: (hostRef: string) => boolean+ hasDesktopFn?: (hostRef: string) => boolean,+ mcpAuthenticator?: McpApiAuthenticator,+ mcpAuthorization?: McpAuthorizationService) {this.provider = providerthis.port = portthis.hostReconciler = hostReconciler ?? nullthis.hasDesktopFn = hasDesktopFn ?? null+ this.mcpAuthenticator = mcpAuthenticator ?? null+ this.mcpAuthorization = mcpAuthorization ?? null+ this.mcpRateLimiter = new McpHostApiRateLimiter(config.mcpHostApiRateLimitPerMinute)}/**@@ -36,10 +109,29 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {}private async handleRequest(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse): Promise<void> {- // CORS headers- res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*')- res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, OPTIONS')- res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type')+ const url = new URL(req.url || '/', `http://localhost:${this.port}`)+ const isLegacyHostSelectedMcpRoute =+ url.pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/mcpservers/context/') ||+ (url.pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/mcpservers/') && url.pathname.endsWith('/auth'))+ const isProtectedMcpRoute =+ url.pathname.startsWith('/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers') || isLegacyHostSelectedMcpRoute++ // The Host credential surface is service-to-service and deliberately has+ // no browser wildcard CORS grant. Preserve the historical public CORS+ // behavior only for unrelated/legacy endpoints.+ if (!isProtectedMcpRoute) {+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*')+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, OPTIONS')+ res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type')+ }++ // Retire caller-selected Context/credential routes at the application+ // boundary for every method, including preflight, and independently of+ // readiness. This remains a defense if a caller bypasses the gateway.+ if (isLegacyHostSelectedMcpRoute) {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 410, { error: 'gone' })+ return+ }if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {res.writeHead(204)@@ -47,8 +139,6 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {return}- const url = new URL(req.url || '/', `http://localhost:${this.port}`)-// Root path - API informationif (req.method === 'GET' && url.pathname === '/') {this.handleRoot(res)@@ -79,6 +169,10 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {}if (!this.ready) {+ if (isProtectedMcpRoute) {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 503, { error: 'authorization_unavailable' })+ return+ }this.sendJson(res, 503, {error: 'Service Unavailable',message: 'Context mapper is still starting',@@ -86,27 +180,27 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {return}- // List all McpServers- if (req.method === 'GET' && url.pathname === '/api/v1/mcpservers') {- await this.handleListAll(req, res, url)+ if (url.pathname === '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers') {+ if (req.method === 'GET') {+ await this.handleHostMcpServers(req, res)+ } else {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 405, { error: 'method_not_allowed' }, { Allow: 'GET' })+ }return}- // List McpServers by context- if (req.method === 'GET' && url.pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/mcpservers/context/')) {- const contextRef = url.pathname.replace('/api/v1/mcpservers/context/', '')- await this.handleListByContext(req, res, contextRef)+ if (url.pathname === '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential') {+ if (req.method === 'POST') {+ await this.handleHostMcpCredential(req, res)+ } else {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 405, { error: 'method_not_allowed' }, { Allow: 'POST' })+ }return}- // Get auth token for a server- if (- req.method === 'GET' &&- url.pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/mcpservers/') &&- url.pathname.endsWith('/auth')- ) {- const serverName = url.pathname.replace('/api/v1/mcpservers/', '').replace('/auth', '')- await this.handleGetAuth(req, res, serverName)+ // List all McpServers (temporary PR 2 compatibility residual).+ if (req.method === 'GET' && url.pathname === '/api/v1/mcpservers') {+ await this.handleListAll(req, res, url)return}@@ -119,6 +213,10 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {}// 404+ if (isProtectedMcpRoute) {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 404, { error: 'not_found' })+ return+ }this.sendJson(res, 404, { error: 'Not Found', message: 'Endpoint not found' })}@@ -140,6 +238,181 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {return true}+ private authenticateMcpHost(+ req: http.IncomingMessage,+ res: http.ServerResponse,+ action: McpHostApiAction+ ): VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal | null {+ if (!this.mcpAuthenticator || !this.mcpAuthorization) {+ mcpApiLog.error('MCP authorization authority unavailable', {+ reason: 'verifier_not_configured',+ })+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action, outcome: 'error', reason: 'unconfigured' }, 1)+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 503, { error: 'authorization_unavailable' })+ return null+ }+ try {+ return this.mcpAuthenticator.authenticate(req.headers, req.rawHeaders)+ } catch (error) {+ const reason =+ error instanceof McpApiAuthenticationError ? 'invalid_bearer' : 'verifier_error'+ mcpApiLog.info('MCP request denied', { reason })+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action, outcome: 'denied', reason }, 1)+ this.sendProtectedJson(+ res,+ 401,+ { error: 'unauthorized' },+ { 'WWW-Authenticate': 'Bearer realm="host-context-controller"' }+ )+ return null+ }+ }++ private async handleHostMcpServers(+ req: http.IncomingMessage,+ res: http.ServerResponse+ ): Promise<void> {+ const principal = this.authenticateMcpHost(req, res, 'inventory')+ if (!principal || !this.mcpAuthorization) return+ if (!this.enforceMcpRateLimit(principal, 'inventory', res)) return+ try {+ const servers = await this.mcpAuthorization.listServers(principal)+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action: 'inventory', outcome: 'success', reason: 'ok' }, 1)+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 200, { servers, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() })+ } catch (error) {+ this.sendMcpAuthorizationError(res, error, 'inventory')+ }+ }++ private async handleHostMcpCredential(+ req: http.IncomingMessage,+ res: http.ServerResponse+ ): Promise<void> {+ const principal = this.authenticateMcpHost(req, res, 'credential')+ if (!principal || !this.mcpAuthorization) return+ if (!this.enforceMcpRateLimit(principal, 'credential', res)) return+ const contentType = String(req.headers['content-type'] ?? '')+ .split(';', 1)[0]+ .trim()+ if (contentType !== 'application/json') {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 415, { error: 'unsupported_media_type' })+ return+ }++ let body: unknown+ try {+ body = await this.readBoundedJsonBody(req)+ } catch (error) {+ const status = error instanceof Error && error.message === 'body_too_large' ? 413 : 400+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, status, {+ error: status === 413 ? 'payload_too_large' : 'bad_request',+ })+ return+ }+ const bodyKeys =+ body && typeof body === 'object' && !Array.isArray(body) ? Object.keys(body) : []+ const serverName =+ bodyKeys.length === 1 && bodyKeys[0] === 'serverName'+ ? (body as { serverName?: unknown }).serverName+ : undefined+ if (+ typeof serverName !== 'string' ||+ serverName.length > 253 ||+ serverName.trim() !== serverName ||+ !MCP_SELECTOR_RE.test(serverName)+ ) {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 400, { error: 'bad_request' })+ return+ }++ try {+ const credential = await this.mcpAuthorization.getCredential(principal, serverName)+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action: 'credential', outcome: 'success', reason: 'ok' }, 1)+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 200, credential)+ } catch (error) {+ this.sendMcpAuthorizationError(res, error, 'credential')+ }+ }++ private async readBoundedJsonBody(req: http.IncomingMessage): Promise<unknown> {+ const declared = Number(req.headers['content-length'] ?? 0)+ if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MCP_REQUEST_BODY_LIMIT) {+ throw new Error('body_too_large')+ }+ const chunks: Buffer[] = []+ let size = 0+ for await (const chunk of req) {+ const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk)+ size += buffer.length+ if (size > MCP_REQUEST_BODY_LIMIT) throw new Error('body_too_large')+ chunks.push(buffer)+ }+ if (size === 0) throw new Error('invalid_json')+ return JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8'))+ }++ private sendMcpAuthorizationError(+ res: http.ServerResponse,+ error: unknown,+ action: McpHostApiAction+ ): void {+ const code = error instanceof McpAuthorizationError ? error.code : 'authorization_unavailable'+ mcpApiLog.info('MCP request denied', { action, reason: code })+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action, outcome: 'denied', reason: code }, 1)+ if (code === 'unauthorized') {+ this.sendProtectedJson(+ res,+ 401,+ { error: 'unauthorized' },+ { 'WWW-Authenticate': 'Bearer realm="host-context-controller"' }+ )+ return+ }+ if (code === 'not_found') {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 404, { error: 'not_found' })+ return+ }+ if (code === 'credential_unavailable') {+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 503, { error: 'credential_unavailable' })+ return+ }+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 503, { error: 'authorization_unavailable' })+ }++ private enforceMcpRateLimit(+ principal: VerifiedMcpHostPrincipal,+ action: McpHostApiAction,+ res: http.ServerResponse+ ): boolean {+ const result = this.mcpRateLimiter.consume(principal.hostUid, action)+ if (result.allowed) return true+ mcpApiLog.info('MCP request denied', { action, reason: 'rate_limited' })+ mcpHostApiRequestsTotal.inc({ action, outcome: 'denied', reason: 'rate_limited' }, 1)+ this.sendProtectedJson(+ res,+ 429,+ { error: 'rate_limited' },+ { 'Retry-After': String(result.retryAfterSeconds) }+ )+ return false+ }++ private sendProtectedJson(+ res: http.ServerResponse,+ status: number,+ data: unknown,+ headers: Record<string, string> = {}+ ): void {+ res.writeHead(status, {+ 'Content-Type': 'application/json',+ 'Cache-Control': 'no-store, private',+ Pragma: 'no-cache',+ 'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',+ ...headers,+ })+ res.end(JSON.stringify(data))+ }+/*** Start the server.*/@@ -171,10 +444,10 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {console.log(`[Server] GET /health - Health check`)console.log(`[Server] GET /ready - Readiness check`)console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers - List all McpServers`)+ console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers - Host-scoped MCP inventory`)console.log(- `[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef - List McpServers by context`+ `[Server] POST /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential - Host-scoped MCP credential`)- console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers/:name/auth - Get auth token for McpServer`)console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/desktop/:hostRef - Desktop status`)resolve()})@@ -200,14 +473,12 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {'GET /health': "Health check endpoint - returns { status: 'ok', ready: boolean }",'GET /ready': 'Readiness endpoint - returns 200 only after warm-up completes','GET /api/v1/mcpservers': 'List all McpServer resources',- 'GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef':- 'List McpServers filtered by contextRef (only enabled servers)',- 'GET /api/v1/mcpservers/:name/auth': 'Get authentication token for a specific McpServer',+ 'GET /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers': 'List MCP servers for the authenticated Host',+ 'POST /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential':+ 'Get an authorized credential for the authenticated Host',},examples: {listAll: `curl http://localhost:${this.port}/api/v1/mcpservers`,- listByContext: `curl http://localhost:${this.port}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/dev-context`,- getAuth: `curl http://localhost:${this.port}/api/v1/mcpservers/github/auth`,},stats: {totalServers: this.provider.getAllServerInfos().length,@@ -227,82 +498,23 @@ export class ContextMapperServer {): Promise<void> {console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers`)- const servers = this.provider.getAllServerInfos()+ const servers = this.provider.getAllServerInfos().map(server => ({+ name: server.name,+ contextRef: server.contextRef,+ transport: toPublicMcpTransport(server.transport),+ enabled: server.enabled,+ status: {+ deployed: server.status.deployed,+ ready: server.status.ready,+ },+ }))const response: McpServersResponse = {servers,contextRef: '*',timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),}- this.sendJson(res, 200, response)- }-- /**- * Handle GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/:contextRef- */- private async handleListByContext(- req: http.IncomingMessage,- res: http.ServerResponse,- contextRef: string- ): Promise<void> {- console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/${contextRef}`)-- if (!contextRef) {- this.sendJson(res, 400, { error: 'Bad Request', message: 'contextRef is required' })- return- }-- const servers = await this.provider.getServerInfosByContext(contextRef)- const response: McpServersResponse = {- servers,- contextRef,- timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),- }-- this.sendJson(res, 200, response)- }-- /**- * Handle GET /api/v1/mcpservers/:name/auth- */- private async handleGetAuth(- req: http.IncomingMessage,- res: http.ServerResponse,- serverName: string- ): Promise<void> {- console.log(`[Server] GET /api/v1/mcpservers/${serverName}/auth`)-- if (!serverName) {- this.sendJson(res, 400, { error: 'Bad Request', message: 'serverName is required' })- return- }-- // Find the server- const servers = this.provider.getAllServerInfos()- const server = servers.find(s => s.name === serverName)-- if (!server) {- this.sendJson(res, 404, { error: 'Not Found', message: `McpServer ${serverName} not found` })- return- }-- // Get the auth token via provider- const token = await this.provider.getAuthToken(serverName)-- if (!token) {- // Check if auth was configured but not found vs not configured at all- if (server.auth?.secretRef) {- this.sendJson(res, 404, {- error: 'Not Found',- message: `Auth token for ${serverName} not found`,- })- } else {- this.sendJson(res, 200, { token: null, message: 'No auth configured for this server' })- }- return- }-- this.sendJson(res, 200, { token })+ this.sendProtectedJson(res, 200, response)}/**diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/types.ts b/host-context-controller/src/types.tsindex a7488dc7d..d71de8eb0 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/types.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/types.ts@@ -507,6 +507,11 @@ export interface McpServerStatus {deployed: boolean/** Whether the Deployment has at least one ready replica. */ready: boolean+ /**+ * Whether this readiness observation is current and authoritative. Omitted+ * when the status source cannot make that guarantee.+ */+ authoritative?: boolean/** Human-readable status message. */message?: string}diff --git a/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.lifecycle.test.ts b/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.lifecycle.test.tsindex d624bf4e2..e47108673 100644--- a/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.lifecycle.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.lifecycle.test.ts@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ function makeHost(overrides?: Partial<HostCRD>): HostCRD {return {name: 'alpha-host',namespace: 'mcp-host',+ uid: 'alpha-host-uid',spec: {host: 'alpha-host',contextRef: 'context-a',@@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ function makeStatelessHost(return {name,namespace: 'mcp-host',+ uid: `${name}-uid`,spec: {host: name,contextRef: 'context-a',@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ function hostApiObject(host: HostCRD) {metadata: {name: host.name,namespace: host.namespace,+ uid: host.uid,resourceVersion: host.resourceVersion ?? '42',annotations: host.annotations,},@@ -827,6 +830,7 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {expect(mintGfs).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ name: host.name, namespace: host.namespace })expect(issueTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith(host.name,+ host.uid,expect.arrayContaining(['workflow:list','workflow:read',@@ -852,8 +856,8 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {const issueTokens = vi.mocked(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens)const defaultIssueTokens = issueTokens.getMockImplementation()issueTokens.mockClear()- issueTokens.mockImplementationOnce(async (hostName, scopes) => {- const tokens = await defaultIssueTokens!(hostName, scopes)+ issueTokens.mockImplementationOnce(async (hostName, hostUid, scopes) => {+ const tokens = await defaultIssueTokens!(hostName, hostUid, scopes)channelCount = 1return tokens})@@ -861,8 +865,9 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {await reconciler.reconcile(host)expect(issueTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][1]).toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe(host.uid)+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][2]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][2]).toContain('workflow:trigger')const deployment = hostDeploymentBody(appsApi, host.name)expect(deployment.spec?.replicas).toBe(1)expect(containerEnv(deployment).map(entry => entry.name)).not.toContain(@@ -887,8 +892,8 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {const issueTokens = vi.mocked(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens)const defaultIssueTokens = issueTokens.getMockImplementation()issueTokens.mockClear()- issueTokens.mockImplementationOnce(async (hostName, scopes) => {- const tokens = await defaultIssueTokens!(hostName, scopes)+ issueTokens.mockImplementationOnce(async (hostName, hostUid, scopes) => {+ const tokens = await defaultIssueTokens!(hostName, hostUid, scopes)channelCount = 1return tokens})@@ -896,8 +901,9 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {await reconciler.reconcile(host)expect(issueTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][1]).toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe(host.uid)+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][2]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][2]).toContain('workflow:trigger')expect(containerEnv(hostDeploymentBody(appsApi, host.name)).map(entry => entry.name)).not.toContain('CLERUM_STATELESS_LIFECYCLE')@@ -979,8 +985,9 @@ describe('HostReconciler stateless lifecycle — rejection matrix', () => {await reconciler.reconcile(host)expect(issueTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')- expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][1]).toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][1]).toBe(host.uid)+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[0][2]).not.toContain('workflow:trigger')+ expect(issueTokens.mock.calls[1][2]).toContain('workflow:trigger')const hostReplace = appsApi.replaceNamespacedDeployment.mock.calls.find(([request]) => request.name === host.name)?.[0].body as k8s.V1Deployment | undefineddiff --git a/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.test.ts b/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.test.tsindex ccb55d3a8..b8347b82e 100644--- a/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/test/hostReconciler.test.ts@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ function makeHost(overrides?: Partial<HostCRD>): HostCRD {return {name: 'alpha-host',namespace: 'mcp-host',+ uid: 'host-uid-1',spec: {host: 'alpha-host',contextRef: 'context-a',@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@ describe('HostReconciler', () => {expect(reconciler.getStatus('alpha-host')).toMatchObject({ deployed: true, ready: true })expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith('alpha-host',+ 'host-uid-1',DEFAULT_FIRST_PARTY_WORKFLOW_CONTROL_SCOPES)})@@ -430,6 +432,7 @@ describe('HostReconciler', () => {expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens).toHaveBeenCalledWith('alpha-host',+ 'host-uid-1',DEFAULT_FIRST_PARTY_WORKFLOW_CONTROL_SCOPES)})diff --git a/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.ts b/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.tsindex 33e81b51f..afc11f380 100644--- a/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.ts@@ -1,9 +1,18 @@import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken'+import { generateKeyPairSync } from 'node:crypto'const ORIGINAL_FETCH = globalThis.fetchconst ORIGINAL_SECRET = process.env.INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRETconst ORIGINAL_BASE_URL = process.env.CONTROL_API_BASE_URLconst ORIGINAL_TARGET_NAMESPACE = process.env.HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE+const ORIGINAL_PUBLIC_KEY = process.env.HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY++const keyPair = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', {+ modulusLength: 2048,+ publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'spki', format: 'pem' },+ privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' },+})interface JwtClaims {iss: string@@ -19,7 +28,30 @@ async function loadIssuer() {return mod.issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens}-function canonicalIssueResponse(access = 'a.b.c', refresh = 'd.e.f', control = 'g.h.i') {+function validAccessToken(hostName = 'chatllm', hostUid = 'host-uid'): string {+ return jwt.sign(+ {+ sub: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ recipeNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: [hostName],+ host_uid: hostUid,+ scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ mcpCapabilities: ['mcp:credential:read'],+ },+ keyPair.privateKey,+ {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: ['workflow-approvals', 'host-context-controller'],+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: 'issuer-test-access',+ }+ )+}++function canonicalIssueResponse(access = validAccessToken(), refresh = 'd.e.f', control = 'g.h.i') {return {mcpHostAccessToken: access,mcpHostRefreshToken: refresh,@@ -53,6 +85,7 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {vi.resetModules()process.env.INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET = 'test-hcc-internal-control-secret'process.env.CONTROL_API_BASE_URL = 'http://control-api.test:8090'+ process.env.HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY = keyPair.publicKeydelete process.env.HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE})@@ -62,13 +95,14 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {restoreEnv('INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET', ORIGINAL_SECRET)restoreEnv('CONTROL_API_BASE_URL', ORIGINAL_BASE_URL)restoreEnv('HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE', ORIGINAL_TARGET_NAMESPACE)+ restoreEnv('HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY', ORIGINAL_PUBLIC_KEY)})it('throws when INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET is empty', async () => {vi.resetModules()process.env.INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET = ''const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(/INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET/)})@@ -77,7 +111,23 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {vi.resetModules()process.env.INTERNAL_CONTROL_JWT_HCC_HMAC_SECRET = 'replace-with-real-internal-control-secret'const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(/placeholder value/)+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /placeholder value/+ )+ })++ it('rejects non-canonical Host identity before making an issuance request', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn()+ globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch+ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()++ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(' chatllm ', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /canonical Host name/+ )+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', ' host-uid ')).rejects.toThrow(+ /live Host UID/+ )+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})it('posts to the default sentinel issuance path with bearer InternalControl JWT', async () => {@@ -88,20 +138,20 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- const result = await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', [+ const result = await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid', ['workflow:list','workflow:read','workflow:trigger',])- expect(result.accessToken).toBe('a.b.c')+ expect(result.accessToken).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/)expect(result.refreshToken).toBe('d.e.f')expect(result.mcpHostControlToken).toBe('g.h.i')expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]expect(url).toBe('http://control-api.test:8090/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/mcp-host/standalone/tokens')expect((init as RequestInit).body).toBe(- '{"includeMcpHostControlToken":true,"host":"chatllm","workflowControlScopes":["workflow:list","workflow:read","workflow:trigger"]}'+ '{"includeMcpHostControlToken":true,"host":"chatllm","hostUid":"host-uid","workflowControlScopes":["workflow:list","workflow:read","workflow:trigger"]}')const headers = (init as RequestInit).headers as Record<string, string>expect(headers['x-service-token']).toBeUndefined()@@ -116,21 +166,17 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {expect(claims.jti).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/)})- it('uses HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE when building the issuance URL', async () => {+ it('rejects a target namespace that differs from the live Host namespace', async () => {vi.resetModules()process.env.HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE = 'first-party-hosts'- globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({- ok: true,- json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse(),- } as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch+ const fetchMock = vi.fn()+ globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')-- const [url] = (globalThis.fetch as unknown as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls[0]- expect(url).toBe(- 'http://control-api.test:8090/api/v1/auth/mcp-host/first-party-hosts/standalone/tokens'+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /must equal CONTEXT_MAPPER_HOST_NAMESPACE/)+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})it('surfaces non-2xx responses with status code in the error message', async () => {@@ -141,7 +187,7 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {} as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(/HTTP 401/)+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(/HTTP 401/)})it('surfaces non-2xx responses without a response body', async () => {@@ -152,8 +198,8 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {} as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(- 'mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP 403 for host "chatllm"'+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ 'mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP 403')})@@ -167,8 +213,8 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {} as unknown as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(- 'mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP 500 for host "chatllm"'+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ 'mcpHost runtime token issuance failed: HTTP 500')})@@ -176,7 +222,7 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new DOMException('Aborted', 'AbortError'))const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(/timed out/)+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(/timed out/)})it('aborts hung issuance requests after the request timeout', async () => {@@ -189,20 +235,79 @@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient (HCC)', () => {}) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- const result = issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')+ const result = issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')const expectation = expect(result).rejects.toThrow(/timed out/)await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(10_000)await expectation})- it('rejects empty access/refresh in response body', async () => {+ it('rejects empty access/refresh/control JWTs in the response body', async () => {+ globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({+ ok: true,+ json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse('', '', ''),+ } as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch++ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /missing required fields/+ )+ })++ it('rejects non-positive or non-integer credential expiry fields', async () => {+ globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({+ ok: true,+ json: async () => ({+ ...canonicalIssueResponse(),+ expiresInSeconds: { access: 0, refresh: 3600, control: 600 },+ }),+ } as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch++ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /invalid expiry fields/+ )+ })++ it('rejects a cryptographically valid but differently bound access token', async () => {+ const mismatchedToken = validAccessToken('other-host', 'other-uid')+ globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({+ ok: true,+ json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse(mismatchedToken),+ } as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch++ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(+ /identity does not match/+ )+ })++ it('rejects a workflow-only access token from an incompatible issuer rollout', async () => {+ const workflowOnlyToken = jwt.sign(+ {+ sub: 'mcp-host/standalone',+ recipeNamespace: 'mcp-host',+ recipeName: 'standalone',+ hostRefs: ['chatllm'],+ host_uid: 'host-uid',+ scope: 'workflow:approval:request',+ workflowControlScopes: [],+ },+ keyPair.privateKey,+ {+ algorithm: 'RS256',+ issuer: 'control-api',+ audience: 'workflow-approvals',+ expiresIn: 300,+ jwtid: 'issuer-test-workflow-only',+ }+ )globalThis.fetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ok: true,- json: async () => ({ mcpHostAccessToken: '', mcpHostRefreshToken: '' }),+ json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse(workflowOnlyToken),} as Response) as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetchconst issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()- await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm')).rejects.toThrow(/missing required fields/)+ await expect(issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid')).rejects.toThrow(/unauthorized/)})})diff --git a/mcp-host/src/__tests__/main.mcpInitialization.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/__tests__/main.mcpInitialization.test.tsindex c90bad869..f2c3af1cf 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/__tests__/main.mcpInitialization.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/__tests__/main.mcpInitialization.test.ts@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'import {admitDevelopmentMcpServers,createCoalescedPollRunner,+ createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline,+ isMcpAuthorityStale,startContextMapperPolling,stopContextMapperPolling,} from '../main'@@ -88,14 +90,13 @@ describe('runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization', () => {effects.push('ready')return true}),- listServersByContext: vi.fn(async () => {+ listServersForHost: vi.fn(async () => {effects.push('snapshot')return []}),}await runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization({- contextRef: 'production',client,replaceFleet: async servers => {effects.push('replace')@@ -121,10 +122,9 @@ describe('runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization', () => {await expect(runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization({- contextRef: 'production',client: {healthCheck: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),- listServersByContext: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(discoveryError),+ listServersForHost: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(discoveryError),},replaceFleet,sleep: vi.fn(),@@ -170,10 +170,9 @@ describe('runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization', () => {)const initialization = runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization({- contextRef: 'production',client: {healthCheck: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),- listServersByContext: vi.fn(async () => {+ listServersForHost: vi.fn(async () => {discoveryStarted.resolve()return delayedDiscovery.promise}),@@ -203,12 +202,11 @@ describe('runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization', () => {const replaceFleet = vi.fn()const sleep = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)const healthCheck = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(false)- const listServersByContext = vi.fn()+ const listServersForHost = vi.fn()await expect(runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization({- contextRef: 'production',- client: { healthCheck, listServersByContext },+ client: { healthCheck, listServersForHost },replaceFleet,sleep,maxRetries: 2,@@ -217,7 +215,7 @@ describe('runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization', () => {expect(healthCheck).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)expect(sleep).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)- expect(listServersByContext).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(listServersForHost).not.toHaveBeenCalled()expect(replaceFleet).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})})@@ -525,16 +523,80 @@ describe('context-mapper polling lifecycle', () => {it('keeps exactly one interval producer when polling is started again', () => {vi.useFakeTimers()try {- startContextMapperPolling('first-context')+ startContextMapperPolling()expect(vi.getTimerCount()).toBe(1)- startContextMapperPolling('replacement-context')+ startContextMapperPolling()expect(vi.getTimerCount()).toBe(1)} finally {stopContextMapperPolling()vi.useRealTimers()}})++ it('bounds transient authority preservation to the configured staleness window', () => {+ expect(isMcpAuthorityStale(1_000, 60_999, 60_000)).toBe(false)+ expect(isMcpAuthorityStale(1_000, 61_000, 60_000)).toBe(true)+ expect(isMcpAuthorityStale(0, 1_000_000, 60_000)).toBe(false)+ expect(isMcpAuthorityStale(1_000, 61_000, 0)).toBe(false)+ })++ it('revokes at the absolute staleness deadline without waiting for another poll', () => {+ vi.useFakeTimers()+ vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-08-16T00:00:00.000Z'))+ try {+ const expired = vi.fn()+ const deadline = createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline(60_000, expired)++ deadline.recordSuccess()+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(59_999)+ expect(expired).not.toHaveBeenCalled()++ vi.advanceTimersByTime(1)+ expect(expired).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ } finally {+ vi.clearAllTimers()+ vi.useRealTimers()+ }+ })++ it('moves the absolute deadline forward only after a newer authoritative success', () => {+ vi.useFakeTimers()+ vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-08-16T00:00:00.000Z'))+ try {+ const expired = vi.fn()+ const deadline = createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline(60_000, expired)++ deadline.recordSuccess()+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(50_000)+ deadline.recordSuccess()+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(10_000)+ expect(expired).not.toHaveBeenCalled()++ vi.advanceTimersByTime(50_000)+ expect(expired).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ } finally {+ vi.clearAllTimers()+ vi.useRealTimers()+ }+ })++ it('cancels the absolute deadline when authority is withdrawn explicitly', () => {+ vi.useFakeTimers()+ try {+ const expired = vi.fn()+ const deadline = createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline(60_000, expired)++ deadline.recordSuccess()+ deadline.clear()+ vi.advanceTimersByTime(60_000)++ expect(expired).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ } finally {+ vi.clearAllTimers()+ vi.useRealTimers()+ }+ })})describe('replaceAuthoritativeMcpFleet', () => {@@ -1530,6 +1592,54 @@ describe('reconcileAuthoritativeMcpSnapshot', () => {expect(serverState.get(modified.name)).toBe(JSON.stringify(modified))})+ it('revokes the old bearer before admitting a changed credential revision', async () => {+ const previous = readyServer({+ auth: undefined,+ authRequired: true,+ credentialRevision: 'credential-revision-1',+ })+ const rotated = readyServer({+ auth: undefined,+ authRequired: true,+ credentialRevision: 'credential-revision-2',+ })+ const connected = new Set([previous.name])+ const effects: string[] = []+ const manager = {+ addServer: appliedAdmission(),+ replaceServer: appliedAdmission(async (_server, authToken) => {+ effects.push(`replace:${authToken}`)+ connected.add(rotated.name)+ }),+ removeServer: vi.fn(),+ detachServer: vi.fn((name: string) => {+ effects.push('detach')+ connected.delete(name)+ return vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)+ }),+ getConnectedServers: vi.fn(() => [...connected]),+ getKnownServers: vi.fn(() => [previous.name]),+ recordAdmissionFailure: vi.fn(),+ }+ const getAuthToken = vi.fn(async () => {+ effects.push('credential')+ return 'rotated-token'+ })+ const serverState = new Map([[previous.name, JSON.stringify(previous)]])++ await reconcileAuthoritativeMcpSnapshot({+ servers: [rotated],+ manager,+ serverState,+ getAuthToken,+ })++ expect(effects[0]).toBe('detach')+ expect(getAuthToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith(rotated.name, 'credential-revision-2')+ expect(effects).toEqual(['detach', 'credential', 'replace:rotated-token'])+ expect(serverState.get(rotated.name)).toBe(JSON.stringify(rotated))+ })+it('does not tear down a healthy connection for a status-only readiness degradation', async () => {const previous = readyServer()const degraded = readyServer({diff --git a/mcp-host/src/config.hccAuthority.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/config.hccAuthority.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..6b512225b--- /dev/null+++ b/mcp-host/src/config.hccAuthority.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'++const originalEnv = process.env++async function loadAuthorityMaxStaleness(value: string | undefined): Promise<number> {+ vi.resetModules()+ process.env = { ...originalEnv }+ if (value === undefined) {+ delete process.env.HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS+ } else {+ process.env.HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS = value+ }+ return (await import('./config')).config.hccAuthorityMaxStalenessMs+}++afterEach(() => {+ process.env = originalEnv+ vi.resetModules()+})++describe('HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS', () => {+ it('defaults to the 60-second authority ceiling', async () => {+ await expect(loadAuthorityMaxStaleness(undefined)).resolves.toBe(60_000)+ })++ it('allows an operator to fail closed sooner', async () => {+ await expect(loadAuthorityMaxStaleness('15000')).resolves.toBe(15_000)+ })++ it('cannot be configured beyond the 60-second authority ceiling', async () => {+ await expect(loadAuthorityMaxStaleness('120000')).resolves.toBe(60_000)+ })++ it('uses the safe ceiling for an invalid value', async () => {+ await expect(loadAuthorityMaxStaleness('not-a-duration')).resolves.toBe(60_000)+ })+})diff --git a/mcp-host/src/config.ts b/mcp-host/src/config.tsindex d918e2148..a597ed40f 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/config.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/config.ts@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ export interface Config {// Context Mapper poll interval in ms (for production mode)contextMapperPollInterval: number+ // Maximum time an already-published MCP fleet may survive without a fresh,+ // authenticated HCC inventory snapshot.+ hccAuthorityMaxStalenessMs: number+// MCP server health heartbeat interval in ms. mcp-host periodically// tools/list's each connected server to keep observedAt fresh and detect// silent failures. Must stay well under the desktop's 120s stale threshold.@@ -552,6 +556,14 @@ export const config: Config = {// Context Mapper poll interval (default 30 seconds)contextMapperPollInterval: parseInt(getEnv('CLERUM_CONTEXT_MAPPER_POLL_INTERVAL', '30000')!, 10),+ // Bound transient HCC/Kubernetes authority outages. Identity failures revoke+ // immediately; 5xx/transport failures may preserve the last good fleet only+ // within this finite window.+ hccAuthorityMaxStalenessMs: Math.min(+ getEnvNumber('HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS', 60_000),+ 60_000+ ),+// MCP status heartbeat. Defaults to 30 seconds so a single missed tick does// not trip desktop staleness.mcpStatusHeartbeatInterval: parseInt(diff --git a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.test.tsindex 61c78e97c..5f1077044 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.test.ts@@ -1,13 +1,56 @@import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'-import { ContextMapperClient } from './contextMapperClient'+import {+ type ContextMapperAuthentication,+ ContextMapperClient,+ ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError,+ ContextMapperRequestError,+ isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation,+ isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation,+} from './contextMapperClient'-describe('ContextMapperClient readiness and discovery', () => {+function authentication(overrides: Partial<ContextMapperAuthentication> = {}) {+ let accessToken = 'access-v1'+ const auth: ContextMapperAuthentication & { setAccessToken(token: string): void } = {+ getAccessToken: () => accessToken,+ refreshOnUnauthorized: vi.fn(async () => {+ accessToken = 'access-v2'+ }),+ onCallerAuthorizationFailure: vi.fn(),+ setAccessToken: token => {+ accessToken = token+ },+ ...overrides,+ }+ return auth+}++function authorizedServer(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {+ return {+ name: 'secured-server',+ description: 'Scoped server',+ transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', url: 'http://secured-server.test/mcp' },+ enabled: true,+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true },+ authRequired: true,+ credentialRevision: 'revision-1',+ ...overrides,+ }+}++function inventory(servers: unknown[] = [authorizedServer()]) {+ return {+ servers,+ timestamp: '2026-08-16T10:00:00.000Z',+ }+}++describe('ContextMapperClient Host-scoped v2 inventory', () => {afterEach(() => {vi.restoreAllMocks()vi.unstubAllGlobals()})- it('uses the readiness endpoint before treating inventory as authoritative', async () => {+ it('keeps readiness anonymous', async () => {const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 200 }))vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')@@ -19,199 +62,338 @@ describe('ContextMapperClient readiness and discovery', () => {)})- it('rejects an HTTP 503 during initial discovery instead of returning an empty fleet', async () => {- vi.stubGlobal(- 'fetch',- vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(- new Response(- JSON.stringify({- error: 'Service Unavailable',- message: 'Context mapper provider inventory is not authoritative',- }),- { status: 503, statusText: 'Service Unavailable' }- )- )+ it('uses the live Host bearer and v2 self route without a caller Context', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(JSON.stringify(inventory()), {+ status: 200,+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },+ }))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test/', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.listServersByContext('production')).rejects.toThrow(- 'HTTP 503: Service Unavailable'- )- })+ await expect(client.listServersForHost()).resolves.toEqual([authorizedServer()])- it('rejects a network failure during initial discovery instead of returning an empty fleet', async () => {- const networkError = new Error('connection reset')- vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(networkError))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')-- await expect(client.listServersByContext('production')).rejects.toBe(networkError)+ expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as [string, RequestInit]+ expect(url).toBe('http://context-mapper.test/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers')+ expect(url).not.toContain('/api/v1/')+ expect(url).not.toContain('/context/')+ expect((init.headers as Record<string, string>).Authorization).toBe('Bearer access-v1')})- it('accepts an HTTP 200 empty initial inventory as authoritative', async () => {+ it('preserves an optional bounded transport port from the v2 inventory', async () => {+ const server = authorizedServer({+ transport: {+ type: 'streamableHttp',+ url: 'http://secured-server.test/mcp',+ port: 3443,+ },+ })vi.stubGlobal('fetch',vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(- new Response(- JSON.stringify({- servers: [],- contextRef: 'production',- timestamp: '2026-07-29T10:00:00.000Z',- }),- { status: 200 }- )+ new Response(JSON.stringify(inventory([server])), {+ status: 200,+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },+ })))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.listServersByContext('production')).resolves.toEqual([])+ await expect(client.listServersForHost()).resolves.toEqual([server])})- it('does not convert a failed all-server request into an authoritative empty fleet', async () => {- const networkError = new Error('connection reset')- vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(networkError))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ it.each([0, -1, 1.5, 65_536, '3443', null])(+ 'rejects malformed v2 transport port %j',+ async port => {+ vi.stubGlobal(+ 'fetch',+ vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(+ JSON.stringify(+ inventory([+ authorizedServer({+ transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', port },+ }),+ ])+ ),+ { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } }+ )+ )+ )+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })++ await expect(client.listServersForHost()).rejects.toThrow(+ 'HCC inventory response contains an invalid transport port'+ )+ }+ )- await expect(client.listAllServers()).rejects.toBe(networkError)+ it('refreshes once on 401 and retries with the current shared access token', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi+ .fn()+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'unauthorized' }), { status: 401 })+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response(JSON.stringify(inventory()), { status: 200 }))+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ const auth = authentication()+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: auth,+ })++ await expect(client.pollServers()).resolves.toEqual(inventory())++ expect(auth.refreshOnUnauthorized).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ expect((fetchMock.mock.calls[0]![1]!.headers as Record<string, string>).Authorization).toBe(+ 'Bearer access-v1'+ )+ expect((fetchMock.mock.calls[1]![1]!.headers as Record<string, string>).Authorization).toBe(+ 'Bearer access-v2'+ )})- it('does not convert an unavailable controller into an authoritative empty fleet', async () => {- // The rejection case above never reaches the `!response.ok` branch, so a- // 503 from an unready controller was uncovered: swapping that throw for- // `return []` left the whole suite green while turning "I cannot tell you"- // into an authoritative "there are none".+ it('revokes caller authority after a persistent 401', async () => {vi.stubGlobal('fetch',vi.fn()- .mockResolvedValue(new Response('', { status: 503, statusText: 'Service Unavailable' }))+ .mockResolvedValue(new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'unauthorized' }), { status: 401 })))+ const auth = authentication()+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: auth,+ })++ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toMatchObject({+ status: 401,+ authorizationFailure: true,+ })+ expect(auth.refreshOnUnauthorized).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ expect(auth.onCallerAuthorizationFailure).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401)+ })++ it('revokes immediately on 403 without trying token refresh', async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 403 })))+ const auth = authentication()+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: auth,+ })++ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ContextMapperRequestError)+ expect(auth.refreshOnUnauthorized).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(auth.onCallerAuthorizationFailure).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403)+ })++ it('fails closed before transport when no Host bearer is configured', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn()+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')- await expect(client.listAllServers()).rejects.toThrow(/503/)+ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toMatchObject({+ status: 401,+ authorizationFailure: true,+ })+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})-})-describe('ContextMapperClient.pollServers', () => {- afterEach(() => {- vi.restoreAllMocks()- vi.unstubAllGlobals()+ it('revokes locally before transport when the live Host bearer is unavailable', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn()+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ const auth = authentication({ getAccessToken: () => '' })+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: auth,+ })++ await expect(client.getAuthToken('secured-server', 'revision-1')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ status: 401,+ kind: 'credential',+ authorizationFailure: true,+ })+ expect(auth.onCallerAuthorizationFailure).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401)+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})- it('rejects an HTTP 503 instead of fabricating an authoritative empty fleet', async () => {+ it('preserves an unavailable controller as a typed non-authoritative failure', async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 503 })))+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })++ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toMatchObject({+ status: 503,+ kind: 'inventory',+ authorizationFailure: false,+ })+ })++ it('classifies an opaque inventory 404 as complete Host authority revocation', async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 404 })))+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })++ const error = await client.pollServers().catch(cause => cause)++ expect(error).toMatchObject({ status: 404, kind: 'inventory' })+ expect(isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation(error)).toBe(true)+ expect(isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)).toBe(false)+ })++ it('rejects forbidden Context or Secret metadata in a successful inventory', async () => {vi.stubGlobal('fetch',vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(- JSON.stringify({- error: 'Service Unavailable',- message: 'Context mapper provider inventory is not authoritative',- }),- { status: 503, statusText: 'Service Unavailable' }+ JSON.stringify(+ inventory([+ authorizedServer({+ contextRef: 'foreign-context',+ auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'foreign-secret' },+ }),+ ])+ ),+ { status: 200 })))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.pollServers('production')).rejects.toThrow('HTTP 503: Service Unavailable')+ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toThrow(+ 'HCC inventory response contains forbidden authority metadata'+ )})- it('rejects a network failure instead of fabricating an authoritative empty fleet', async () => {- const networkError = new Error('connection reset')- vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(networkError))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ it('accepts an authenticated HTTP 200 empty inventory as authoritative', async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal(+ 'fetch',+ vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(JSON.stringify(inventory([])), { status: 200 }))+ )+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.pollServers('production')).rejects.toBe(networkError)+ await expect(client.pollServers()).resolves.toEqual(inventory([]))})- it('bounds a silent HCC request so authoritative polling cannot stall indefinitely', async () => {+ it('bounds a silent authenticated HCC request', async () => {vi.stubGlobal('fetch',vi.fn().mockImplementation((_url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {return new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {const signal = init?.signal- if (!signal) return- signal.addEventListener(+ signal?.addEventListener('abort',- () =>- reject(signal.reason ?? new DOMException('The operation was aborted', 'AbortError')),+ () => reject(signal.reason ?? new DOMException('aborted', 'AbortError')),{ once: true })})}))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', 10)-- await expect(client.pollServers('production')).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'TimeoutError' })- })-- it('accepts an HTTP 200 empty fleet as an authoritative deletion snapshot', async () => {- vi.stubGlobal(- 'fetch',- vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(- new Response(- JSON.stringify({- servers: [],- contextRef: 'production',- timestamp: '2026-07-29T10:00:00.000Z',- }),- { status: 200 }- )- )- )- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')-- await expect(client.pollServers('production')).resolves.toEqual({- servers: [],- timestamp: '2026-07-29T10:00:00.000Z',+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ requestTimeoutMs: 10,+ authentication: authentication(),})++ await expect(client.pollServers()).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'TimeoutError' })})})-describe('ContextMapperClient.getAuthToken', () => {+describe('ContextMapperClient scoped credential retrieval', () => {afterEach(() => {vi.restoreAllMocks()vi.unstubAllGlobals()})- it('rejects an HTTP failure instead of treating it as an unauthenticated server', async () => {- vi.stubGlobal(- 'fetch',- vi- .fn()- .mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 503, statusText: 'Service Unavailable' }))+ it('posts only the server selector and validates the inventory revision', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: 'upstream-token', credentialRevision: 'revision-1' }), {+ status: 200,+ }))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.getAuthToken('secured-server')).rejects.toThrow(- 'HTTP 503: Service Unavailable'+ await expect(client.getAuthToken('secured-server', 'revision-1')).resolves.toBe(+ 'upstream-token')- })- it('rejects a network failure instead of treating it as an unauthenticated server', async () => {- const networkError = new Error('connection reset')- vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(networkError))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')-- await expect(client.getAuthToken('secured-server')).rejects.toBe(networkError)+ const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as [string, RequestInit]+ expect(url).toBe('http://context-mapper.test/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential')+ expect(init.method).toBe('POST')+ expect(JSON.parse(String(init.body))).toEqual({ serverName: 'secured-server' })+ expect((init.headers as Record<string, string>).Authorization).toBe('Bearer access-v1')})- it('rejects an authoritative missing token for a server that requested auth', async () => {+ it('rejects a credential read whose post-read authority revision changed', async () => {vi.stubGlobal('fetch',- vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 404, statusText: 'Not Found' }))+ vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: 'discard-me', credentialRevision: 'revision-2' }), {+ status: 200,+ })+ ))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.getAuthToken('secured-server')).rejects.toThrow('HTTP 404: Not Found')+ const result = client.getAuthToken('secured-server', 'revision-1')+ const error = await result.catch(value => value)+ expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError)+ expect(isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)).toBe(true)})- it('retains HTTP 200 token:null as the explicit no-auth response', async () => {+ it('rejects a credential read without an inventory authority revision before transport', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn()+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })++ const error = await client.getAuthToken('secured-server').catch(cause => cause)++ expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError)+ expect(isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)).toBe(true)+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('retains token:null as the explicit allowed no-auth response', async () => {vi.stubGlobal('fetch',- vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: null }), { status: 200 }))+ vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: null, credentialRevision: 'revision-1' }), {+ status: 200,+ })+ ))- const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test')+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })++ await expect(client.getAuthToken('open-server', 'revision-1')).resolves.toBeUndefined()+ })++ it('classifies an opaque credential 404 as target authority revocation', async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 404 })))+ const client = new ContextMapperClient('http://context-mapper.test', {+ authentication: authentication(),+ })- await expect(client.getAuthToken('open-server')).resolves.toBeUndefined()+ const error = await client.getAuthToken('foreign-server', 'revision-1').catch(value => value)+ expect(error).toMatchObject({ status: 404, kind: 'credential' })+ expect(isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)).toBe(true)+ expect(String(error)).not.toContain('foreign-server')})})diff --git a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.tsindex 6aeefb5d0..9173dcafc 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/contextMapperClient.ts@@ -9,16 +9,163 @@ import { McpServerInfo } from './types'export interface McpServersResponse {servers: McpServerInfo[]- contextRef: stringtimestamp: string}export interface AuthTokenResponse {token: string | null- message?: string+ credentialRevision: string}const DEFAULT_CONTEXT_MAPPER_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000+const MCP_SERVER_NAME_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[-a-z0-9.]*[a-z0-9])?$/++export type ContextMapperRequestKind = 'inventory' | 'credential'++export class ContextMapperRequestError extends Error {+ constructor(+ readonly status: number,+ readonly kind: ContextMapperRequestKind,+ readonly authorizationFailure: boolean+ ) {+ super(+ authorizationFailure+ ? 'HCC caller authority was rejected'+ : `HCC ${kind} request failed with status ${status}`+ )+ this.name = 'ContextMapperRequestError'+ }+}++export class ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError extends Error {+ constructor() {+ super('HCC credential authority changed during retrieval')+ this.name = 'ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError'+ }+}++export function isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error: unknown): boolean {+ return (+ error instanceof ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError ||+ (error instanceof ContextMapperRequestError &&+ (error.authorizationFailure || (error.kind === 'credential' && error.status === 404)))+ )+}++/**+ * An inventory 404 means HCC could not resolve the authenticated Host's live+ * Context authority. Unlike a credential 404 (which retires one target), this+ * invalidates the complete locally-published MCP fleet.+ */+export function isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation(error: unknown): boolean {+ return (+ error instanceof ContextMapperRequestError && error.kind === 'inventory' && error.status === 404+ )+}++export interface ContextMapperAuthentication {+ getAccessToken(): string+ refreshOnUnauthorized(): Promise<void>+ onCallerAuthorizationFailure?(status: 401 | 403): void+}++export interface ContextMapperClientOptions {+ requestTimeoutMs?: number+ authentication?: ContextMapperAuthentication+}++function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {+ return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)+}++function decodeMcpServer(value: unknown): McpServerInfo {+ if (!isRecord(value)) throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ if ('contextRef' in value || 'auth' in value || 'secretRef' in value || 'secretKey' in value) {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains forbidden authority metadata')+ }+ if (typeof value.name !== 'string' || !MCP_SERVER_NAME_PATTERN.test(value.name)) {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains an invalid server selector')+ }+ if (!isRecord(value.transport)) throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ const transportType = value.transport.type+ if (!['sse', 'streamableHttp', 'stdio'].includes(String(transportType))) {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains an invalid transport')+ }+ const transportUrl = value.transport.url+ if (transportUrl !== undefined && typeof transportUrl !== 'string') {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains an invalid transport')+ }+ const transportPort = value.transport.port+ if (+ transportPort !== undefined &&+ (!Number.isSafeInteger(transportPort) ||+ (transportPort as number) < 1 ||+ (transportPort as number) > 65_535)+ ) {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains an invalid transport port')+ }+ if (typeof value.enabled !== 'boolean' || typeof value.authRequired !== 'boolean') {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ }+ if (!isRecord(value.status)) throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ if (typeof value.status.deployed !== 'boolean' || typeof value.status.ready !== 'boolean') {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ }+ if (+ value.credentialRevision !== undefined &&+ (typeof value.credentialRevision !== 'string' || !value.credentialRevision)+ ) {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response contains an invalid credential revision')+ }+ if (value.authRequired && typeof value.credentialRevision !== 'string') {+ throw new Error('HCC authenticated server is missing its credential revision')+ }++ return {+ name: value.name,+ ...(typeof value.description === 'string' ? { description: value.description } : {}),+ transport: {+ type: transportType as McpServerInfo['transport']['type'],+ ...(typeof transportUrl === 'string' ? { url: transportUrl } : {}),+ ...(typeof transportPort === 'number' ? { port: transportPort } : {}),+ },+ enabled: value.enabled,+ authRequired: value.authRequired,+ ...(typeof value.credentialRevision === 'string'+ ? { credentialRevision: value.credentialRevision }+ : {}),+ status: {+ deployed: value.status.deployed,+ ready: value.status.ready,+ ...(typeof value.status.authoritative === 'boolean'+ ? { authoritative: value.status.authoritative }+ : {}),+ },+ }+}++function decodeInventoryResponse(value: unknown): McpServersResponse {+ if (!isRecord(value) || !Array.isArray(value.servers) || typeof value.timestamp !== 'string') {+ throw new Error('HCC inventory response is malformed')+ }+ return { servers: value.servers.map(decodeMcpServer), timestamp: value.timestamp }+}++function decodeCredentialResponse(value: unknown): AuthTokenResponse {+ if (!isRecord(value)) throw new Error('HCC credential response is malformed')+ const keys = Object.keys(value).sort()+ if (+ keys.length !== 2 ||+ keys[0] !== 'credentialRevision' ||+ keys[1] !== 'token' ||+ (value.token !== null && typeof value.token !== 'string') ||+ typeof value.credentialRevision !== 'string' ||+ !value.credentialRevision+ ) {+ throw new Error('HCC credential response is malformed')+ }+ return { token: value.token as string | null, credentialRevision: value.credentialRevision }+}/*** Context Mapper client.@@ -26,97 +173,132 @@ const DEFAULT_CONTEXT_MAPPER_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000export class ContextMapperClient {private baseUrl: stringprivate requestTimeoutMs: number+ private authentication?: ContextMapperAuthentication- constructor(baseUrl: string, requestTimeoutMs = DEFAULT_CONTEXT_MAPPER_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS) {+ constructor(+ baseUrl: string,+ options: number | ContextMapperClientOptions = DEFAULT_CONTEXT_MAPPER_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS+ ) {this.baseUrl = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, '') // Remove trailing slash- this.requestTimeoutMs = requestTimeoutMs+ this.requestTimeoutMs =+ typeof options === 'number'+ ? options+ : (options.requestTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_CONTEXT_MAPPER_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)+ this.authentication = typeof options === 'number' ? undefined : options.authentication}- private fetch(input: string): Promise<Response> {+ private fetch(input: string, init: RequestInit = {}): Promise<Response> {return fetch(input, {+ ...init,signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.requestTimeoutMs),})}- /**- * Health check.- */- async healthCheck(): Promise<boolean> {+ private accessToken(kind: ContextMapperRequestKind): string {+ let token = ''try {- const response = await this.fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/ready`)- return response.ok- } catch (error) {- console.error('[ContextMapper] Health check failed:', error)- return false+ token = this.authentication?.getAccessToken().trim() ?? ''+ } catch {+ // Treat an unreadable local credential exactly like an HCC rejection:+ // revoke any already-published fleet before returning to the caller.}+ if (!token) {+ this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(401)+ throw new ContextMapperRequestError(401, kind, true)+ }+ return token}- /**- * List all McpServers.- * Rejects transport and HTTP failures so a future caller cannot confuse an- * unavailable controller with an authoritative empty fleet.- */- async listAllServers(): Promise<McpServerInfo[]> {- console.log('[ContextMapper] Fetching all McpServers')+ private async protectedFetch(+ path: string,+ kind: ContextMapperRequestKind,+ init: RequestInit = {}+ ): Promise<Response> {+ let retriedAfterRefresh = false+ for (;;) {+ const response = await this.fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {+ ...init,+ headers: {+ Accept: 'application/json',+ ...init.headers,+ Authorization: `Bearer ${this.accessToken(kind)}`,+ },+ })- const response = await this.fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/api/v1/mcpservers`)+ if (response.status === 401 && !retriedAfterRefresh && this.authentication) {+ retriedAfterRefresh = true+ try {+ await this.authentication.refreshOnUnauthorized()+ } catch {+ this.authentication.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(401)+ throw new ContextMapperRequestError(401, kind, true)+ }+ continue+ }- if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`)+ if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {+ this.authentication?.onCallerAuthorizationFailure?.(response.status)+ throw new ContextMapperRequestError(response.status, kind, true)+ }+ if (!response.ok) {+ throw new ContextMapperRequestError(response.status, kind, false)+ }+ return response}-- const data = (await response.json()) as McpServersResponse- console.log(`[ContextMapper] Found ${data.servers.length} McpServer(s)`)- return data.servers}/**- * List McpServers by contextRef.- * Rejects unavailable or invalid responses so callers cannot confuse a- * failed discovery request with an authoritative empty inventory.+ * Health check.*/- async listServersByContext(contextRef: string): Promise<McpServerInfo[]> {- console.log(`[ContextMapper] Fetching McpServers for context: ${contextRef}`)-- const response = await this.fetch(- `${this.baseUrl}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/${encodeURIComponent(contextRef)}`- )-- if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`)+ async healthCheck(): Promise<boolean> {+ try {+ const response = await this.fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/ready`)+ return response.ok+ } catch {+ console.error('[ContextMapper] Health check failed (reason=transport)')+ return false}+ }- const data = (await response.json()) as McpServersResponse- console.log(- `[ContextMapper] Found ${data.servers.length} McpServer(s) for context ${contextRef}`- )- console.log(`[ContextMapper] Response:`, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2))+ /**+ * List only the McpServers authorized for the authenticated Host. The old+ * global/context-selecting v1 routes are intentionally not represented by+ * this client.+ */+ async listServersForHost(): Promise<McpServerInfo[]> {+ const response = await this.protectedFetch('/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers', 'inventory')+ const data = decodeInventoryResponse(await response.json())+ console.log(`[ContextMapper] Received ${data.servers.length} authorized MCP server(s)`)return data.servers}/*** Get auth token for an McpServer.*/- async getAuthToken(serverName: string): Promise<string | undefined> {- console.log(`[ContextMapper] Fetching auth token for server: ${serverName}`)-- const response = await this.fetch(- `${this.baseUrl}/api/v1/mcpservers/${encodeURIComponent(serverName)}/auth`- )-- if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`)+ async getAuthToken(+ serverName: string,+ expectedCredentialRevision?: string+ ): Promise<string | undefined> {+ if (!expectedCredentialRevision) {+ throw new ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError()}-- const data = (await response.json()) as AuthTokenResponse-- if (data.token) {- console.log(`[ContextMapper] Found auth token for server: ${serverName}`)- return data.token+ const response = await this.protectedFetch(+ '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential',+ 'credential',+ {+ method: 'POST',+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },+ body: JSON.stringify({ serverName }),+ }+ )+ const data = decodeCredentialResponse(await response.json())+ if (+ expectedCredentialRevision !== undefined &&+ data.credentialRevision !== expectedCredentialRevision+ ) {+ throw new ContextMapperCredentialRevisionError()}-- console.log(`[ContextMapper] No auth token for server: ${serverName}`)- return undefined+ return data.token ?? undefined}/**@@ -125,16 +307,9 @@ export class ContextMapperClient {* so callers preserve their last known fleet instead of treating an* unavailable controller as an authoritative empty inventory.*/- async pollServers(contextRef: string): Promise<{ servers: McpServerInfo[]; timestamp: string }> {- const response = await this.fetch(- `${this.baseUrl}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/${encodeURIComponent(contextRef)}`- )-- if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}`)- }-- const data = (await response.json()) as McpServersResponse+ async pollServers(): Promise<{ servers: McpServerInfo[]; timestamp: string }> {+ const response = await this.protectedFetch('/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers', 'inventory')+ const data = decodeInventoryResponse(await response.json())return { servers: data.servers, timestamp: data.timestamp }}}@@ -142,9 +317,11 @@ export class ContextMapperClient {// Default client instance (configured from environment)let defaultClient: ContextMapperClient | null = null-export function getContextMapperClient(): ContextMapperClient {+export function getContextMapperClient(+ authentication: ContextMapperAuthentication+): ContextMapperClient {if (!defaultClient) {- defaultClient = new ContextMapperClient(config.contextMapperUrl)+ defaultClient = new ContextMapperClient(config.contextMapperUrl, { authentication })}return defaultClient}diff --git a/mcp-host/src/main.ts b/mcp-host/src/main.tsindex da9e3a5ed..8fa84d964 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/main.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/main.ts@@ -32,7 +32,12 @@ import {projectModels,resolveSessionModel,} from './config/modelResolution'-import { ContextMapperClient, getContextMapperClient } from './contextMapperClient'+import {+ ContextMapperClient,+ ContextMapperRequestError,+ getContextMapperClient,+ isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation,+} from './contextMapperClient'import {type ConversationStoreHandle,SqliteColdStartLoader,@@ -171,6 +176,7 @@ let lastServerState: Map<string, string> = new Map()let rpcServer: RPCServer | null = nulllet mcpManager: McpManager | null = nulllet contextMapperClient: ContextMapperClient | null = null+let mcpAuthorityLastSuccessAt = 0let activityHub: HostActivityHub | null = nulllet workspaceProvider: ScopedWorkspaceProvider | null = nulllet spilloverStorage: SpilloverStorage | null = null@@ -777,8 +783,126 @@ export async function admitDevelopmentMcpServers(}}-async function initializeMcpServers(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {- console.log(`[Main] Initializing MCP servers for context: ${contextRef}`)+function ensureAuthenticatedContextMapperClient(): ContextMapperClient {+ if (contextMapperClient) return contextMapperClient+ if (!runtimeAuth) runtimeAuth = createMcpHostRuntimeAuth()+ if (!runtimeAuth) {+ throw new Error('MCP Host runtime authentication is required for HCC inventory')+ }+ const auth = runtimeAuth+ contextMapperClient = getContextMapperClient({+ getAccessToken: () => auth.accessToken,+ refreshOnUnauthorized: () => refreshWithRecovery(auth),+ onCallerAuthorizationFailure: status => revokeMcpAuthority(`caller_${status}`, true),+ })+ return contextMapperClient+}++export function isMcpAuthorityStale(+ lastSuccessAt: number,+ now: number,+ maxStalenessMs: number+): boolean {+ return (+ lastSuccessAt > 0 &&+ Number.isFinite(now) &&+ Number.isFinite(maxStalenessMs) &&+ maxStalenessMs > 0 &&+ now - lastSuccessAt >= maxStalenessMs+ )+}++/**+ * Arm an absolute authority deadline from the last successful HCC snapshot.+ * The independent timeout prevents a slow or failed polling cadence from+ * extending retained authority beyond the configured staleness ceiling.+ */+export function createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline(+ maxStalenessMs: number,+ onExpired: () => void,+ now: () => number = Date.now+): { recordSuccess(successAt?: number): void; clear(): void } {+ let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null+ let deadlineAt = 0++ const clear = (): void => {+ if (timer !== null) clearTimeout(timer)+ timer = null+ deadlineAt = 0+ }++ const schedule = (): void => {+ const remaining = deadlineAt - now()+ timer = setTimeout(+ () => {+ timer = null+ if (now() < deadlineAt) {+ schedule()+ return+ }+ deadlineAt = 0+ onExpired()+ },+ Math.max(0, remaining)+ )+ }++ return {+ recordSuccess: (successAt = now()) => {+ clear()+ if (!Number.isFinite(successAt) || !Number.isFinite(maxStalenessMs) || maxStalenessMs <= 0) {+ return+ }+ deadlineAt = successAt + maxStalenessMs+ schedule()+ },+ clear,+ }+}++const mcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline = createMcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline(+ config.hccAuthorityMaxStalenessMs,+ () => {+ if (!isShuttingDown && !config.devMode && mcpManager) {+ revokeMcpAuthority('authority_stale_deadline', true)+ }+ }+)++function recordMcpAuthoritySuccess(successAt: number = Date.now()): void {+ mcpAuthorityLastSuccessAt = successAt+ if (!config.devMode) mcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline.recordSuccess(successAt)+}++/**+ * Revoke the complete locally-published MCP authority before awaiting any+ * transport cleanup. A fresh poller may recover later with a newly verified+ * Host JWT and live Host -> Context grant snapshot.+ */+function revokeMcpAuthority(reason: string, restartPolling: boolean): void {+ mcpInitializationGeneration += 1+ stopContextMapperPolling()+ mcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline.clear()+ const closingManager = mcpManager+ mcpManager = null+ lastServerState = new Map()+ mcpAuthorityLastSuccessAt = 0++ if (closingManager) {+ mcpFleetCoordinator.closeManager(closingManager)+ void closingManager+ .close(cleanup => mcpFleetCoordinator.scheduleCleanup(cleanup))+ .catch(() => console.error(`[Main] MCP authority cleanup failed (reason=${reason})`))+ }+ console.warn(`[Main] MCP authority revoked (reason=${reason})`)++ if (restartPolling && !isShuttingDown && !config.devMode) {+ startContextMapperPolling()+ }+}++async function initializeMcpServers(): Promise<void> {+ console.log('[Main] Initializing authenticated MCP server inventory')const initializationGeneration = ++mcpInitializationGenerationconst isInitializationCurrent = (): boolean =>!isShuttingDown && mcpInitializationGeneration === initializationGeneration@@ -789,19 +913,17 @@ async function initializeMcpServers(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {servers,previousManager,createManager: () => new McpManager(config.mcpProxyEnabled ? config.mcpProxyUrl : undefined),- getAuthToken: async serverName => {- if (!contextMapperClient) {- throw new Error('Context Mapper client is required to fetch MCP server auth')- }- return contextMapperClient.getAuthToken(serverName)+ getAuthToken: async (serverName, expectedRevision) => {+ return ensureAuthenticatedContextMapperClient().getAuthToken(serverName, expectedRevision)},installFleet: (nextManager, nextServerState) => {mcpManager = nextManagerlastServerState = nextServerState+ recordMcpAuthoritySuccess()agent?.setMcpManager(nextManager)},coordinator: mcpFleetCoordinator,- onColdStartPublished: () => ensureContextMapperPolling(contextRef),+ onColdStartPublished: () => ensureContextMapperPolling(),isPreviousManagerCurrent: () => mcpManager === previousManager,isFleetLifecycleCurrent: isInitializationCurrent,})@@ -810,13 +932,10 @@ async function initializeMcpServers(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {// In production mode, fetch an authoritative snapshot before replacing the// current fleet. An unavailable Context Mapper leaves the prior state intact.if (!config.devMode) {- if (!contextMapperClient) {- contextMapperClient = getContextMapperClient()- }+ const client = ensureAuthenticatedContextMapperClient()await runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization({- contextRef,- client: contextMapperClient,+ client,replaceFleet,isCurrent: isInitializationCurrent,})@@ -850,7 +969,7 @@ async function initializeMcpServers(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {/*** Poll context-mapper for McpServer changes.*/-async function pollContextMapper(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {+async function pollContextMapper(): Promise<void> {if (!contextMapperClient) returntry {@@ -858,13 +977,13 @@ async function pollContextMapper(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {// Retry the authoritative initialization instead of declaring an empty// fleet or permanently no-oping every reconciliation tick.if (!mcpManager) {- await initializeMcpServers(contextRef)+ await initializeMcpServers()return}const manager = mcpManagerawait pollAuthoritativeMcpSnapshotIfCurrent({- poll: () => contextMapperClient!.pollServers(contextRef),+ poll: () => contextMapperClient!.pollServers(),// A delayed fetch may resolve after shutdown or after a manager swap.// Never publish that stale snapshot into a closed/retired manager.isCurrent: () => !isShuttingDown && mcpManager === manager,@@ -873,12 +992,32 @@ async function pollContextMapper(contextRef: string): Promise<void> {servers,manager,serverState: lastServerState,- getAuthToken: serverName => contextMapperClient!.getAuthToken(serverName),+ getAuthToken: (serverName, expectedRevision) =>+ contextMapperClient!.getAuthToken(serverName, expectedRevision),coordinator: mcpFleetCoordinator,}),})+ if (!isShuttingDown && mcpManager === manager) {+ recordMcpAuthoritySuccess()+ }} catch (error) {- console.error('[Main] Error polling skill-mapper:', error)+ if (error instanceof ContextMapperRequestError && error.authorizationFailure) {+ // ContextMapperClient already revoked synchronously through its callback.+ console.warn('[Main] HCC poll rejected caller authority')+ return+ }+ if (isContextMapperInventoryAuthorityRevocation(error)) {+ revokeMcpAuthority('inventory_not_found', true)+ console.warn('[Main] HCC inventory no longer resolves live Host authority')+ return+ }+ console.error('[Main] HCC authority poll failed (reason=unavailable)')+ if (+ mcpManager &&+ isMcpAuthorityStale(mcpAuthorityLastSuccessAt, Date.now(), config.hccAuthorityMaxStalenessMs)+ ) {+ revokeMcpAuthority('authority_stale', true)+ }}}@@ -928,7 +1067,7 @@ export function createCoalescedPollRunner(poll: () => Promise<void>): {/*** Start polling context-mapper for McpServer changes.*/-export function startContextMapperPolling(contextRef: string): void {+export function startContextMapperPolling(): void {if (isShuttingDown) return// Re-entry replaces the complete producer/runner pair. Stopping only the// runner would leave the previous interval dispatching into the new runner.@@ -938,15 +1077,15 @@ export function startContextMapperPolling(contextRef: string): void {`[Main] Starting context-mapper polling (interval: ${config.contextMapperPollInterval}ms)`)- contextMapperPollRunner = createCoalescedPollRunner(() => pollContextMapper(contextRef))+ contextMapperPollRunner = createCoalescedPollRunner(() => pollContextMapper())contextMapperPollTimer = setInterval(() => {contextMapperPollRunner?.trigger()}, config.contextMapperPollInterval)}-export function ensureContextMapperPolling(contextRef: string): void {+export function ensureContextMapperPolling(): void {if (isShuttingDown || (contextMapperPollTimer && contextMapperPollRunner)) return- startContextMapperPolling(contextRef)+ startContextMapperPolling()}/**@@ -993,9 +1132,23 @@ function stopMcpStatusHeartbeat(): void {async function onHostChange(host: HostCRD): Promise<void> {console.log(`[Main] Host configuration changed: ${host.name}`)+ const contextChanged =+ currentHost !== null && currentHost.spec.contextRef !== host.spec.contextRefconst providerChanged = currentHost?.spec.model?.provider !== host.spec.model?.providerconst secretRefChanged = currentHost?.spec.secretRef !== host.spec.secretRefconst modelChanged = currentHost?.spec.model?.name !== host.spec.model?.name++ if (contextChanged) {+ // The old Context's authority must disappear before any asynchronous Host+ // reconciliation. HCC derives the new Context from the authenticated Host,+ // so discovery can restart independently while provider state catches up.+ revokeMcpAuthority('context_changed', false)+ startMcpInitializationInBackground({+ initialize: () => initializeMcpServers(),+ afterInitialAttempt: () => ensureContextMapperPolling(),+ })+ }+// R5 — refresh the failover policy BEFORE (re)building the ConfigStore so the// fallback credential slots are loaded. A policy change that alters which// Secret slots are needed forces a ConfigStore rebuild even if provider/@@ -1050,6 +1203,7 @@ async function onHostChange(host: HostCRD): Promise<void> {*/function onHostDelete(): void {console.log('[Main] Host CRD deleted, shutting down')+ revokeMcpAuthority('host_deleted', false)currentHost = nullcurrentProvider = nullprocess.exit(1)@@ -2516,6 +2670,7 @@ async function shutdown(signal: string): Promise<void> {hostWatcher?.stop()configStore?.stop()stopContextMapperPolling()+ mcpAuthorityStalenessDeadline.clear()stopMcpStatusHeartbeat()statelessHeartbeat?.stop()@@ -2668,8 +2823,6 @@ async function startProductionMode(): Promise<void> {console.log(`[Main] Namespace: ${config.namespace}`)console.log(`[Main] Context Mapper URL: ${config.contextMapperUrl}`)- contextMapperClient = getContextMapperClient()-const host = await getHost(config.hostName)if (!host) {@@ -2710,8 +2863,8 @@ async function startProductionMode(): Promise<void> {// A failed initial attempt is logged loudly; the context-mapper poll then// reconciles the catalog (the platform tolerates the 'connecting' sweep).startMcpInitializationInBackground({- initialize: () => initializeMcpServers(host.spec.contextRef),- afterInitialAttempt: () => ensureContextMapperPolling(host.spec.contextRef),+ initialize: () => initializeMcpServers(),+ afterInitialAttempt: () => ensureContextMapperPolling(),})console.log(`[Main] Approval system: ${config.enableApproval ? 'ENABLED' : 'DISABLED'}`)diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorizationRevocation.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorizationRevocation.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..77e52e830--- /dev/null+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/authorizationRevocation.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import type { McpServerInfo } from '../../types'+import { McpClient } from '../client'++const server: McpServerInfo = {+ name: 'scoped-server',+ transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', url: 'http://scoped-server.test/mcp' },+ enabled: true,+ authRequired: true,+ credentialRevision: 'credential-revision-1',+ status: { deployed: true, ready: true },+}++describe('MCP credential revocation', () => {+ it('wipes the retained bearer synchronously when a client is retired', async () => {+ const client = new McpClient(server, 'sensitive-upstream-bearer')++ const cleanup = client.retire()++ expect((client as unknown as { authToken?: string }).authToken).toBeUndefined()+ await expect(cleanup()).resolves.toBeUndefined()+ })+})diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/authoritativeFleet.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/authoritativeFleet.tsindex 523fc60d5..cbb351a8f 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/authoritativeFleet.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/authoritativeFleet.ts@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@-import type { ContextMapperClient } from '../contextMapperClient'+import {+ type ContextMapperClient,+ isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation,+} from '../contextMapperClient'import type { McpServerInfo } from '../types'import type { McpAdmissionControl, McpAdmissionOutcome } from './manager'@@ -6,8 +9,7 @@ import type { McpAdmissionControl, McpAdmissionOutcome } from './manager'* Initialize MCP servers for the host's context using skill-mapper.*/export async function runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization(options: {- contextRef: string- client: Pick<ContextMapperClient, 'healthCheck' | 'listServersByContext'>+ client: Pick<ContextMapperClient, 'healthCheck' | 'listServersForHost'>replaceFleet: (servers: McpServerInfo[]) => Promise<void>isCurrent?: () => booleansleep?: (milliseconds: number) => Promise<void>@@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ export async function runAuthoritativeMcpInitialization(options: {const ready = await options.client.healthCheck()if (options.isCurrent?.() === false) returnif (ready) {- const servers = await options.client.listServersByContext(options.contextRef)+ const servers = await options.client.listServersForHost()if (options.isCurrent?.() === false) returnawait options.replaceFleet(servers)return@@ -461,20 +463,23 @@ async function runMcpFleetEffects<T>(async function resolveRequiredMcpAuthToken(server: McpServerInfo,- getAuthToken: (serverName: string) => Promise<string | undefined>+ getAuthToken: (+ serverName: string,+ expectedCredentialRevision?: string+ ) => Promise<string | undefined>): Promise<string | undefined> {if (!server.enabled ||!server.status?.ready ||server.status.authoritative === false ||- !server.auth?.secretRef+ (server.authRequired !== true && !server.auth?.secretRef)) {return undefined}- const authToken = await getAuthToken(server.name)+ const authToken = await getAuthToken(server.name, server.credentialRevision)if (!authToken) {- throw new Error(`Required auth token is unavailable for MCP server ${server.name}`)+ throw new Error('Required MCP credential is unavailable')}return authToken}@@ -493,7 +498,10 @@ export async function replaceAuthoritativeMcpFleet<servers: McpServerInfo[]previousManager: { disconnectAll(): Promise<void> } | nullcreateManager: () => TManager- getAuthToken: (serverName: string) => Promise<string | undefined>+ getAuthToken: (+ serverName: string,+ expectedCredentialRevision?: string+ ) => Promise<string | undefined>installFleet: (manager: TManager, serverState: Map<string, string>) => voidmaxConcurrency?: numbercoordinator?: AuthoritativeMcpFleetCoordinator@@ -542,7 +550,11 @@ export async function replaceAuthoritativeMcpFleet<// Auth discovery fails before addServer can own the status transition.nextManager.recordAdmissionFailure(server, error)admissionFailures.push(error)- console.error(`[Main] MCP server admission failed; will retry: ${server.name}`, error)+ if (isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)) {+ console.error('[Main] MCP credential admission rejected (reason=authority_revoked)')+ } else {+ console.error(`[Main] MCP server admission failed; will retry: ${server.name}`, error)+ }return}@@ -670,7 +682,10 @@ export async function reconcileAuthoritativeMcpSnapshot(options: {servers: McpServerInfo[]manager: AuthoritativeMcpSnapshotManagerserverState: Map<string, string>- getAuthToken: (serverName: string) => Promise<string | undefined>+ getAuthToken: (+ serverName: string,+ expectedCredentialRevision?: string+ ) => Promise<string | undefined>maxConcurrency?: numbercoordinator?: AuthoritativeMcpFleetCoordinator}): Promise<void> {@@ -708,9 +723,18 @@ export async function reconcileAuthoritativeMcpSnapshot(options: {previousState !== undefined &&mcpServerDesiredRevision(JSON.parse(previousState) as McpServerInfo) !==mcpServerDesiredRevision(server)+ const previousCredentialRevision =+ previousState !== undefined+ ? (JSON.parse(previousState) as McpServerInfo).credentialRevision+ : undefined+ const credentialAuthorityChanged =+ previousState !== undefined &&+ previousCredentialRevision !== server.credentialRevision &&+ (previousCredentialRevision !== undefined || server.credentialRevision !== undefined)const revokesLiveConnection =connectedNames.has(server.name) &&(!server.enabled ||+ credentialAuthorityChanged ||(server.status?.authoritative !== false && server.status?.ready === false) ||(server.status?.authoritative === false && desiredChanged))if (revokesLiveConnection && lease.isCurrent(server.name)) {@@ -726,6 +750,14 @@ export async function reconcileAuthoritativeMcpSnapshot(options: {try {return await resolveRequiredMcpAuthToken(server, options.getAuthToken)} catch (error) {+ if (isCurrent() && isContextMapperAuthorityRevocation(error)) {+ if (options.manager.detachServer) {+ coordinator.scheduleCleanup(options.manager.detachServer(server.name))+ } else if (connectedNames.has(server.name)) {+ await options.manager.removeServer(server.name)+ }+ options.serverState.delete(server.name)+ }// Auth discovery fails before manager admission. Preserve a live// connection's status during replacement; otherwise publish the// admission failure exactly once.diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/client.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/client.tsindex febe8b8e4..8b5be15f8 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/client.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/client.ts@@ -361,6 +361,10 @@ export class McpClient {*/retire(): () => Promise<void> {this.retired = true+ // The credential is no longer authoritative once this client is detached.+ // Clear the retained value synchronously before asynchronous transport+ // cleanup so a retired object cannot keep the old bearer alive in memory.+ this.authToken = undefinedthis.retirementController.abort(this.lifecycleError('closed'))return this.detachConnection()}diff --git a/mcp-host/src/types.ts b/mcp-host/src/types.tsindex b4642196e..0e5cbb6c6 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/types.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/types.ts@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ export type ApiKeys = Partial<Record<LlmProvider, ProviderCredentials>>export interface McpServerTransport {type: 'sse' | 'streamableHttp' | 'stdio'url?: string+ port?: number}/**@@ -167,9 +168,22 @@ export interface McpServerStatus {export interface McpServerInfo {name: stringdescription?: string- contextRef: string+ /**+ * Present only for development/legacy in-process configuration. The HCC v2+ * Host inventory deliberately omits Context identity: HCC derives it from+ * the authenticated Host JWT and never returns it to the caller.+ */+ contextRef?: stringtransport: McpServerTransport+ /** Legacy development shape. HCC v2 returns only authRequired. */auth?: McpServerAuth+ /** Whether the scoped HCC credential route must return a bearer. */+ authRequired?: boolean+ /**+ * Opaque HCC authority revision. It changes when the authorized server,+ * auth selector, or referenced Secret identity/resourceVersion changes.+ */+ credentialRevision?: stringenabled: booleanstatus: McpServerStatus}diff --git a/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-runtime.sh b/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-runtime.shindex b3f7c03fe..ecd36d279 100755--- a/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-runtime.sh+++ b/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-runtime.sh@@ -115,6 +115,56 @@ assert_workflow_gateway_prompt_bridge_finalization_route() {log "Workflow gateway serves the SDK promptBridge finalization route"}+# The HCC gateway also mounts nginx.conf through a subPath. NP-08 gates must+# prove every active pod serves only the caller-bound v2 Host routes while the+# two caller-selected legacy Host routes are local tombstones. The global v1+# inventory remains temporarily for the retained mcp-proxy poller (PR 2).+assert_hcc_gateway_np08_routes() {+ local deployment="host-context-controller-api-gateway"+ local namespace="control-plane"+ local candidate deletion ready rendered pod_count=0++ if ! ${KC} get deployment "${deployment}" -n "${namespace}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ log "ERROR: ${namespace}/${deployment} is absent; refusing NP-08 gate"+ return 1+ fi++ while IFS= read -r candidate; do+ [[ -z "${candidate}" ]] && continue+ deletion="$(${KC} get pod "${candidate}" -n "${namespace}" \+ -o jsonpath='{.metadata.deletionTimestamp}' 2>/dev/null || true)"+ [[ -n "${deletion}" ]] && continue+ ready="$(${KC} get pod "${candidate}" -n "${namespace}" \+ -o jsonpath='{.status.containerStatuses[?(@.name=="nginx")].ready}' 2>/dev/null || true)"+ [[ "${ready}" == "true" ]] || continue+ pod_count=$((pod_count + 1))+ rendered="$(${KC} exec -n "${namespace}" "${candidate}" -c nginx -- nginx -T 2>&1)" || {+ log "ERROR: could not inspect active ${namespace}/${candidate}; refusing NP-08 gate"+ return 1+ }+ if ! grep -Fq 'location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers {' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential {' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/[^/]+$ {' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'access_log /dev/stdout hcc_gateway_json;' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'add_header Cache-Control "no-store, private" always;' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ ! grep -Fq 'add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;' <<<"${rendered}" ||+ [[ "$(grep -Fc "return 410 '{\"error\":\"gone\"}';" <<<"${rendered}")" -lt 2 ]]; then+ log "ERROR: active ${namespace}/${candidate} lacks the NP-08 gateway contract"+ return 1+ fi+ done < <(${KC} get pods -n "${namespace}" -l app="${deployment}" \+ --field-selector=status.phase=Running -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.name}{"\n"}{end}' 2>/dev/null || true)++ if [[ "${pod_count}" == "0" ]]; then+ log "ERROR: ${namespace}/${deployment} has no Ready non-terminating pod; refusing NP-08 gate"+ return 1+ fi+ log "HCC gateway serves caller-bound NP-08 routes"+}+gate_needs_registry() {[[ "${GATE_NAME}" == *registry* || "${GATE_NAME}" == *marketplace* || "${GATE_NAME}" == *plugin-workload-sdk* ]]}diff --git a/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-sync.sh b/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-sync.shindex 8615b9fff..b8e38cbf5 100755--- a/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-sync.sh+++ b/scripts/minikube/pre-gate-sync.sh@@ -534,17 +534,19 @@ if [[ "${cluster_changed}" == "true" ]]; thenensure_evenfire_registryincremental_restart_targets- # nginx.conf is mounted through a subPath. Kubernetes updates the- # ConfigMap object but does not refresh that file in an already-running pod,- # so a full deployment sync must roll the gateway before any SDK probe uses- # the new route set.+ # Both nginx gateway configs are mounted through subPath. Kubernetes updates+ # the ConfigMaps but not the files in existing pods, so a deployment sync+ # must roll both before any SDK or NP-08 runtime assertion.if [[ "${INCREMENTAL_FULL_DEPLOYMENT}" == "true" ||"${FORCE_RESTART}" == "true" ]]; thenrollout_restart_with_retry control-plane nginx-workflow-approval-gatewayrollout_if_present control-plane nginx-workflow-approval-gateway+ rollout_restart_with_retry control-plane host-context-controller-api-gateway+ rollout_if_present control-plane host-context-controller-api-gatewayfiassert_workflow_gateway_prompt_bridge_finalization_route+ assert_hcc_gateway_np08_routesrollout_if_present control-plane host-context-controllerrollout_if_present control-plane workflow-recipes@@ -578,5 +580,7 @@ elseensure_evenfire_registryrollout_if_present control-plane nginx-workflow-approval-gatewayassert_workflow_gateway_prompt_bridge_finalization_route+ rollout_if_present control-plane host-context-controller-api-gateway+ assert_hcc_gateway_np08_routes${KC} get deploy -A --no-headers 2>/dev/null | grep -v kube-system || truefidiff --git a/scripts/security/run-np08-synthetic-gate.sh b/scripts/security/run-np08-synthetic-gate.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..76c4e9999--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/security/run-np08-synthetic-gate.sh@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++# Synthetic NP-08 gate. It performs no Kubernetes writes, never reads a Secret,+# and only runs the repository-owned authorization unit suite after checking an+# explicit branch-owned context. The live deployment probe remains Gate F.++context=''+test_file='host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts'+summary=''++while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do+ case "$1" in+ --context)+ context="${2:-}"+ shift 2+ ;;+ --test)+ test_file="${2:-}"+ shift 2+ ;;+ --summary)+ summary="${2:-}"+ shift 2+ ;;+ *)+ echo "usage: $0 --context <kube-context> [--test <HCC unit test>] --summary <file>" >&2+ exit 2+ ;;+ esac+done++if [[ -z "${context}" || -z "${summary}" ]]; then+ echo "usage: $0 --context <kube-context> [--test <HCC unit test>] --summary <file>" >&2+ exit 2+fi+if [[ "${test_file}" != host-context-controller/src/*.test.ts ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: synthetic gate accepts only the HCC authorization unit suite" >&2+ exit 2+fi+if [[ ! -f "${test_file}" ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: synthetic test file is absent" >&2+ exit 1+fi+if [[ -L "${summary}" ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: summary path must not be a symlink" >&2+ exit 2+fi++mkdir -p "$(dirname "${summary}")"+kubectl --context="${context}" get namespace mcp-server -o name >/dev/null+npm --prefix host-context-controller test -- "${test_file#host-context-controller/}"++printf '{"status":"pass","real_kubernetes_secret_reads":"zero","negative_path_secret_reads":"zero","synthetic_fixture_secret_values":"allowed","kubernetes_writes":"zero"}\n' >"${summary}"+echo 'PASS: NP-08 synthetic authorization gate (unit matrix; no real Secret reads; negative paths zero)'diff --git a/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh b/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..6d5bd8985--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++# Evidence hygiene scanner. It counts violations without echoing matching+# lines. API/log inputs must already be redacted; rendered manifests are a+# separate scope and may contain Secret references, but never credential values.++tmpdir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/np08-evidence.XXXXXX")"+trap 'rm -rf "${tmpdir}"' EXIT++api_inputs=()+log_inputs=()+manifest_inputs=()+stdin_kind=''++while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do+ case "$1" in+ --api)+ api_inputs+=("${2:-}")+ shift 2+ ;;+ --logs)+ log_inputs+=("${2:-}")+ shift 2+ ;;+ --manifest)+ manifest_inputs+=("${2:-}")+ shift 2+ ;;+ --stdin-kind)+ stdin_kind="${2:-}"+ shift 2+ ;;+ *)+ echo "usage: $0 [--api file] [--logs file] [--manifest file] [--stdin-kind api|logs|manifest]" >&2+ exit 2+ ;;+ esac+done++if [[ "${#api_inputs[@]}" -eq 0 && "${#log_inputs[@]}" -eq 0 && "${#manifest_inputs[@]}" -eq 0 && -z "${stdin_kind}" ]]; then+ echo "usage: $0 [--api file] [--logs file] [--manifest file] [--stdin-kind api|logs|manifest]" >&2+ exit 2+fi++copy_input() {+ local source="$1"+ local destination="$2"+ if [[ ! -f "${source}" || -L "${source}" ]]; then+ echo 'FAIL: evidence input is absent or a symlink' >&2+ exit 1+ fi+ cp -- "${source}" "${destination}"+}++scan_scope() {+ local scope="$1"+ local pattern="$2"+ shift 2+ local count=0+ local input+ for input in "$@"; do+ local hits="${tmpdir}/${scope}-${count}.hits"+ if rg -n -I -i --no-messages -e "${pattern}" "${input}" >"${hits}"; then+ count=$((count + $(wc -l <"${hits}")))+ fi+ done+ echo "${scope}_violations=${count}"+ [[ "${count}" -eq 0 ]]+}++declare -a api_files=()+declare -a manifest_files=()+for input in "${api_inputs[@]}" "${log_inputs[@]}"; do+ [[ -n "${input}" ]] || { echo 'FAIL: empty evidence path' >&2; exit 2; }+ destination="${tmpdir}/input-${#api_files[@]}"+ copy_input "${input}" "${destination}"+ api_files+=("${destination}")+done+for input in "${manifest_inputs[@]}"; do+ [[ -n "${input}" ]] || { echo 'FAIL: empty evidence path' >&2; exit 2; }+ destination="${tmpdir}/manifest-${#manifest_files[@]}"+ copy_input "${input}" "${destination}"+ manifest_files+=("${destination}")+done++if [[ -n "${stdin_kind}" ]]; then+ case "${stdin_kind}" in+ api|logs)+ cat >"${tmpdir}/stdin-api"+ api_files+=("${tmpdir}/stdin-api")+ ;;+ manifest)+ cat >"${tmpdir}/stdin-manifest"+ manifest_files+=("${tmpdir}/stdin-manifest")+ ;;+ *)+ echo 'FAIL: --stdin-kind must be api, logs, or manifest' >&2+ exit 2+ ;;+ esac+fi++api_pattern=$'(Bearer[[:space:]]+[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|secretRef|secretKey|mcpHostAccessToken|mcpHostRefreshToken|mcpHostControlToken|authorization[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[^[:space:]}" ]+|proxy-authorization[[:space:]]*[:=][[:space:]]*[^[:space:]}" ]+|token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"}]+)'+manifest_pattern='(Bearer[[:space:]]+[A-Za-z0-9._~-]+|[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|-----BEGIN (RSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----)'++api_ok=1+if [[ "${#api_files[@]}" -gt 0 ]]; then+ scan_scope api "${api_pattern}" "${api_files[@]}" || api_ok=0+else+ echo 'api_violations=0'+fi+manifest_ok=1+if [[ "${#manifest_files[@]}" -gt 0 ]]; then+ scan_scope manifest "${manifest_pattern}" "${manifest_files[@]}" || manifest_ok=0+else+ echo 'manifest_violations=0'+fi++if [[ "${api_ok}" -ne 1 || "${manifest_ok}" -ne 1 ]]; then+ echo 'FAIL: NP-08 evidence hygiene violations found' >&2+ exit 1+fi+echo 'PASS: NP-08 evidence hygiene'diff --git a/scripts/security/verify-np08-hcc-authz.sh b/scripts/security/verify-np08-hcc-authz.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..696f2433f--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/security/verify-np08-hcc-authz.sh@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++# Read-only deployment conformance for NP-08. Every Kubernetes call carries the+# caller-provided context. This script never reads Secret objects, token files,+# pod filesystems, or tenant data; output is limited to booleans/counts.++context=''+read_only=0+redact=0+while [[ "$#" -gt 0 ]]; do+ case "$1" in+ --context)+ context="${2:-}"+ shift 2+ ;;+ --read-only)+ read_only=1+ shift+ ;;+ --redact-identifiers)+ redact=1+ shift+ ;;+ *)+ echo "usage: $0 --context <kube-context> --read-only --redact-identifiers" >&2+ exit 2+ ;;+ esac+done++if [[ -z "${context}" || "${read_only}" -ne 1 || "${redact}" -ne 1 ]]; then+ echo "usage: $0 --context <kube-context> --read-only --redact-identifiers" >&2+ exit 2+fi++check() {+ local name="$1"+ local result="$2"+ if [[ "${result}" != 1 ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: ${name}=false" >&2+ exit 1+ fi+ echo "CHECK ${name}=true"+}++kubectl --context="${context}" get namespace control-plane -o name >/dev/null+kubectl --context="${context}" get namespace mcp-host -o name >/dev/null+kubectl --context="${context}" get namespace mcp-server -o name >/dev/null++hcc_replicas="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller -o jsonpath='{.spec.replicas}')"+hcc_ready="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}')"+gateway_replicas="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller-api-gateway -o jsonpath='{.spec.replicas}')"+gateway_ready="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller-api-gateway -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}')"+check hcc_ready "$([[ -n "${hcc_replicas}" && "${hcc_ready}" == "${hcc_replicas}" ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"+check gateway_ready "$([[ -n "${gateway_replicas}" && "${gateway_ready}" == "${gateway_replicas}" ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"++hcc_key_ref="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller -o jsonpath='{range .spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="host-context-controller")].env[?(@.name=="HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY")]}{.valueFrom.configMapKeyRef.name}{"/"}{.valueFrom.configMapKeyRef.key}{end}')"+check hcc_public_key_ref "$([[ "${hcc_key_ref}" == 'control-api-public-key/CONTROL_API_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM' ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"++hcc_issuer_ref="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get deployment host-context-controller -o jsonpath='{range .spec.template.spec.containers[?(@.name=="host-context-controller")].env[?(@.name=="HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_ISSUER")]}{.valueFrom.configMapKeyRef.name}{"/"}{.valueFrom.configMapKeyRef.key}{end}')"+check hcc_issuer_config_ref "$([[ "${hcc_issuer_ref}" == 'control-api-config/CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_ISSUER' ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"++proxy_flag="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n mcp-host get configmap mcp-host-config -o jsonpath='{.data.MCP_PROXY_ENABLED}')"+check mcp_proxy_enabled_false "$([[ "${proxy_flag}" == 'false' ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"++proxy_replicas="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n mcp-server get deployment mcp-proxy -o jsonpath='{.spec.replicas}')"+proxy_ready="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n mcp-server get deployment mcp-proxy -o jsonpath='{.status.readyReplicas}')"+check proxy_singleton_replicas "$([[ "${proxy_replicas}" == '1' ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"+check proxy_singleton_ready "$([[ "${proxy_ready}" == '1' ]] && echo 1 || echo 0)"++host_proxy_ports="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n mcp-host get networkpolicies -o jsonpath='{range .items[*].spec.egress[*].ports[*]}{.port}{"\n"}{end}')"+if rg -x -q '8083' <<<"${host_proxy_ports}"; then+ host_proxy_8083_ok=0+else+ host_proxy_8083_ok=1+fi+check no_host_proxy_8083_egress "${host_proxy_8083_ok}"++gateway_config="$(kubectl --context="${context}" -n control-plane get configmap host-context-controller-api-gateway -o jsonpath='{.data.nginx\.conf}')"+check v1_context_tombstone "$(rg -q 'location ~ \^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/\[\^/\]\+\$' <<<"${gateway_config}" && rg -q 'return 410' <<<"${gateway_config}" && echo 1 || echo 0)"+check v1_auth_tombstone "$(rg -q 'location ~ \^/api/v1/mcpservers/\[\^/\]\+/auth\$' <<<"${gateway_config}" && rg -q 'return 410' <<<"${gateway_config}" && echo 1 || echo 0)"+check v2_host_routes "$(rg -q '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers' <<<"${gateway_config}" && rg -q '/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential' <<<"${gateway_config}" && echo 1 || echo 0)"++echo 'PASS: NP-08 read-only HCC deployment conformance'diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-minikube-pre-gate-sync-state.sh b/scripts/tests/test-minikube-pre-gate-sync-state.shindex 1273936d1..4f9e0c9d6 100755--- a/scripts/tests/test-minikube-pre-gate-sync-state.sh+++ b/scripts/tests/test-minikube-pre-gate-sync-state.sh@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ elsefail "pre-gate sync does not use the shared idempotent auth-key sync helper"fi-if contains 'nginx.conf is mounted through a subPath' &&+if contains 'Both nginx gateway configs are mounted through subPath' &&contains 'INCREMENTAL_FULL_DEPLOYMENT' &&contains 'rollout_restart_with_retry control-plane nginx-workflow-approval-gateway' &&contains 'rollout_if_present control-plane nginx-workflow-approval-gateway' &&@@ -127,6 +127,33 @@ elsefail "pre-gate sync can leave a stale workflow gateway after ConfigMap changes"fi+hcc_gateway_restart_line="$(grep -nF 'rollout_restart_with_retry control-plane host-context-controller-api-gateway' "$SCRIPT" | head -n 1 | cut -d: -f1)"+hcc_gateway_wait_line="$(grep -nF 'rollout_if_present control-plane host-context-controller-api-gateway' "$SCRIPT" | head -n 1 | cut -d: -f1)"+hcc_gateway_assert_line="$(grep -nF 'assert_hcc_gateway_np08_routes' "$SCRIPT" | head -n 1 | cut -d: -f1)"+if [[ -n "$hcc_gateway_restart_line" &&+ -n "$hcc_gateway_wait_line" &&+ -n "$hcc_gateway_assert_line" &&+ "$hcc_gateway_restart_line" -lt "$hcc_gateway_wait_line" &&+ "$hcc_gateway_wait_line" -lt "$hcc_gateway_assert_line" ]]; then+ pass "pre-gate restarts and waits for the subPath-mounted HCC gateway before NP-08 inspection"+else+ fail "pre-gate can inspect a stale HCC gateway after its ConfigMap changes"+fi++if runtime_contains 'assert_hcc_gateway_np08_routes()' &&+ runtime_contains 'location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers {' &&+ runtime_contains 'location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential {' &&+ runtime_contains 'location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/[^/]+$ {' &&+ runtime_contains 'location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {' &&+ runtime_contains 'proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;' &&+ runtime_contains 'add_header Pragma "no-cache" always;' &&+ runtime_contains 'access_log /dev/stdout hcc_gateway_json;' &&+ runtime_contains 'return 410'; then+ pass "pre-gate fails closed when the running HCC gateway lacks the NP-08 route contract"+else+ fail "pre-gate does not verify the running NP-08 HCC gateway contract"+fi+if runtime_contains 'assert_workflow_gateway_prompt_bridge_finalization_route()' &&runtime_contains 'nginx_config="$(${KC} exec' &&runtime_contains 'could not inspect the active nginx configuration' &&diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh b/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..2a4fee539--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/tests/test-np08-evidence-scanner.sh@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"+SCANNER="${ROOT}/scripts/security/scan-np08-evidence.sh"+tmpdir="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/np08-scan-test.XXXXXX")"+trap 'rm -rf "${tmpdir}"' EXIT++if ! printf '%s\n' '{"error":"authorization_unavailable"}' | bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind api >/dev/null; then+ echo 'FAIL: sanitized authorization error was treated as a credential leak' >&2+ exit 1+fi++if printf '%s\n' '{"Authorization":"Bearer abc.def.ghi"}' | bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind api >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ echo 'FAIL: bearer header was not rejected' >&2+ exit 1+fi++if printf '%s\n' '{"token":"credential-value"}' | bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind api >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ echo 'FAIL: credential field was not rejected' >&2+ exit 1+fi++printf '%s\n' 'env: secretRef: runtime-token' >"${tmpdir}/rendered.yaml"+bash "${SCANNER}" --manifest "${tmpdir}/rendered.yaml" >/dev/null++if printf '%s\n' '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----' | bash "${SCANNER}" --stdin-kind manifest >/dev/null 2>&1; then+ echo 'FAIL: private key material was not rejected' >&2+ exit 1+fi++echo 'PASS: NP-08 evidence scanner fixtures'diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-np08-render-contract.sh b/scripts/tests/test-np08-render-contract.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..d814ea3d9--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/tests/test-np08-render-contract.sh@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++if [[ "$#" -lt 1 ]]; then+ echo "usage: $0 <rendered-yaml|-> [...]" >&2+ exit 2+fi++for rendered in "$@"; do+ if [[ "${rendered}" != "-" && ! -f "${rendered}" ]]; then+ echo "FAIL: rendered manifest is absent" >&2+ exit 1+ fi++ RUBYOPT=--disable=gems ruby -ryaml -e '+ source = ARGV.fetch(0)+ yaml = source == "-" ? STDIN.read : File.read(source)+ documents = YAML.load_stream(yaml).select { |document| document.is_a?(Hash) }++ find = lambda do |kind, name, namespace|+ documents.find do |document|+ document["kind"] == kind &&+ document.dig("metadata", "name") == name &&+ document.dig("metadata", "namespace") == namespace+ end+ end+ require_resource = lambda do |kind, name, namespace|+ find.call(kind, name, namespace) || abort("missing #{namespace}/#{kind}/#{name}")+ end++ host_config = require_resource.call("ConfigMap", "mcp-host-config", "mcp-host")+ abort("mcp-host must keep direct MCP transport") unless host_config.dig("data", "MCP_PROXY_ENABLED") == "false"+ abort("HCC authority staleness must stay bounded at 60 seconds") unless host_config.dig("data", "HCC_AUTHORITY_MAX_STALENESS_MS") == "60000"++ hcc = require_resource.call("Deployment", "host-context-controller", "control-plane")+ hcc_container = Array(hcc.dig("spec", "template", "spec", "containers")).find do |container|+ container["name"] == "host-context-controller"+ end+ abort("HCC container is missing") unless hcc_container+ hcc_env = Array(hcc_container["env"]).to_h { |entry| [entry["name"], entry] }+ public_key_ref = hcc_env.dig("HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_PUBLIC_KEY", "valueFrom", "configMapKeyRef")+ unless public_key_ref == {+ "name" => "control-api-public-key",+ "key" => "CONTROL_API_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM",+ }+ abort("HCC Host JWT public-key wiring is not authoritative")+ end+ issuer_ref = hcc_env.dig("HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_ISSUER", "valueFrom", "configMapKeyRef")+ unless issuer_ref == {+ "name" => "control-api-config",+ "key" => "CONTROL_API_ADMIN_JWT_ISSUER",+ }+ abort("HCC Host JWT issuer is not wired to the Control API issuer contract")+ end+ max_ttl_ref = hcc_env.dig("HCC_MCP_HOST_JWT_MAX_TTL_SECONDS", "valueFrom", "configMapKeyRef")+ unless max_ttl_ref == {+ "name" => "control-api-config",+ "key" => "WORKFLOW_APPROVAL_ACCESS_TTL_SEC",+ }+ abort("HCC Host JWT maximum TTL must share the Control API access-token contract")+ end++ gateway = require_resource.call("ConfigMap", "host-context-controller-api-gateway", "control-plane")+ nginx = gateway.dig("data", "nginx.conf").to_s+ location_block = lambda do |marker|+ start = nginx.index(marker) || abort("gateway is missing #{marker}")+ finish = nginx.index(/^\s*location\s/m, start + marker.length) || nginx.length+ nginx[start...finish]+ end+ inventory = location_block.call("location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers {")+ credential = location_block.call("location = /api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers/credential {")+ [inventory, credential].each do |block|+ abort("v2 route forwards ambient request headers") unless block.include?("proxy_pass_request_headers off;")+ abort("v2 route does not explicitly forward Authorization") unless block.include?("proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;")+ abort("v2 route permits caching") unless block.include?("Cache-Control \"no-store, private\"")+ end+ abort("credential route is not POST-only") unless credential.include?("$request_method != POST")+ abort("credential body is not bounded") unless credential.include?("client_max_body_size 1k;")+ abort("credential route does not preserve explicit body framing") unless credential.include?("proxy_set_header Content-Length $content_length;")+ abort("inventory route is not GET-only") unless inventory.include?("$request_method != GET")+ secure_local_response = lambda do |block, label|+ abort("#{label} permits caching") unless block.include?("Cache-Control \"no-store, private\"")+ abort("#{label} omits legacy no-cache protection") unless block.include?("Pragma \"no-cache\"")+ abort("#{label} permits content sniffing") unless block.include?("X-Content-Type-Options \"nosniff\"")+ end+ legacy_context = location_block.call("location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/context/[^/]+$ {")+ legacy_credential = location_block.call("location ~ ^/api/v1/mcpservers/[^/]+/auth$ {")+ [legacy_context, legacy_credential].each do |block|+ abort("legacy Host route is not tombstoned") unless block.include?("return 410")+ secure_local_response.call(block, "legacy Host tombstone")+ end+ %w[@hcc_bad_request @hcc_method_not_allowed @hcc_payload_too_large].each do |location|+ secure_local_response.call(location_block.call("location #{location} {"), "gateway error response")+ end+ abort("temporary system inventory compatibility route is absent") unless nginx.include?("location = /api/v1/mcpservers {")++ access_log = nginx[/log_format hcc_gateway_json.*?;/m].to_s+ abort("sanitized HCC audit log is absent") if access_log.empty?+ %w[$uri $request_uri $request_body $http_authorization].each do |forbidden|+ abort("HCC audit log includes request-derived sensitive data") if access_log.include?(forbidden)+ end++ proxy_deployment = require_resource.call("Deployment", "mcp-proxy", "mcp-server")+ require_resource.call("Service", "mcp-proxy", "mcp-server")+ abort("PR 1 must not disable the retained mcp-proxy") unless proxy_deployment.dig("spec", "replicas") == 1++ policies = documents.select do |document|+ document["kind"] == "NetworkPolicy" && document.dig("metadata", "namespace") == "mcp-host"+ end+ hcc_lane = policies.any? do |policy|+ Array(policy.dig("spec", "egress")).any? do |rule|+ ports = Array(rule["ports"])+ peers = Array(rule["to"])+ ports.any? { |port| port["port"] == 8081 && port.fetch("protocol", "TCP") == "TCP" } &&+ peers.any? do |peer|+ peer.dig("namespaceSelector", "matchLabels", "kubernetes.io/metadata.name") == "control-plane" &&+ peer.dig("podSelector", "matchLabels", "app") == "host-context-controller-api-gateway"+ end+ end+ end+ abort("mcp-host to HCC TCP 8081 lane is absent") unless hcc_lane++ host_proxy_lane = policies.any? do |policy|+ Array(policy.dig("spec", "egress")).any? do |rule|+ Array(rule["ports"]).any? { |port| port["port"] == 8083 }+ end+ end+ abort("mcp-host must not gain an egress lane to mcp-proxy TCP 8083") if host_proxy_lane+ ' "${rendered}"++ echo "PASS: NP-08 rendered contract (${rendered##*/})"+donediff --git a/scripts/tests/test-np08-v1-reference-inventory.sh b/scripts/tests/test-np08-v1-reference-inventory.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..56596843d--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/tests/test-np08-v1-reference-inventory.sh@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+set -euo pipefail++ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"+cd "${ROOT}"++fail=0++if rg -n -F '/api/v1/mcpservers' mcp-host/src; then+ echo "FAIL: mcp-host must not retain an HCC v1 discovery or credential path" >&2+ fail=1+fi++if rg -n 'listServersByContext|getAuthTokenForServer|pollServers\([^)]*context' mcp-host/src; then+ echo "FAIL: mcp-host retains a caller-selected Context or legacy credential API" >&2+ fail=1+fi++if ! rg -q -F '/api/v1/mcpservers' mcp-proxy/src/hccClient.ts; then+ echo "FAIL: the temporary PR 2 global-inventory consumer is no longer explicit" >&2+ fail=1+fi++if rg -n '/api/v1/mcpservers/(context/|[^/]+/auth)' mcp-proxy/src; then+ echo "FAIL: mcp-proxy must not consume caller-selected v1 Host routes" >&2+ fail=1+fi++if rg -n 'getMcpServers\s*\([^)]*context|getMcpAuth|getAuthTokenForServer' tests/e2e; then+ echo "FAIL: E2E helpers retain a caller-selected v1 Host contract" >&2+ fail=1+fi++if [[ "${fail}" -ne 0 ]]; then+ exit 1+fi++echo "PASS: NP-08 v1 reference inventory"diff --git a/tests/e2e/helpers.ts b/tests/e2e/helpers.tsindex aadf1b29d..4d8d1cc78 100644--- a/tests/e2e/helpers.ts+++ b/tests/e2e/helpers.ts@@ -204,9 +204,9 @@ export async function waitForTasksProcessed(minCount: number, timeoutMs = 60_000throw new Error(`Agent did not process ${minCount} tasks within ${timeoutMs}ms`)}-/** Query host-context-controller for MCP servers in a context. */-export async function getMcpServers(contextRef: string): Promise<any> {- const { data } = await fetchJson(`${CTX_MAPPER_URL}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/${contextRef}`)+/** Query the temporary PR 2 global-inventory compatibility route. */+export async function getGlobalMcpInventory(): Promise<any> {+ const { data } = await fetchJson(`${CTX_MAPPER_URL}/api/v1/mcpservers`)return data}diff --git a/tests/e2e/mcp-host/context-mapper.test.ts b/tests/e2e/mcp-host/context-mapper.test.tsindex 7b8a80bf9..7e83847b5 100644--- a/tests/e2e/mcp-host/context-mapper.test.ts+++ b/tests/e2e/mcp-host/context-mapper.test.ts@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@/**- * E2E: Context Mapper — verify server discovery and filtering.+ * E2E: Context Mapper — verify the PR 1 route and disclosure boundaries.*/import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'-import { CTX_MAPPER_URL, getMcpServers, healthCheck } from '../helpers.js'+import { CTX_MAPPER_URL, getGlobalMcpInventory, healthCheck } from '../helpers.js'let contextMapperUp = false@@ -16,27 +16,37 @@ beforeAll(async () => {})describe('Context Mapper', () => {- it('GET /api/v1/mcpservers/context/context1 returns servers', async () => {+ it('retains only the metadata-only global v1 inventory for the PR 2 proxy migration', async () => {if (!contextMapperUp) return- const data = await getMcpServers('context1')+ const data = await getGlobalMcpInventory()expect(data.servers).toBeDefined()expect(Array.isArray(data.servers)).toBe(true)- expect(data.contextRef).toBe('context1')+ expect(data.contextRef).toBe('*')+ for (const server of data.servers) {+ expect(server).not.toHaveProperty('auth')+ expect(server).not.toHaveProperty('secretRef')+ expect(server).not.toHaveProperty('secretKey')+ }})- it('context1 includes at least one ready MCP server with transport metadata', async () => {+ it.each([+ '/api/v1/mcpservers/context/context1',+ '/api/v1/mcpservers/server-from-another-context/auth',+ ])('tombstones caller-selected legacy Host route %s', async path => {if (!contextMapperUp) return- const data = await getMcpServers('context1')- const readyServer = data.servers.find((s: any) => s.status?.ready === true)- expect(readyServer).toBeDefined()- expect(readyServer.transport).toBeDefined()- expect(readyServer.transport.type).toBeDefined()+ const response = await fetch(`${CTX_MAPPER_URL}${path}`)++ expect(response.status).toBe(410)+ expect(response.headers.get('cache-control')).toContain('no-store')+ await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({ error: 'gone' })})- it('non-existent context returns empty server list', async () => {+ it('rejects the v2 Host inventory without an authenticated Host JWT', async () => {if (!contextMapperUp) return- const res = await fetch(`${CTX_MAPPER_URL}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/does-not-exist`)- const data = await res.json()- expect(data.servers).toEqual([])+ const response = await fetch(`${CTX_MAPPER_URL}/api/v2/hosts/self/mcpservers`)++ expect(response.status).toBe(401)+ expect(response.headers.get('cache-control')).toContain('no-store')+ await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual({ error: 'unauthorized' })})})diff --git a/tests/e2e/mcp-host/tool-discovery.test.ts b/tests/e2e/mcp-host/tool-discovery.test.tsindex 65464cba7..77fe1365a 100644--- a/tests/e2e/mcp-host/tool-discovery.test.ts+++ b/tests/e2e/mcp-host/tool-discovery.test.ts@@ -1,44 +1,47 @@/*** E2E: Tool Discovery — verify mcp-host discovers MCP tools via context-mapper.*- * Checks both the context-mapper API and mcp-host startup logs to confirm- * MCP tools are registered and used during message processing.+ * Uses mcp-host's authenticated runtime status and startup logs to confirm MCP+ * tools are registered and used during message processing. It deliberately+ * does not call an HCC route with a caller-selected Context.*/-import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";-import { getMcpServers, sendMessage, waitForIdle, getPodLogs } from "../helpers.js";+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import { getPodLogs, getStatus, sendMessage, waitForIdle } from '../helpers.js'-describe("Tool Discovery", () => {- it("context-mapper reports mock-server with 2 tools", async () => {- const data = await getMcpServers("context1");- const mock = data.servers.find((s: any) => s.name === "mock-server");- expect(mock).toBeDefined();- expect(mock.status.ready).toBe(true);- });+describe('Tool Discovery', () => {+ it('mcp-host publishes only its effective connected mock-server fleet', async () => {+ const status = await getStatus()+ const mock = status.mcpServers?.find((server: any) => server.name === 'mock-server')- it("mcp-host connected to mock-server and found tools", async () => {+ expect(mock).toBeDefined()+ expect(mock.state).toBe('connected')+ expect(mock.toolCount).toBe(2)+ })++ it('mcp-host connected to mock-server and found tools', async () => {// These log lines are emitted by MCP connection logic (shared by both pipelines)- const logs = getPodLogs("mcp-host", "mcp-host", 500);- expect(logs).toContain("[MCP:mock-server] Connected successfully");- expect(logs).toContain("[MCP:mock-server] Found 2 tool(s):");- expect(logs).toContain("echo: Echoes back the provided text");- expect(logs).toContain("add: Adds two numbers together");- });+ const logs = getPodLogs('mcp-host', 'mcp-host', 500)+ expect(logs).toContain('[MCP:mock-server] Connected successfully')+ expect(logs).toContain('[MCP:mock-server] Found 2 tool(s):')+ expect(logs).toContain('echo: Echoes back the provided text')+ expect(logs).toContain('add: Adds two numbers together')+ })it("mcp-host reports total tools available (at least mock-server's 2)", async () => {- const logs = getPodLogs("mcp-host", "mcp-host", 500);+ const logs = getPodLogs('mcp-host', 'mcp-host', 500)// Cluster may have additional MCP servers beyond mock-server;// verify the log line exists and reports >= 2 tools- const match = logs.match(/\[Main\] Total tools available: (\d+)/);- expect(match).not.toBeNull();- expect(Number(match![1])).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);- });+ const match = logs.match(/\[Main\] Total tools available: (\d+)/)+ expect(match).not.toBeNull()+ expect(Number(match![1])).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2)+ })- it("mcp-host processes messages via single pipeline", async () => {- await sendMessage("tool discovery test");- await waitForIdle(30_000);+ it('mcp-host processes messages via single pipeline', async () => {+ await sendMessage('tool discovery test')+ await waitForIdle(30_000)- const logs = getPodLogs("mcp-host", "mcp-host", 200);+ const logs = getPodLogs('mcp-host', 'mcp-host', 200)// Single pipeline — verify the task was processed- expect(logs).toContain("[Agent] Processing task");- });-});+ expect(logs).toContain('[Agent] Processing task')+ })+})diff --git a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/hcc-wrc-integration.test.ts b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/hcc-wrc-integration.test.tsindex e34d0e3d5..4930973f9 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/hcc-wrc-integration.test.ts+++ b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/hcc-wrc-integration.test.ts@@ -116,13 +116,15 @@ describe('HCC-WRC Integration E2E', () => {expect(logs).toContain(MCP_SERVER_NAME)})- // E6.10: HCC Discovery API serves the delegated McpServer- // The Discovery API filters by Context allowlist. The WRC must first:+ // E6.10: temporary PR 2 system inventory serves the delegated McpServer+ // This suite does not mint a Host JWT, so it cannot exercise the v2 Host+ // route. Keep the current global metadata-only poll assertion here until+ // PR 2 adds an authenticated system-inventory fixture.// 1. Create the McpServer CRD (done in E6.9)// 2. Patch the Context to add the server to mcpServers[]// 3. HCC watches Context change → caches the server → serves via API// We wait for Context to be patched first, then poll the Discovery API.- it('E6.10 — HCC Discovery API lists delegated McpServer', { timeout: 60_000 }, async () => {+ it('E6.10 — HCC metadata inventory lists delegated McpServer', { timeout: 60_000 }, async () => {// Wait for WRC to patch Context (may take a reconciliation cycle)const ctxStart = Date.now()while (Date.now() - ctxStart < 30_000) {@@ -138,9 +140,7 @@ describe('HCC-WRC Integration E2E', () => {let found: { name: string; transport?: { type: string } } | undefinedwhile (Date.now() - start < 20_000) {- const { data } = await fetchJson(- `http://localhost:${HCC_LOCAL_PORT}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/default`- )+ const { data } = await fetchJson(`http://localhost:${HCC_LOCAL_PORT}/api/v1/mcpservers`)const response = data as { servers: Array<{ name: string; transport?: { type: string } }> }if (response.servers) {found = response.servers.find(s => s.name === MCP_SERVER_NAME)@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ describe('HCC-WRC Integration E2E', () => {expect(found).toBeDefined()expect(found!.transport?.type).toBe('streamableHttp')+ expect(found).not.toHaveProperty('secretRef')+ expect(found).not.toHaveProperty('secretKey')+ expect(found).not.toHaveProperty('auth')})// E6.11: Context patch triggers L2 context-allow NetworkPolicy from HCC@@ -228,11 +231,9 @@ describe('HCC-WRC Integration E2E', () => {expect(body).toContain('clerum_hcc_mcpservers_total')})- // E6.14: HCC Discovery API no longer serves the deleted McpServer- it('E6.14 — HCC Discovery API no longer lists deleted McpServer', async () => {- const { data } = await fetchJson(- `http://localhost:${HCC_LOCAL_PORT}/api/v1/mcpservers/context/default`- )+ // E6.14: temporary PR 2 metadata inventory no longer lists the deleted server+ it('E6.14 — HCC metadata inventory no longer lists deleted McpServer', async () => {+ const { data } = await fetchJson(`http://localhost:${HCC_LOCAL_PORT}/api/v1/mcpservers`)const response = data as { servers: Array<{ name: string }> }const found = (response.servers ?? []).find(s => s.name === MCP_SERVER_NAME)diff --git a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package-lock.json b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package-lock.jsonindex 3bbbf90d3..885666681 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package-lock.json+++ b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "workflow-recipes-e2e",- "version": "0.1.18",+ "version": "0.1.19","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "workflow-recipes-e2e",- "version": "0.1.18",+ "version": "0.1.19","devDependencies": {"@types/node": "^20.10.0","typescript": "^5.3.0",diff --git a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package.json b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package.jsonindex 075f12ed2..1f91e6533 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package.json+++ b/workflow-recipes/tests/e2e/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "workflow-recipes-e2e",- "version": "0.1.18",+ "version": "0.1.19","private": true,"description": "E2E tests for Workload Recipes Controller (minikube)","scripts": {