Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
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fix(secrets): close PR 252 adversarial findings
Alfredo Lopeza06ef3fc99c0
diff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/communicationchannel.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/communicationchannel.yamlindex 4466b1079..f0be8d5d9 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/communicationchannel.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/communicationchannel.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,18 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: communicationchannels.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "communicationchannels",+ "fields": [+ {+ "path": "spec.credentialsSecretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ }+ ]+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: communicationchannelapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/context.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/context.yamlindex 974af4acb..dcfeb64a9 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/context.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/context.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: contexts.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "contexts",+ "fields": []+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: contextapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/globalfilesystem.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/globalfilesystem.yamlindex 955ddfeaa..23ba9cabc 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/globalfilesystem.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/globalfilesystem.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: globalfilesystems.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "globalfilesystems",+ "fields": []+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: globalfilesystemapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/host.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/host.yamlindex 8599faceb..00bc14097 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/host.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/host.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,18 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: hosts.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "hosts",+ "fields": [+ {+ "path": "spec.secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "host-secret"+ }+ ]+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: hostapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yamlindex 6c02f0271..13f2fedb0 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: llmhooks.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "llmhooks",+ "fields": [+ {+ "path": "spec.target.image.imagePullSecrets",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.target.image.envSecret",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.target.remote.authHeadersSecret",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ }+ ]+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: llmhookapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yamlindex af2fbfc4f..1a557f3fb 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: mcpservers.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "mcpservers",+ "fields": [+ {+ "path": "spec.auth.secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.envSecret",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.imagePullSecrets",+ "namespaceBinding": "resource"+ }+ ]+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: mcpserverapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/sharedfilesystem.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/sharedfilesystem.yamlindex c47151ef4..7656bc6e9 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/sharedfilesystem.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/sharedfilesystem.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: sharedfilesystems.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "sharedfilesystems",+ "fields": []+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: sharedfilesystemapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yamlindex ec1bae3ab..3fd6bd884 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,46 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: workflowrecipes.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "workflowrecipes",+ "fields": [+ {+ "path": "spec.agent.secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "reference-value"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.steps[].run.capabilities.secrets[].secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-recipe"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.workloads[].envSecret",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-workload"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.workloads[].imagePullSecrets",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-workload"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.oauthClients[].clientIdRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-recipe"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.oauthClients[].clientSecretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-recipe"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.webhooks[].verification.secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-recipe"+ },+ {+ "path": "spec.webhooks[].verification.setupHandshake.secretRef",+ "namespaceBinding": "workflow-recipe"+ }+ ]+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: workflowrecipeapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerum@@ -396,6 +436,9 @@ spec:secretRef:type: objectrequired: [name, key]+ description: >-+ Reference to a Secret in the recipe namespace+ containing the snippet capability value.properties:name:type: stringdiff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipepolicy.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipepolicy.yamlindex 8db97a969..c1275421e 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipepolicy.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipepolicy.yaml@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@ apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1kind: CustomResourceDefinitionmetadata:name: workflowrecipepolicies.clerum.io+ annotations:+ clerum.io/secret-reference-contract: |-+ {+ "version": 1,+ "plural": "workflowrecipepolicies",+ "fields": []+ }labels:app.kubernetes.io/name: workflowrecipepolicyapp.kubernetes.io/part-of: clerumdiff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex b2ce7fe8d..b73f8aa11 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.503",+ "version": "0.1.504","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.503",+ "version": "0.1.504","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex c60946ab6..9adeb7ea7 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.503",+ "version": "0.1.504","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.tsindex 6e42ee7bd..ab00c0274 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ import {REGISTRY_SPEC_DIGEST_ANNOTATION,type RegistryMutationOutcome,type RegistryResourceSnapshot,- classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback,classifyRegistryAssociationReadback,classifyRegistryMutationReadback,registrySpecDigest,@@ -1020,13 +1019,28 @@ async function fenceSecretAtSnapshot(snapshot.name,snapshot.namespace)- if (fenced.uid !== snapshot.uid || !fenced.resourceVersion) return 'ambiguous'+ if (fenced.uid !== snapshot.uid || !fenced.resourceVersion) {+ logRegistryFenceFailure({+ resourceKind: 'Secret',+ resourceName: snapshot.name,+ namespace: snapshot.namespace,+ failure: 'identity-mismatch',+ })+ return 'ambiguous'+ }// The successful CAS write consumed the exact prior UID/RV. An ambiguous// Registry write carrying that same precondition cannot commit afterwards.return 'not-committed'- } catch {+ } catch (error) {// A rejected fence proves only that the object changed or the fence itself// was uncertain. The prior GET state is never promoted to no-commit.+ logRegistryFenceFailure({+ resourceKind: 'Secret',+ resourceName: snapshot.name,+ namespace: snapshot.namespace,+ failure: registryFenceFailure(error),+ error,+ })return 'ambiguous'}}@@ -1034,22 +1048,10 @@ async function fenceSecretAtSnapshot(async function readSecretMutationOutcome(gateway: K8sGateway,snapshotBefore: SecretSnapshot | null-): Promise<{- outcome: 'committed' | 'not-committed' | 'ambiguous'- snapshot: SecretSnapshot | null- identityProven: boolean-}> {- if (snapshotBefore) {- const fenceOutcome = await fenceSecretAtSnapshot(gateway, snapshotBefore)- if (fenceOutcome === 'not-committed') {- return { outcome: fenceOutcome, snapshot: null, identityProven: false }- }- }- // A GET after a failed fence is never a receipt of this write. The observed- // resourceVersion may belong to a same-UID writer that raced with us, so do- // not adopt it as a compensation precondition. The caller must preserve the- // state and surface repair_required.- return { outcome: 'ambiguous', snapshot: null, identityProven: false }+): Promise<'not-committed' | 'ambiguous'> {+ // A Secret has no immutable request marker that can turn a readback into a+ // receipt. Only consuming the exact pre-write UID/RV proves no commit.+ return snapshotBefore ? fenceSecretAtSnapshot(gateway, snapshotBefore) : 'ambiguous'}export type CreatedSecretAfterDeleteFailure =@@ -1185,45 +1187,6 @@ async function readResourceForRollback(}}-type CreatedResourceReadbackOutcome = {- outcome: 'committed' | 'not-committed' | 'ambiguous'- snapshot: RegistryResourceSnapshot | null-}--async function readCreatedResourceOutcome(- gateway: K8sGateway,- plural: Parameters<K8sGateway['getResource']>[0],- name: string,- namespace: string,- desired: {- spec: Record<string, unknown>- metadata: { labels?: Record<string, string>; annotations?: Record<string, string> }- specDigest: string- },- operationId: string-): Promise<CreatedResourceReadbackOutcome> {- for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt += 1) {- try {- const current = normalizeRegistryResourceSnapshot(- await gateway.getResource(plural, name, namespace),- name,- namespace- )- if (- classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback({ current, desired, operationId }) === 'committed'- ) {- return { outcome: 'committed', snapshot: current }- }- } catch {- // A failed read cannot prove that a create did not commit. This includes- // repeated 404s: the original request may still be in flight or the- // read path may be stale, and a create has no pre-write UID/RV fence.- }- if (attempt < 3) await sleep(UPDATE_CONFLICT_RETRY_DELAY_MS * attempt)- }- return { outcome: 'ambiguous', snapshot: null }-}-async function fenceRegistryResourceAtSnapshot(gateway: K8sGateway,plural: Parameters<K8sGateway['getResource']>[0],@@ -1233,7 +1196,15 @@ async function fenceRegistryResourceAtSnapshot(): Promise<'not-committed' | 'ambiguous'> {const uid = snapshot.metadata?.uidconst resourceVersion = snapshot.metadata?.resourceVersion- if (!uid || !resourceVersion) return 'ambiguous'+ if (!uid || !resourceVersion) {+ logRegistryFenceFailure({+ resourceKind: plural,+ resourceName: name,+ namespace,+ failure: 'identity-unavailable',+ })+ return 'ambiguous'+ }try {const fenced = normalizeRegistryResourceSnapshot(@@ -1257,15 +1228,28 @@ async function fenceRegistryResourceAtSnapshot(namespace)if (fenced.metadata?.uid !== uid || typeof fenced.metadata?.resourceVersion !== 'string') {+ logRegistryFenceFailure({+ resourceKind: plural,+ resourceName: name,+ namespace,+ failure: 'identity-mismatch',+ })return 'ambiguous'}// A successful replacement fenced the old UID/RV. Any in-flight Registry// write carrying that same precondition can no longer commit afterwards.return 'not-committed'- } catch {+ } catch (error) {// A rejected fence means the object changed, but does not identify whether// this operation or another writer won. The caller must read and classify// the current state; the prior state alone is never proof of no-commit.+ logRegistryFenceFailure({+ resourceKind: plural,+ resourceName: name,+ namespace,+ failure: registryFenceFailure(error),+ error,+ })return 'ambiguous'}}@@ -1543,6 +1527,34 @@ export async function getInstalledRegistryState(gateway?: K8sGateway): Promise<{const log = rootLogger.child({ module: 'admin-registry' })+type RegistryFenceFailure = 'identity-mismatch' | 'identity-unavailable' | 'rejected' | 'unresolved'++function registryFenceFailure(+ error: unknown+): Extract<RegistryFenceFailure, 'rejected' | 'unresolved'> {+ const status = extractK8sError(error)?.status+ return status === 409 || isDeterministicRegistryNoCommit(error) ? 'rejected' : 'unresolved'+}++function logRegistryFenceFailure(input: {+ resourceKind: string+ resourceName: string+ namespace: string+ failure: RegistryFenceFailure+ error?: unknown+}): void {+ log.warn(+ {+ resourceKind: input.resourceKind,+ resourceName: input.resourceName,+ namespace: input.namespace,+ fenceFailure: input.failure,+ ...(input.error === undefined ? {} : { error: registryErrorLogFields(input.error) }),+ },+ 'Registry mutation identity fence did not establish no-commit'+ )+}+export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {const router = Router()@@ -2052,7 +2064,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {// ── Step 3: Create K8s Secret if credentials provided ─────────────let createdSecretSnapshot: SecretSnapshot | null = null- let createdSecretIdentityProven = falseif (credRequired) {const secretData = credentialPayload.secretDataif (Object.keys(secretData).length > 0) {@@ -2068,7 +2079,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {createdSecretSnapshot = await gateway.createSecret(secretReq, {capability: 'registryCredential',})- createdSecretIdentityProven = true} catch (err) {const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)if (k8sErr && k8sErr.status < 500) {@@ -2077,34 +2087,14 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {.json({ error: `Secret creation failed: ${k8sErr.message}` })return}- const recovered = await readSecretMutationOutcome(gateway, null)- if (recovered.outcome === 'not-committed') {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_not_committed',- outcome: 'not_committed',- })- return- }- if (recovered.outcome !== 'committed' || !recovered.snapshot) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- if (!recovered.identityProven) {- // A create has no pre-write UID to compare against. The- // readback may be a same-name replacement that copied the- // operation marker, so it cannot be reported as this request's- // commit or used as a compensation target.- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- createdSecretSnapshot = recovered.snapshot- createdSecretIdentityProven = recovered.identityProven+ // A create has no pre-write UID/RV to fence. Its response cannot+ // be recovered into a compensable success, even if the named+ // Secret later looks like the requested intent.+ res.status(503).json({+ error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',+ outcome: 'repair_required',+ })+ return}auditLog('secret_created', {secretName,@@ -2117,11 +2107,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {// ── Step 4: Create McpServer CRD (rollback by UID on failure) ────let createdMcpServerSnapshot: RegistryResourceSnapshot | null = null- const desiredMcpServerMutation = {- spec: mcpServerSpec,- metadata: { labels: registryLabels, annotations: registryAnnotations },- specDigest: registrySpecDigest(mcpServerSpec),- }try {const created = await gateway.createResource('mcpservers',@@ -2148,106 +2133,39 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {}} catch (err) {const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)- const ambiguousCreate =- err instanceof RegistryInstallRollbackError || !k8sErr || k8sErr.status >= 500- if (ambiguousCreate) {- const recovered = await readCreatedResourceOutcome(- gateway,- 'mcpservers',- serverName,- targetNs,- desiredMcpServerMutation,- resourceOperationId- )- if (recovered.outcome === 'not-committed') {- if (createdSecretSnapshot && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- let rollbackFailed = false- if (createdSecretSnapshot) {- try {- await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)- } catch {- rollbackFailed = true- }- }- if (rollbackFailed) {- res.status(500).json({- error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',- outcome: 'compensation_failed',- })- return- }- res.status(k8sErr?.status ?? 503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_not_committed',- outcome: 'not_committed',- })- return- }- if (recovered.outcome !== 'committed' || !recovered.snapshot) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- // A create readback has no pre-write UID to compare with. Even a- // perfect operation marker/spec match can belong to a same-name- // replacement that copied the mutable intent. It is safe to leave- // the observed object for repair, but not to report it as this- // request's commit or to make it compensable.+ if (+ err instanceof RegistryInstallRollbackError ||+ !isDeterministicRegistryNoCommit(err)+ ) {res.status(503).json({error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',outcome: 'repair_required',})return- } else {- // A conflict, timeout, or throttling response is not a proof that- // the named CR is absent. It may identify a live CR or follow an- // accepted create, so preserve the Secret for repair instead of- // deleting a dependency we cannot disassociate atomically.- if (!isDeterministicRegistryNoCommit(err)) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }+ }- // A deterministic create rejection proves there is no CR to- // compensate; only the earlier credential object needs rollback.- if (createdSecretSnapshot && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- let rollbackFailed = false- if (createdSecretSnapshot) {- try {- await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)- } catch {- rollbackFailed = true- }- }- if (rollbackFailed) {- res.status(500).json({- error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',- outcome: 'compensation_failed',- })- return- }- if (k8sErr) {- res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: k8sErr.message })- return+ // A deterministic create rejection proves there is no CR to+ // compensate; only the earlier credential object needs rollback.+ let rollbackFailed = false+ if (createdSecretSnapshot) {+ try {+ await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)+ } catch {+ rollbackFailed = true}- throw err}+ if (rollbackFailed) {+ res.status(500).json({+ error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',+ outcome: 'compensation_failed',+ })+ return+ }+ if (k8sErr) {+ res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: k8sErr.message })+ return+ }+ throw err}// ── Step 5: Update Context allowlist ──────────────────────────────@@ -2311,13 +2229,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {return}if (associationOutcome !== 'committed') {- if (createdSecretSnapshot && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }let resourceRollbackFailed = falsetry {await rollbackCreatedResource(@@ -2784,7 +2695,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {const credentials = body.credentials ?? {}const secretName = `${crName}-creds`let secretCreated = false- let createdSecretIdentityProven = falselet createdSecretSnapshot: SecretSnapshot | null = nullif (Object.keys(credentials).length > 0) {const schemaKeys = new Set((credSchema?.keys ?? []).map(k => k.name))@@ -2809,40 +2719,19 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {},REGISTRY_SECRET_WRITE_OPTIONS)- createdSecretIdentityProven = true} catch (err) {const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)if (k8sErr && k8sErr.status < 500) {res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: `Secret creation failed: ${k8sErr.message}` })return}- const recovered = await readSecretMutationOutcome(gateway, null)- if (recovered.outcome === 'not-committed') {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_not_committed',- outcome: 'not_committed',- })- return- }- if (recovered.outcome !== 'committed' || !recovered.snapshot) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- if (!recovered.identityProven) {- // A create readback cannot prove the UID was issued for this- // request. Leave the object for repair rather than treating it- // as a successful, compensable install.- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- createdSecretSnapshot = recovered.snapshot- createdSecretIdentityProven = recovered.identityProven+ // A create has no pre-write UID/RV to fence. Its response cannot+ // be recovered into a compensable success.+ res.status(503).json({+ error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',+ outcome: 'repair_required',+ })+ return}secretCreated = true}@@ -2858,13 +2747,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {try {await ensureRegistryPullSecret(gateway, targetNs)} catch (err) {- if (secretCreated && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }if (secretCreated && createdSecretSnapshot) {try {await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)@@ -2913,11 +2795,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {registryAnnotations[REGISTRY_SPEC_DIGEST_ANNOTATION] = registrySpecDigest(hookSpec)let createdHookSnapshot: RegistryResourceSnapshot | null = null- const desiredHookMutation = {- spec: hookSpec,- metadata: { labels: registryLabels, annotations: registryAnnotations },- specDigest: registrySpecDigest(hookSpec),- }try {const created = await gateway.createResource('llmhooks',@@ -2933,101 +2810,37 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {}} catch (err) {const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)- const ambiguousCreate =- err instanceof RegistryInstallRollbackError || !k8sErr || k8sErr.status >= 500- if (ambiguousCreate) {- const recovered = await readCreatedResourceOutcome(- gateway,- 'llmhooks',- crName,- targetNs,- desiredHookMutation,- resourceOperationId- )- if (recovered.outcome === 'not-committed') {- if (secretCreated && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- let rollbackFailed = false- if (secretCreated && createdSecretSnapshot) {- try {- await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)- } catch {- rollbackFailed = true- }- }- if (rollbackFailed) {- res.status(500).json({- error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',- outcome: 'compensation_failed',- })- return- }- res.status(k8sErr?.status ?? 503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_not_committed',- outcome: 'not_committed',- })- return- }- if (recovered.outcome !== 'committed' || !recovered.snapshot) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- // A create readback cannot prove that the observed UID was issued- // for this request. Do not turn a mutable marker/spec match into a- // successful install or a later compensation target.+ if (+ err instanceof RegistryInstallRollbackError ||+ !isDeterministicRegistryNoCommit(err)+ ) {res.status(503).json({error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',outcome: 'repair_required',})return- } else {- // A conflict, timeout, or throttling response is not a proof that- // the named hook is absent. Preserve its Secret for repair because- // no cross-resource transaction can prove dependency safety.- if (!isDeterministicRegistryNoCommit(err)) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_resource_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }+ }- if (secretCreated && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }- let rollbackFailed = false- if (secretCreated && createdSecretSnapshot) {- try {- await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)- } catch {- rollbackFailed = true- }- }- if (rollbackFailed) {- res.status(500).json({- error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',- outcome: 'compensation_failed',- })- return- }- if (k8sErr) {- res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: k8sErr.message })- return+ let rollbackFailed = false+ if (secretCreated && createdSecretSnapshot) {+ try {+ await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecretSnapshot)+ } catch {+ rollbackFailed = true}- throw err}+ if (rollbackFailed) {+ res.status(500).json({+ error: 'registry_install_rollback_incomplete',+ outcome: 'compensation_failed',+ })+ return+ }+ if (k8sErr) {+ res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: k8sErr.message })+ return+ }+ throw err}// Step 10 — reference the hook from Host.spec.guardrails.hooks[phase] as@@ -3089,13 +2902,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {return}if (associationOutcome !== 'committed') {- if (secretCreated && createdSecretSnapshot && !createdSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_install_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }let resourceRollbackFailed = falsetry {await rollbackCreatedResource(@@ -4009,7 +3815,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {// constrained writer, so fail closed before creating side effects.let previousSecretSnapshot: SecretSnapshot | null = nulllet secretCreatedDuringUpgrade = false- let mutatedSecretIdentityProven = falselet mutatedSecretPreconditions: SecretPreconditions | null = nulllet mutatedSecretSnapshot: SecretSnapshot | null = nullconst hasCredentialUpdates = Object.keys(credentialPayload.secretData).length > 0@@ -4087,7 +3892,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {REGISTRY_SECRET_WRITE_OPTIONS)mutatedSecretSnapshot = updatedSecret- mutatedSecretIdentityProven = truemutatedSecretPreconditions = secretPreconditions(updatedSecret)auditLog('secret_updated', {secretName,@@ -4101,7 +3905,6 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {REGISTRY_SECRET_WRITE_OPTIONS)mutatedSecretSnapshot = created- mutatedSecretIdentityProven = truesecretCreatedDuringUpgrade = truemutatedSecretPreconditions = secretPreconditions(created)auditLog('secret_created', {@@ -4117,52 +3920,28 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {return}- const recovered = await readSecretMutationOutcome(gateway, previousSecretSnapshot)- if (recovered.outcome === 'not-committed') {+ const secretOutcome = await readSecretMutationOutcome(gateway, previousSecretSnapshot)+ if (secretOutcome === 'not-committed') {res.status(503).json({error: 'registry_secret_outcome_not_committed',outcome: 'not_committed',})return}- if (recovered.outcome !== 'committed' || !recovered.snapshot) {- log.error(- {- serverName: body.serverName,- namespace,- secretName,- error: registryErrorLogFields(err),- },- 'Registry credential write outcome is ambiguous'- )- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }-- if (!recovered.identityProven) {- // `previousSecretSnapshot === null` means this was a create.- // A post-error readback has no pre-write UID proof, so returning- // success would allow an old/replaced object to masquerade as- // this upgrade's credential commit.- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }-- mutatedSecretSnapshot = recovered.snapshot- mutatedSecretIdentityProven = recovered.identityProven- secretCreatedDuringUpgrade = previousSecretSnapshot === null- mutatedSecretPreconditions = secretPreconditions(recovered.snapshot)- auditLog('secret_write_recovered_after_ambiguous_response', {- secretName,- namespace,- registryEntry: body.registryEntryName,+ log.error(+ {+ serverName: body.serverName,+ namespace,+ secretName,+ error: registryErrorLogFields(err),+ },+ 'Registry credential write outcome is ambiguous'+ )+ res.status(503).json({+ error: 'registry_secret_outcome_ambiguous',+ outcome: 'repair_required',})+ return}}@@ -4210,12 +3989,7 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {)if (mutation.outcome !== 'committed') {const err = mutation.error- const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)- const outcomeIsAmbiguous = mutation.outcome !== 'rejected'- const upgradeOutcome: RegistryMutationOutcome | null =- mutation.outcome === 'rejected' ? null : mutation.outcome-- if (outcomeIsAmbiguous && upgradeOutcome === 'ambiguous') {+ if (mutation.outcome === 'ambiguous') {log.error({serverName: body.serverName,@@ -4231,35 +4005,11 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {return}- // An ambiguous CR response is not made safe for cross-resource- // compensation merely because the identity fence proves that the- // requested CR replace did not commit. The live CR may still depend- // on the Secret, and the failed request may have been accepted by a- // different apiserver path. Preserve the credential state and make- // repair explicit until the caller can reconcile both resources.- if (upgradeOutcome === 'ambiguous' && hasCredentialUpdates) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }-- if (hasCredentialUpdates && mutatedSecretSnapshot && !mutatedSecretIdentityProven) {- res.status(503).json({- error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_ambiguous',- outcome: 'repair_required',- })- return- }-- if (upgradeOutcome !== 'ambiguous' && hasCredentialUpdates) {+ // An ambiguous CR response never reaches compensation. The live CR+ // may still depend on the credential, so repair remains the only+ // safe outcome until the caller can reconcile both resources.+ if (hasCredentialUpdates) {try {- if (!mutatedSecretPreconditions) {- throw Object.assign(new Error('mutated Secret identity unavailable'), {- code: 'secret_identity_unavailable',- })- }if (secretCreatedDuringUpgrade) {const createdSecret = mutatedSecretSnapshotif (!createdSecret) {@@ -4269,6 +4019,11 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {}await rollbackCreatedSecret(gateway, createdSecret)} else if (previousSecretSnapshot) {+ if (!mutatedSecretPreconditions) {+ throw Object.assign(new Error('mutated Secret identity unavailable'), {+ code: 'secret_identity_unavailable',+ })+ }await gateway.updateSecret({name: previousSecretSnapshot.name,@@ -4302,18 +4057,20 @@ export function createAdminRegistryRouter(gateway?: K8sGateway): Router {}}- if (upgradeOutcome === 'not-committed') {+ if (mutation.outcome === 'not-committed') {res.status(503).json({error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_not_committed',outcome: 'not_committed',})return- } else if (k8sErr) {+ }++ const k8sErr = extractK8sError(err)+ if (k8sErr) {res.status(k8sErr.status).json({ error: k8sErr.message })return- } else {- throw err}+ throw err}auditLog('upgrade', {serverName: body.serverName,diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.tsindex 7c86873a0..58c5f274a 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/secrets.ts@@ -13,15 +13,24 @@ import {type SecretOwnership,parseSecretOwnership,} from '../../secretOwnership.js'-import {- REGISTRY_SECRET_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS,- REGISTRY_SECRET_ROTATION_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS,-} from '../../services/secretConstraints.js'import { invalidSecretDataKeyReason } from '../../services/secretKeys.js'import { findSecretReferenceState } from '../../services/secretReferenceService.js'import { secretIdentityPreconditions } from '../../services/secretRepository.js'import { toPublicDeleteSecretSummary, toPublicSecretSummary } from '../../services/secretService.js'import { SecretPreconditions, SecretUpsertRequest } from '../../types.js'+import {+ MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,+ type McpSecretDeleteProofClaims,+ createMcpSecretDeleteProof,+ mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName,+ verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof,+} from '../../utils/auth/mcpSecretDeleteProof.js'+import {+ CONTROL_UI_ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE,+ clearHttpOnlySessionCookie,+ readCookie,+ setHttpOnlySessionCookie,+} from '../../utils/auth/sessionCookies.js'import { listHostSecrets } from './hostSecrets.js'import { isLlmHostSecret } from './llmSecretIdentity.js'@@ -76,6 +85,22 @@ function requestSecretPreconditions(raw: unknown): SecretPreconditions | null {return { uid: body.uid, resourceVersion: body.resourceVersion }}+function hasRequestedSecretIdentity(raw: unknown): boolean {+ if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return false+ return (+ Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(raw, 'uid') ||+ Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(raw, 'resourceVersion')+ )+}++function isLegacyMcpSecretDeleteBody(raw: unknown): boolean {+ return (+ raw === undefined ||+ raw === null ||+ (typeof raw === 'object' && !Array.isArray(raw) && Object.keys(raw).length === 0)+ )+}+// The plaintext data being written, merging base64 `data` and plaintext// `stringData` (stringData wins, matching Kubernetes Secret semantics).function effectiveSecretData(body: unknown): Record<string, string> {@@ -538,15 +563,37 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {const created = await gateway.createSecret(secretReq)const identity = secretIdentityPreconditions(created)- if (!identity) {+ const completeIdentity =+ identity?.uid && identity.resourceVersion+ ? { uid: identity.uid, resourceVersion: identity.resourceVersion }+ : null+ if (!completeIdentity) {res.status(503).json({ error: 'secret_identity_unavailable', outcome: 'repair_required' })return}+ const sessionToken = readCookie(req, CONTROL_UI_ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE)+ if (sessionToken) {+ setHttpOnlySessionCookie(+ req,+ res,+ mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName(secretReq.name),+ createMcpSecretDeleteProof(+ {+ name: secretReq.name,+ namespace: targetNs,+ uid: completeIdentity.uid,+ resourceVersion: completeIdentity.resourceVersion,+ },+ sessionToken+ ),+ MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS+ )+ }res.status(201).json({name: name.trim(),namespace: targetNs,- uid: identity.uid,- resourceVersion: identity.resourceVersion,+ uid: completeIdentity.uid,+ resourceVersion: completeIdentity.resourceVersion,created: true,})})@@ -667,18 +714,11 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {res.status(503).json({ error: 'secret_identity_unavailable', outcome: 'repair_required' })return}- const existingAnnotations = existing.metadata?.annotations- const isRegistryManaged = REGISTRY_SECRET_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS.every(- key => typeof existingAnnotations?.[key] === 'string'- )- const preserveRegistryAnnotations = isRegistryManaged- ? {- allowExistingPlatformAnnotationKeys: REGISTRY_SECRET_ROTATION_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS,- }- : undefinedconst merged = await gateway.mergeSecret({ name, namespace: targetNs, stringData: data },- preserveRegistryAnnotations,+ // Public rotation has no metadata capability; the optional constraints+ // parameter precedes the UID fence in the gateway contract.+ undefined,precondition)@@ -758,10 +798,42 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {}const name = req.params.name.trim()const requestedPrecondition = requestSecretPreconditions(req.body)- if (!requestedPrecondition) {+ if (hasRequestedSecretIdentity(req.body) && !requestedPrecondition) {res.status(428).json({ error: 'secret_identity_precondition_required' })return}+ let deletePrecondition: SecretPreconditions+ let signedCreateProof: McpSecretDeleteProofClaims | null = null+ if (requestedPrecondition) {+ // Current clients send the identity returned by POST and retain the+ // established compare-and-delete contract.+ deletePrecondition = requestedPrecondition+ } else {+ // Only the historical empty DELETE body can use the stateless rollback+ // proof minted during this browser session's successful create. Any+ // other body must use the normal complete identity contract.+ if (!isLegacyMcpSecretDeleteBody(req.body)) {+ res.status(428).json({ error: 'secret_identity_precondition_required' })+ return+ }+ const sessionToken = readCookie(req, CONTROL_UI_ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE)+ const proofCookieName = mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName(name)+ const proofCookie = readCookie(req, proofCookieName)+ const candidateProof =+ sessionToken && proofCookie ? verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(proofCookie, sessionToken) : null+ signedCreateProof =+ candidateProof?.name === name && candidateProof.namespace === config.mcpServersNamespace+ ? candidateProof+ : null+ if (!signedCreateProof) {+ res.status(428).json({ error: 'secret_identity_precondition_required' })+ return+ }+ deletePrecondition = {+ uid: signedCreateProof.uid,+ resourceVersion: signedCreateProof.resourceVersion,+ }+ }let existing: {metadata?: { labels?: Record<string, string>; uid?: string; resourceVersion?: string }} | null@@ -784,8 +856,8 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {return}if (- currentPrecondition.uid !== requestedPrecondition.uid ||- currentPrecondition.resourceVersion !== requestedPrecondition.resourceVersion+ currentPrecondition.uid !== deletePrecondition.uid ||+ currentPrecondition.resourceVersion !== deletePrecondition.resourceVersion) {res.status(409).json({ error: 'secret_identity_changed', outcome: 'repair_required' })return@@ -811,12 +883,33 @@ export function createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {.json({ error: 'mcp_secret_reference_check_unavailable', outcome: 'repair_required' })return}- const deleted = await gateway.deleteSecret(- name,- config.mcpServersNamespace,- requestedPrecondition- )- res.status(200).json(toPublicDeleteSecretSummary(deleted))+ if (signedCreateProof) {+ logger.warn(+ {+ module: 'admin-secrets',+ event: 'mcp-secret-delete-legacy-signed-create-proof',+ name,+ namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ preconditionSource: 'signed-create-proof',+ },+ 'MCP Secret delete used signed create proof'+ )+ }+ try {+ const deleted = await gateway.deleteSecret(+ name,+ config.mcpServersNamespace,+ deletePrecondition+ )+ clearHttpOnlySessionCookie(req, res, mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName(name))+ res.status(200).json(toPublicDeleteSecretSummary(deleted))+ } catch (err) {+ if (extractHttpStatus(err) === 409) {+ res.status(409).json({ error: 'secret_identity_changed', outcome: 'repair_required' })+ return+ }+ throw err+ }}))diff --git a/control-api/src/services/registryClient.ts b/control-api/src/services/registryClient.tsindex 17c1c798a..3f05745c4 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/registryClient.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/registryClient.ts@@ -599,44 +599,76 @@ export async function publishEntry(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unkno// These proxy the registry's per-org owner surface (delivered by the machine-// grant + owner-entries registry PRs). Unlike registryFetch, this helper:// • is 204/empty-aware (revokes return 204 with no body — res.json() would 500),-// • throws a RegistryProxyError carrying BOTH the upstream status AND the parsed-// { error: <code> } body, so the admin route can forward it verbatim to the UI-// (status alone can't disambiguate self_grant / grantee_reserved / plugin_public,-// all 400). Mirrors routes/admin/workflows/grants.routes.ts's typed passthrough.+// • throws a RegistryProxyError carrying the upstream status plus a narrowly+// allowlisted error code, so the admin route can preserve the UI's typed+// grant errors without reflecting arbitrary upstream diagnostics.// Built on authedFetch (machine Bearer + 401-evict-retry), same as registryFetch.-/** Upstream registry error carrying the status + parsed body for verbatim proxy forwarding. */+export type RegistryProxyErrorBody = { error: string }++/** Upstream registry error carrying a status plus a safe, bounded error code. */export class RegistryProxyError extends Error {constructor(readonly status: number,- readonly body: unknown+ readonly body: RegistryProxyErrorBody) {super(`Registry ${status}`)this.name = 'RegistryProxyError'}}+// These are the only registry-owned codes that the current publisher UI renders+// specially. Keeping the values as an explicit allowlist means an upstream error+// cannot turn a raw message, HTML page, token, or credential into API output.+const SAFE_REGISTRY_PROXY_ERROR_CODES = new Set([+ 'grantee_not_found',+ 'self_grant',+ 'plugin_public',+ 'grantee_reserved',+ 'plugin_not_found',+])++function registryProxyFallbackError(status: number): RegistryProxyErrorBody {+ return { error: status >= 400 && status <= 599 ? `registry_${status}` : 'registry_error' }+}++function isJsonResponse(res: Response): boolean {+ const contentType = res.headers.get('content-type')+ if (!contentType) return false+ const mediaType = contentType.split(';', 1)[0]?.trim().toLowerCase()+ return mediaType === 'application/json' || mediaType?.endsWith('+json') === true+}++async function registryProxyErrorBody(res: Response): Promise<RegistryProxyErrorBody> {+ const fallback = registryProxyFallbackError(res.status)+ if (!isJsonResponse(res)) {+ await discardResponseBody(res)+ return fallback+ }+ try {+ const parsed = (await res.json()) as unknown+ if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) return fallback+ const error = (parsed as { error?: unknown }).error+ if (typeof error !== 'string' || !SAFE_REGISTRY_PROXY_ERROR_CODES.has(error)) return fallback+ return { error }+ } catch {+ return fallback+ }+}+async function orgRegistryFetch<T>(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<T> {const res = await authedFetch(path, init)if (!res.ok) {// A persistent 401 (authedFetch already evict-retried once) is a machine-token /// integration fault, NOT the admin's session — remap to 502 at the transport so// every caller is protected and control-ui never force-logs-out on it. A 403- // (e.g. tenant client lacks registry:grant) is a real authz signal, forwarded verbatim.+ // (e.g. tenant client lacks registry:grant) keeps its status and, when known,+ // its safe typed code.if (res.status === 401) {+ await discardResponseBody(res)throw new RegistryProxyError(502, { error: 'registry_integration_error' })}- const text = await res.text()- let body: unknown- try {- // Preserve the registry's typed { error:<code> } body verbatim; a non-JSON error- // body (HTML gateway page, plaintext) collapses to a synthetic code rather than- // reflecting arbitrary upstream markup as the machine-readable error.- body = text ? JSON.parse(text) : { error: `registry_${res.status}` }- } catch {- body = { error: `registry_${res.status}` }- }- throw new RegistryProxyError(res.status, body)+ throw new RegistryProxyError(res.status, await registryProxyErrorBody(res))}// Empty body (204 or any empty 2xx) → undefined. A non-empty non-JSON 2xx body is an// integration fault, surfaced as a typed 502 rather than a raw SyntaxError → 500.diff --git a/control-api/src/services/registryMutation.ts b/control-api/src/services/registryMutation.tsindex 420f3f597..d19ca285d 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/registryMutation.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/registryMutation.ts@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ export const REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/registry-operation-idexport const REGISTRY_SPEC_DIGEST_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/registry-spec-sha256'export type RegistryMutationOutcome = 'committed' | 'not-committed' | 'ambiguous'+export type RegistryMutationReadbackOutcome = 'committed' | 'ambiguous'export type RegistryResourceSnapshot = {metadata?: {@@ -48,38 +49,6 @@ export function registrySpecDigest(spec: Record<string, unknown>): string {return createHash('sha256').update(canonicalRegistryJson(spec)).digest('hex')}-/**- * Classify a create response that may have been lost after the object committed.- *- * `committed` here means that the observed object carries this operation's complete- * intent. A create readback has no pre-write UID to compare against, so it does NOT- * prove that the observed UID is the object created by this request. Callers may use- * the result to finish an idempotent success, but must mark the snapshot as- * non-compensable until a direct create response supplied its identity.- */-export function classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback(input: {- current: RegistryResourceSnapshot | null- desired: RegistryMutationDesired- operationId: string-}): RegistryMutationOutcome {- const metadata = input.current?.metadata- if (- !metadata ||- typeof metadata.uid !== 'string' ||- typeof metadata.resourceVersion !== 'string'- ) {- return 'ambiguous'- }- if (metadata.annotations?.[REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION] !== input.operationId) {- return 'ambiguous'- }- if (registrySpecDigest(input.current?.spec ?? {}) !== input.desired.specDigest) {- return 'ambiguous'- }- if (!metadataSubsetMatches(metadata, input.desired.metadata)) return 'ambiguous'- return 'committed'-}-function metadataSubsetMatches(current: RegistryResourceSnapshot['metadata'],expected: RegistryResourceSnapshot['metadata']@@ -105,7 +74,7 @@ export function classifyRegistryMutationReadback(input: {desired: RegistryMutationDesiredcurrent: RegistryResourceSnapshotoperationId: string-}): RegistryMutationOutcome {+}): RegistryMutationReadbackOutcome {const beforeMeta = input.before.metadataconst currentMeta = input.current.metadataif (!beforeMeta?.uid || !beforeMeta.resourceVersion || !currentMeta?.uid) return 'ambiguous'@@ -135,7 +104,7 @@ export function classifyRegistryAssociationReadback(input: {before: RegistryResourceSnapshotcurrent: RegistryResourceSnapshot | nullisCommitted: (spec: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean-}): RegistryMutationOutcome {+}): RegistryMutationReadbackOutcome {const beforeMeta = input.before.metadataconst currentMeta = input.current?.metadataif (@@ -153,11 +122,5 @@ export function classifyRegistryAssociationReadback(input: {) {return 'committed'}- if (- currentMeta.resourceVersion === beforeMeta.resourceVersion &&- registrySpecDigest(input.current?.spec ?? {}) === registrySpecDigest(input.before.spec ?? {})- ) {- return 'not-committed'- }return 'ambiguous'}diff --git a/control-api/src/services/resourceService.ts b/control-api/src/services/resourceService.tsindex 9aa4925ad..723e864bf 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/resourceService.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/resourceService.ts@@ -333,9 +333,11 @@ export class ResourceService {const intent = await persistHostIntent({ plural, action: 'update', namespace: ns, name })const readerUid = body.metadata?.uid || undefinedconst readerResourceVersion = body.metadata?.resourceVersion || undefined- // With a reader-supplied precondition a retry can never succeed with the- // same payload, so the loop collapses to a single attempt.- const maxAttempts = readerResourceVersion || readerUid ? 1 : 3+ // A reader resourceVersion freezes the caller's edit and must not be retried:+ // re-reading then replaying that stale payload would lose a concurrent update.+ // A UID alone guards only against same-name delete/recreate, so it keeps the+ // legacy bounded retry contract while every fresh read revalidates identity.+ const maxAttempts = readerResourceVersion ? 1 : 3for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt += 1) {const current = (attempt === 1 && options?.preReadCurrent@@ -382,7 +384,7 @@ export class ResourceService {metadata: {name,namespace: ns,- ...(readerUid && current.metadata?.uid ? { uid: current.metadata.uid } : {}),+ ...(readerUid ? { uid: readerUid } : {}),...(current.metadata?.labels && { labels: current.metadata.labels }),...(sanitizedMetadata?.labels && { labels: sanitizedMetadata.labels }),...(annotations && { annotations }),diff --git a/control-api/src/services/secretConstraints.ts b/control-api/src/services/secretConstraints.tsindex a606ab38d..d07eeb432 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/secretConstraints.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/secretConstraints.ts@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@import { SecretUpsertRequest } from '../types.js'+import { REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION } from './registryMutation.js'export const ALLOWED_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = ['Opaque',@@ -6,6 +7,18 @@ export const ALLOWED_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = ['kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson',]+/**+ * Existing Secret types are normally safe to preserve. These are the narrow+ * exceptions whose lifecycle is owned by Kubernetes bootstrap controllers or+ * Helm, so control-api must not mutate their data or metadata. In particular,+ * basic-auth, ssh-auth, and custom types remain valid preserved state.+ */+const NON_MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = [+ 'kubernetes.io/service-account-token',+ 'bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token',+ 'helm.sh/release.v1',+]+const INFRA_ANNOTATION_PREFIXES: readonly string[] = ['kubectl.kubernetes.io/','kubernetes.io/',@@ -29,7 +42,7 @@ export const REGISTRY_SECRET_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS = [] as const/** Operation marker used only by the internal Registry mutation capability. */-export const REGISTRY_SECRET_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/registry-operation-id'+export const REGISTRY_SECRET_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION = REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION/** Platform keys a public Registry credential rotation may preserve, never assign. */export const REGISTRY_SECRET_ROTATION_PRESERVED_ANNOTATION_KEYS = [@@ -84,6 +97,10 @@ function secretTypeErrorMessage(type: string): string {return `Secret type "${type}" is not allowed; must be one of: ${ALLOWED_SECRET_TYPES.join(', ')}`}+function managedSecretTypeErrorMessage(type: string): string {+ return `Secret type "${type}" is managed by Kubernetes or Helm and cannot be mutated`+}+function annotationKeyErrorMessage(key: string, prefixes: readonly string[]): string {return `annotation key "${key}" is not allowed: keys starting with ${prefixes.map(p => `"${p}"`).join(' or ')} are reserved`}@@ -91,8 +108,8 @@ function annotationKeyErrorMessage(key: string, prefixes: readonly string[]): stexport class InvalidSecretTypeError extends Error {readonly status = 400readonly type: string- constructor(type: string) {- super(secretTypeErrorMessage(type))+ constructor(type: string, message = secretTypeErrorMessage(type)) {+ super(message)this.name = 'InvalidSecretTypeError'this.type = type}@@ -124,27 +141,18 @@ export function dangerousAnnotationKeyReason(: null}-/**- * Existing infrastructure metadata is preserved as an opaque server-owned- * value. It is not a caller assignment, so it is safe to carry through a- * mutation; platform metadata remains constrained by capability or an exact- * preservation allowlist.- */-export function existingSecretAnnotationKeyReason(- key: string,- opts?: SecretConstraintOptions-): string | null {- if (isInfrastructureAnnotationKey(key)) return null- if (opts?.allowExistingPlatformAnnotationKeys?.includes(key)) return null- return dangerousAnnotationKeyReason(key, opts)-}-export function assertValidSecretType(type: string): void {if (invalidSecretTypeReason(type) !== null) {throw new InvalidSecretTypeError(type)}}+export function assertMutablePreservedSecretType(type: string | undefined): void {+ if (type !== undefined && NON_MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES.includes(type)) {+ throw new InvalidSecretTypeError(type, managedSecretTypeErrorMessage(type))+ }+}+export function assertValidSecretAnnotations(annotations: Record<string, string> | undefined,opts?: SecretConstraintOptions,@@ -166,55 +174,23 @@ export function assertValidSecretAnnotations(}}-/**- * Validate metadata already present on an existing Secret. Public mutation- * routes may preserve a narrow, verified platform-owned annotation pair, but- * their request payloads remain subject to assertValidSecretAnnotations().- */-export function assertValidExistingSecretAnnotations(- annotations: Record<string, string> | undefined,- opts?: SecretConstraintOptions-): void {- // Existing platform metadata is opaque state owned by the component that- // wrote it. A data-only mutation does not claim or rewrite that metadata, so- // an unknown/future `clerum.io/` key must not brick future rotations. The- // transition validator above still rejects a caller that introduces or- // changes a reserved key; this function intentionally validates no existing- // key in isolation.- void annotations- void opts-}-export function assertValidSecretConstraints(req: SecretUpsertRequest,opts?: SecretConstraintOptions,existingAnnotations?: Record<string, string>): void {- // Type validation fires only on explicit type assignment. When req.type is- // undefined, the write method defaults to 'Opaque' (create) or preserves- // the existing type (update/merge) — no attacker-controlled type enters.+ // The allowlist applies only to an explicit caller assignment. A preserved+ // type is checked separately against the narrow controller-owned denylist.if (req.type !== undefined) {assertValidSecretType(req.type)}assertValidSecretAnnotations(req.annotations, opts, existingAnnotations)}-/** Validate the complete state that a mutation will leave behind. */-export function assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints(- req: SecretUpsertRequest,- opts?: SecretConstraintOptions-): void {- if (req.type !== undefined) {- assertValidSecretType(req.type)- }- assertValidExistingSecretAnnotations(req.annotations, opts)-}-/*** Resolve the annotation map a full replacement is allowed to leave behind.- * Caller-owned keys retain full-replace semantics. Infrastructure metadata is- * transport-only, while platform metadata is either capability-owned or an- * exact existing-key preservation granted to a narrow partial writer.+ * Requested reserved keys must match the live value; omitted protected keys+ * are carried forward. Caller-owned keys retain full-replace semantics.*/export function resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(existingAnnotations: Record<string, string> | undefined,@@ -226,7 +202,6 @@ export function resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(}assertValidSecretAnnotations(requestedAnnotations, opts, existingAnnotations)- assertValidExistingSecretAnnotations(existingAnnotations, opts)const resolved: Record<string, string> = { ...requestedAnnotations }for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(existingAnnotations ?? {})) {diff --git a/control-api/src/services/secretReferenceService.ts b/control-api/src/services/secretReferenceService.tsindex 4601e0be6..f5bdce767 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/secretReferenceService.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/secretReferenceService.ts@@ -7,84 +7,288 @@ export type SecretReferenceReader = {listResource: (plural: ClerumResourceType, namespace?: string) => Promise<unknown[]>}+export const SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION = 'clerum.io/secret-reference-contract'+export const SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_VERSION = 1++/**+ * Namespace resolution is part of a Secret reference's meaning. A matching+ * name in another namespace is not a dependency and must not block a safe+ * rollback.+ */+export type SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding =+ | 'resource'+ | 'host-secret'+ | 'reference-value'+ | 'workflow-recipe'+ | 'workflow-workload'++export type SecretReferenceFieldContract = {+ path: string+ namespaceBinding: SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding+}++export type SecretReferenceCrdContract = {+ plural: string+ fields: readonly SecretReferenceFieldContract[]+}++/**+ * Runtime source of truth for Secret consumers. Each CRD carries the same+ * versioned contract in metadata.annotations so schema changes cannot silently+ * expand or shrink this cleanup boundary.+ *+ * Do not add a generic `*Ref` traversal here. Some CRDs expose ordinary+ * resource references with the same shape, and treating those as Secret+ * consumers would retain unrelated objects during compensation.+ */+export const SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS = [+ {+ plural: 'communicationchannels',+ fields: [{ path: 'spec.credentialsSecretRef', namespaceBinding: 'resource' }],+ },+ { plural: 'contexts', fields: [] },+ { plural: 'globalfilesystems', fields: [] },+ {+ plural: 'hosts',+ fields: [{ path: 'spec.secretRef', namespaceBinding: 'host-secret' }],+ },+ {+ plural: 'llmhooks',+ fields: [+ { path: 'spec.target.image.imagePullSecrets', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ { path: 'spec.target.image.envSecret', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ { path: 'spec.target.remote.authHeadersSecret', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ ],+ },+ {+ plural: 'mcpservers',+ fields: [+ { path: 'spec.auth.secretRef', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ { path: 'spec.envSecret', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ { path: 'spec.imagePullSecrets', namespaceBinding: 'resource' },+ ],+ },+ { plural: 'sharedfilesystems', fields: [] },+ { plural: 'workflowrecipepolicies', fields: [] },+ {+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ fields: [+ {+ path: 'spec.agent.secretRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'reference-value',+ },+ {+ path: 'spec.steps[].run.capabilities.secrets[].secretRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-recipe',+ },+ { path: 'spec.workloads[].envSecret', namespaceBinding: 'workflow-workload' },+ {+ path: 'spec.workloads[].imagePullSecrets',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-workload',+ },+ {+ path: 'spec.oauthClients[].clientIdRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-recipe',+ },+ {+ path: 'spec.oauthClients[].clientSecretRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-recipe',+ },+ {+ path: 'spec.webhooks[].verification.secretRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-recipe',+ },+ {+ path: 'spec.webhooks[].verification.setupHandshake.secretRef',+ namespaceBinding: 'workflow-recipe',+ },+ ],+ },+] as const satisfies readonly SecretReferenceCrdContract[]+type ReferenceScope = {plural: ClerumResourceTyperesourceNamespace: string- secretNamespace: string+ fields: readonly SecretReferenceFieldContract[]+}++function fieldsFor(plural: string): readonly SecretReferenceFieldContract[] {+ const contract = SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS.find(candidate => candidate.plural === plural)+ if (!contract) throw new Error(`Missing Secret reference contract for CRD plural "${plural}"`)+ return contract.fields}export const SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES = [{plural: 'mcpservers',resourceNamespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,- secretNamespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ fields: fieldsFor('mcpservers'),},{plural: 'llmhooks',resourceNamespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,- secretNamespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ fields: fieldsFor('llmhooks'),},{plural: 'workflowrecipes',resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,- secretNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ fields: fieldsFor('workflowrecipes'),},{plural: 'hosts',resourceNamespace: config.hostsNamespace,- secretNamespace: config.secretsNamespace,+ fields: fieldsFor('hosts'),},{plural: 'communicationchannels',resourceNamespace: config.communicationChannelsNamespace,- secretNamespace: config.communicationChannelsNamespace,+ fields: fieldsFor('communicationchannels'),},] as const satisfies readonly ReferenceScope[]-const REFERENCE_SCOPES: readonly ReferenceScope[] = SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES+const WORKFLOW_WORKLOAD_PATH_PREFIX = 'spec.workloads[].'-// Explicitly enumerate every Secret-bearing field in the deployed CRD schemas.-// A generic "*Ref" fallback would turn unrelated resource references into false-// dependencies and make compensation behavior implicit. Keep this list aligned-// with charts/clerum-crds/crds/{mcpserver,llmhook,workflowrecipe,communicationchannel,host}.yaml.-export const SECRET_REFERENCE_FIELDS = [- 'authHeadersSecret',- 'credentialsSecretRef',- 'envSecret',- 'secretRef',- 'imagePullSecrets',- 'clientIdRef',- 'clientSecretRef',-] as const+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {+ return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)+}-const REFERENCE_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(SECRET_REFERENCE_FIELDS)+function valuesAtPath(value: unknown, path: string): unknown[] {+ let values: unknown[] = [value]-function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {- return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null+ for (const token of path.split('.')) {+ const isArray = token.endsWith('[]')+ const key = isArray ? token.slice(0, -2) : token++ values = values.flatMap(current => {+ if (!isRecord(current) || !Object.hasOwn(current, key)) return []+ const child = current[key]+ if (isArray) return Array.isArray(child) ? child : []+ return [child]+ })+ }++ return values}function referenceValueMatches(value: unknown, name: string): boolean {if (typeof value === 'string') return value === nameif (Array.isArray(value)) return value.some(item => referenceValueMatches(item, name))- if (!isRecord(value)) return false- return value.name === name+ return isRecord(value) && value.name === name}-function containsSecretReference(value: unknown, name: string, seen = new Set<object>()): boolean {- if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false- if (seen.has(value)) return false- seen.add(value)+function workflowWorkloadNamespace(+ workload: Record<string, unknown>,+ uiWorkloadRef: string | undefined+): string {+ // Keep this three-way split aligned with the WorkflowRecipe runtime's+ // resolveWorkloadNamespace contract: transport → mcp-server, UI →+ // sandbox-ui, all other workloads → sandbox-recipes.+ if (workload.transport !== undefined && workload.transport !== null) {+ return config.mcpServersNamespace+ }+ if (uiWorkloadRef && workload.id === uiWorkloadRef) return config.sandboxUiNamespace+ return config.sandboxNamespace+}- if (Array.isArray(value)) {- return value.some(item => containsSecretReference(item, name, seen))+function workflowWorkloadReferenceMatches(+ resource: unknown,+ field: SecretReferenceFieldContract,+ name: string,+ namespace: string+): boolean {+ if (!field.path.startsWith(WORKFLOW_WORKLOAD_PATH_PREFIX)) {+ throw new Error(`Invalid workflow-workload Secret reference path "${field.path}"`)}- return Object.entries(value).some(([key, child]) => {- if (REFERENCE_KEYS.has(key) && referenceValueMatches(child, name)) return true- return containsSecretReference(child, name, seen)+ const [uiWorkloadRef] = valuesAtPath(resource, 'spec.ui.workloadRef')+ const uiRef = typeof uiWorkloadRef === 'string' ? uiWorkloadRef : undefined+ const relativePath = field.path.slice(WORKFLOW_WORKLOAD_PATH_PREFIX.length)++ return valuesAtPath(resource, 'spec.workloads[]').some(workload => {+ if (!isRecord(workload) || workflowWorkloadNamespace(workload, uiRef) !== namespace)+ return false+ return valuesAtPath(workload, relativePath).some(value => referenceValueMatches(value, name))})}+function namespaceBindingApplies(+ binding: SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding,+ resourceNamespace: string,+ namespace: string+): boolean {+ switch (binding) {+ case 'resource':+ return resourceNamespace === namespace+ case 'host-secret':+ return config.secretsNamespace === namespace+ case 'reference-value':+ return [+ config.secretsNamespace,+ config.sandboxNamespace,+ config.mcpServersNamespace,+ config.sandboxUiNamespace,+ config.llmHooksNamespace,+ config.communicationChannelsNamespace,+ ].includes(namespace)+ case 'workflow-recipe':+ return config.sandboxNamespace === namespace+ case 'workflow-workload':+ return (+ namespace === config.sandboxNamespace ||+ namespace === config.mcpServersNamespace ||+ namespace === config.sandboxUiNamespace+ )+ }+}++function fieldReferencesSecret(+ resource: unknown,+ field: SecretReferenceFieldContract,+ name: string,+ namespace: string+): boolean {+ if (field.namespaceBinding === 'reference-value') {+ return valuesAtPath(resource, field.path).some(value => {+ if (typeof value === 'string') {+ return value === name && namespace === config.secretsNamespace+ }+ if (!isRecord(value) || value.name !== name) return false+ const referencedNamespace =+ typeof value.namespace === 'string' && value.namespace.trim()+ ? value.namespace+ : config.secretsNamespace+ return referencedNamespace === namespace+ })+ }+ if (field.namespaceBinding === 'workflow-workload') {+ return workflowWorkloadReferenceMatches(resource, field, name, namespace)+ }+ return valuesAtPath(resource, field.path).some(value => referenceValueMatches(value, name))+}++function validateRuntimeContract(): void {+ const declaredPlurals = new Set<string>()+ for (const contract of SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS) {+ if (declaredPlurals.has(contract.plural)) {+ throw new Error(`Duplicate Secret reference contract for CRD plural "${contract.plural}"`)+ }+ declaredPlurals.add(contract.plural)+ }++ for (const scope of SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES) {+ for (const field of scope.fields) {+ if (+ field.namespaceBinding === 'workflow-workload' &&+ !field.path.startsWith(WORKFLOW_WORKLOAD_PATH_PREFIX)+ ) {+ throw new Error(`Invalid workflow-workload Secret reference path "${field.path}"`)+ }+ }+ }+}++validateRuntimeContract()+/*** Check every CRD family that can consume a namespaced Secret. A failed list is* deliberately `unknown`: compensation must preserve the object when the@@ -95,17 +299,24 @@ export async function findSecretReferenceState(name: string,namespace: string): Promise<SecretReferenceState> {- const scopes = REFERENCE_SCOPES.filter(scope => scope.secretNamespace === namespace)- if (scopes.length === 0) return 'unknown'+ const applicableScopes = SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES.map(scope => ({+ ...scope,+ fields: scope.fields.filter(field =>+ namespaceBindingApplies(field.namespaceBinding, scope.resourceNamespace, namespace)+ ),+ })).filter(scope => scope.fields.length > 0)++ if (applicableScopes.length === 0) return 'unknown'try {const resourceLists = await Promise.all(- scopes.map(scope => reader.listResource(scope.plural, scope.resourceNamespace))+ applicableScopes.map(scope => reader.listResource(scope.plural, scope.resourceNamespace)))- for (const resources of resourceLists) {+ for (const [index, resources] of resourceLists.entries()) {+ const { fields } = applicableScopes[index]if (resources.some(resource =>- containsSecretReference((resource as { spec?: unknown }).spec, name)+ fields.some(field => fieldReferencesSecret(resource, field, name, namespace)))) {return 'referenced'diff --git a/control-api/src/services/secretRepository.ts b/control-api/src/services/secretRepository.tsindex 3a187be6c..bde2b5e8e 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/secretRepository.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/secretRepository.ts@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@-import type { SecretPreconditions, SecretUpsertRequest } from '../types.js'-import type { SecretConstraintOptions } from './secretConstraints.js'+import type { SecretPreconditions } from '../types.js'/** The subset of a Kubernetes Secret that callers are allowed to observe. */export interface SecretResource {@@ -35,32 +34,6 @@ export interface SecretSnapshot {stringData?: Record<string, string>}-/** Typed boundary for every Secret mutation used by control-api. */-export interface SecretRepository {- listSecrets(namespace?: string): Promise<unknown[]>- getSecret(name: string, namespace?: string): Promise<SecretResource>- createSecret(req: SecretUpsertRequest, opts?: SecretConstraintOptions): Promise<SecretSnapshot>- updateSecret(- req: SecretUpsertRequest,- precondition?: SecretPreconditions,- opts?: SecretConstraintOptions- ): Promise<SecretSnapshot>- mergeSecret(- req: SecretUpsertRequest,- opts?: SecretConstraintOptions,- precondition?: SecretPreconditions- ): Promise<SecretSnapshot>- removeSecretKey(- req: { name: string; namespace?: string; key: string },- precondition?: SecretPreconditions- ): Promise<SecretSnapshot>- deleteSecret(- name: string,- namespace?: string,- precondition?: SecretPreconditions- ): Promise<unknown>-}-/** Convert an apiserver response into the only mutation result callers may use for CAS. */export function toSecretSnapshot(raw: unknown,diff --git a/control-api/src/services/secretService.ts b/control-api/src/services/secretService.tsindex a9afbcfac..034916fa8 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/secretService.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/secretService.ts@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ import * as k8s from '@kubernetes/client-node'import { SecretPreconditions, SecretUpsertRequest } from '../types.js'import {type SecretConstraintOptions,- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints,+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType,+ assertValidSecretAnnotations,assertValidSecretConstraints,assertValidSecretType,- isInfrastructureAnnotationKey,resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace,} from './secretConstraints.js'import { assertValidSecretDataKey, assertValidSecretWriteKeys } from './secretKeys.js'@@ -167,19 +167,12 @@ export class SecretService {precondition?: SecretPreconditions,opts?: SecretConstraintOptions): Promise<unknown> {- const hasInfrastructureAnnotations = Object.keys(req.annotations ?? {}).some(- isInfrastructureAnnotationKey- )- const carriesInternalInfrastructure =- hasInfrastructureAnnotations && opts?.capability !== undefined- if (!carriesInternalInfrastructure) {- assertValidSecretConstraints(req, opts)- } else if (req.type !== undefined) {- assertValidSecretType(req.type)- }+ if (req.type !== undefined) assertValidSecretType(req.type)assertValidSecretWriteKeys(req)const ns = req.namespace || this.defaultNamespaceconst existing = await this.coreApi.readNamespacedSecret({ namespace: ns, name: req.name })+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type)+ assertValidSecretAnnotations(req.annotations, opts, existing.metadata?.annotations)const effectiveAnnotations = resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(existing?.metadata?.annotations,req.annotations,@@ -203,25 +196,14 @@ export class SecretService {: {}),...(existing?.metadata?.finalizers ? { finalizers: existing.metadata.finalizers } : {}),},- type: req.type || existing?.type || 'Opaque',+ type: req.type ?? existing?.type ?? 'Opaque',data: req.data,stringData: req.stringData,...(typeof existing?.immutable === 'boolean' ? { immutable: existing.immutable } : {}),}- // Validate the complete replacement state, not only fields explicitly- // supplied by the caller. An existing Secret may predate these constraints;- // allowing an omitted type/annotation field to preserve a forbidden value- // would make updateSecret a write-path bypass.- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints(- {- name: req.name,- type: body.type,- annotations: body.metadata?.annotations,- },- opts- )-+ // Explicit types passed the write allowlist above. A preserved type is+ // mutable unless it belongs to a Kubernetes or Helm-managed Secret.const replaced = await this.coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret({namespace: ns,name: req.name,@@ -279,23 +261,14 @@ export class SecretService {assertValidSecretWriteKeys(req)const ns = req.namespace || this.defaultNamespaceconst existing = await this.coreApi.readNamespacedSecret({ namespace: ns, name: req.name })+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type)+ assertValidSecretAnnotations(req.annotations, opts, existing.metadata?.annotations)const effectiveAnnotations = resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(existing.metadata?.annotations,req.annotations,opts)- // Merge-patch preserves fields omitted from the patch. Validate those- // preserved fields as part of the effective target state before mutating.- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints(- {- name: req.name,- type: req.type ?? existing.type ?? 'Opaque',- annotations: effectiveAnnotations,- },- opts- )-const body: Partial<k8s.V1Secret> = {}if (req.stringData !== undefined) body.stringData = req.stringDataif (req.data !== undefined) body.data = req.data@@ -371,19 +344,10 @@ export class SecretService {assertValidSecretDataKey(req.key)const ns = req.namespace || this.defaultNamespaceconst existing = await this.coreApi.readNamespacedSecret({ namespace: ns, name: req.name })- const effectiveAnnotations = resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(- existing.metadata?.annotations,- undefined- )- // Removing one data key still mutates the Secret. Preserve unchanged- // infrastructure metadata while applying the same effective-state checks- // as the other mutation paths.- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints({- name: req.name,- type: existing.type ?? 'Opaque',- annotations: effectiveAnnotations,- })+ // Removing one data key still mutates the Secret, so controller-owned+ // Secret types remain off limits here too.+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type ?? 'Opaque')const body = {...(precondition && {diff --git a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpSecretDeleteProof.ts b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpSecretDeleteProof.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..16bbf8deb--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpSecretDeleteProof.ts@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@+import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'++export const MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS = 120++export type McpSecretDeleteProofInput = {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ uid: string+ resourceVersion: string+}++export type McpSecretDeleteProofClaims = McpSecretDeleteProofInput & {+ exp: number+}++const CLAIM_KEYS = ['name', 'namespace', 'uid', 'resourceVersion', 'exp'] as const+const COOKIE_NAME_PREFIX = 'mcp_secret_delete_proof_'++function isNonEmptyString(value: unknown): value is string {+ return typeof value === 'string' && value.trim().length > 0+}++function encodeClaims(claims: McpSecretDeleteProofClaims): string {+ return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims), 'utf8').toString('base64url')+}++function sign(encodedClaims: string, sessionKey: string): Buffer {+ return createHmac('sha256', sessionKey).update(encodedClaims, 'utf8').digest()+}++function parseClaims(encodedClaims: string): McpSecretDeleteProofClaims | null {+ if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(encodedClaims)) return null++ let raw: unknown+ try {+ const decoded = Buffer.from(encodedClaims, 'base64url')+ if (decoded.toString('base64url') !== encodedClaims) return null+ raw = JSON.parse(decoded.toString('utf8'))+ } catch {+ return null+ }++ if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return null+ const claims = raw as Record<string, unknown>+ if (+ Object.keys(claims).length !== CLAIM_KEYS.length ||+ !CLAIM_KEYS.every(key => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(claims, key)) ||+ !isNonEmptyString(claims.name) ||+ !isNonEmptyString(claims.namespace) ||+ !isNonEmptyString(claims.uid) ||+ !isNonEmptyString(claims.resourceVersion) ||+ typeof claims.exp !== 'number' ||+ !Number.isSafeInteger(claims.exp)+ ) {+ return null+ }++ return {+ name: claims.name,+ namespace: claims.namespace,+ uid: claims.uid,+ resourceVersion: claims.resourceVersion,+ exp: claims.exp,+ }+}++export function mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName(name: string): string {+ return `${COOKIE_NAME_PREFIX}${Buffer.from(name, 'utf8').toString('base64url')}`+}++export function createMcpSecretDeleteProof(+ input: McpSecretDeleteProofInput,+ sessionKey: string+): string {+ if (!sessionKey) throw new Error('Admin session is required to issue an MCP Secret delete proof')++ const claims: McpSecretDeleteProofClaims = {+ name: input.name,+ namespace: input.namespace,+ uid: input.uid,+ resourceVersion: input.resourceVersion,+ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,+ }+ const encodedClaims = encodeClaims(claims)+ return `${encodedClaims}.${sign(encodedClaims, sessionKey).toString('base64url')}`+}++export function verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(+ proof: string,+ sessionKey: string+): McpSecretDeleteProofClaims | null {+ if (!proof || !sessionKey) return null++ const [encodedClaims, encodedSignature, ...rest] = proof.split('.')+ if (+ !encodedClaims ||+ !encodedSignature ||+ rest.length > 0 ||+ !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(encodedSignature)+ ) {+ return null+ }++ const claims = parseClaims(encodedClaims)+ if (!claims) return null++ let suppliedSignature: Buffer+ try {+ suppliedSignature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, 'base64url')+ } catch {+ return null+ }+ const expectedSignature = sign(encodedClaims, sessionKey)+ if (+ suppliedSignature.length !== expectedSignature.length ||+ suppliedSignature.toString('base64url') !== encodedSignature ||+ !timingSafeEqual(suppliedSignature, expectedSignature)+ ) {+ return null+ }++ if (claims.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) return null+ return claims+}diff --git a/control-api/test/crd.secretReferenceCoverage.test.ts b/control-api/test/crd.secretReferenceCoverage.test.tsindex 6bdea7a56..43b9e81f7 100644--- a/control-api/test/crd.secretReferenceCoverage.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/crd.secretReferenceCoverage.test.ts@@ -4,15 +4,55 @@ import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path'import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'import { parse } from 'yaml'import {- SECRET_REFERENCE_FIELDS,+ SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION,+ SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_VERSION,+ SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS,SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES,+ type SecretReferenceCrdContract,+ type SecretReferenceFieldContract,+ type SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding,} from '../src/services/secretReferenceService.js'const crdsDir = resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '../../charts/clerum-crds/crds')+const namespaceBindings = new Set<SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding>([+ 'resource',+ 'host-secret',+ 'reference-value',+ 'workflow-recipe',+ 'workflow-workload',+])++/**+ * Every schema field whose name looks reference/credential-related must be+ * classified. These paths are explicitly non-Secret references (or keys+ * inside an already-contracted Secret reference). A new `*Ref`, `*Secret`, or+ * `*Credential*` field therefore fails closed until a reviewer puts it in the+ * runtime contract or this narrow exclusion inventory.+ */+const NON_SECRET_REFERENCE_PATHS = new Set([+ 'communicationchannel.yaml:spec.hostRef',+ 'host.yaml:spec.contextRef',+ 'host.yaml:spec.llmPolicy.fallbacks[].credentialSlot',+ 'llmhook.yaml:spec.target.image.ref',+ 'mcpserver.yaml:spec.auth.secretKey',+ 'mcpserver.yaml:spec.contextRef',+ 'mcpserver.yaml:spec.envSecret.keys[].secretKey',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.agent.soulRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.agent.soulRef.storageRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.contextRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.security.allowContextRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.steps[].run.capabilities.secrets',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.ui.egress.internal[].workloadRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.ui.workloadRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.webhooks[].workloadRef',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:spec.workloads[].envSecret.keys[].secretKey',+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml:status.pluginWorkloadSdk.defaultTargetRef',+ 'workflowrecipepolicy.yaml:spec.allowContextRef',+])+type OpenApiSchema = {description?: unknown- type?: unknownproperties?: unknownitems?: unknownallOf?: unknown@@ -20,73 +60,382 @@ type OpenApiSchema = {oneOf?: unknown}+type CrdSource = {+ file: string+ document: Record<string, unknown>+}++type ParsedCrd = CrdSource & {+ plural: string+ schemas: OpenApiSchema[]+}+function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {return value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)? (value as Record<string, unknown>): undefined}-function schemaDeclaresSecretReference(fieldName: string, schema: OpenApiSchema): boolean {- if (fieldName === 'imagePullSecrets') return true+function normalizeContracts(+ contracts: readonly SecretReferenceCrdContract[]+): Array<{ plural: string; fields: SecretReferenceFieldContract[] }> {+ return contracts+ .map(contract => ({+ plural: contract.plural,+ fields: [...contract.fields].sort(+ (left, right) =>+ left.path.localeCompare(right.path) ||+ left.namespaceBinding.localeCompare(right.namespaceBinding)+ ),+ }))+ .sort((left, right) => left.plural.localeCompare(right.plural))+}- const description = typeof schema.description === 'string' ? schema.description : ''- if (!/\bSecret\b/.test(description) || /secret.*key$/i.test(fieldName)) return false- if (/secret/i.test(fieldName)) return true- if (!fieldName.endsWith('Ref')) return false+function loadCrdSources(): CrdSource[] {+ return readdirSync(crdsDir)+ .filter(file => file.endsWith('.yaml'))+ .sort()+ .map(file => {+ const document = asRecord(parse(readFileSync(resolve(crdsDir, file), 'utf8')))+ if (!document) throw new Error(`Invalid CRD document: ${file}`)+ return { file, document }+ })+}++function parseCrd(source: CrdSource, errors: string[]): ParsedCrd | undefined {+ const metadata = asRecord(source.document.metadata)+ const spec = asRecord(source.document.spec)+ const names = asRecord(spec?.names)+ const plural = typeof names?.plural === 'string' ? names.plural : undefined+ const versions = spec?.versions+ if (!metadata || !spec || !plural || !Array.isArray(versions)) {+ errors.push(`${source.file}: invalid CRD metadata, names.plural, or versions`)+ return undefined+ }- const properties = asRecord(schema.properties)- return schema.type === 'string' || properties?.name !== undefined+ const schemas = versions.flatMap((version, index) => {+ const schema = asRecord(asRecord(asRecord(version)?.schema)?.openAPIV3Schema)+ if (!schema) {+ errors.push(`${source.file}: version ${index} has no openAPIV3Schema`)+ return []+ }+ return [schema]+ })++ return { ...source, plural, schemas }}-function collectSecretReferenceFields(schema: unknown, fields: Set<string>): void {- const record = asRecord(schema)- if (!record) return+function isContractPath(path: string): boolean {+ return /^spec(?:\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*(?:\[\])?)+$/.test(path)+}- const properties = asRecord(record.properties)- if (properties) {- for (const [fieldName, value] of Object.entries(properties)) {- const fieldSchema = asRecord(value) as OpenApiSchema | undefined- if (fieldSchema && schemaDeclaresSecretReference(fieldName, fieldSchema)) {- fields.add(fieldName)- }- collectSecretReferenceFields(value, fields)+function isNamespaceBinding(value: unknown): value is SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding {+ return (+ typeof value === 'string' && namespaceBindings.has(value as SecretReferenceNamespaceBinding)+ )+}++function parseCrdContract(+ crd: ParsedCrd,+ errors: string[]+): SecretReferenceCrdContract | undefined {+ const annotations = asRecord(asRecord(crd.document.metadata)?.annotations)+ const rawContract = annotations?.[SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION]+ if (typeof rawContract !== 'string') {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: missing ${SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION} annotation`)+ return undefined+ }++ let value: unknown+ try {+ value = JSON.parse(rawContract)+ } catch {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: ${SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION} must contain JSON`)+ return undefined+ }++ const contract = asRecord(value)+ if (!contract || contract.version !== SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_VERSION) {+ errors.push(+ `${crd.file}: ${SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION} must declare version ${SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_VERSION}`+ )+ return undefined+ }+ if (typeof contract.plural !== 'string' || contract.plural.length === 0) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: Secret reference contract must declare a plural`)+ return undefined+ }+ if (!Array.isArray(contract.fields)) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: Secret reference contract fields must be an array`)+ return undefined+ }++ const fields: SecretReferenceFieldContract[] = []+ const paths = new Set<string>()+ contract.fields.forEach((value, index) => {+ const field = asRecord(value)+ const path = field?.path+ const namespaceBinding = field?.namespaceBinding+ if (+ typeof path !== 'string' ||+ !isContractPath(path) ||+ !isNamespaceBinding(namespaceBinding)+ ) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: invalid Secret reference contract field at index ${index}`)+ return+ }+ if (paths.has(path)) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: duplicate Secret reference contract path ${path}`)+ return}+ paths.add(path)+ fields.push({ path, namespaceBinding })+ })++ return { plural: contract.plural, fields }+}++function schemaAtPath(schema: OpenApiSchema, path: string): OpenApiSchema | undefined {+ let current: OpenApiSchema | undefined = schema+ for (const token of path.split('.')) {+ const isArray = token.endsWith('[]')+ const fieldName = isArray ? token.slice(0, -2) : token+ const properties = asRecord(current?.properties)+ const field = asRecord(properties?.[fieldName])+ if (!field) return undefined+ current = isArray ? (asRecord(field.items) as OpenApiSchema | undefined) : field+ if (!current) return undefined}+ return current+}++function hasDescription(schema: OpenApiSchema): boolean {+ return typeof schema.description === 'string' && schema.description.trim().length > 0+}++/**+ * The contract is the source of truth; this narrow structural check only keeps+ * an obvious new credential-shaped object from being added without a contract.+ * It deliberately ignores generic `{ name, key }` objects whose field name has+ * no Secret/credential meaning, avoiding broad `*Ref` false positives.+ */+function isSecretReferenceCandidate(fieldName: string, schema: OpenApiSchema): boolean {+ void schema+ return /(secret|credential)/i.test(fieldName) || /ref$/i.test(fieldName)+}++function collectSecretReferenceCandidates(schema: OpenApiSchema, path = ''): string[] {+ const candidates = new Set<string>()++ const walk = (current: OpenApiSchema, prefix: string): void => {+ const properties = asRecord(current.properties)+ if (properties) {+ for (const [fieldName, value] of Object.entries(properties)) {+ const field = asRecord(value) as OpenApiSchema | undefined+ if (!field) continue+ const fieldPath = prefix ? `${prefix}.${fieldName}` : fieldName+ if (isSecretReferenceCandidate(fieldName, field)) candidates.add(fieldPath)+ walk(field, fieldPath)+ }+ }- collectSecretReferenceFields(record.items, fields)- for (const branch of [record.allOf, record.anyOf, record.oneOf]) {- if (Array.isArray(branch)) branch.forEach(item => collectSecretReferenceFields(item, fields))+ const items = asRecord(current.items) as OpenApiSchema | undefined+ if (items) walk(items, `${prefix}[]`)+ for (const branches of [current.allOf, current.anyOf, current.oneOf]) {+ if (Array.isArray(branches)) {+ branches.forEach(branch => {+ const branchSchema = asRecord(branch) as OpenApiSchema | undefined+ if (branchSchema) walk(branchSchema, prefix)+ })+ }+ }}++ walk(schema, path)+ return [...candidates].sort()}-function collectCrdSecretReferences(): Array<{ plural: string; field: string }> {- const references: Array<{ plural: string; field: string }> = []- for (const file of readdirSync(crdsDir).filter(name => name.endsWith('.yaml')).sort()) {- const document = asRecord(parse(readFileSync(resolve(crdsDir, file), 'utf8')))- const crdName = asRecord(document?.metadata)?.name- const plural = typeof crdName === 'string' ? crdName.split('.', 1)[0] : undefined- const versions = asRecord(document?.spec)?.versions- if (!plural || !Array.isArray(versions)) throw new Error(`Invalid CRD schema: ${file}`)+function auditCrdContracts(+ sources: readonly CrdSource[],+ runtimeContracts: readonly SecretReferenceCrdContract[] = SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS+): string[] {+ const errors: string[] = []+ const contracts: SecretReferenceCrdContract[] = []+ const crdPlurals = new Set<string>()+ const seenNonSecretPaths = new Set<string>()++ for (const source of sources) {+ const crd = parseCrd(source, errors)+ if (!crd) continue+ if (crdPlurals.has(crd.plural)) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: duplicate CRD plural ${crd.plural}`)+ continue+ }+ crdPlurals.add(crd.plural)++ const contract = parseCrdContract(crd, errors)+ if (!contract) continue+ if (contract.plural !== crd.plural) {+ errors.push(+ `${crd.file}: contract plural ${contract.plural} does not match CRD plural ${crd.plural}`+ )+ }++ const contractPaths = new Set(contract.fields.map(field => field.path))+ for (const field of contract.fields) {+ crd.schemas.forEach((schema, versionIndex) => {+ const fieldSchema = schemaAtPath(schema, field.path)+ if (!fieldSchema) {+ errors.push(+ `${crd.file}: contract path ${field.path} does not resolve in version ${versionIndex}`+ )+ return+ }+ if (!hasDescription(fieldSchema)) {+ errors.push(`${crd.file}: contract path ${field.path} must have a non-empty description`)+ }+ })+ }++ for (const schema of crd.schemas) {+ for (const candidatePath of collectSecretReferenceCandidates(schema)) {+ if (contractPaths.has(candidatePath)) continue+ const inventoryKey = `${crd.file}:${candidatePath}`+ if (NON_SECRET_REFERENCE_PATHS.has(inventoryKey)) {+ seenNonSecretPaths.add(inventoryKey)+ } else {+ errors.push(+ `${crd.file}: secret-shaped field ${candidatePath} is absent from the explicit contract`+ )+ }+ }+ }++ contracts.push(contract)+ }++ if (+ JSON.stringify(normalizeContracts(contracts)) !==+ JSON.stringify(normalizeContracts(runtimeContracts))+ ) {+ errors.push(+ 'CRD Secret reference contracts do not match the runtime plural, field, and namespace-binding contract'+ )+ }- const fields = new Set<string>()- for (const version of versions) {- const openApiSchema = asRecord(asRecord(asRecord(version)?.schema)?.openAPIV3Schema)- collectSecretReferenceFields(openApiSchema, fields)+ for (const inventoryKey of NON_SECRET_REFERENCE_PATHS) {+ if (!seenNonSecretPaths.has(inventoryKey)) {+ errors.push(`stale non-Secret reference classification: ${inventoryKey}`)}- for (const field of fields) references.push({ plural, field })}- return references++ return errors+}++function cloneSources(): CrdSource[] {+ return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(loadCrdSources())) as CrdSource[]+}++function workflowRecipeSchema(sources: readonly CrdSource[]): OpenApiSchema {+ const source = sources.find(candidate => candidate.file === 'workflowrecipe.yaml')+ if (!source) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe CRD fixture is missing')+ const spec = asRecord(source.document.spec)+ const versions = spec?.versions+ if (!Array.isArray(versions)) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe CRD versions are missing')+ const schema = asRecord(asRecord(asRecord(versions[0])?.schema)?.openAPIV3Schema)+ if (!schema) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe CRD schema is missing')+ return schema}describe('Secret reference CRD coverage', () => {- it('keeps every schema-declared Secret reference covered by the safety scanner', () => {- const references = collectCrdSecretReferences()+ it('keeps the explicit CRD contracts in parity with the runtime scanner', () => {+ expect(auditCrdContracts(loadCrdSources())).toEqual([])- expect([...new Set(references.map(reference => reference.field))].sort()).toEqual(- [...SECRET_REFERENCE_FIELDS].sort()+ expect(+ normalizeContracts(SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES.map(({ plural, fields }) => ({ plural, fields })))+ ).toEqual(+ normalizeContracts(+ SECRET_REFERENCE_CRD_CONTRACTS.filter(contract => contract.fields.length > 0)+ ))- expect([...new Set(references.map(reference => reference.plural))].sort()).toEqual(- [...new Set(SECRET_REFERENCE_SCOPES.map(scope => scope.plural))].sort()+ })++ it('rejects lowercase paths, missing descriptions, uncontracted credentials, and new CRDs without a contract', () => {+ const lowercasePath = cloneSources()+ const lowercaseProperties = asRecord(+ schemaAtPath(workflowRecipeSchema(lowercasePath), 'spec.steps[].run.capabilities.secrets[]')+ ?.properties+ )+ if (!lowercaseProperties?.secretRef)+ throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe secretRef fixture is missing')+ lowercaseProperties.secretref = lowercaseProperties.secretRef+ delete lowercaseProperties.secretRef+ expect(auditCrdContracts(lowercasePath)).toContain(+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml: contract path spec.steps[].run.capabilities.secrets[].secretRef does not resolve in version 0'+ )++ const missingDescription = cloneSources()+ const envSecretSchema = schemaAtPath(+ workflowRecipeSchema(missingDescription),+ 'spec.workloads[].envSecret'+ )+ if (!envSecretSchema) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe envSecret fixture is missing')+ delete envSecretSchema.description+ expect(auditCrdContracts(missingDescription)).toContain(+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml: contract path spec.workloads[].envSecret must have a non-empty description'+ )++ const uncontractedTokenRef = cloneSources()+ const tokenRefSpecProperties = asRecord(workflowRecipeSchema(uncontractedTokenRef).properties)+ const tokenRefRecipeProperties = asRecord(asRecord(tokenRefSpecProperties?.spec)?.properties)+ if (!tokenRefRecipeProperties) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe properties fixture is missing')+ tokenRefRecipeProperties.tokenRef = {+ type: 'string',+ description: 'a lowercase secret reference',+ }+ expect(auditCrdContracts(uncontractedTokenRef)).toContain(+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml: secret-shaped field spec.tokenRef is absent from the explicit contract'+ )++ const extraCredentials = cloneSources()+ const workflowSpecProperties = asRecord(workflowRecipeSchema(extraCredentials).properties)+ if (!workflowSpecProperties?.spec) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe spec fixture is missing')+ const recipeProperties = asRecord(asRecord(workflowSpecProperties.spec)?.properties)+ if (!recipeProperties) throw new Error('WorkflowRecipe properties fixture is missing')+ recipeProperties.extraCredentials = {+ type: 'object',+ description: 'Extra credential reference.',+ properties: {+ name: { type: 'string' },+ key: { type: 'string' },+ },+ }+ expect(auditCrdContracts(extraCredentials)).toContain(+ 'workflowrecipe.yaml: secret-shaped field spec.extraCredentials is absent from the explicit contract'+ )++ const missingContract = cloneSources()+ missingContract.push({+ file: 'newresource.yaml',+ document: {+ metadata: { name: 'newresources.clerum.io' },+ spec: {+ names: { plural: 'newresources' },+ versions: [+ {+ schema: {+ openAPIV3Schema: {+ type: 'object',+ properties: { spec: { type: 'object' } },+ },+ },+ },+ ],+ },+ },+ })+ expect(auditCrdContracts(missingContract)).toContain(+ `newresource.yaml: missing ${SECRET_REFERENCE_CONTRACT_ANNOTATION} annotation`)})})diff --git a/control-api/test/mockGateway.contract.test.ts b/control-api/test/mockGateway.contract.test.tsindex 87dedc948..4d8ec0e63 100644--- a/control-api/test/mockGateway.contract.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/mockGateway.contract.test.ts@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'import { MockGateway } from './mockGateway.js'+const b64 = (value: string): string => Buffer.from(value).toString('base64')+describe('MockGateway Kubernetes identity contract', () => {it('returns the server-assigned identity from a mutation', async () => {const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')@@ -197,6 +199,210 @@ describe('MockGateway Kubernetes identity contract', () => {})})+ it('materializes stringData over data as base64 on Secret create', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')++ const created = await gateway.createSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ type: 'Opaque',+ data: { KEEP: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('stale') },+ stringData: { OVERRIDE: 'plain' },+ })++ expect(created).toMatchObject({+ data: { KEEP: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('plain') },+ })+ expect(created).not.toHaveProperty('stringData')++ const stored = await gateway.getSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server')+ expect(stored).toMatchObject({ data: { KEEP: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('plain') } })+ expect(stored).not.toHaveProperty('stringData')+ })++ it('materializes stringData over data as base64 on Secret replace', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'Opaque',+ data: { PRIOR: b64('prior') },+ })++ const updated = await gateway.updateSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ type: 'Opaque',+ data: { DATA_ONLY: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('stale') },+ stringData: { OVERRIDE: 'plain' },+ })++ expect(updated).toMatchObject({+ data: { DATA_ONLY: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('plain') },+ })+ expect(updated).not.toHaveProperty('stringData')+ })++ it('applies merge-patch deletions before materializing stringData over data', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'Opaque',+ labels: { keep: 'yes', remove: 'yes' },+ annotations: { 'safe.example/keep': 'yes', 'safe.example/remove': 'yes' },+ data: { KEEP: b64('keep'), REMOVE: b64('remove'), OVERRIDE: b64('stale') },+ })++ const merged = await gateway.mergeSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ labels: { remove: null },+ annotations: { 'safe.example/remove': null },+ data: { REMOVE: null, DATA_ONLY: b64('encoded'), OVERRIDE: b64('stale-data') },+ stringData: { DATA_ONLY: 'plain', OVERRIDE: 'plain-override', UNUSED: null },+ } as unknown)++ expect(merged).toMatchObject({+ labels: { keep: 'yes' },+ annotations: { 'safe.example/keep': 'yes' },+ data: {+ KEEP: b64('keep'),+ DATA_ONLY: b64('plain'),+ OVERRIDE: b64('plain-override'),+ },+ })+ expect(merged.data).not.toHaveProperty('REMOVE')+ expect(merged.data).not.toHaveProperty('UNUSED')+ expect(merged).not.toHaveProperty('stringData')++ const stored = await gateway.getSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server')+ expect(stored).toMatchObject({+ metadata: {+ labels: { keep: 'yes' },+ annotations: { 'safe.example/keep': 'yes' },+ },+ data: {+ KEEP: b64('keep'),+ DATA_ONLY: b64('plain'),+ OVERRIDE: b64('plain-override'),+ },+ })+ expect(stored.data).not.toHaveProperty('REMOVE')+ expect(stored.data).not.toHaveProperty('UNUSED')+ expect(stored).not.toHaveProperty('stringData')+ })++ it('preserves an identical future clerum.io annotation through a Secret merge', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ const futureKey = 'clerum.io/future-controller-state'+ const futureValue = 'opaque-v1'+ const constraints = { allowExistingPlatformAnnotationKeys: [futureKey] }+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'Opaque',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: futureValue },+ })++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret(+ {+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: futureValue },+ stringData: { VALUE: 'rotated' },+ },+ constraints+ )+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({ annotations: { [futureKey]: futureValue } })++ await expect(gateway.getSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({+ metadata: { annotations: { [futureKey]: futureValue } },+ })+ })++ it('rejects changed or injected future clerum.io annotations after reading a Secret', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ const futureKey = 'clerum.io/future-controller-state'+ const constraints = { allowExistingPlatformAnnotationKeys: [futureKey] }+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'Opaque',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: 'opaque-v1' },+ })++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret(+ {+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: 'caller-controlled' },+ },+ constraints+ )+ ).rejects.toThrow()++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret(+ {+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: null },+ } as unknown,+ constraints+ )+ ).rejects.toThrow()++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret(+ {+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ annotations: { 'clerum.io/another-future-key': 'caller-controlled' },+ },+ constraints+ )+ ).rejects.toThrow()++ await expect(gateway.getSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({+ metadata: { annotations: { [futureKey]: 'opaque-v1' } },+ })+ })++ it('applies the current type policy when a Secret merge preserves its type', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'kubernetes.io/service-account-token',+ })++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ stringData: { VALUE: 'rotated' },+ })+ ).rejects.toThrow(/Secret type/)+ })++ it('does not let an explicit safe type mask a controller-managed live type', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'kubernetes.io/service-account-token',+ })++ await expect(+ gateway.updateSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ type: 'Opaque',+ stringData: { VALUE: 'rotated' },+ })+ ).rejects.toThrow(/managed by Kubernetes/)++ await expect(+ gateway.mergeSecret({+ name: 'credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ type: 'Opaque',+ stringData: { VALUE: 'rotated' },+ })+ ).rejects.toThrow(/managed by Kubernetes/)+ })+it('stores a dynamic map key as data without changing the object prototype', async () => {const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')gateway.seedSecret('credentials', 'mcp-server', { type: 'Opaque' })diff --git a/control-api/test/mockGateway.ts b/control-api/test/mockGateway.tsindex 64c5e3ab7..8313e9748 100644--- a/control-api/test/mockGateway.ts+++ b/control-api/test/mockGateway.ts@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@import { K8sNotFoundError } from '../src/services/resourceService.js'import {type SecretConstraintOptions,- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints,+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType,assertValidSecretConstraints,- assertValidSecretType,resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace,} from '../src/services/secretConstraints.js'import { assertValidSecretDataKey, assertValidSecretWriteKeys } from '../src/services/secretKeys.js'@@ -85,6 +84,22 @@ function mergePatchMap(return Object.fromEntries([...retainedEntries, ...replacementEntries])}+/**+ * Kubernetes materializes write-only stringData into data after applying a+ * Secret payload or merge patch. The API server returns only the resulting+ * base64 data map, never stringData.+ */+function materializeSecretData(+ data: Record<string, string> | undefined,+ stringData: Record<string, unknown> | undefined+): Record<string, string> | undefined {+ if (data === undefined && stringData === undefined) return undefined+ const stringDataEntries = Object.entries(stringData ?? {})+ .filter(([, value]): value is string => typeof value === 'string')+ .map(([key, value]) => [key, Buffer.from(value).toString('base64')] as const)+ return Object.fromEntries([...Object.entries(data ?? {}), ...stringDataEntries])+}+export type MockGatewaySecretWriteFault = (input: {operation: 'create' | 'update' | 'merge'snapshot: SecretSnapshot@@ -121,7 +136,6 @@ export class MockGateway {uid: stringresourceVersion: stringdata?: Record<string, string>- stringData?: Record<string, string>}>@@ -194,8 +208,7 @@ export class MockGateway {annotations: options?.annotations,uid: options?.uid ?? this.allocateUid('secret', ns, name),resourceVersion: options?.resourceVersion ?? '1',- data: options?.data,- stringData: options?.stringData,+ data: materializeSecretData(options?.data, options?.stringData),})}@@ -421,7 +434,6 @@ export class MockGateway {},type: entry.type || 'Opaque',data: entry.data,- stringData: entry.stringData,}}@@ -447,8 +459,7 @@ export class MockGateway {annotations: body.annotations,uid: this.allocateUid('secret', body.namespace || this.ns, body.name),resourceVersion: '1',- data: body.data,- stringData: body.stringData,+ data: materializeSecretData(body.data, body.stringData),}this.secretStore.set(key, entry)const snapshot = this.snapshot(entry)@@ -485,6 +496,7 @@ export class MockGateway {err.code = 404throw err}+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type)assertValidSecretConstraints(body, opts, existing.annotations)assertValidSecretWriteKeys(body)this.assertPrecondition(body.name, existing, precondition)@@ -494,10 +506,6 @@ export class MockGateway {opts)const effectiveType = body.type ?? existing.type ?? 'Opaque'- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints(- { name: body.name, type: effectiveType, annotations: effectiveAnnotations },- opts- )const updated = {name: body.name,namespace: body.namespace || this.ns,@@ -506,8 +514,7 @@ export class MockGateway {annotations: effectiveAnnotations,uid: existing?.uid,resourceVersion: MockGateway.nextResourceVersion(existing?.resourceVersion),- data: body.data,- stringData: body.stringData,+ data: materializeSecretData(body.data, body.stringData),}this.secretStore.set(key, updated)const snapshot = this.snapshot(updated)@@ -534,30 +541,22 @@ export class MockGateway {err.code = 404throw err}- this.assertPrecondition(body.name, existing, precondition)- if (body.type !== undefined) assertValidSecretType(body.type)+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type)+ assertValidSecretConstraints(body, opts, existing.annotations)assertValidSecretWriteKeys(body)- const effectiveAnnotations = resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(+ this.assertPrecondition(body.name, existing, precondition)+ const effectiveAnnotations = mergePatchMap(existing.annotations,- body.annotations,- opts+ body.annotations as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)const effectiveType = body.type ?? existing.type ?? 'Opaque'- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints(- { name: body.name, type: effectiveType, annotations: effectiveAnnotations },- opts- )const updated = {...existing,type: effectiveType,labels: mergePatchMap(existing.labels, body.labels as Record<string, unknown> | undefined),- annotations: mergePatchMap(- existing.annotations,- body.annotations as Record<string, unknown> | undefined- ),- data: mergePatchMap(existing.data, body.data as Record<string, unknown> | undefined),- stringData: mergePatchMap(- existing.stringData,+ annotations: effectiveAnnotations,+ data: materializeSecretData(+ mergePatchMap(existing.data, body.data as Record<string, unknown> | undefined),body.stringData as Record<string, unknown> | undefined),resourceVersion:@@ -580,9 +579,8 @@ export class MockGateway {uid: stringresourceVersion: stringdata?: Record<string, string>- stringData?: Record<string, string>}): SecretSnapshot {- return toSecretSnapshot(+ const snapshot = toSecretSnapshot({metadata: {name: entry.name,@@ -594,11 +592,12 @@ export class MockGateway {},type: entry.type,data: entry.data,- stringData: entry.stringData,},entry.name,entry.namespace)+ delete (snapshot as { stringData?: unknown }).stringData+ return snapshot}/**@@ -692,20 +691,14 @@ export class MockGateway {}this.assertPrecondition(req.name, existing, precondition)const effectiveAnnotations = resolveSecretAnnotationsForReplace(existing.annotations, undefined)- assertValidEffectiveSecretConstraints({- name: existing.name,- type: existing.type ?? 'Opaque',- annotations: effectiveAnnotations,- })+ assertMutablePreservedSecretType(existing.type ?? 'Opaque')const updated = {...existing,...(existing.data ? { data: { ...existing.data } } : {}),- ...(existing.stringData ? { stringData: { ...existing.stringData } } : {}),resourceVersion:MockGateway.nextResourceVersion(existing.resourceVersion) ?? existing.resourceVersion,}delete updated.data?.[req.key]- delete updated.stringData?.[req.key]this.secretStore.set(key, updated)return this.snapshot(updated)}diff --git a/control-api/test/registryClient.test.ts b/control-api/test/registryClient.test.tsindex 360b4a298..bf5c7c883 100644--- a/control-api/test/registryClient.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/registryClient.test.ts@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'import {type PublishScope,+ RegistryProxyError,__resetScopeCacheForTests,__resetTokenCacheForTests,applyPublishScope,+ createOrgGrant,getCategories,invalidateRegistryIdentityCaches,mintToken,@@ -1073,3 +1075,66 @@ describe('registryClient — catalog read-through cache', () => {expect(entryGets.length).toBe(2)})})++describe('registryClient — safe registry proxy errors', () => {+ it('keeps only an allowlisted JSON error code from an upstream error response', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string) => {+ if (url.endsWith('/oauth/token')) return Promise.resolve(fakeTokenResponse('tok', 600))+ return Promise.resolve(+ new Response(+ JSON.stringify({+ error: 'self_grant',+ message: 'untrusted diagnostic text',+ extra: { source: 'upstream' },+ }),+ { status: 400, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8' } }+ )+ )+ })+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ Object.assign(process.env, ENV_OVERRIDE)++ const err = (await createOrgGrant('acme', {+ pluginName: '@acme/plugin',+ granteeOrg: 'other-org',+ actingUserId: 'operator-1',+ }).catch(error => error)) as RegistryProxyError++ expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(RegistryProxyError)+ expect(err.status).toBe(400)+ expect(err.body).toEqual({ error: 'self_grant' })+ })++ it('uses a synthetic code for unallowlisted JSON and non-JSON upstream errors', async () => {+ const upstreamResponses = [+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'unreviewed_code', detail: 'untrusted diagnostic' }), {+ status: 409,+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },+ }),+ new Response('<html><body>upstream diagnostic</body></html>', {+ status: 502,+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' },+ }),+ ]+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockImplementation((url: string) => {+ if (url.endsWith('/oauth/token')) return Promise.resolve(fakeTokenResponse('tok', 600))+ return Promise.resolve(upstreamResponses.shift()!)+ })+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ Object.assign(process.env, ENV_OVERRIDE)++ const jsonErr = (await createOrgGrant('acme', {+ pluginName: '@acme/plugin',+ granteeOrg: 'other-org',+ actingUserId: 'operator-1',+ }).catch(error => error)) as RegistryProxyError+ const htmlErr = (await createOrgGrant('acme', {+ pluginName: '@acme/plugin',+ granteeOrg: 'other-org',+ actingUserId: 'operator-1',+ }).catch(error => error)) as RegistryProxyError++ expect(jsonErr.body).toEqual({ error: 'registry_409' })+ expect(htmlErr.body).toEqual({ error: 'registry_502' })+ })+})diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.adminRecipes.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.adminRecipes.test.tsindex 98d105ff8..55697ef3d 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.adminRecipes.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.adminRecipes.test.ts@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ const WORKFLOW_TEAM_ID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'const NON_TRANSPORT_PUBLIC_WEB_MESSAGE ='public-web is only supported on MCP transport workloads; non-transport workloads must use exact-host egressBindings'+function decodeKubernetesData(snapshot: { data?: Record<string, string> }): Record<string, string> {+ return Object.fromEntries(+ Object.entries(snapshot.data ?? {}).map(([key, value]) => [+ key,+ Buffer.from(value, 'base64').toString('utf8'),+ ])+ )+}+const VALID_RECIPE = {metadata: { name: 'my-recipe' },spec: {@@ -1554,8 +1563,10 @@ describe.sequential('routes/admin/recipes', () => {})expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain('CG-test-secret')const stored = (await gateway.getSecret('coingecko-api', SANDBOX_NS)) as {+ data?: Record<string, string>stringData?: Record<string, string>}+ stored.stringData = decodeKubernetesData(stored)expect(stored.stringData?.apiKey).toBe('CG-test-secret')await expect(gateway.getSecret('coingecko-api', MCP_NS)).rejects.toThrow()})@@ -1580,8 +1591,10 @@ describe.sequential('routes/admin/recipes', () => {})expect(JSON.stringify(res.body)).not.toContain('transport-secret')const stored = (await gateway.getSecret('workflow-api-credentials', MCP_NS)) as {+ data?: Record<string, string>stringData?: Record<string, string>}+ stored.stringData = decodeKubernetesData(stored)expect(stored.stringData?.apiKey).toBe('transport-secret')await expect(gateway.getSecret('workflow-api-credentials', SANDBOX_NS)).rejects.toThrow()})@@ -1619,6 +1632,7 @@ describe.sequential('routes/admin/recipes', () => {data?: Record<string, string>stringData?: Record<string, string>}+ stored.stringData = decodeKubernetesData(stored)expect(stored.data?.existingKey).toBe('ZXhpc3Rpbmc=')expect(stored.stringData?.apiKey).toBe('CG-test-secret')})diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.adminRegistryGrants.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.adminRegistryGrants.test.tsindex 960405ead..783abc01c 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.adminRegistryGrants.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.adminRegistryGrants.test.ts@@ -397,7 +397,13 @@ describe('wire shape (real wrappers, stubbed registry fetch)', () => {)vi.mocked(createOrgGrant).mockImplementationOnce(real.createOrgGrant)real.__resetTokenCacheForTests()- stubFetch(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'self_grant' }), { status: 400 }))+ stubFetch(+ () =>+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'self_grant' }), {+ status: 400,+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },+ })+ )const res = await request(makeApp()).post('/admin/registry/grants').send({ pluginName: '@acme/p', granteeOrg: 'acme' })diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.mcpSecrets.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.mcpSecrets.test.tsindex ec46a7457..e138503a6 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.mcpSecrets.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.mcpSecrets.test.ts@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import express from 'express'import request from 'supertest'import { rootLogger } from '../src/observability/logger.js'import { createAdminSecretsRouter } from '../src/routes/admin/secrets.js'+import { CONTROL_UI_ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE } from '../src/utils/auth/sessionCookies.js'+import { MockGateway } from './mockGateway.js'/** The write shape the admin routes hand to the gateway. */type SecretWrite = {@@ -104,6 +106,25 @@ function makeApp(gateway: ReturnType<typeof createGateway>) {return app}+const TEST_CONTROL_UI_SESSION = 'test-control-ui-session'++function createAuthenticatedAgent(app: express.Express) {+ const agent = request.agent(app)+ agent.jar.setCookie(+ `${CONTROL_UI_ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE}=${TEST_CONTROL_UI_SESSION}; Path=/; HttpOnly`,+ '127.0.0.1',+ '/'+ )+ return agent+}++function mcpDeleteProofCookieName(value: unknown): string {+ const cookies = Array.isArray(value) ? value : typeof value === 'string' ? [value] : []+ const proofCookie = cookies.find(cookie => cookie.startsWith('mcp_secret_delete_proof_'))+ if (!proofCookie) throw new Error('Expected MCP Secret delete proof cookie')+ return proofCookie.slice(0, proofCookie.indexOf('='))+}+describe('POST /admin/mcp-secrets', () => {// ── Happy path ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -511,7 +532,7 @@ describe('PUT /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (credential rotation, issue #223)', () =>expect(res.body.resourceVersion).toBe('2')})- it('preserves Registry catalog annotations while rotating managed credentials', async () => {+ it('does not grant public rotation a registry annotation capability', async () => {const gateway = createGateway()gateway.getSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({metadata: {@@ -540,13 +561,7 @@ describe('PUT /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (credential rotation, issue #223)', () =>namespace: 'mcp-server',stringData: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'rotated-value' },}),- {- allowExistingPlatformAnnotationKeys: [- 'clerum.io/catalog-id',- 'clerum.io/catalog-version',- 'clerum.io/registry-operation-id',- ],- },+ undefined,{uid: 'uid-linear-credentials',}@@ -835,16 +850,97 @@ describe('PUT /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (credential rotation, issue #223)', () =>})describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (identity and dependency guard)', () => {- it('requires both server-issued identity values', async () => {+ it('requires both server-issued identity values when a client supplies either one', async () => {const gateway = createGateway()const app = makeApp(gateway)- await request(app).delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').send({}).expect(428)+ for (const body of [{ uid: 'uid-linear-credentials' }, { resourceVersion: '1' }]) {+ await request(app).delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').send(body).expect(428)+ }expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})- it('refuses to delete a Secret referenced by a live connector', async () => {+ it('supports an old UI POST plus bodyless DELETE with a signed create proof', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ const created = await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'linear-credentials', data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const proofCookieName = mcpDeleteProofCookieName(created.headers['set-cookie'])+ const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(rootLogger, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {})++ try {+ const res = await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').expect(200)++ expect(res.body).toEqual({+ name: 'linear-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ deleted: true,+ })+ expect(res.status).toBe(200)+ expect(gateway.getSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith('linear-credentials', 'mcp-server')+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith('linear-credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ uid: 'uid-linear-credentials',+ resourceVersion: '1',+ })+ expect(warnSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(+ expect.objectContaining({+ module: 'admin-secrets',+ event: 'mcp-secret-delete-legacy-signed-create-proof',+ name: 'linear-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ preconditionSource: 'signed-create-proof',+ }),+ 'MCP Secret delete used signed create proof'+ )+ expect(JSON.stringify(warnSpy.mock.calls)).not.toContain(TEST_CONTROL_UI_SESSION)+ expect(res.headers['set-cookie']).toEqual(+ expect.arrayContaining([expect.stringMatching(new RegExp(`^${proofCookieName}=`))])+ )+ } finally {+ warnSpy.mockRestore()+ }+ })++ it('rejects a bodyless old UI DELETE with no signed create proof', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').expect(428)++ expect(gateway.getSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('rejects a stale supplied identity before delete', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ gateway.getSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: {+ name: 'linear-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'uid-current',+ resourceVersion: '2',+ labels: {},+ },+ data: {},+ })+ const app = makeApp(gateway)++ const res = await request(app)+ .delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials')+ .send({ uid: 'uid-linear-credentials', resourceVersion: '1' })+ .expect(409)++ expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ error: 'secret_identity_changed', outcome: 'repair_required' })+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('legacy signed proof refuses to delete a Secret referenced by a live connector', async () => {const gateway = createGateway()gateway.listResource.mockResolvedValueOnce([{@@ -853,16 +949,43 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (identity and dependency guard)', () =},])const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)- const res = await request(app)- .delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials')- .send({ uid: 'uid-linear-credentials', resourceVersion: '1' })- .expect(409)+ await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'linear-credentials', data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const res = await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').expect(409)expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ error: 'mcp_secret_in_use', outcome: 'repair_required' })expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})+ it('legacy signed proof refuses to delete a WorkflowRecipe-owned Secret', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ gateway.getSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: {+ name: 'recipe-creds',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'uid-recipe-creds',+ resourceVersion: '1',+ labels: { 'clerum.io/recipe-secret': 'true' },+ },+ data: {},+ })+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'recipe-creds', data: { RECIPE_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const res = await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/recipe-creds').expect(409)++ expect(res.body.error).toContain('WorkflowRecipe')+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })+it('refuses to delete a Secret used as a live connector image pull Secret', async () => {const gateway = createGateway()gateway.listResource.mockResolvedValueOnce([@@ -913,4 +1036,128 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-secrets/:name (identity and dependency guard)', () =resourceVersion: '1',})})++ it('rejects a malformed fallback body even when a signed proof exists', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'linear-credentials', data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ await agent+ .delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials')+ .send({ unexpected: true })+ .expect(428)++ expect(gateway.getSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('rejects a tampered signed create proof', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ const created = await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'linear-credentials', data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const proofCookieName = mcpDeleteProofCookieName(created.headers['set-cookie'])+ agent.jar.setCookie(`${proofCookieName}=tampered; Path=/; HttpOnly`, '127.0.0.1', '/')++ await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').expect(428)++ expect(gateway.getSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('rejects an expired signed create proof', async () => {+ const gateway = createGateway()+ const app = makeApp(gateway)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name: 'linear-credentials', data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const dateNowSpy = vi.spyOn(Date, 'now').mockReturnValue(Date.now() + 121_000)+ try {+ await agent.delete('/admin/mcp-secrets/linear-credentials').expect(428)+ } finally {+ dateNowSpy.mockRestore()+ }++ expect(gateway.getSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('does not delete a replacement that wins before the legacy proof read', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ const name = 'linear-credentials'+ const app = makeApp(gateway as never)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ const created = await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name, data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const originalIdentity = {+ uid: created.body.uid as string,+ resourceVersion: created.body.resourceVersion as string,+ }+ await gateway.deleteSecret(name, 'mcp-server', originalIdentity)+ gateway.seedSecret(name, 'mcp-server', {+ uid: 'uid-linear-replacement',+ resourceVersion: '1',+ })++ const res = await agent.delete(`/admin/mcp-secrets/${name}`).expect(409)++ expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ error: 'secret_identity_changed', outcome: 'repair_required' })+ await expect(gateway.getSecret(name, 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-linear-replacement', resourceVersion: '1' },+ })+ })++ it('does not delete a replacement that wins after the legacy proof read', async () => {+ const gateway = new MockGateway('mcp-server')+ const name = 'linear-credentials'+ const app = makeApp(gateway as never)+ const agent = createAuthenticatedAgent(app)++ const created = await agent+ .post('/admin/mcp-secrets')+ .send({ name, data: { LINEAR_API_KEY: 'create-value' } })+ .expect(201)+ const originalIdentity = {+ uid: created.body.uid as string,+ resourceVersion: created.body.resourceVersion as string,+ }++ const deleteSpy = vi.spyOn(gateway, 'deleteSecret')+ const listResources = gateway.listResource.bind(gateway)+ let replacementCreated = false+ vi.spyOn(gateway, 'listResource').mockImplementation(async (...args) => {+ if (!replacementCreated && args[0] === 'mcpservers' && args[1] === 'mcp-server') {+ replacementCreated = true+ await gateway.deleteSecret(name, 'mcp-server', originalIdentity)+ gateway.seedSecret(name, 'mcp-server', {+ uid: 'uid-linear-replacement',+ resourceVersion: '1',+ })+ }+ return listResources(...args)+ })++ const res = await agent.delete(`/admin/mcp-secrets/${name}`).expect(409)++ expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ error: 'secret_identity_changed', outcome: 'repair_required' })+ expect(replacementCreated).toBe(true)+ expect(deleteSpy).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(name, 'mcp-server', originalIdentity)+ await expect(gateway.getSecret(name, 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-linear-replacement', resourceVersion: '1' },+ })+ })})diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.registryInstall.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.registryInstall.test.tsindex 4953f295b..9289f654c 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.registryInstall.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.registryInstall.test.ts@@ -4091,7 +4091,7 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade', () => {}expect(current.spec?.image).toBe('test:2.0')await expect(gw.getSecret('my-srv-credentials', 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({- stringData: { [field]: nextValue },+ data: { [field]: Buffer.from(nextValue).toString('base64') },})})@@ -4263,7 +4263,7 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade', () => {})const current = await gw.getSecret(secretName, 'mcp-server')expect(current.metadata?.uid).toBe('uid-existing-credentials')- expect(current.stringData).toEqual({ [field]: concurrentValue })+ expect(current.data).toEqual({ [field]: Buffer.from(concurrentValue).toString('base64') })})it('does not compensate after a same-UID metadata-only concurrent mutation', async () => {@@ -4395,7 +4395,9 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade', () => {const current = await gw.getSecret(secretName, 'mcp-server')expect(current.metadata?.uid).toBe('uid-existing-credentials')expect(current.metadata?.resourceVersion).not.toBe('1')- expect(current.stringData).toEqual({ [field]: ['registry', 'value'].join('-') })+ expect(current.data).toEqual({+ [field]: Buffer.from(['registry', 'value'].join('-')).toString('base64'),+ })})it('requires repair when an upgrade credential create response is lost after commit', async () => {@@ -4856,6 +4858,62 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade', () => {})})+ it('restores a future platform annotation after a not-committed CR fence', async () => {+ vi.mocked(getEntryVersion).mockResolvedValueOnce(MOCK_ENTRY_V2 as any)+ const credentialKey = ['API', 'KEY'].join('_')+ vi.mocked(getCredentialSchema).mockResolvedValueOnce({+ required: true,+ authType: 'api-key',+ keys: [{ name: credentialKey }],+ })+ const { app, gw } = makeApp()+ const futureKey = 'clerum.io/future-controller-state'+ const priorValue = ['fixture', 'prior'].join('-')+ gw.seedSecret('my-srv-credentials', 'mcp-server', {+ type: 'Opaque',+ uid: 'secret-uid-fenced-future-platform',+ resourceVersion: '7',+ annotations: { [futureKey]: 'opaque-v1' },+ data: { [credentialKey]: priorValue },+ })+ const originalUpdate = gw.updateResource.bind(gw)+ let firstServerUpdate = true+ vi.spyOn(gw, 'updateResource').mockImplementation(async (...args) => {+ if (args[0] === 'mcpservers' && firstServerUpdate) {+ firstServerUpdate = false+ throw Object.assign(new Error('response lost before CR commit'), {+ code: 503,+ statusCode: 503,+ })+ }+ return originalUpdate(...args)+ })+ const updateSecretSpy = vi.spyOn(gw, 'updateSecret')++ const res = await request(app)+ .post('/admin/registry/upgrade')+ .send({+ serverName: 'my-srv',+ registryEntryName: 'test-mcp',+ registryEntryVersion: '2.0.0',+ credentials: { [credentialKey]: ['fixture', 'next'].join('-') },+ })+ .expect(503)++ expect(res.body).toMatchObject({+ error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_not_committed',+ outcome: 'not_committed',+ })+ expect(updateSecretSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)+ expect(updateSecretSpy.mock.calls[1][0].annotations).toMatchObject({+ [futureKey]: 'opaque-v1',+ })+ await expect(gw.getSecret('my-srv-credentials', 'mcp-server')).resolves.toMatchObject({+ metadata: { annotations: { [futureKey]: 'opaque-v1' } },+ data: { [credentialKey]: priorValue },+ })+ })+it('sets annotations to empty object on rollback when the original secret had no annotations', async () => {vi.mocked(getEntryVersion).mockResolvedValueOnce(MOCK_ENTRY_V2 as any)vi.mocked(getCredentialSchema).mockResolvedValueOnce({@@ -5935,6 +5993,39 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade-recipe', () => {expect(recipe.spec).toEqual({ steps: [{ id: 's1', instruction: 'Run step' }] })})+ it('requires repair when a recipe write and identity fence remain ambiguous', async () => {+ vi.mocked(getEntryVersion).mockResolvedValueOnce({+ ...MOCK_RECIPE_ENTRY,+ recipe_meta: { recipeYaml: JSON.stringify({ spec: { steps: [{ id: 'ambiguous' }] } }) },+ })+ const { app, gw } = makeRecipeUpgradeApp()+ const originalUpdate = gw.updateResource.bind(gw)+ vi.spyOn(gw, 'updateResource').mockImplementation(async (plural, name, body, namespace) => {+ if (plural === 'workflowrecipes') {+ throw Object.assign(new Error('recipe update and fence response lost'), {+ statusCode: 503,+ code: 503,+ })+ }+ return originalUpdate(plural, name, body, namespace)+ })++ const response = await request(app).post('/admin/registry/upgrade-recipe').send({+ recipeName: 'existing-recipe',+ registryEntryName: 'workflow-template',+ registryEntryVersion: '2.0.0',+ })++ expect(response.status, JSON.stringify(response.body)).toBe(503)+ expect(response.body).toMatchObject({+ error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_ambiguous',+ outcome: 'repair_required',+ })+ await expect(+ gw.getResource('workflowrecipes', 'existing-recipe', 'sandbox-recipes')+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({ spec: { steps: [{ id: 's1', instruction: 'Run step' }] } })+ })+it('rejects cluster-local sibling egressBindings in another namespace before updating the CRD', async () => {vi.mocked(getEntryVersion).mockResolvedValueOnce({...MOCK_RECIPE_ENTRY,@@ -6491,6 +6582,44 @@ describe('POST /admin/registry/upgrade-hook — gates are not bypassed', () => {expect(hook.spec.target.image.ref).toBe(IMG_A)})+ it('requires repair when a hook write and identity fence remain ambiguous', async () => {+ const gw = new MockGateway()+ await seedInstalledImageHook(gw, 'my-hook')+ vi.mocked(resolvePublishScope).mockResolvedValue(clusterScope)+ vi.mocked(getEntryVersion).mockResolvedValue(+ hookEntry({+ name: '@acme/hook',+ trust_level: 'low',+ hook_meta: { target: { image: { ref: IMG_B, port: 8080 } }, lifecyclePoints: ['preCall'] },+ })+ )+ const originalUpdate = gw.updateResource.bind(gw)+ vi.spyOn(gw, 'updateResource').mockImplementation(async (plural, name, body, namespace) => {+ if (plural === 'llmhooks') {+ throw Object.assign(new Error('hook update and fence response lost'), {+ statusCode: 503,+ code: 503,+ })+ }+ return originalUpdate(plural, name, body, namespace)+ })++ const response = await request(makeApp(gw))+ .post('/admin/registry/upgrade-hook')+ .send({ hookName: 'my-hook', registryEntryName: '@acme/hook', registryEntryVersion: '2.0.0' })++ expect(response.status, JSON.stringify(response.body)).toBe(503)+ expect(response.body).toMatchObject({+ error: 'registry_upgrade_outcome_ambiguous',+ outcome: 'repair_required',+ })+ await expect(+ gw.getResource('llmhooks', 'my-hook', config.llmHooksNamespace)+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({+ spec: { target: { image: { ref: IMG_A } } },+ })+ })+it('refuses an upgrade that names a different entry than the one installed', async () => {const gw = new MockGateway()await seedInstalledImageHook(gw)diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.tsindex 676be6d3a..99d30c283 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ import { createAdminResourcesRouter } from '../src/routes/admin/resources.js'import { K8sConflictError, ResourceService } from '../src/services/resourceService.js'import { MockGateway } from './mockGateway.js'+function decodeKubernetesData(snapshot: { data?: Record<string, string> }): Record<string, string> {+ return Object.fromEntries(+ Object.entries(snapshot.data ?? {}).map(([key, value]) => [+ key,+ Buffer.from(value, 'base64').toString('utf8'),+ ])+ )+}+vi.mock('node:dns/promises', () => ({lookup: vi.fn(),}))@@ -341,8 +350,10 @@ describe('routes/resources', () => {name: 'cc-teams-channel-credentials',})const secret = (await gateway.getSecret('cc-teams-channel-credentials', 'channels')) as {+ data?: Record<string, string>stringData?: Record<string, string>}+ secret.stringData = decodeKubernetesData(secret)expect(secret.stringData?.['teams-app-password']).toBe('secret-value')})diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.secrets.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.secrets.test.tsindex eb837447d..b602cdf81 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.secrets.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.secrets.test.ts@@ -493,6 +493,18 @@ describe('routes/secrets', () => {})})+ it('keeps recipe Secret DELETE identity-gated for clients without a body', async () => {+ const gateway = createRecipeGateway()+ const app = express()+ app.use(express.json())+ app.use(createAdminSecretsRouter(gateway as never))++ const res = await request(app).delete('/admin/recipe-secrets/r1').expect(428)++ expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ error: 'secret_identity_precondition_required' })+ expect(gateway.deleteSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })+it('deletes a recipe secret from an allowed runtime namespace', async () => {const gateway = createRecipeGateway()gateway.getSecret.mockImplementation(async (name: string, namespace?: string) => {diff --git a/control-api/test/services.registryMutation.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.registryMutation.test.tsindex 2aed18cb6..87a828516 100644--- a/control-api/test/services.registryMutation.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/services.registryMutation.test.ts@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import {REGISTRY_SPEC_DIGEST_ANNOTATION,type RegistryMutationDesired,type RegistryResourceSnapshot,- classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback,+ classifyRegistryAssociationReadback,classifyRegistryMutationReadback,registrySpecDigest,} from '../src/services/registryMutation.js'@@ -61,6 +61,16 @@ describe('registry mutation readback classifier', () => {).toBe('ambiguous')})+ it('keeps a stable unchanged association ambiguous until the caller fences it', () => {+ expect(+ classifyRegistryAssociationReadback({+ before,+ current: current({}),+ isCommitted: spec => spec.image === 'plugin:new',+ })+ ).toBe('ambiguous')+ })+it('requires the current operation identity, desired digest, labels and an advanced RV', () => {expect(classifyRegistryMutationReadback({@@ -143,54 +153,3 @@ describe('registry mutation readback classifier', () => {).toBe('ambiguous')})})--describe('created resource readback classifier', () => {- const desiredSpec = { image: 'example:new', transport: { port: 3000 } }- const desired = {- spec: desiredSpec,- metadata: {- labels: { 'clerum.io/managed-by': 'control-api' },- annotations: {- [REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION]: operationId,- [REGISTRY_SPEC_DIGEST_ANNOTATION]: registrySpecDigest(desiredSpec),- },- },- specDigest: registrySpecDigest(desiredSpec),- }-- it('requires operation identity, exact intent digest, and server identity', () => {- expect(- classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback({- current: {- metadata: {- uid: 'uid-created',- resourceVersion: '1',- labels: desired.metadata.labels,- annotations: desired.metadata.annotations,- },- spec: desiredSpec,- },- desired,- operationId,- })- ).toBe('committed')- expect(- classifyCreatedRegistryMutationReadback({- current: {- metadata: {- uid: 'uid-created',- resourceVersion: '1',- labels: desired.metadata.labels,- annotations: {- ...desired.metadata.annotations,- [REGISTRY_OPERATION_ID_ANNOTATION]: 'other',- },- },- spec: desiredSpec,- },- desired,- operationId,- })- ).toBe('ambiguous')- })-})diff --git a/control-api/test/services.resourceService.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.resourceService.test.tsindex 5da2da662..dde8a7c4f 100644--- a/control-api/test/services.resourceService.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/services.resourceService.test.ts@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ describe('ResourceService.updateResource — AP-6 reader-version precondition',function makeCustomApi(overrides: {currentAnnotations?: Record<string, string>+ currentUid?: stringreplace?: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>} = {}) {@@ -263,6 +264,7 @@ describe('ResourceService.updateResource — AP-6 reader-version precondition',namespace: 'mcp-host',resourceVersion: '11',...(overrides.currentAnnotations && { annotations: overrides.currentAnnotations }),+ ...(overrides.currentUid && { uid: overrides.currentUid }),},spec: { contextRef: 'live' },}),@@ -275,14 +277,14 @@ describe('ResourceService.updateResource — AP-6 reader-version precondition',}}- it('uses the caller-provided resourceVersion as the replace precondition (not the server current one)', async () => {- const customApi = makeCustomApi()+ it('uses the caller-provided identity and resourceVersion in the replacement', async () => {+ const customApi = makeCustomApi({ currentUid: 'uid-reader' })const service = new ResourceService(customApi as never, 'control-plane', { hosts: 'mcp-host' })await service.updateResource('hosts','host-a',- { metadata: { resourceVersion: '10' }, spec: { contextRef: 'edited' } },+ { metadata: { uid: 'uid-reader', resourceVersion: '10' }, spec: { contextRef: 'edited' } },'mcp-host')@@ -291,18 +293,22 @@ describe('ResourceService.updateResource — AP-6 reader-version precondition',// The precondition is the READER's version ('10'), not the fresher// server version ('11') harvested by the internal read.expect(replaceArgs.body.metadata.resourceVersion).toBe('10')+ expect(replaceArgs.body.metadata.uid).toBe('uid-reader')})it('surfaces a 409 as K8sConflictError WITHOUT retrying when the reader version is stale', async () => {const replace = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(makeConflictError())- const customApi = makeCustomApi({ replace })+ const customApi = makeCustomApi({ replace, currentUid: 'uid-reader' })const service = new ResourceService(customApi as never, 'control-plane', { hosts: 'mcp-host' })await expect(service.updateResource('hosts','host-a',- { metadata: { resourceVersion: '10' }, spec: { contextRef: 'stale-edit' } },+ {+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-reader', resourceVersion: '10' },+ spec: { contextRef: 'stale-edit' },+ },'mcp-host')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(K8sConflictError)@@ -311,6 +317,78 @@ describe('ResourceService.updateResource — AP-6 reader-version precondition',// re-apply the same stale payload over the concurrent write.expect(customApi.getNamespacedCustomObject).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)expect(replace).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ expect(replace.mock.calls[0][0].body.metadata).toMatchObject({+ uid: 'uid-reader',+ resourceVersion: '10',+ })+ })++ it('retries a UID-only legacy write after a 409 while the refetched object keeps that UID', async () => {+ const customApi = {+ getNamespacedCustomObject: vi+ .fn()+ .mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '1' },+ spec: {},+ })+ .mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '2' },+ spec: {},+ }),+ replaceNamespacedCustomObject: vi+ .fn()+ .mockRejectedValueOnce(makeConflictError())+ .mockResolvedValueOnce({ metadata: { uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '3' } }),+ listNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn(),+ }+ const service = new ResourceService(customApi as never, 'control-plane', { hosts: 'mcp-host' })++ await service.updateResource(+ 'hosts',+ 'host-a',+ { metadata: { uid: 'uid-original' }, spec: { contextRef: 'edited' } },+ 'mcp-host'+ )++ expect(customApi.getNamespacedCustomObject).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)+ const attempts = customApi.replaceNamespacedCustomObject.mock.calls.map(+ call => call[0].body.metadata+ )+ expect(attempts).toEqual([+ expect.objectContaining({ uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '1' }),+ expect.objectContaining({ uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '2' }),+ ])+ })++ it('does not write a same-name replacement after a UID-only retry observes a different UID', async () => {+ const replace = vi.fn().mockRejectedValueOnce(makeConflictError())+ const customApi = {+ getNamespacedCustomObject: vi+ .fn()+ .mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-original', resourceVersion: '1' },+ spec: {},+ })+ .mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: { uid: 'uid-replacement', resourceVersion: '2' },+ spec: {},+ }),+ replaceNamespacedCustomObject: replace,+ listNamespacedCustomObject: vi.fn(),+ }+ const service = new ResourceService(customApi as never, 'control-plane', { hosts: 'mcp-host' })++ await expect(+ service.updateResource(+ 'hosts',+ 'host-a',+ { metadata: { uid: 'uid-original' }, spec: { contextRef: 'edited' } },+ 'mcp-host'+ )+ ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(K8sConflictError)++ expect(customApi.getNamespacedCustomObject).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)+ expect(replace).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)})it('AP-6 + concurrent wake bump: a stale reader version is rejected 409 while the newer clerum.io/wake-requested on the server is left untouched (no retry re-applies the stale spec)', async () => {diff --git a/control-api/test/services.secretReferenceService.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.secretReferenceService.test.tsindex f819b3e52..cf45cecc2 100644--- a/control-api/test/services.secretReferenceService.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/services.secretReferenceService.test.ts@@ -5,53 +5,251 @@ import { findSecretReferenceState } from '../src/services/secretReferenceServiceconst referencedName = 'referenced-credential'describe('findSecretReferenceState', () => {- it('recognizes every current CRD reference shape that can retain a Secret', async () => {+ it('recognizes every explicitly contracted CRD reference shape', async () => {const cases = [{+ label: 'McpServer auth secret',namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,plural: 'mcpservers',+ resourceNamespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { auth: { secretRef: referencedName } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'McpServer environment secret',+ namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ plural: 'mcpservers',+ resourceNamespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { envSecret: { name: referencedName } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'McpServer image pull secret',+ namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ plural: 'mcpservers',+ resourceNamespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,resource: { spec: { imagePullSecrets: [{ name: referencedName }] } },},{+ label: 'LlmHook image pull secret',+ namespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ plural: 'llmhooks',+ resourceNamespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { target: { image: { imagePullSecrets: [referencedName] } } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'LlmHook environment secret',+ namespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ plural: 'llmhooks',+ resourceNamespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { target: { image: { envSecret: referencedName } } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'LlmHook remote auth headers secret',+ namespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ plural: 'llmhooks',+ resourceNamespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { target: { remote: { authHeadersSecret: referencedName } } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'Host Secret',+ namespace: config.secretsNamespace,+ plural: 'hosts',+ resourceNamespace: config.hostsNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { secretRef: referencedName } },+ },+ {+ label: 'CommunicationChannel credential Secret',+ namespace: config.communicationChannelsNamespace,+ plural: 'communicationchannels',+ resourceNamespace: config.communicationChannelsNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { credentialsSecretRef: { name: referencedName } } },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe agent Secret with an explicit namespace',namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,plural: 'workflowrecipes',- resource: { spec: { workloads: [{ imagePullSecrets: [referencedName] }] } },+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ agent: {+ secretRef: { name: referencedName, namespace: config.sandboxNamespace },+ },+ },+ },},{+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe snippet Secret',namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,plural: 'workflowrecipes',- resource: { spec: { oauth: { clientIdRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'client-id' } } } },+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ steps: [+ {+ run: {+ capabilities: {+ secrets: [{ secretRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'api-key' } }],+ },+ },+ },+ ],+ },+ },},{+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe regular workload environment Secret',namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: { spec: { workloads: [{ id: 'worker', envSecret: { name: referencedName } }] } },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe transport workload environment Secret',+ namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,resource: {- spec: { oauth: { clientSecretRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'client-secret' } } },+ spec: {+ workloads: [+ { id: 'transport', transport: { type: 'sse' }, envSecret: { name: referencedName } },+ ],+ },},},{- namespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,- plural: 'llmhooks',- resource: { spec: { target: { image: { imagePullSecrets: [referencedName] } } } },+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe UI workload environment Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxUiNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ ui: { workloadRef: 'ui' },+ workloads: [{ id: 'ui', envSecret: { name: referencedName } }],+ },+ },},{- namespace: config.llmHooksNamespace,- plural: 'llmhooks',- resource: { spec: { target: { remote: { authHeadersSecret: referencedName } } } },+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe UI workload image pull Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxUiNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ ui: { workloadRef: 'ui' },+ workloads: [{ id: 'ui', imagePullSecrets: [referencedName] }],+ },+ },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe OAuth client ID Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: { oauthClients: [{ clientIdRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'client-id' } }] },+ },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe OAuth client Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ oauthClients: [{ clientSecretRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'client-secret' } }],+ },+ },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe webhook verification Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ webhooks: [{ verification: { secretRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'signing' } } }],+ },+ },+ },+ {+ label: 'WorkflowRecipe webhook setup handshake Secret',+ namespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ plural: 'workflowrecipes',+ resourceNamespace: config.sandboxNamespace,+ resource: {+ spec: {+ webhooks: [+ {+ verification: {+ setupHandshake: { secretRef: { name: referencedName, key: 'verify' } },+ },+ },+ ],+ },+ },},]- for (const { namespace, plural, resource } of cases) {+ for (const { label, namespace, plural, resourceNamespace, resource } of cases) {const reader = {listResource: vi.fn(async (requestedPlural: string, requestedNamespace?: string) =>- requestedPlural === plural && requestedNamespace === namespace ? [resource] : []+ requestedPlural === plural && requestedNamespace === resourceNamespace ? [resource] : []),}- await expect(findSecretReferenceState(reader as never, referencedName, namespace)).resolves.toBe(- 'referenced'- )- expect(reader.listResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith(plural, namespace)+ await expect(+ findSecretReferenceState(reader as never, referencedName, namespace),+ label+ ).resolves.toBe('referenced')+ expect(reader.listResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith(plural, resourceNamespace)+ }+ })++ it('does not treat uncontracted reference-shaped values as Secret dependencies', async () => {+ const reader = {+ listResource: vi.fn(async (plural: string, namespace?: string) =>+ plural === 'workflowrecipes' && namespace === config.sandboxNamespace+ ? [+ {+ spec: {+ extraCredentials: { name: referencedName, key: 'api-key' },+ },+ },+ ]+ : []+ ),+ }++ await expect(+ findSecretReferenceState(reader as never, referencedName, config.sandboxNamespace)+ ).resolves.toBe('not-referenced')+ })++ it('binds ordinary WorkflowRecipe workloads to sandbox-recipes, not every workflow Secret namespace', async () => {+ const reader = {+ listResource: vi.fn(async (plural: string, namespace?: string) =>+ plural === 'workflowrecipes' && namespace === config.sandboxNamespace+ ? [{ spec: { workloads: [{ id: 'worker', envSecret: { name: referencedName } }] } }]+ : []+ ),+ }++ await expect(+ findSecretReferenceState(reader as never, referencedName, config.mcpServersNamespace)+ ).resolves.toBe('not-referenced')+ })++ it('fails closed when no contract applies or a required CRD list cannot be read', async () => {+ const reader = { listResource: vi.fn(async () => []) }+ await expect(+ findSecretReferenceState(reader as never, referencedName, 'untracked-namespace')+ ).resolves.toBe('unknown')+ expect(reader.listResource).not.toHaveBeenCalled()++ const unavailableReader = {+ listResource: vi.fn(async () => Promise.reject(new Error('unavailable'))),}+ await expect(+ findSecretReferenceState(unavailableReader as never, referencedName, config.sandboxNamespace)+ ).resolves.toBe('unknown')})})diff --git a/control-api/test/services.secretService.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.secretService.test.tsindex 49e796502..9eb7d0335 100644--- a/control-api/test/services.secretService.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/services.secretService.test.ts@@ -555,6 +555,18 @@ const FORBIDDEN_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = ['helm.sh/release.v1',]+const NON_MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = [+ 'kubernetes.io/service-account-token',+ 'bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token',+ 'helm.sh/release.v1',+]++const MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES: readonly string[] = [+ 'kubernetes.io/basic-auth',+ 'kubernetes.io/ssh-auth',+ 'example.com/custom',+]+// Annotation keys that must be stripped/rejected on write (infra tier — always blocked).const DANGEROUS_ANNOTATION_KEYS: readonly string[] = ['kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration',@@ -854,18 +866,67 @@ describe('SecretService — preserved Secret state is constrained before mutatioexpect(body).not.toHaveProperty('metadata.annotations')})- it('rejects update when an omitted type preserves a forbidden existing type', async () => {+ it.each(NON_MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES)(+ 'rejects update when an omitted type preserves the managed %s type',+ async type => {+ coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: {},+ type,+ })++ await expect(+ svc.updateSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', stringData: { k: 'v' } })+ ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSecretTypeError)+ expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ }+ )++ it.each([+ {+ operation: 'update',+ call: () =>+ svc.updateSecret({+ name: 's',+ namespace: 'test-ns',+ type: 'Opaque',+ stringData: { k: 'v' },+ }),+ write: () => coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret,+ },+ {+ operation: 'merge',+ call: () =>+ svc.mergeSecret({+ name: 's',+ namespace: 'test-ns',+ type: 'Opaque',+ stringData: { k: 'v' },+ }),+ write: () => coreApi.patchNamespacedSecret,+ },+ ])('rejects $operation when an explicit safe type masks a managed live type', async testCase => {coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({metadata: {},type: 'kubernetes.io/service-account-token',})- await expect(- svc.updateSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', stringData: { k: 'v' } })- ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSecretTypeError)- expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ await expect(testCase.call()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSecretTypeError)+ expect(testCase.write()).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})+ it.each(MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES)(+ 'allows update when an omitted type preserves the non-managed %s type',+ async type => {+ coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({ metadata: {}, type })++ await expect(+ svc.updateSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', stringData: { k: 'v' } })+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns' })+ expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()+ expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret.mock.calls[0][0].body.type).toBe(type)+ }+ )+it('allows update when omitted annotations preserve infrastructure metadata', async () => {coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({metadata: { annotations: { 'meta.helm.sh/release-name': 'release' } },@@ -878,16 +939,76 @@ describe('SecretService — preserved Secret state is constrained before mutatioexpect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()})- it('rejects merge when the preserved existing type is forbidden', async () => {+ it.each(MUTABLE_PRESERVED_SECRET_TYPES)(+ 'allows merge when an omitted type preserves the non-managed %s type',+ async type => {+ coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({ metadata: {}, type })++ await expect(+ svc.mergeSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', stringData: { k: 'v' } })+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns' })+ expect(coreApi.patchNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()+ expect(coreApi.patchNamespacedSecret.mock.calls[0][0].body.type).toBeUndefined()+ }+ )++ it.each([+ { kind: 'infrastructure', key: 'meta.helm.sh/release-name' },+ { kind: 'platform', key: 'clerum.io/catalog-id' },+ ])('allows update to preserve an unchanged live $kind annotation', async ({ key }) => {+ const annotations = { [key]: 'server-owned' }+ coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({+ metadata: { annotations, resourceVersion: '15' },+ type: 'Opaque',+ })++ await expect(+ svc.updateSecret({+ name: 's',+ namespace: 'test-ns',+ annotations: { ...annotations },+ stringData: { k: 'v' },+ })+ ).resolves.toMatchObject({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns' })++ expect(coreApi.readNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ namespace: 'test-ns', name: 's' })+ expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret.mock.calls[0][0].body.metadata.annotations).toEqual(+ annotations+ )+ })++ it.each([+ { kind: 'introduces', key: 'meta.helm.sh/release-name', existing: {}, requested: 'release-a' },+ {+ kind: 'changes',+ key: 'meta.helm.sh/release-name',+ existing: { 'meta.helm.sh/release-name': 'release-a' },+ requested: 'release-b',+ },+ { kind: 'introduces', key: 'clerum.io/catalog-id', existing: {}, requested: 'catalog-a' },+ {+ kind: 'changes',+ key: 'clerum.io/catalog-id',+ existing: { 'clerum.io/catalog-id': 'catalog-a' },+ requested: 'catalog-b',+ },+ ])('rejects update that $kind a reserved annotation', async ({ key, existing, requested }) => {coreApi.readNamespacedSecret.mockResolvedValueOnce({- metadata: {},- type: 'kubernetes.io/ssh-auth',+ metadata: { annotations: existing, resourceVersion: '16' },+ type: 'Opaque',})await expect(- svc.mergeSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', stringData: { k: 'v' } })- ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(InvalidSecretTypeError)- expect(coreApi.patchNamespacedSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ svc.updateSecret({+ name: 's',+ namespace: 'test-ns',+ annotations: { [key]: requested },+ stringData: { k: 'v' },+ })+ ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(DangerousAnnotationError)++ expect(coreApi.readNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ namespace: 'test-ns', name: 's' })+ expect(coreApi.replaceNamespacedSecret).not.toHaveBeenCalled()})it('preserves unknown platform metadata without locking data-only rotation', async () => {@@ -939,7 +1060,7 @@ describe('SecretService — forbidden Secret types never reach the apiserver', (name: 'updateSecret',call: type =>svc.updateSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', type, stringData: { k: 'v' } }),- apiSurface: ['readNamespacedSecret', 'replaceNamespacedSecret'],+ apiSurface: ['replaceNamespacedSecret'],},{name: 'mergeSecret',@@ -983,7 +1104,7 @@ describe('SecretService — forbidden Secret types never reach the apiserver', (})})-describe('SecretService — dangerous annotations never reach the apiserver', () => {+describe('SecretService — dangerous annotations never reach a mutation endpoint', () => {let coreApi: CoreApiMocklet svc: SecretService@@ -995,26 +1116,29 @@ describe('SecretService — dangerous annotations never reach the apiserver', ()const writeOps: ReadonlyArray<{name: stringcall: (annotations: Record<string, string>) => Promise<unknown>- apiSurface: (keyof CoreApiMock)[]+ writeSurface: keyof CoreApiMock+ readsLiveSecret: boolean}> = [{name: 'createSecret',call: annotations =>svc.createSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', annotations, stringData: { k: 'v' } }),- apiSurface: ['createNamespacedSecret'],+ writeSurface: 'createNamespacedSecret',+ readsLiveSecret: false,},{name: 'updateSecret',call: annotations =>svc.updateSecret({ name: 's', namespace: 'test-ns', annotations, stringData: { k: 'v' } }),- apiSurface: ['readNamespacedSecret', 'replaceNamespacedSecret'],+ writeSurface: 'replaceNamespacedSecret',+ readsLiveSecret: true,},]for (const op of writeOps) {describe(op.name, () => {for (const badKey of DANGEROUS_ANNOTATION_KEYS) {- it(`rejects annotation "${badKey}" with a 400 and never calls the apiserver`, async () => {+ it(`rejects annotation "${badKey}" with a 400 and never calls a mutation endpoint`, async () => {const err = await op.call({ [badKey]: 'value' }).then(() => {throw new Error('expected the write to reject')@@ -1023,17 +1147,15 @@ describe('SecretService — dangerous annotations never reach the apiserver', ())expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(DangerousAnnotationError)expect((err as DangerousAnnotationError).status).toBe(400)- for (const surface of op.apiSurface) {- expect(coreApi[surface]).not.toHaveBeenCalled()- }+ expect(coreApi[op.writeSurface]).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ if (op.readsLiveSecret) expect(coreApi.readNamespacedSecret).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()})}for (const safeKey of SAFE_ANNOTATION_KEYS) {it(`lets safe annotation "${safeKey}" through to the apiserver`, async () => {await op.call({ [safeKey]: 'value' })- const writeSurface = op.apiSurface[op.apiSurface.length - 1]- expect(coreApi[writeSurface]).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()+ expect(coreApi[op.writeSurface]).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()})}})diff --git a/control-api/test/utils.auth.mcpSecretDeleteProof.test.ts b/control-api/test/utils.auth.mcpSecretDeleteProof.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..6a546bb77--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/test/utils.auth.mcpSecretDeleteProof.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import {+ MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,+ createMcpSecretDeleteProof,+ mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName,+ verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof,+} from '../src/utils/auth/mcpSecretDeleteProof.js'++const adminSession = 'test-admin-session'+const claims = {+ name: 'linear-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'uid-linear-credentials',+ resourceVersion: '1',+}++describe('MCP Secret delete proof', () => {+ it('binds exactly the Secret identity claims to the admin session', () => {+ const now = 1_700_000_000_000+ const nowSpy = vi.spyOn(Date, 'now').mockReturnValue(now)++ try {+ const proof = createMcpSecretDeleteProof(claims, adminSession)++ expect(verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(proof, adminSession)).toEqual({+ ...claims,+ exp: Math.floor(now / 1000) + MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS,+ })+ expect(Object.keys(verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(proof, adminSession) ?? {}).sort()).toEqual([+ 'exp',+ 'name',+ 'namespace',+ 'resourceVersion',+ 'uid',+ ])+ } finally {+ nowSpy.mockRestore()+ }+ })++ it('rejects a proof when its session binding, signature, or expiry is invalid', () => {+ const now = 1_700_000_000_000+ const nowSpy = vi.spyOn(Date, 'now').mockReturnValue(now)++ try {+ const proof = createMcpSecretDeleteProof(claims, adminSession)+ const [payload, signature] = proof.split('.')++ expect(verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(proof, 'different-admin-session')).toBeNull()+ expect(verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(`${payload}.${signature}x`, adminSession)).toBeNull()++ nowSpy.mockReturnValue(now + (MCP_SECRET_DELETE_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 1) * 1000)+ expect(verifyMcpSecretDeleteProof(proof, adminSession)).toBeNull()+ } finally {+ nowSpy.mockRestore()+ }+ })++ it('uses a deterministic, HTTP-cookie-safe name derived from the Secret name', () => {+ const name = mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName(claims.name)++ expect(name).toMatch(/^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+$/)+ expect(name).not.toBe(mcpSecretDeleteProofCookieName('other-credentials'))+ })+})diff --git a/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx b/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsxindex 1b6df4f24..5f1c244da 100644--- a/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx+++ b/control-ui/components/CreateMcpServerForm/index.tsx@@ -533,11 +533,16 @@ export function CreateMcpServerForm({const willCreateSecret =useEnvSecret && envSecretName.trim().length > 0 && Object.keys(secretData).length > 0- let createdSecretIdentity: SecretIdentity | null = null+ let createdSecretName: string | null = null+ let createdSecretIdentity: SecretIdentity | undefinedtry {if (willCreateSecret) {- const created = await createMcpSecret(envSecretName.trim(), secretData)- createdSecretIdentity = { uid: created.uid, resourceVersion: created.resourceVersion }+ const secretName = envSecretName.trim()+ const created = await createMcpSecret(secretName, secretData)+ createdSecretName = secretName+ if (created.uid && created.resourceVersion) {+ createdSecretIdentity = { uid: created.uid, resourceVersion: created.resourceVersion }+ }}await createMcpServer({@@ -576,17 +581,25 @@ export function CreateMcpServerForm({onCreated()}, 600)} catch (submitError) {- // Rollback: if we created the Secret but the CRD (or anything after)- // failed, the Secret is orphan — best-effort delete.- if (createdSecretIdentity) {+ // Rollback only a Secret this submission created. Legacy create APIs did+ // not return an identity, so this is the one bounded bodyless-delete+ // compatibility path; existing Secret deletes remain identity-bound.+ let cleanupError: unknown+ if (createdSecretName) {try {- await deleteMcpSecret(envSecretName.trim(), createdSecretIdentity)- } catch {- // best-effort rollback; swallow — the operator already sees the- // primary error below.+ await deleteMcpSecret(createdSecretName, createdSecretIdentity)+ } catch (error) {+ cleanupError = error}}- setError(formatCreateError(submitError))+ const primaryError = formatCreateError(submitError)+ setError(+ cleanupError+ ? `${primaryError} Cleanup of the created Secret also failed: ${formatCreateError(+ cleanupError+ )}. Refresh the page and review the Secret before taking further action.`+ : primaryError+ )} finally {setSubmitting(false)}diff --git a/control-ui/components/SecretsTable.tsx b/control-ui/components/SecretsTable.tsxindex a79ba6317..bab15bce1 100644--- a/control-ui/components/SecretsTable.tsx+++ b/control-ui/components/SecretsTable.tsx@@ -358,7 +358,12 @@ export function SecretsTable({async function deleteRecipeSecretRow(row: RecipeSecretRow) {const { name, namespace, uid, resourceVersion } = rowif (!uid || !resourceVersion) {- setRecipeError(`Secret ${name} has no current identity; refresh before deleting it.`)+ // Existing Secret deletes never use the legacy bodyless path. It is+ // reserved for the create form's rollback immediately after an older+ // create endpoint omitted identity fields.+ setRecipeError(+ `Secret ${name} has no current identity. Refresh the page and review the latest state before deleting it.`+ )return}const ok = await confirm({@@ -841,10 +846,7 @@ export function SecretsTable({? 'Deleting…': 'Delete',danger: true,- disabled:- !row.uid ||- !row.resourceVersion ||- recipeDeletingName === `${row.namespace}/${row.name}`,+ disabled: recipeDeletingName === `${row.namespace}/${row.name}`,onClick: () => void deleteRecipeSecretRow(row),},]}diff --git a/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx b/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsxindex c9ea205cd..ccff30124 100644--- a/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx+++ b/control-ui/components/__tests__/CreateMcpServerForm.test.tsx@@ -539,6 +539,76 @@ describe('CreateMcpServerForm — envSecret guardrails', () => {})})+ it('uses the legacy bodyless rollback when the create API omits identity fields', async () => {+ ;(api.createMcpSecret as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockResolvedValueOnce({+ name: 'legacy-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ })+ ;(api.createMcpServer as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockRejectedValueOnce(+ new Error('Connector create failed')+ )++ render(<CreateMcpServerForm onCancel={vi.fn()} onCreated={vi.fn()} />)+ await fillRequiredBasics()+ enableEnvSecret('legacy-credentials')+ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add Key Mapping' }))+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('api-key'), {+ target: { value: 'api-key' },+ })+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('BRAVE_API_KEY'), {+ target: { value: 'BRAVE_API_KEY' },+ })+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('sk-...'), {+ target: { value: 'test-value' },+ })++ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create connector' }))++ await waitFor(() => {+ expect(api.deleteMcpSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith('legacy-credentials', undefined)+ })+ expect(screen.getByText('Connector create failed')).toBeInTheDocument()+ })++ it('preserves the primary error when legacy rollback fails against a newer delete API', async () => {+ ;(api.createMcpSecret as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockResolvedValueOnce({+ name: 'mixed-version-credentials',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ })+ ;(api.createMcpServer as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockRejectedValueOnce(+ new Error('Connector create failed')+ )+ ;(api.deleteMcpSecret as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockRejectedValueOnce(+ new Error('428 Precondition Required - current identity required')+ )++ render(<CreateMcpServerForm onCancel={vi.fn()} onCreated={vi.fn()} />)+ await fillRequiredBasics()+ enableEnvSecret('mixed-version-credentials')+ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add Key Mapping' }))+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('api-key'), {+ target: { value: 'api-key' },+ })+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('BRAVE_API_KEY'), {+ target: { value: 'BRAVE_API_KEY' },+ })+ fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('sk-...'), {+ target: { value: 'test-value' },+ })++ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create connector' }))++ await waitFor(() => {+ expect(api.deleteMcpSecret).toHaveBeenCalledWith('mixed-version-credentials', undefined)+ })+ expect(screen.getByText(/Connector create failed/)).toBeInTheDocument()+ expect(+ screen.getByText(+ /Cleanup of the created Secret also failed: 428 Precondition Required - current identity required\. Refresh the page and review the Secret before taking further action\./+ )+ ).toBeInTheDocument()+ })+it('happy path: creates Secret then CRD, no rollback', async () => {const onCreated = vi.fn()render(<CreateMcpServerForm onCancel={vi.fn()} onCreated={onCreated} />)diff --git a/control-ui/components/__tests__/SecretsTable.test.tsx b/control-ui/components/__tests__/SecretsTable.test.tsxindex fd084a260..4963c6c99 100644--- a/control-ui/components/__tests__/SecretsTable.test.tsx+++ b/control-ui/components/__tests__/SecretsTable.test.tsx@@ -8,7 +8,13 @@ import {waitFor,within,} from '@testing-library/react'-import { apiSend, getMcpServers, getRecipeSecrets, getRecipes } from '../../lib/api'+import {+ apiSend,+ deleteRecipeSecret,+ getMcpServers,+ getRecipeSecrets,+ getRecipes,+} from '../../lib/api'import { buildSecretSummary } from '../../test/fixtures/secretSummary'import { SecretsTable } from '../SecretsTable'import { ToastProvider } from '../Toast'@@ -25,6 +31,7 @@ vi.mock('../../lib/api', async () => {return {...actual,apiSend: vi.fn(),+ deleteRecipeSecret: vi.fn(),getMcpServers: vi.fn(),getRecipeSecrets: vi.fn(),getRecipes: vi.fn(),@@ -32,6 +39,7 @@ vi.mock('../../lib/api', async () => {})const apiSendMock = vi.mocked(apiSend)+const deleteRecipeSecretMock = vi.mocked(deleteRecipeSecret)const getMcpServersMock = vi.mocked(getMcpServers)const getRecipeSecretsMock = vi.mocked(getRecipeSecrets)const getRecipesMock = vi.mocked(getRecipes)@@ -41,6 +49,8 @@ const getRecipesMock = vi.mocked(getRecipes)beforeEach(() => {apiSendMock.mockReset()apiSendMock.mockResolvedValue(undefined as never)+ deleteRecipeSecretMock.mockReset()+ deleteRecipeSecretMock.mockResolvedValue(undefined as never)})function renderTable(@@ -377,6 +387,85 @@ describe('SecretsTable — connector marketplace source', () => {})})+describe('SecretsTable — recipe deletion identity', () => {+ beforeEach(() => {+ getMcpServersMock.mockReset()+ getRecipeSecretsMock.mockReset()+ getRecipesMock.mockReset()+ mockReplace.mockClear()+ mockPush.mockClear()+ })++ afterEach(() => {+ cleanup()+ })++ it('requires a refresh before deleting a legacy row without identity', async () => {+ getRecipeSecretsMock.mockResolvedValue({+ items: [+ {+ name: 'legacy-recipe-credentials',+ namespace: 'sandbox-recipes',+ keys: ['api-key'],+ ownership: { kind: 'shared' },+ },+ ],+ })+ getRecipesMock.mockResolvedValue({ items: [] })++ renderTable('recipe')++ const trigger = await screen.findByRole('button', {+ name: 'Actions for recipe secret legacy-recipe-credentials',+ })+ fireEvent.click(trigger)+ const deleteAction = screen.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Delete' })+ expect(deleteAction).not.toBeDisabled()+ fireEvent.click(deleteAction)++ expect(+ await screen.findByText(+ 'Secret legacy-recipe-credentials has no current identity. Refresh the page and review the latest state before deleting it.'+ )+ ).toBeInTheDocument()+ expect(deleteRecipeSecretMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })++ it('sends the listed identity when deleting a current recipe Secret', async () => {+ getRecipeSecretsMock.mockResolvedValue({+ items: [+ {+ name: 'current-recipe-credentials',+ namespace: 'sandbox-recipes',+ keys: ['api-key'],+ ownership: { kind: 'shared' },+ uid: 'uid-current-recipe-credentials',+ resourceVersion: '7',+ },+ ],+ })+ getRecipesMock.mockResolvedValue({ items: [] })++ renderTable('recipe')++ const trigger = await screen.findByRole('button', {+ name: 'Actions for recipe secret current-recipe-credentials',+ })+ fireEvent.click(trigger)+ fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Delete' }))+ const dialog = await screen.findByRole('alertdialog', { name: 'Delete Recipe Secret' })+ fireEvent.click(within(dialog).getByRole('button', { name: 'Delete' }))++ await waitFor(() => {+ expect(deleteRecipeSecretMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(+ 'current-recipe-credentials',+ 'sandbox-recipes',+ { uid: 'uid-current-recipe-credentials', resourceVersion: '7' }+ )+ })+ })+})+describe('SecretsTable — recipe pending refs', () => {beforeEach(() => {getMcpServersMock.mockReset()diff --git a/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts b/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.tsindex 1117c2a6a..51b40a404 100644--- a/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts+++ b/control-ui/e2e/qa-recorder-connector-edit.spec.ts@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@// egress. Guarded by QA_RECORDER_CONFIRM_MUTATIONS; connector then context are// deleted via the Control API in a finally.import { type Page, expect, test } from '@playwright/test'-import { requireSecretIdentity, type SecretIdentity } from '../test-utils/secretIdentity'+import { type SecretIdentity, requireSecretIdentity } from '../test-utils/secretIdentity'import {CONTROL_API_URL,CONTROL_UI_URL,@@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ const MOCK_MCP_IMAGE = process.env.TEST_MOCK_MCP_IMAGE ?? 'clerum/mock-mcp-serve// The connector-form's Transport Type and Managed selects are not label-associated,// so use their visible field label as the stable local scope for those controls.async function fieldSelect(page: Page, fieldLabelText: string, value: string): Promise<void> {- await page.getByText(fieldLabelText, { exact: true }).locator('..').getByRole('combobox').selectOption(value)+ await page+ .getByText(fieldLabelText, { exact: true })+ .locator('..')+ .getByRole('combobox')+ .selectOption(value)}async function createEmptyContext(page: Page, contextName: string): Promise<void> {@@ -78,9 +82,6 @@ async function createDiscoveryConnector(await fieldSelect(page, 'Transport Type', 'stdio')await expect(page.locator('input[type="number"]')).toHaveCount(0)await fieldSelect(page, 'Managed', 'false')- await page.getByLabel('Egress mode').selectOption('exact-cidr')- await page.getByLabel('Allowed CIDRs/IPs').fill('8.8.8.8/32')- await page.getByLabel('Allowed ports').fill('443')await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue', exact: true }).click()@@ -94,9 +95,9 @@ async function createDiscoveryConnector(await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue', exact: true }).click()- await expect(- page.getByRole('radio', { name: /^No credentials required/ })- ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })+ await expect(page.getByRole('radio', { name: /^No credentials required/ })).toBeVisible({+ timeout: 20_000,+ })await page.getByRole('radio', { name: /^No credentials required/ }).check()await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create connector', exact: true }).click()@@ -156,6 +157,10 @@ test.describe('optional QA recorder: Control UI connector edit', () => {await expect(meta.getByText('qa-recorder/example:dev')).toBeVisible()await expect(meta.getByText(contextName)).toBeVisible()+ // The connector starts closed, so the following persistence check proves a+ // real edit rather than re-reading setup data.+ await expect(page.getByLabel('Egress mode')).toHaveValue('none')+// External Egress: switch to exact-CIDR mode and add one public CIDR + port.// 8.8.8.8/32 is a valid public target; the model rejects private/doc ranges.await page.getByLabel('Egress mode').selectOption('exact-cidr')@@ -167,6 +172,20 @@ test.describe('optional QA recorder: Control UI connector edit', () => {page.getByText(`Connector ${connectorName} updated.`, { exact: true })).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })+ await test.step('reopen the connector and read its persisted egress through the UI', async () => {+ await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/connectors$/, { timeout: 20_000 })+ await expect(+ page.getByRole('button', { name: `Expand connector ${connectorName}` })+ ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })+ await openConnectorEditor(page, connectorName)+ await expect(+ page.getByRole('heading', { name: `Edit Connector: ${connectorName}`, exact: true })+ ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20_000 })+ await expect(page.getByLabel('Egress mode')).toHaveValue('exact-cidr')+ await expect(page.getByLabel('Allowed CIDRs/IPs')).toHaveValue('8.8.8.8/32')+ await expect(page.getByLabel('Allowed ports')).toHaveValue('443')+ })+await screenshotAndLog(page, testInfo, 'control-ui-connector-edit')} finally {await directApi(@@ -263,7 +282,9 @@ test.describe('optional QA recorder: Control UI connector edit', () => {// The connector edit screen is split into tabs; the rotation flow lives// on the Credentials tab — navigate there via the visible tab.await page.getByRole('tab', { name: 'Credentials', exact: true }).click()- await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Update credentials', exact: true })).toBeVisible({+ await expect(+ page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Update credentials', exact: true })+ ).toBeVisible({timeout: 20_000,})diff --git a/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts b/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.tsindex d02a7d459..dc21c07a3 100644--- a/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts+++ b/control-ui/e2e/registry-install.spec.ts@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@*/import { type Page, expect, test } from '@playwright/test'import { setTimeout as delay } from 'node:timers/promises'+import { type SecretIdentity, requireSecretIdentity } from '../test-utils/secretIdentity'const BASE_API = process.env.CONTROL_API_URL || 'http://localhost:8090'const REGISTRY_BASE = process.env.REGISTRY_URL || 'http://localhost:8085'@@ -91,16 +92,6 @@ async function api(return { status: resp.status, data }}-type ObjectIdentity = { uid: string; resourceVersion: string }--function requireObjectIdentity(value: unknown, operation: string): ObjectIdentity {- const record = value as { uid?: unknown; resourceVersion?: unknown }- if (typeof record?.uid !== 'string' || typeof record.resourceVersion !== 'string') {- throw new Error(`${operation} did not return a complete object identity`)- }- return { uid: record.uid, resourceVersion: record.resourceVersion }-}-async function login(page: Page) {// Public authentication entry; never a terminal/deep-link state.await page.goto('/')@@ -1720,9 +1711,9 @@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Editor Journeys', () => {const deferredEnvSecretName = uniqueE2EName('e2e-deferred-creds')const deferredSandboxUiEntryName = uniqueE2EName('e2e-sandbox-ui-secret')const deferredSandboxUiSecretName = uniqueE2EName('e2e-sandbox-ui-creds')- let manualPendingIdentity: ObjectIdentity | null = null- let deferredEnvIdentity: ObjectIdentity | null = null- let deferredSandboxUiIdentity: ObjectIdentity | null = null+ let manualPendingIdentity: SecretIdentity | null = null+ let deferredEnvIdentity: SecretIdentity | null = null+ let deferredSandboxUiIdentity: SecretIdentity | null = nullconst overLimitEntryName = uniqueE2EName('e2e-overlimit')let installedRegistryRecipeName = ''let installedDeferredEnvSecretRecipeName = ''@@ -2010,7 +2001,11 @@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Editor Journeys', () => {const pendingManifestEditor = page.locator('textarea')await expect(pendingManifestEditor).toHaveCount(1)await pendingManifestEditor.fill(- JSON.stringify(manualPendingSecretRecipe(manualPendingRecipeName, manualPendingSecretName), null, 2)+ JSON.stringify(+ manualPendingSecretRecipe(manualPendingRecipeName, manualPendingSecretName),+ null,+ 2+ ))await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Review manifest' }).click()await expect(page.getByText(/Manifest review passed/)).toBeVisible()@@ -2105,7 +2100,7 @@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Editor Journeys', () => {await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create secret' }).click()const createdManualPending = await createRecipeSecretResponseexpect(createdManualPending.status()).toBe(201)- manualPendingIdentity = requireObjectIdentity(+ manualPendingIdentity = requireSecretIdentity(await createdManualPending.json(),'create manual pending recipe credential')@@ -2471,7 +2466,7 @@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Editor Journeys', () => {await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create secret' }).click()const createdDeferredEnv = await createRecipeSecretResponseexpect(createdDeferredEnv.status()).toBe(201)- deferredEnvIdentity = requireObjectIdentity(+ deferredEnvIdentity = requireSecretIdentity(await createdDeferredEnv.json(),'create deferred recipe credential')@@ -2603,7 +2598,7 @@ test.describe('J. Operator Egress Editor Journeys', () => {await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Create secret' }).click()const createdDeferredSandboxUi = await createRecipeSecretResponseexpect(createdDeferredSandboxUi.status()).toBe(201)- deferredSandboxUiIdentity = requireObjectIdentity(+ deferredSandboxUiIdentity = requireSecretIdentity(await createdDeferredSandboxUi.json(),'create sandbox-ui recipe credential')diff --git a/control-ui/lib/__tests__/mcpIdentity.test.ts b/control-ui/lib/__tests__/mcpIdentity.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..e37d7de4f--- /dev/null+++ b/control-ui/lib/__tests__/mcpIdentity.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import { createMcpSecret, deleteMcpSecret, formatApiError } from '../api'++function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200, statusText = 'OK'): Response {+ return {+ ok: status >= 200 && status < 300,+ status,+ statusText,+ text: async () => JSON.stringify(body),+ } as unknown as Response+}++let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>++beforeEach(() => {+ fetchMock = vi.fn()+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+})++afterEach(() => {+ vi.unstubAllGlobals()+ vi.restoreAllMocks()+})++describe('MCP identity compatibility', () => {+ it('accepts a legacy create response without identity and rolls it back without a body', async () => {+ fetchMock+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ jsonResponse({ name: 'legacy-object', namespace: 'mcp-server' }, 201, 'Created')+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ name: 'legacy-object', namespace: 'mcp-server' }))++ const created = await createMcpSecret('legacy-object', { fixture: 'fixture' })++ expect(created).toEqual({ name: 'legacy-object', namespace: 'mcp-server' })++ await deleteMcpSecret(created.name, undefined)++ expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(+ 2,+ '/control-api/api/v1/admin/mcp-secrets/legacy-object',+ expect.objectContaining({+ method: 'DELETE',+ body: undefined,+ })+ )+ })++ it('preserves and sends a complete identity returned by a current API', async () => {+ fetchMock+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(+ jsonResponse(+ {+ name: 'current-object',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'uid-current-object',+ resourceVersion: '9',+ },+ 201,+ 'Created'+ )+ )+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(jsonResponse({ name: 'current-object', namespace: 'mcp-server' }))++ const created = await createMcpSecret('current-object', { fixture: 'fixture' })++ expect(created).toEqual({+ name: 'current-object',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'uid-current-object',+ resourceVersion: '9',+ })++ await deleteMcpSecret(created.name, {+ uid: created.uid!,+ resourceVersion: created.resourceVersion!,+ })++ const deleteRequest = fetchMock.mock.calls[1]?.[1] as RequestInit+ expect(JSON.parse(String(deleteRequest.body))).toEqual({+ uid: 'uid-current-object',+ resourceVersion: '9',+ })+ })++ it('fails closed when a create response returns only part of an identity', async () => {+ fetchMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(+ jsonResponse(+ { name: 'partial-object', namespace: 'mcp-server', uid: 'uid-partial-object' },+ 201,+ 'Created'+ )+ )++ await expect(createMcpSecret('partial-object', { fixture: 'fixture' })).rejects.toThrow(+ /incomplete Secret identity/+ )+ })+})++describe('MCP delete API errors', () => {+ it.each([+ [+ 'secret_identity_precondition_required',+ 'A current Secret identity is required before it can be deleted.',+ ],+ ['secret_identity_unavailable', 'The server could not verify the current Secret identity.'],+ ['secret_identity_changed', 'This Secret changed since it was loaded.'],+ ['mcp_secret_in_use', 'This Secret is still in use by one or more connectors.'],+ [+ 'mcp_secret_reference_check_unavailable',+ 'The server could not verify whether this Secret is in use.',+ ],+ ])('maps %s to an operator-safe remediation', (code, message) => {+ const error = formatApiError(+ { status: 409, statusText: 'Conflict' } as Response,+ JSON.stringify({ error: code })+ )++ expect(error.message).toContain(message)+ expect((error as Error & { code?: string }).code).toBe(code)+ })+})diff --git a/control-ui/lib/api.ts b/control-ui/lib/api.tsindex 1634a25e4..34873174c 100644--- a/control-ui/lib/api.ts+++ b/control-ui/lib/api.ts@@ -13,8 +13,11 @@ export type SecretIdentity = {resourceVersion: string}-function requireSecretIdentity(raw: unknown, operation: string): SecretIdentity {+function readSecretIdentity(raw: unknown, operation: string): SecretIdentity | undefined {const value = (raw ?? {}) as { uid?: unknown; resourceVersion?: unknown }+ const hasUid = value.uid !== undefined+ const hasResourceVersion = value.resourceVersion !== undefined+ if (!hasUid && !hasResourceVersion) return undefinedif (typeof value.uid !== 'string' ||!value.uid.trim() ||@@ -26,6 +29,19 @@ function requireSecretIdentity(raw: unknown, operation: string): SecretIdentityreturn { uid: value.uid, resourceVersion: value.resourceVersion }}+const SECRET_ERROR_MESSAGES: Record<string, string> = {+ secret_identity_precondition_required:+ 'A current Secret identity is required before it can be deleted. Refresh the page and review the latest state before taking further action.',+ secret_identity_unavailable:+ 'The server could not verify the current Secret identity. Refresh the page and review the Secret before taking further action.',+ secret_identity_changed:+ 'This Secret changed since it was loaded. Refresh the page and review the latest state before taking further action.',+ mcp_secret_in_use:+ 'This Secret is still in use by one or more connectors. Remove or update its references before deleting it.',+ mcp_secret_reference_check_unavailable:+ 'The server could not verify whether this Secret is in use. Refresh the page and review its references before taking further action.',+}+// Global error handler for 401s - managed by AuthContextlet globalHandleAuthError: (() => void) | null = null@@ -118,8 +134,10 @@ export function formatApiError(res: Response, text: string): Error {} catch {detail = text}+ const errorCode = typeof parsedBody?.error === 'string' ? parsedBody.error : undefinedconst friendlyDetail =- detail === 'duplicate_username'+ (errorCode ? SECRET_ERROR_MESSAGES[errorCode] : undefined) ??+ (detail === 'duplicate_username'? 'That username is already taken.': detail === 'duplicate_email'? 'That email is already registered.'@@ -144,15 +162,14 @@ export function formatApiError(res: Response, text: string): Error {? "Invitations are unavailable — the member-registration service isn't configured or can't be reached. Check the server logs for details.": detail === 'member_registration_misconfigured'? 'Invitations are unavailable — member registration is misconfigured. Check the server logs for details.'- : detail+ : detail)const error = new Error(`${res.status} ${res.statusText} - ${friendlyDetail}`);(error as Error & { status?: number }).status = res.status// Preserve the machine-readable error code and full JSON body so callers can// render structured, actionable errors (e.g. unpriced_models, price_in_use_by_budget)// instead of the generic message string.if (parsedBody) {- ;(error as Error & { code?: string }).code =- typeof parsedBody.error === 'string' ? (parsedBody.error as string) : undefined+ ;(error as Error & { code?: string }).code = errorCode;(error as Error & { body?: Record<string, unknown> }).body = parsedBody}return error@@ -1470,25 +1487,41 @@ export async function updateMcpServer(name: string, payload: { spec: Record<stri) as Promise<McpServerResource>}-export async function createMcpSecret(name: string, data: Record<string, string>) {- const response = await apiSend('POST', '/api/v1/admin/mcp-secrets', { name, data })- const identity = requireSecretIdentity(response, 'createMcpSecret')- return {- ...(response as { name: string; namespace: string }),- ...identity,- } as {+export type McpSecretCreateResult =+ | ({+ name: string+ namespace: string+ } & SecretIdentity)+ | {+ name: string+ namespace: string+ uid?: undefined+ resourceVersion?: undefined+ }++export async function createMcpSecret(+ name: string,+ data: Record<string, string>+): Promise<McpSecretCreateResult> {+ const response = (await apiSend('POST', '/api/v1/admin/mcp-secrets', { name, data })) as {name: stringnamespace: string- } & SecretIdentity+ }+ const identity = readSecretIdentity(response, 'createMcpSecret')+ return identity ? { ...response, ...identity } : response}/*** Deletes a Secret in the MCP-servers namespace (hardcoded server-side to* `config.mcpServersNamespace`). Used by the Create MCP Server flow to roll- * back a just-created Secret when the subsequent McpServer CRD creation fails,- * so we never leave orphan Secrets behind.+ * back a just-created Secret when the subsequent McpServer CRD creation fails.+ *+ * Current API versions require the server-issued identity. `undefined` is a+ * narrow compatibility path for that rollback only: older create endpoints+ * succeeded without returning identity and accepted the original bodyless+ * DELETE. Primary delete flows must keep their identity precondition.*/-export async function deleteMcpSecret(name: string, identity: SecretIdentity) {+export async function deleteMcpSecret(name: string, identity: SecretIdentity | undefined) {return apiSend('DELETE',`/api/v1/admin/mcp-secrets/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`,diff --git a/control-ui/package-lock.json b/control-ui/package-lock.jsonindex 9371562e4..c7cda9813 100644--- a/control-ui/package-lock.json+++ b/control-ui/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.458",+ "version": "0.1.459","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.458",+ "version": "0.1.459","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/llm-providers": "file:../packages/llm-providers",diff --git a/control-ui/package.json b/control-ui/package.jsonindex 6feb28a82..29e399255 100644--- a/control-ui/package.json+++ b/control-ui/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.458",+ "version": "0.1.459","private": true,"scripts": {"dev": "NEXT_IGNORE_INCORRECT_LOCKFILE=1 next dev",