Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
fix(mcp-host): pin SSRF prefix boundaries in tests
Alfredo Lopezb8bb0a499134
diff --git a/mcp-host/package-lock.json b/mcp-host/package-lock.jsonindex 7f183a0de..6dff9be3d 100644--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.477",+ "version": "0.1.478","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.477",+ "version": "0.1.478","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",diff --git a/mcp-host/package.json b/mcp-host/package.jsonindex fc186a3e8..df246a7d9 100644--- a/mcp-host/package.json+++ b/mcp-host/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.477",+ "version": "0.1.478","description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/agent/__tests__/taskExecutorCatalogBootstrap.integration.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/agent/__tests__/taskExecutorCatalogBootstrap.integration.test.tsindex 339017b65..893c3f84e 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/agent/__tests__/taskExecutorCatalogBootstrap.integration.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/agent/__tests__/taskExecutorCatalogBootstrap.integration.test.ts@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ vi.mock('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js', async () => {// The SDK is mocked, so no real transport fetch runs; keep the SSRF guard off DNS.vi.mock('../../core/net/ssrf', () => ({SsrfBlockedError: class SsrfBlockedError extends Error {},- resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '203.0.113.10'),+ resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '93.184.216.34'),}))function remoteOauthUserServer(name = 'calendar'): McpServerInfo {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/net/__tests__/ssrf.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/net/__tests__/ssrf.test.tsindex b0a77abad..f75e01908 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/net/__tests__/ssrf.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/net/__tests__/ssrf.test.ts@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ function literalUrl(ip: string): URL {return ip.includes(':') ? new URL(`http://[${ip}]/`) : new URL(`http://${ip}/`)}+function normalizedLiteralHost(ip: string): string {+ return literalUrl(ip).hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '')+}+const BLOCKED_SPECIAL_PURPOSE_ADDRESSES: readonly (readonly [string, string])[] = [['100.64.0.1', 'CGNAT (RFC 6598)'],['198.18.0.1', 'benchmarking (RFC 2544)'],@@ -94,7 +98,7 @@ describe('resolvePinnedPublicIp', () => {async (ip: string) => {const outcome = resolvePinnedPublicIp(literalUrl(ip))await expect(outcome).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SsrfBlockedError)- await expect(outcome).rejects.toThrow(`Target is a private IP (${ip})`)+ await expect(outcome).rejects.toThrow(`Target is a private IP (${normalizedLiteralHost(ip)})`)expect(resolve4).not.toHaveBeenCalled()expect(resolve6).not.toHaveBeenCalled()}@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ describe('resolvePinnedPublicIp', () => {async (ip: string) => {const outcome = resolvePinnedPublicIp(literalUrl(ip))await expect(outcome).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SsrfBlockedError)- await expect(outcome).rejects.toThrow(`Target is a private IP (${ip})`)+ await expect(outcome).rejects.toThrow(`Target is a private IP (${normalizedLiteralHost(ip)})`)expect(resolve4).not.toHaveBeenCalled()expect(resolve6).not.toHaveBeenCalled()}diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/net/ssrf.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/net/ssrf.tsindex 19d44e02a..ca68a48e4 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/net/ssrf.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/net/ssrf.ts@@ -128,19 +128,16 @@ function formatIpv6Bytes(bytes: Uint8Array): string {return groups.join(':')}-function isPrivateIpv4Octets(octets: readonly number[]): boolean {- if (octets.length !== 4) return false- return nonPublicAddresses.check(`${octets[0]}.${octets[1]}.${octets[2]}.${octets[3]}`, 'ipv4')-}-/**- * Non-public IPv4 prefixes required by the SSRF hardening scope. This is the- * issue-required subset of the IPv4 exclusions in- * deploy/base/public-egress-exceptions.yaml and the IANA range list used by- * mcp-servers/web-search's fetch destination validator. Those policies also- * exclude 192.31.196/24, 192.52.193/24, 192.88.99/24, and 192.175.48/24,- * which are deliberately out of scope here; the three policies keep- * distinct ranges by design.+ * Non-public IPv4 prefixes in scope for the outbound HTTP guard: the legacy+ * private/loopback/link-local ranges plus special-purpose ranges that must+ * not be treated as public SSRF destinations. This is a deliberate subset+ * of the IPv4 exclusions in deploy/base/public-egress-exceptions.yaml and+ * the IANA range list used by mcp-servers/web-search's fetch destination+ * validator. Those policies also exclude 192.31.196/24, 192.52.193/24,+ * 192.88.99/24, and 192.175.48/24, which stay public here by design: they+ * are relay/service blocks handled by egress policy rather than ranges this+ * model-facing guard needs to classify as non-public.*/const NON_PUBLIC_IPV4_PREFIXES: readonly (readonly [address: string, prefix: number])[] = [['0.0.0.0', 8], // "This network"@@ -160,8 +157,11 @@ const NON_PUBLIC_IPV4_PREFIXES: readonly (readonly [address: string, prefix: num]/**- * Canonical non-public IPv6 prefixes. ::/128 and ::1/128 are covered by the- * IPv4-compatible delegation (their tails fall inside 0.0.0.0/8).+ * Non-public IPv6 prefixes in scope for this change; this is not a complete+ * IANA special-purpose list. Notably still public: 100::/64 (discard-only),+ * 2001:1::/128, 2001:2::/48, 3fff::/20 (documentation), 5f00::/16, and+ * ISATAP embeddings inside global prefixes. ::/128 and ::1/128 are covered+ * by the IPv4-compatible delegation (their tails fall inside 0.0.0.0/8).*/const NON_PUBLIC_IPV6_PREFIXES: readonly (readonly [address: string, prefix: number])[] = [['64:ff9b::', 96], // NAT64 (RFC 6052)@@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ for (const [address, prefix] of NON_PUBLIC_IPV6_PREFIXES) {nonPublicAddresses.addSubnet(address, prefix, 'ipv6')}+function isPrivateIpv4Octets(octets: readonly number[]): boolean {+ if (octets.length !== 4) return false+ return nonPublicAddresses.check(`${octets[0]}.${octets[1]}.${octets[2]}.${octets[3]}`, 'ipv4')+}+/*** Block private, metadata, multicast, reserved, and other special-purpose* non-public IP ranges (SSRF defense).diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.tsindex 6109e5969..fecfd954b 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/__tests__/safety.test.ts@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {expect(result.errors.join(' ')).toMatch(/kubernetes|cluster/i)})+ it('blocks special-purpose non-public http_request targets before execution', () => {+ const result = safety.validateToolParams('http_request', {+ url: 'http://100.64.0.1/',+ })++ expect(result.is_valid).toBe(false)+ expect(result.errors).toContain('Non-public target "100.64.0.1" is blocked')+ })+it('blocks shell_exec attempts to read service account tokens', () => {const result = safety.validateToolParams('shell_exec', {command: 'cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token',@@ -122,10 +131,7 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {const s = new BasicSafety(() => [{ name: 'OPENAI_API_KEY', value: 'totally-not-a-pattern-match-12345' },])- const result = s.sanitizeOutput(- 'shell_exec',- 'echoed key totally-not-a-pattern-match-12345'- )+ const result = s.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', 'echoed key totally-not-a-pattern-match-12345')expect(result.content).toContain('[REDACTED:OPENAI_API_KEY]')expect(result.content).not.toContain('totally-not-a-pattern-match-12345')@@ -162,9 +168,7 @@ describe('BasicSafety', () => {})it('reads from the provider on every call (hot reload)', () => {- let entries: Array<{ name: string; value: string }> = [- { name: 'TOK', value: 'rev-1-secret' },- ]+ let entries: Array<{ name: string; value: string }> = [{ name: 'TOK', value: 'rev-1-secret' }]const s = new BasicSafety(() => entries)const r1 = s.sanitizeOutput('shell_exec', 'echo rev-1-secret here')diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.tsindex 6322914e3..8870dee24 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/safety/safety.ts@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ export class BasicSafety implements Safety {}if (hostname && isPrivateIp(hostname)) {- errors.push(`Private or link-local target "${hostname}" is blocked`)+ errors.push(`Non-public target "${hostname}" is blocked`)}for (const rule of BasicSafety.HTTP_BLOCKED_HOST_PATTERNS) {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/core/tools/__tests__/shellAndHttp.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/core/tools/__tests__/shellAndHttp.test.tsindex 67a8b08e4..6bd717df9 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/core/tools/__tests__/shellAndHttp.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/core/tools/__tests__/shellAndHttp.test.ts@@ -242,6 +242,57 @@ describe('HttpRequestTool', () => {expect(isPrivateIp('2002:808:808::')).toBe(true) // 6to4 form of 8.8.8.8})+ it('should pin exact prefix boundaries against over-blocking regressions', () => {+ // Each group asserts an in-range boundary and the adjacent public+ // neighbor for one prefix table entry. Widening a prefix or dropping a+ // row must fail here, not merely survive review.+ // fc00::/7+ expect(isPrivateIp('fbff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('fdff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ // fe80::/10+ expect(isPrivateIp('fe7f:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('febf:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ // fec0::/10+ expect(isPrivateIp('fe00::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('fec0::1')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('feff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ // 2001::/32 (Teredo)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:0:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:1::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:4860:4860::8888')).toBe(false)+ // 2001:db8::/32 (documentation)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:db7:ffff::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:db9::1')).toBe(false)+ // 2002::/16 (6to4)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2002:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2003::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('2001:ffff::1')).toBe(false)+ // 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48 (NAT64 and local-use NAT64)+ expect(isPrivateIp('64:ff9a:ffff::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('64:ff9b:0:1::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('64:ff9b:2::1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('64:ff9b:1:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ // ff00::/8+ expect(isPrivateIp('ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff')).toBe(true)+ // IANA /24 boundaries and public neighbors.+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.0.0.255')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.0.1.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.0.2.255')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.0.3.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('198.51.100.255')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('198.51.101.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('203.0.113.255')).toBe(true)+ expect(isPrivateIp('203.0.114.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('223.255.255.255')).toBe(false)+ // Relay/service /24s deliberately remain public in this classifier;+ // egress policy owns their handling. Pin that contract so any future+ // divergence has to be an explicit decision.+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.31.196.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.52.193.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.88.99.1')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('192.175.48.1')).toBe(false)+ })+const NEW_SPECIAL_PURPOSE_IPV4: readonly (readonly [string, string])[] = [['100.64.0.1', '6440:1'],['198.18.0.1', 'c612:1'],@@ -274,5 +325,7 @@ describe('HttpRequestTool', () => {expect(isPrivateIp('example.com')).toBe(false)expect(isPrivateIp('sub.domain.example.com')).toBe(false)expect(isPrivateIp('not-an-ip')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp('')).toBe(false)+ expect(isPrivateIp(undefined as unknown as string)).toBe(false)})})diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerCatalogBootstrap.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerCatalogBootstrap.test.tsindex 4da6dd89e..cdd64890c 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerCatalogBootstrap.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerCatalogBootstrap.test.ts@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ vi.mock('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js', async () => {// resolver is stubbed so these tests never touch DNS.vi.mock('../../core/net/ssrf', () => ({SsrfBlockedError: class SsrfBlockedError extends Error {},- resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '203.0.113.10'),+ resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '93.184.216.34'),}))function remoteOauthUserServer(name = 'gh'): McpServerInfo {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerConnectRequired.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerConnectRequired.test.tsindex ff3bade1f..bacb4e611 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerConnectRequired.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerConnectRequired.test.ts@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ vi.mock('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js', () => ({// only keeps import-time resolution offline.vi.mock('../../core/net/ssrf', () => ({SsrfBlockedError: class SsrfBlockedError extends Error {},- resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '203.0.113.10'),+ resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '93.184.216.34'),}))function httpError(status: number): () => Promise<never> {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerSharedGrantGate.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerSharedGrantGate.test.tsindex 369ffd3b1..5a4e107ec 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerSharedGrantGate.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/mcp/__tests__/managerSharedGrantGate.test.ts@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ vi.mock('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js', async () => {// never touch DNS (the SDK is mocked, so its returned fetch is never invoked).vi.mock('../../core/net/ssrf', () => ({SsrfBlockedError: class SsrfBlockedError extends Error {},- resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '203.0.113.10'),+ resolvePinnedPublicIp: vi.fn(async () => '93.184.216.34'),}))function remoteOauthContextServer(name = 'remote-ctx'): McpServerInfo {