Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
docs: scope the authorize parser-error wording and the image reader claims
Alfredo Lopez9b3cf93aa341
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex dac8a3f72..5ec8f7bf8 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.642",+ "version": "0.1.643","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.642",+ "version": "0.1.643","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/grok-provider-attempt-contract": "file:../packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 48ff97068..3aafb96fd 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.642",+ "version": "0.1.643","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/llmProviderAttempts.routes.ts b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/llmProviderAttempts.routes.tsindex 3c04b014f..eceb6dc42 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/llmProviderAttempts.routes.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/mcp-host/llmProviderAttempts.routes.ts@@ -165,9 +165,11 @@ export function createMcpHostLlmProviderAttemptRoutes(gateway: K8sGateway): Rout}}))- // Every parser error is answered here. body-parser attaches the raw body to- // a verify or JSON.parse error as `err.body`, and the global error handler- // would parse it again.+ // The size, structure, depth, charset, encoding and JSON.parse errors are+ // answered here, because body-parser attaches the raw body to them as+ // `err.body` and the global error handler would parse it again. The other+ // parser errors (`request.aborted`, `request.size.invalid`, `stream.*`)+ // carry no body and go to the global handler, which logs no body.router.use((err: unknown, _req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {const typed = err as { type?: string; status?: number }if (typed.type === 'entity.too.large' || typed.status === 413) {diff --git a/docs/architecture/codex-subscription-transport-contract.md b/docs/architecture/codex-subscription-transport-contract.mdindex 25510dce0..c0397992d 100644--- a/docs/architecture/codex-subscription-transport-contract.md+++ b/docs/architecture/codex-subscription-transport-contract.md@@ -257,9 +257,11 @@ raw body before parsing it.that is too deep 400 `invalid_request`, and a charset other than UTF-8 415`unsupported_media_type`. A refused visual body frees its slot.- body-parser attaches the raw body to these errors, so the proxies' error- handlers log only the error type and status, and the control-api authorize- route answers every parser error itself instead of passing it to the global- error handler.+ handlers log only the error type and status. The control-api authorize route+ answers the size, structure, depth, charset, encoding and JSON.parse errors+ itself instead of passing them to the global error handler; the parser+ errors that carry no body (`request.aborted`, `request.size.invalid`,+ `stream.*`) reach the global handler, which logs no body.- The control-api authorize route parses with `inflate: false`, so an encodedbody is refused 415 before it is read. Before, 35750 bytes of gzip inflatedto 35 MiB.diff --git a/docs/architecture/grok-subscription-transport-contract.md b/docs/architecture/grok-subscription-transport-contract.mdindex 7a24a2880..aa4920dbb 100644--- a/docs/architecture/grok-subscription-transport-contract.md+++ b/docs/architecture/grok-subscription-transport-contract.md@@ -88,8 +88,9 @@ Where the envelope is enforced:scan described under "Body structure before parse", and the authorizerbuilds the exact V2proxy envelope inside its transaction after signing and before commit, so- an envelope over the cap rolls back the attempt, the ticket and the- reservation;+ an envelope over the cap rolls back the attempt, the ticket and a+ reservation created in that transaction (a reservation the Host presented+ is kept);- the workflow-approval gateway's authorize location has`client_max_body_size 36700160`;- `grok-llm-proxy` reads a V2 body with a separate parser whose limit isdiff --git a/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs b/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjsindex 0fc3d786a..f372e7ca0 100644--- a/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs+++ b/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@* decode pixels, verify PNG CRCs, validate entropy-coded JPEG data, or prove* that the image renders. "Valid" here means "syntactically well-formed* container inside the local budget", never "decoded and visually correct".+ * The readers are stricter than the formats: they also refuse some rare valid+ * images, such as a JPEG whose SOF declares height 0 and defers it to a DNL+ * marker, or a PNG with bytes after IEND.** The numbers come from the xAI documentation for api.x.ai/v1 (read* 2026-09-23): at most 20 MiB per image, jpg/jpeg and png only, no@@ -17,8 +20,8 @@* cli-chat-proxy.grok.com/v1/responses is UNMEASURED for images: these limits* are not an upstream capability fact for it.*- * There is no dimension or pixel limit. Dimensions are read only to validate- * the container.+ * There is no dimension or pixel limit. The declared dimensions are read as+ * part of the container check and are never compared with a bound.** The decoder and the container readers are a copy of the Codex contract's* visualPayload.cjs, kept separate so this package never imports the Codexdiff --git a/packages/llm-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs b/packages/llm-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjsindex 63894fe1a..52a347e29 100644--- a/packages/llm-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs+++ b/packages/llm-provider-attempt-contract/visualPayload.cjs@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@* decode pixels, verify PNG CRCs, validate entropy-coded JPEG data, or prove* that the image renders. "Valid" here means "syntactically well-formed* container inside the local budget", never "decoded and visually correct".+ * The readers are stricter than the formats: they also refuse some rare valid+ * images, such as a JPEG whose SOF declares height 0 and defers it to a DNL+ * marker, or a PNG with bytes after IEND.** The budget below is a conservative local safety/product decision. It is not* an upstream capability fact; the frozen ChatGPT endpoint is not certified by