Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
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feat(guardrails): make tool-lane hooks installable, gated as content-bearing (l5)
Andy Paviaa12e72b59976
diff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yamlindex fb4217a14..6c02f0271 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/llmhook.yaml@@ -157,8 +157,15 @@ spec:lifecyclePoints:type: arrayminItems: 1- maxItems: 4- description: Lifecycle points this hook subscribes to.+ maxItems: 6+ description: >-+ Lifecycle points this hook subscribes to. The first four are the+ LLM lane (§8.1); preToolUse/postToolUse are the tool lane (§6.2)+ and are accepted here because Host.spec.guardrails.hooks already+ keys on them and mcp-host already maps them+ (guardrailHookResolver PHASE_TO_POINT). Omitting them made an+ installed tool-lane hook unrepresentable: the apiserver rejected+ the CR the install saga tried to create.items:type: stringenum:@@ -166,6 +173,8 @@ spec:- moderate- postCallSuccess- onError+ - preToolUse+ - postToolUsecontentAccess:type: stringenum:@@ -248,9 +257,15 @@ spec:# contentAccess: metadata is contradictory for an inherently content-bearing# point. An absent field passes (absent is read as `content`), so this is# non-breaking for existing CRs; it only rejects an explicit metadata on- # moderate/post/onError.- - rule: "!has(self.contentAccess) || self.contentAccess == 'content' || !self.lifecyclePoints.exists(p, p == 'moderate' || p == 'postCallSuccess' || p == 'onError')"- message: "contentAccess: metadata is not allowed for a hook using moderate/postCallSuccess/onError (those points are inherently content-bearing)"+ # a content-bearing point.+ #+ # The tool-lane points are listed because the tool lane has no metadata+ # projection at all: preToolUse receives {tool, arguments} and postToolUse+ # receives the tool result, and remoteToolHook never consults+ # contentAccess. Declaring `metadata` there would describe a projection+ # that does not exist.+ - rule: "!has(self.contentAccess) || self.contentAccess == 'content' || !self.lifecyclePoints.exists(p, p == 'moderate' || p == 'postCallSuccess' || p == 'onError' || p == 'preToolUse' || p == 'postToolUse')"+ message: "contentAccess: metadata is not allowed for a hook using moderate/postCallSuccess/onError/preToolUse/postToolUse (those points are inherently content-bearing)"status:type: objectdescription: >-diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 971556d02..94317002b 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.469",+ "version": "0.1.470","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.469",+ "version": "0.1.470","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 4d711e8cd..32f95cd2f 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.469",+ "version": "0.1.470","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/installHookTrust.test.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/installHookTrust.test.tsindex 6f424ccb3..aeed720d7 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/installHookTrust.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/installHookTrust.test.ts@@ -70,6 +70,20 @@ describe('content-bearing classification (§8.4/§8.7)', () => {expect(isContentBearingHook(undefined)).toBe(false)expect(isContentBearingHook(['somethingElse'])).toBe(false)})++ // The tool lane has no metadata projection: preToolUse receives {tool, arguments}+ // and postToolUse receives the tool result, and remoteToolHook never consults+ // contentAccess. Classified content-free, a preToolUse-only hook with egress at+ // low trust passed the gate while reading every tool argument at runtime.+ it('both tool-lane points are always content-bearing', () => {+ expect(isContentBearingHook(['preToolUse'])).toBe(true)+ expect(isContentBearingHook(['postToolUse'])).toBe(true)+ })++ it('contentAccess: metadata cannot make a tool-lane point content-free', () => {+ expect(isContentBearingHook(['preToolUse'], 'metadata')).toBe(true)+ expect(isContentBearingHook(['postToolUse'], 'metadata')).toBe(true)+ })})describe('content/egress separation gate (§8.4)', () => {@@ -118,6 +132,43 @@ describe('content/egress separation gate (§8.4)', () => {).toBe(false)})+ // A tool-lane hook reads tool arguments and results, so egress at low trust is+ // the same exfiltration shape the LLM-lane points are gated on. Before the tool+ // points were classified content-bearing this returned false and the install+ // was admitted.+ it('preToolUse + egress at low trust → requires high (blocked)', () => {+ expect(+ contentEgressRequiresHighTrust({+ lifecyclePoints: ['preToolUse'],+ hasEgress: true,+ isRemote: false,+ trustLevel: 'low',+ })+ ).toBe(true)+ })++ it('postToolUse + remote target at mid trust → requires high (blocked)', () => {+ expect(+ contentEgressRequiresHighTrust({+ lifecyclePoints: ['postToolUse'],+ hasEgress: false,+ isRemote: true,+ trustLevel: 'mid',+ })+ ).toBe(true)+ })++ it('a tool-lane hook with no egress at low trust → allowed', () => {+ expect(+ contentEgressRequiresHighTrust({+ lifecyclePoints: ['preToolUse', 'postToolUse'],+ hasEgress: false,+ isRemote: false,+ trustLevel: 'low',+ })+ ).toBe(false)+ })+it('egress WITHOUT content at low trust → allowed (nothing to leak)', () => {expect(contentEgressRequiresHighTrust({diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.tsindex 2d25b8b40..a477fd59c 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/registry.ts@@ -161,14 +161,28 @@ const HOOK_TRUST_ORDER: Record<string, number> = { low: 0, mid: 1, high: 2 }// Lifecycle points that ALWAYS receive message/response content (§8.4/§8.7). preCall// is the one point with two flavors — content-bearing unless the hook declares// `contentAccess: metadata` — so it is handled separately in isContentBearingHook.-const INHERENTLY_CONTENT_POINTS = new Set(['moderate', 'postCallSuccess', 'onError'])+//+// The tool-lane points (§6.2) are here because the tool lane has NO metadata+// projection: preToolUse receives {tool, arguments} and postToolUse receives the+// tool result, and remoteToolHook never consults contentAccess. Leaving them out+// classified a preToolUse-only hook as content-free, so a low-trust third-party+// hook with egressBindings or a remote target passed the content/egress gate+// while reading every tool argument and result at runtime.+const INHERENTLY_CONTENT_POINTS = new Set([+ 'moderate',+ 'postCallSuccess',+ 'onError',+ 'preToolUse',+ 'postToolUse',+])/*** §8.4/§8.7 — does this hook receive message/response CONTENT at any of its- * lifecycle points? moderate/postCallSuccess/onError always do; preCall does- * unless it explicitly declared `contentAccess: metadata` (mcp-host's projection- * enforces the same rule, so the gate and the runtime agree — the two land- * together, §12.4). Absent contentAccess ⇒ content-bearing (conservative).+ * lifecycle points? moderate/postCallSuccess/onError and both tool-lane points+ * always do; preCall does unless it explicitly declared `contentAccess: metadata`+ * (mcp-host's projection enforces the same rule, so the gate and the runtime+ * agree — the two land together, §12.4). Absent contentAccess ⇒ content-bearing+ * (conservative).*/export function isContentBearingHook(lifecyclePoints: string[] | undefined,