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feat(oauth): legalize remote-oauth mcpservers + HCC auth precedence (C3)
Diego Zacariasbaf12e1fac26
diff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yamlindex 217cc2d02..12a39b164 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/mcpserver.yaml@@ -120,20 +120,16 @@ spec:connection just-in-time and NEVER mounted into the pod. Shapemirrors WorkflowRecipe spec.oauthClients[] (a single client perserver).- required:- - id- - provider- - clientIdRef- - clientSecretRefproperties:id:type: string- maxLength: 63- pattern: "^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$"+ maxLength: 512description: >-Stable OAuth client identifier for this server. Surfaced asthe `clientId` on clerum:oauth URLs and the callback path- segment. Immutable once set.+ segment. Immutable once set. Baked carril (source absent) is+ re-narrowed to ^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$ by CEL; remote carril carries+ an AS-assigned client_id (arbitrary charset).provider:type: string# Known-shape adapters baked into control-api@@ -180,10 +176,10 @@ spec:maxLength: 253scopes:type: array- maxItems: 32+ maxItems: 128items:type: string- maxLength: 128+ maxLength: 512description: >-OAuth scopes to request. Provider-specific syntax. Includethe provider's offline/refresh scope when backgroundAccess@@ -208,6 +204,59 @@ spec:bootstraps it and the rest inherit it, keyed by(server, context). Immutable once set: flipping it wouldchange in place which identity is exercised.+ source:+ type: string+ enum: [remote]+ description: >-+ Carril discriminator. ABSENT = baked (a known-shape adapter+ via spec.oauth.provider). 'remote' = a discovery-configured+ client (control-api remote-MCP install) whose pinned endpoints+ below replace the baked provider. Immutable; the carril cannot flip.+ clientMode:+ type: string+ enum: [public, confidential]+ description: >-+ REMOTE only. 'public' (CIMD/PKCE, no client secret) or+ 'confidential' (secret via clientIdRef/clientSecretRef, or the+ encrypted dynamic_clients store for DCR). Immutable.+ authorizationEndpoint:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: REMOTE only. Pinned discovery authorize URL. Immutable.+ tokenEndpoint:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: REMOTE only. Pinned discovery token URL. Immutable.+ registrationEndpoint:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: REMOTE only, optional. Pinned DCR registration URL. Immutable.+ issuer:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: REMOTE only. Pinned AS issuer. Immutable.+ resource:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: REMOTE only. RFC 8707 resource sent on authorize+token. Immutable.+ issForCallback:+ type: string+ maxLength: 2048+ description: >-+ REMOTE only, optional. RFC 9207 iss to validate the callback+ against (present only when advertised). Immutable.+ bearerInBody:+ type: boolean+ description: >-+ REMOTE only (D-8). Token goes in the request body, not the+ Authorization header. No default (required-by-CEL for remote).+ Immutable (pinned at install; runtime never re-derives).+ supportsRefresh:+ type: boolean+ description: >-+ REMOTE only (D-8), fail-closed. false ⇒ never attempt refresh.+ No default (required-by-CEL for remote). Immutable (pinned at+ install; runtime never re-derives).serverConfig:type: objectdescription: Operational configuration for the MCP server runtime.@@ -504,9 +553,14 @@ spec:# id / provider that ALREADY existed is rejected.- rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || oldSelf.oauth.grantScope == self.oauth.grantScope"message: "spec.oauth.grantScope is immutable; delete and recreate the McpServer to change which identity is exercised"- - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || oldSelf.oauth.id == self.oauth.id"+ # id/provider value immutability (IMM-2/IMM-4) is has()-guarded on+ # BOTH the coordinate presence and the oauth presence: a remote-carril+ # UPDATE has no id/provider, so an unguarded dereference would+ # CEL-ERROR. The presence of id (IMM-3) and of the carril (IMM-5) are+ # pinned separately below, so guarding the value comparison is safe.+ - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || !has(oldSelf.oauth.id) || !has(self.oauth.id) || oldSelf.oauth.id == self.oauth.id"message: "spec.oauth.id is immutable"- - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || oldSelf.oauth.provider == self.oauth.provider"+ - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || !has(oldSelf.oauth.provider) || !has(self.oauth.provider) || oldSelf.oauth.provider == self.oauth.provider"message: "spec.oauth.provider is immutable"# R1-L1: close the two-step immutability bypass. The rules above# short-circuit on !has(self.oauth), so an UPDATE could (1) drop@@ -537,6 +591,53 @@ spec:# rule (oldSelf) → skipped on CREATE.- rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || self.contextRef == oldSelf.contextRef"message: "spec.contextRef is immutable; delete and recreate the McpServer to re-parent it to a different Context"+ # C3 remote×oauth carril. spec.oauth.source discriminates the carril:+ # ABSENT = baked (a known-shape provider adapter), 'remote' = a+ # discovery-configured client with pinned endpoints. The block-level+ # `required` is gone; requiredness is carril-specific and enforced+ # here so each carril rejects the other's shape.+ #+ # Baked-only slug re-narrow: the structural `pattern` moved to CEL so+ # the remote carril can carry an AS-assigned client_id (arbitrary+ # charset). Gated on baked (has(self.oauth.source) short-circuits for+ # remote) so remote ids are not re-narrowed.+ - rule: "!has(self.oauth) || has(self.oauth.source) || !has(self.oauth.id) || self.oauth.id.matches('^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$')"+ message: "baked spec.oauth.id must match ^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$"+ # BAKED-REQ: baked (no source) requires the classic adapter quartet.+ - rule: "!has(self.oauth) || has(self.oauth.source) || (has(self.oauth.id) && has(self.oauth.provider) && has(self.oauth.clientIdRef) && has(self.oauth.clientSecretRef))"+ message: "baked spec.oauth (no source) requires id, provider, clientIdRef and clientSecretRef"+ # REMOTE-REQ: remote requires the pinned discovery client shape.+ - rule: "!has(self.oauth) || !has(self.oauth.source) || (has(self.oauth.clientMode) && has(self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint) && has(self.oauth.tokenEndpoint) && has(self.oauth.issuer) && has(self.oauth.resource) && has(self.oauth.bearerInBody) && has(self.oauth.supportsRefresh))"+ message: "remote spec.oauth requires clientMode, authorizationEndpoint, tokenEndpoint, issuer, resource, bearerInBody and supportsRefresh"+ # REMOTE-FORBID-PROVIDER: source 'remote' replaces the baked adapter.+ - rule: "!has(self.oauth) || !has(self.oauth.source) || !has(self.oauth.provider)"+ message: "remote spec.oauth must not set provider; source 'remote' replaces the baked adapter"+ # BAKED-FORBID-REMOTE-FIELDS: baked must not carry remote-only fields.+ - rule: "!has(self.oauth) || has(self.oauth.source) || (!has(self.oauth.clientMode) && !has(self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint) && !has(self.oauth.tokenEndpoint) && !has(self.oauth.registrationEndpoint) && !has(self.oauth.issuer) && !has(self.oauth.resource) && !has(self.oauth.issForCallback) && !has(self.oauth.bearerInBody) && !has(self.oauth.supportsRefresh))"+ message: "baked spec.oauth (no source) must not set remote-only fields"+ # IMM-3: id presence is immutable — closes the drop/re-add two-step+ # that would otherwise let an UPDATE add or remove id under a+ # value-only immutability guard.+ - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || has(oldSelf.oauth.id) == has(self.oauth.id)"+ message: "spec.oauth.id presence is immutable; delete and recreate to add or remove it"+ # IMM-5: the carril (source presence) is immutable — baked cannot flip+ # to remote or vice versa in place.+ - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || has(oldSelf.oauth.source) == has(self.oauth.source)"+ message: "spec.oauth carril (source) is immutable; delete and recreate to change it"+ # IMM-6: remote pinned endpoints + clientMode + registration ++ # issForCallback + the discovery-derived quirks (bearerInBody,+ # supportsRefresh) are immutable. These are all pinned at install from+ # AS metadata and the runtime never re-derives them (D-4/D-8), so an+ # update-RBAC actor must not flip them in place — e.g. supportsRefresh+ # false→true would re-enable refresh against the pinned token endpoint,+ # defeating the D-8 fail-closed decision. Double-source-guarded so it+ # only dereferences remote-only fields when BOTH revisions are remote;+ # REMOTE-REQ then guarantees clientMode/endpoints/issuer/resource/+ # bearerInBody/supportsRefresh are present, so those accesses cannot+ # CEL-error. registrationEndpoint/issForCallback are optional even on+ # remote → presence-pinned + guarded value-equality.+ - rule: "!has(oldSelf.oauth) || !has(self.oauth) || !has(oldSelf.oauth.source) || !has(self.oauth.source) || (oldSelf.oauth.clientMode == self.oauth.clientMode && oldSelf.oauth.authorizationEndpoint == self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint && oldSelf.oauth.tokenEndpoint == self.oauth.tokenEndpoint && oldSelf.oauth.issuer == self.oauth.issuer && oldSelf.oauth.resource == self.oauth.resource && oldSelf.oauth.bearerInBody == self.oauth.bearerInBody && oldSelf.oauth.supportsRefresh == self.oauth.supportsRefresh && (has(oldSelf.oauth.registrationEndpoint) == has(self.oauth.registrationEndpoint)) && (!has(oldSelf.oauth.registrationEndpoint) || oldSelf.oauth.registrationEndpoint == self.oauth.registrationEndpoint) && (has(oldSelf.oauth.issForCallback) == has(self.oauth.issForCallback)) && (!has(oldSelf.oauth.issForCallback) || oldSelf.oauth.issForCallback == self.oauth.issForCallback))"+ message: "remote spec.oauth pinned endpoints/clientMode/quirks are immutable; delete and recreate to change them"status:type: objectproperties:diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 2498af64c..900dc4ee9 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.591",+ "version": "0.1.592","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.591",+ "version": "0.1.592","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/grok-provider-attempt-contract": "file:../packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 798e366f8..5a7c785da 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.591",+ "version": "0.1.592","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/test/crd.mcpServerOauth.test.ts b/control-api/test/crd.mcpServerOauth.test.tsindex 51d23b5af..4888586fb 100644--- a/control-api/test/crd.mcpServerOauth.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/crd.mcpServerOauth.test.ts@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ describe('McpServer CRD — OAuth surface (U1)', () => {expect(specSchema.properties.auth.properties.type.enum).toContain('oauth')})- it('defines spec.oauth with the required client fields', () => {+ it('drops the block-level required and enforces the baked quartet via CEL (BAKED-REQ)', () => {const oauth = specSchema.properties.oauthexpect(oauth.type).toBe('object')- expect(oauth.required).toEqual(- expect.arrayContaining(['id', 'provider', 'clientIdRef', 'clientSecretRef'])- )+ // The static block-level required is gone — requiredness is now carril-specific+ // (baked vs remote) and enforced by CEL, not by a single required list.+ expect(oauth.required).toBeUndefined()for (const p of ['id','provider',@@ -44,6 +44,149 @@ describe('McpServer CRD — OAuth surface (U1)', () => {]) {expect(oauth.properties).toHaveProperty(p)}+ const bakedReq = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.source)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.id)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.provider)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.clientIdRef)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.clientSecretRef)')+ )+ expect(bakedReq, 'BAKED-REQ rule present').toBeDefined()+ })++ it('exposes source as an optional enum[remote] carril discriminator (no default, not required)', () => {+ const oauth = specSchema.properties.oauth+ const source = oauth.properties.source+ expect(source.type).toBe('string')+ expect(source.enum).toEqual(['remote'])+ expect(source).not.toHaveProperty('default')+ // Never in a (now-absent) block-level required list.+ expect(oauth.required).toBeUndefined()+ })++ it('declares the remote-carril properties (clientMode enum [public, confidential])', () => {+ const props = specSchema.properties.oauth.properties+ for (const p of [+ 'source',+ 'clientMode',+ 'authorizationEndpoint',+ 'tokenEndpoint',+ 'registrationEndpoint',+ 'issuer',+ 'resource',+ 'issForCallback',+ 'bearerInBody',+ 'supportsRefresh',+ ]) {+ expect(props).toHaveProperty(p)+ }+ expect(props.clientMode.enum).toEqual(['public', 'confidential'])+ // bearerInBody/supportsRefresh must carry NO default (a default makes has()+ // always true and voids the REMOTE-REQ presence check).+ expect(props.bearerInBody).not.toHaveProperty('default')+ expect(props.supportsRefresh).not.toHaveProperty('default')+ })++ it('loosens oauth.id to maxLength 512 with no structural pattern, re-narrowed for baked by CEL', () => {+ const id = specSchema.properties.oauth.properties.id+ expect(id.maxLength).toBe(512)+ expect(id).not.toHaveProperty('pattern')+ const slugRule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes("self.oauth.id.matches('^[a-z0-9-]{1,63}$')") &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.source)')+ )+ expect(slugRule, 'baked-slug CEL rule present and gated on source').toBeDefined()+ })++ it('loosens oauth.scopes caps to maxItems 128 / items.maxLength 512 (large-AS installs)', () => {+ const scopes = specSchema.properties.oauth.properties.scopes+ expect(scopes.maxItems).toBe(128)+ expect(scopes.items.maxLength).toBe(512)+ })++ it('requires the remote client shape via CEL (REMOTE-REQ)', () => {+ const rule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.source)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.clientMode)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.tokenEndpoint)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.issuer)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.resource)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.bearerInBody)') &&+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.supportsRefresh)')+ )+ expect(rule, 'REMOTE-REQ rule present').toBeDefined()+ })++ it('forbids provider on the remote carril (REMOTE-FORBID-PROVIDER)', () => {+ const rule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.source)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.provider)') &&+ !r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.clientMode)')+ )+ expect(rule, 'REMOTE-FORBID-PROVIDER rule present').toBeDefined()+ expect(rule?.message).toMatch(/must not set provider/)+ })++ it('forbids remote-only fields on the baked carril (BAKED-FORBID-REMOTE-FIELDS)', () => {+ const rule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('has(self.oauth.source)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.clientMode)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.tokenEndpoint)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.registrationEndpoint)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.issuer)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.resource)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.issForCallback)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.bearerInBody)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.supportsRefresh)')+ )+ expect(rule, 'BAKED-FORBID-REMOTE-FIELDS rule present').toBeDefined()+ })++ it('has()-guards the id and provider value immutability rules against a remote UPDATE (IMM-2/IMM-4)', () => {+ const idRule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('oldSelf.oauth.id == self.oauth.id') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(oldSelf.oauth.id)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.id)')+ )+ expect(idRule, 'id value immutability rule is coordinate-presence guarded').toBeDefined()+ const providerRule = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes('oldSelf.oauth.provider == self.oauth.provider') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(oldSelf.oauth.provider)') &&+ r.rule.includes('!has(self.oauth.provider)')+ )+ expect(+ providerRule,+ 'provider value immutability rule is coordinate-presence guarded'+ ).toBeDefined()+ })++ it('pins id presence (IMM-3), the carril (IMM-5) and remote endpoints (IMM-6) as immutable', () => {+ const imm3 = specRules.find(r => r.rule.includes('has(oldSelf.oauth.id) == has(self.oauth.id)'))+ expect(imm3, 'IMM-3 id-presence immutability present').toBeDefined()+ const imm5 = specRules.find(r =>+ r.rule.includes('has(oldSelf.oauth.source) == has(self.oauth.source)')+ )+ expect(imm5, 'IMM-5 carril immutability present').toBeDefined()+ const imm6 = specRules.find(+ r =>+ r.rule.includes(+ 'oldSelf.oauth.authorizationEndpoint == self.oauth.authorizationEndpoint'+ ) && r.rule.includes('oldSelf.oauth.clientMode == self.oauth.clientMode')+ )+ expect(imm6, 'IMM-6 remote pinned-endpoint immutability present').toBeDefined()+ // IMM-6 also pins the discovery-derived quirks (bearerInBody, supportsRefresh)+ // so an update-RBAC actor cannot flip the fail-closed refresh decision (D-8).+ expect(imm6?.rule).toContain('oldSelf.oauth.bearerInBody == self.oauth.bearerInBody')+ expect(imm6?.rule).toContain('oldSelf.oauth.supportsRefresh == self.oauth.supportsRefresh')})it('grantScope is enum [user, context], default user, nested under spec.oauth', () => {diff --git a/host-context-controller/package-lock.json b/host-context-controller/package-lock.jsonindex b2905694f..8e2309e28 100644--- a/host-context-controller/package-lock.json+++ b/host-context-controller/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-host-context-controller",- "version": "0.1.340",+ "version": "0.1.341","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-host-context-controller",- "version": "0.1.340",+ "version": "0.1.341","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@clerum/codex-catalog-projection": "file:../packages/codex-catalog-projection",diff --git a/host-context-controller/package.json b/host-context-controller/package.jsonindex 81dfb1b9c..543c8b462 100644--- a/host-context-controller/package.json+++ b/host-context-controller/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-host-context-controller",- "version": "0.1.340",+ "version": "0.1.341","description": "Host Context Controller - provides McpServer CRDs to mcp-host via REST API","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/reconciler.remote.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/reconciler.remote.test.tsindex 1e1e74d93..524e1e09c 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/reconciler.remote.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/__tests__/reconciler.remote.test.ts@@ -411,12 +411,95 @@ describe('McpServerReconciler remote egress proxy', () => {expect(conf).toContain('${API_KEY}')})- it('should omit auth header section when authHeaders is not set', () => {+ it('omits the credential auth-header section but clears Authorization for a static remote with no authHeaders (D-2)', () => {const cm = (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(REMOTE_SERVER)const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']expect(conf).not.toContain('Credential auth headers')- expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization')+ // A static remote (no oauth, no declared Authorization) clears the header so+ // it never forwards an incoming Authorization by accident.+ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ })++ // ── D-2 Authorization precedence/clearing ──+ describe('Authorization precedence (D-2)', () => {+ const oauthRemote = (authHeaders?: Array<{ header: string; valueTemplate: string }>) =>+ cloneServer(REMOTE_SERVER, {+ auth: { type: 'oauth' },+ remote: {+ baseUrl: 'https://mcp.sentry.io/sse',+ ...(authHeaders ? { authHeaders } : {}),+ },+ })++ it('passes the per-user Bearer through for a remote oauth server (no authHeaders)', () => {+ const cm = (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(oauthRemote())+ const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']++ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;')+ expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ })++ it('clears Authorization for a static remote (no oauth, no authHeaders)', () => {+ const cm = (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(REMOTE_SERVER)+ const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']++ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;')+ })++ it('lets the operator static credential win for a static remote declaring Authorization', () => {+ const server = cloneServer(REMOTE_SERVER, {+ remote: {+ baseUrl: 'https://api.example.com/v1',+ authHeaders: [{ header: 'Authorization', valueTemplate: 'Bearer ${API_KEY}' }],+ },+ })+ const cm = (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(server)+ const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']++ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "Bearer ${API_KEY}";')+ // Neither the clearing form nor the passthrough form is emitted.+ expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;')+ })++ it('clears Authorization for a static remote whose Authorization authHeader is dropped by sanitization', () => {+ // The clear-vs-operator-wins decision keys on the SANITIZED set, not the raw+ // list: a CR/LF value is dropped by sanitizeAuthHeader, so no static line is+ // rendered and we must still CLEAR — otherwise the incoming Authorization+ // would be forwarded to the upstream (the D-2 invariant hole).+ const server = cloneServer(REMOTE_SERVER, {+ remote: {+ baseUrl: 'https://api.example.com/v1',+ authHeaders: [{ header: 'Authorization', valueTemplate: 'Bearer x\nInjected: y' }],+ },+ })+ const cm = (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(server)+ const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']++ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ // The malformed value is never rendered.+ expect(conf).not.toContain('Injected: y')+ })++ it('throws when a remote oauth server also declares a static Authorization header (conflict)', () => {+ const server = oauthRemote([+ { header: 'Authorization', valueTemplate: 'Bearer ${API_KEY}' },+ ])+ expect(() => (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(server)).toThrow(+ /Authorization header/+ )+ })++ it('detects the Authorization conflict case-insensitively', () => {+ const server = oauthRemote([+ { header: 'authorization', valueTemplate: 'Bearer ${API_KEY}' },+ ])+ expect(() => (reconciler as any).buildNginxConfigMap(server)).toThrow(+ /Authorization header/+ )+ })})// ── Codex P0 fix (PR #101) — authHeaders sanitization (nginx + HTTP injection) ──@@ -520,7 +603,9 @@ describe('McpServerReconciler remote egress proxy', () => {const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']expect(conf).not.toContain('xxxxxxxx')- expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization')+ // Dropped by sanitization → the static remote clears Authorization (D-2):+ // the rejected value is never rendered and the incoming header is not forwarded.+ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('too long'))warn.mockRestore()})@@ -532,7 +617,9 @@ describe('McpServerReconciler remote egress proxy', () => {)const conf = cm.data['default.conf.template']- expect(conf).not.toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization')+ // Dropped by sanitization → the static remote clears Authorization (D-2).+ expect(conf).toContain('proxy_set_header Authorization "";')+ expect(conf).not.toContain('evil')expect(warn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringContaining('CR/LF/NUL'))warn.mockRestore()})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.tsindex 0419fbb3e..4f621bcac 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.test.ts@@ -627,10 +627,43 @@ describe('MCP authorization store Kubernetes 404 normalization', () => {description: 'Server A',transport: { type: 'streamableHttp', url: 'http://server-a/mcp', port: 8080 },auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'server-a-auth', secretKey: 'token' },+ // Non-remote fixture → remote-ness projects as false (mirrors reconciler isRemote).+ remote: false,enabled: true,status: { deployed: true, ready: true, authoritative: true },})})++ it('projects remote:true against the real producer when spec.remote.baseUrl is set', async () => {+ const objects: Record<string, unknown> = {+ 'mcpservers/server-remote': {+ metadata: {+ name: 'server-remote',+ namespace: 'mcp-server',+ uid: 'server-uid-remote',+ resourceVersion: '20',+ },+ spec: {+ description: 'Remote Server',+ transport: {+ type: 'streamableHttp',+ url: 'http://server-remote.mcp-server.svc.cluster.local:8080/mcp',+ port: 8080,+ },+ auth: { type: 'oauth' },+ remote: { baseUrl: 'https://mcp.example.com/mcp' },+ enabled: true,+ },+ },+ }+ mocks.getNamespacedCustomObject.mockImplementation(+ async ({ plural, name }: { plural: string; name: string }) => objects[`${plural}/${name}`]+ )++ const store = createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider)+ const server = await store.readMcpServer('server-remote')+ expect(server.remote).toBe(true)+ })})describe('McpServerWatcher startup', () => {diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.tsindex c96c3d04d..b14fd448e 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/k8sClient.ts@@ -5344,6 +5344,8 @@ export function createMcpAuthorizationStore(provider: McpServerProvider): McpAutauth: object.spec.auth ? { ...object.spec.auth } : undefined,// grantScope drives the inventory authKind derivation (mini-spec 10 §3.1).oauth: object.spec.oauth ? { ...object.spec.oauth } : undefined,+ // Single source of truth for remote-ness, mirrors the reconciler's isRemote.+ remote: !!object.spec.remote?.baseUrl,enabled: object.spec.enabled !== false,status,}diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.tsindex 98471acba..efb1189bd 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.test.ts@@ -649,3 +649,49 @@ describe('listServers authKind emission (mini-spec 10 §3.2, T1)', () => {expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('authKind')})})++describe('listServers remote projection (C3, orthogonal transport axis)', () => {+ it('emits remote:true for a remote oauth server while authKind stays oauth-user (no remote rama)', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = {+ ...server,+ auth: { type: 'oauth' },+ oauth: fullOAuth('user'),+ remote: true,+ }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const inventory = await service.listServers(principal)+ expect(inventory[0].remote).toBe(true)+ expect(inventory[0].authKind).toBe('oauth-user')+ // No authority leaks onto the wire item regardless of the transport axis.+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('contextRef')+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('auth')+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('oauth')+ })++ it('omits remote for a local oauth server (absent → local, fail-safe)', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = {+ ...server,+ auth: { type: 'oauth' },+ oauth: fullOAuth('context'),+ }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const inventory = await service.listServers(principal)+ expect(inventory[0]).not.toHaveProperty('remote')+ expect(inventory[0].authKind).toBe('oauth-context')+ })++ it('emits remote:true with authKind static for a static remote server', async () => {+ const store = new FakeStore()+ store.serverObject = {+ ...server,+ auth: { type: 'bearer', secretRef: 'server-a-auth', secretKey: 'token' },+ remote: true,+ }+ const service = new McpAuthorizationService(store)+ const inventory = await service.listServers(principal)+ expect(inventory[0].remote).toBe(true)+ expect(inventory[0].authKind).toBe('static')+ })+})diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.ts b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.tsindex c314a90da..863cc209c 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/mcpAuthorization.ts@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ export interface AuthorityMcpServer {// OAuth broker config (grantScope) from the CRD. Non-secret; used only to// derive the inventory `authKind`. HCC never forwards it to mcp-host raw.oauth?: McpServerOAuth+ /** True iff spec.remote.baseUrl is set (nginx egress-proxy server). Non-secret topology bit, orthogonal to authKind; C4 lifts the SHARED-without-token precondition on it. */+ remote?: booleanenabled: booleanstatus: McpServerStatus}@@ -70,6 +72,8 @@ export interface AuthorizedMcpServerInfo {* omitted field. Absent → mcp-host degrades to `static` (fail-closed).*/authKind?: AuthorizedMcpAuthKind+ /** True iff a remote (egress-proxy) server. Absent → local (fail-safe). Orthogonal to authKind; carries no authority. */+ remote?: boolean}export type AuthorizedMcpAuthKind = 'static' | 'oauth-user' | 'oauth-context'@@ -338,6 +342,7 @@ export class McpAuthorizationService {authRequired,...(authRequired ? { credentialRevision: grant.credentialRevision } : {}),...(authKind ? { authKind } : {}),+ ...(grant.server.remote ? { remote: true } : {}),})}const revalidated = await this.resolveHostContext(principal)diff --git a/host-context-controller/src/reconciler.ts b/host-context-controller/src/reconciler.tsindex 5ce469df1..612acbd4a 100644--- a/host-context-controller/src/reconciler.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/reconciler.ts@@ -999,12 +999,69 @@ export class McpServerReconciler {// sanitizeAuthHeader() before emission so an operator-authored CRD cannot// break out of the quoted string to inject arbitrary nginx config, and// cannot smuggle HTTP headers via CR/LF.- const authHeaderLines = (server.spec.remote!.authHeaders ?? [])+ const sanitizedAuthHeaders = (server.spec.remote!.authHeaders ?? []).map(h => this.sanitizeAuthHeader(h)).filter((h): h is { header: string; valueTemplate: string } => h !== null)+ const authHeaderLines = sanitizedAuthHeaders.map(h => ` proxy_set_header ${h.header} "${h.valueTemplate}";`).join('\n')+ // ── D-2 Authorization precedence/clearing ──+ // Exactly one Authorization directive is emitted, by precedence, because the+ // security decision here is non-obvious:+ // oauth (and no static Authorization) → passthrough the per-user Bearer that+ // mcp-host injects ($http_authorization);+ // authHeaders declares Authorization → emit nothing here — the operator's+ // static credential (already rendered by+ // authHeaderLines) wins;+ // otherwise (static remote) → clear it ("") so a static remote never+ // forwards an incoming Authorization by accident.+ // An oauth server that also statically pins Authorization is a contradiction:+ // the static value would shadow the per-user Bearer. Reject the reconcile.+ //+ // Two different detections on purpose:+ // - CONFLICT (oauth) is keyed on the RAW authHeaders: an oauth server must not+ // declare Authorization at all, even a malformed value that sanitization would+ // drop — otherwise the reject could be bypassed by injecting a bad value.+ // - The clear-vs-operator-wins decision is keyed on the SANITIZED/EMITTED set:+ // if the operator's Authorization entry was dropped by sanitizeAuthHeader (bad+ // name/length/CR-LF-NUL), no static line is rendered, so we must still CLEAR —+ // keying this on the raw list would leave the incoming Authorization forwarded.+ const isOAuth = server.spec.auth?.type === 'oauth'+ const rawDeclaresAuthorizationHeader = (server.spec.remote!.authHeaders ?? []).some(+ h => h.header.toLowerCase() === 'authorization'+ )+ const emitsAuthorizationHeader = sanitizedAuthHeaders.some(+ h => h.header.toLowerCase() === 'authorization'+ )+ if (isOAuth && rawDeclaresAuthorizationHeader) {+ hccLogger.error(+ 'Rejecting remote reconcile: oauth server pins a static Authorization header',+ {+ scope: '[Reconciler]',+ mcpServer: server.name,+ namespace: server.namespace,+ }+ )+ throw new Error(+ `remote MCP server "${server.name}" uses auth.type 'oauth' but also declares a static ` ++ 'Authorization header in spec.remote.authHeaders; the per-user Bearer must pass through — ' ++ 'remove the Authorization entry'+ )+ }+ const authorizationDirective = isOAuth+ ? ' proxy_set_header Authorization $http_authorization;'+ : emitsAuthorizationHeader+ ? ''+ : ' proxy_set_header Authorization "";'+ const authorizationBlock = authorizationDirective+ ? `\n # ── Authorization precedence (D-2): ${+ isOAuth+ ? 'passthrough the per-user Bearer'+ : 'clear — a static remote never forwards Authorization'+ } ──\n${authorizationDirective}\n`+ : ''+const nginxConf = `# Auto-generated by Clerum HCC for remote MCP server: ${server.name}# Stored as .conf.template; Clerum's nginx egress proxy runs envsubst at startup.server {@@ -1018,7 +1075,7 @@ server {proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;-${authHeaderLines ? '\n # ── Credential auth headers (envsubst-resolved) ──\n' + authHeaderLines + '\n' : ''}+${authHeaderLines ? '\n # ── Credential auth headers (envsubst-resolved) ──\n' + authHeaderLines + '\n' : ''}${authorizationBlock}# SSE/streaming supportproxy_buffering off;proxy_cache off;