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TypeScript
fix(control-api): fence the mcp-server uninstall OAuth teardown by CR uid (R3-H5)
Diego Zacariase20e505a0879
diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 4c29ba6c0..ace292e60 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.665",+ "version": "0.1.666","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.665",+ "version": "0.1.666","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/grok-provider-attempt-contract": "file:../packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 63e5abaa8..ebcadcb60 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.665",+ "version": "0.1.666","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/callbackMcpMembership.test.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/callbackMcpMembership.test.tsindex 6c7498c16..f72d0b0d6 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/callbackMcpMembership.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/callbackMcpMembership.test.ts@@ -204,4 +204,56 @@ describe('handleOAuthCallback — mcp context membership guard (R3-L1)', () => {expect(String(query.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')expect(String(query.mock.calls[0][0])).toContain("'user'")})++ // R3-H5 (D-T3): the subject's CR uid seals the grant so a same-name reinstall's+ // teardown never purges this installation's consent.+ it('seals a shared bootstrap grant with the subject cr_uid', async () => {+ const deps = buildDeps({+ subject: mcpSubject({ grantScope: 'context', contextRef: CONTEXT_REF, crUid: 'uid-live-cr' }),+ contextIds: [CONTEXT_REF],+ })++ const result = await handleOAuthCallback(input(), deps)+ expect(result.kind).toBe('ok')++ const query = deps.db.query as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>+ const [sql, values] = query.mock.calls[0]+ expect(String(sql)).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')+ expect(String(sql)).toContain("'shared'")+ // cr_uid is the last positional param of the shared INSERT.+ expect((values as unknown[]).at(-1)).toBe('uid-live-cr')+ })++ it('seals a per-user grant with the subject cr_uid', async () => {+ const deps = buildDeps({+ subject: mcpSubject({ grantScope: 'user', contextRef: undefined, crUid: 'uid-live-cr' }),+ userContextsReader: vi.fn(async () => ({ contextIds: [] })),+ })++ const result = await handleOAuthCallback(input(), deps)+ expect(result.kind).toBe('ok')++ const query = deps.db.query as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>+ const [sql, values] = query.mock.calls[0]+ expect(String(sql)).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')+ expect(String(sql)).toContain("'user'")+ // cr_uid is the last positional param of the user INSERT.+ expect((values as unknown[]).at(-1)).toBe('uid-live-cr')+ })++ // A grant with NO subject cr_uid (a legacy/authorize-url path that never read a+ // live CR) persists cr_uid NULL — never crashes, and stays purgeable by any teardown.+ it('persists cr_uid NULL when the subject carries no uid', async () => {+ const deps = buildDeps({+ subject: mcpSubject({ grantScope: 'user', contextRef: undefined, crUid: undefined }),+ userContextsReader: vi.fn(async () => ({ contextIds: [] })),+ })++ const result = await handleOAuthCallback(input(), deps)+ expect(result.kind).toBe('ok')++ const query = deps.db.query as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>+ const [, values] = query.mock.calls[0]+ expect((values as unknown[]).at(-1)).toBeNull()+ })})diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.test.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.test.tsindex 1031a52c1..beb85641d 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/__tests__/deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.test.ts@@ -3,23 +3,22 @@ import type { DbClient } from '../../db.js'import { deleteOAuthGrantsForServer } from '../store.js'/**- * Server-teardown purge (H-3, DEC-R2): delete EVERY oauth_grants row owned by one- * McpServer, across all flavors. The SQL scoping IS the testable contract at this- * layer — the service has no real-DB store harness (dynamicClientStore.ts and- * cleanupDynamicClientForServer are likewise untested), so a T4 observable-list- * assertion (which rows survived) is not achievable here. What we CAN pin is that- * the emitted DELETE is scoped to owner_kind='mcpserver' + the server coordinate- * and carries NO per-flavor narrowing that would leave grants behind.+ * Server-teardown purge (H-3, DEC-R2; fenced by cr_uid in R3-H5): delete EVERY+ * oauth_grants row of ONE McpServer installation, across all flavors. This unit+ * layer pins the SQL contract — scope, the cr_uid fence, and the absence of any+ * per-flavor narrowing that would leave grants behind. The T4 observable-list+ * behavior (which rows survived) is pinned in the real-Postgres suites+ * (oauth.deleteOAuthGrantsForServer / oauth.mcpServerOAuthTeardown).*/-describe('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe', () => {- const COORDS = { recipeNamespace: 'mcp-servers', recipeName: 'gdrive' }+describe('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (fenced by cr_uid)', () => {+ const COORDS = { recipeNamespace: 'mcp-servers', recipeName: 'gdrive', crUid: 'uid-abc' }function fakeDb(rowCount: number | null) {const query = vi.fn(async () => ({ rowCount, rows: [] }))return { db: { query } as unknown as DbClient, query }}- it('issues exactly one DELETE scoped to owner_kind=mcpserver + ns + name, all-flavors', async () => {+ it('issues exactly one DELETE scoped to owner_kind=mcpserver + ns + name, all-flavors, fenced by cr_uid', async () => {const { db, query } = fakeDb(3)await deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(db, COORDS)@@ -31,6 +30,8 @@ describe('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe', () => {expect(sql).toContain("owner_kind = 'mcpserver'")expect(sql).toContain('recipe_namespace = $1')expect(sql).toContain('recipe_name = $2')+ // Fenced: this installation's uid OR a legacy (NULL) row — never another uid's.+ expect(sql).toContain('cr_uid = $3 OR cr_uid IS NULL')// All-flavors wipe: NONE of these narrowings may appear, or grants survive.expect(sql).not.toContain('user_id')expect(sql).not.toContain('context_id')@@ -38,12 +39,12 @@ describe('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe', () => {expect(sql).not.toContain('grant_kind')})- it('binds params to exactly [recipeNamespace, recipeName]', async () => {+ it('binds params to exactly [recipeNamespace, recipeName, crUid]', async () => {const { db, query } = fakeDb(3)await deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(db, COORDS)- expect(query.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(['mcp-servers', 'gdrive'])+ expect(query.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(['mcp-servers', 'gdrive', 'uid-abc'])})it('returns the deleted row count', async () => {diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/callback.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/callback.tsindex 0d2bf0c72..f52ac4464 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/callback.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/callback.ts@@ -184,6 +184,12 @@ export interface McpServerOAuthSubject {decl: OAuthClientDeclgrantScope: 'user' | 'context'contextRef?: string+ /**+ * metadata.uid of the McpServer CR, sealing any grant this consent writes to the+ * exact installation (R3-H5). Present when the reader read a live CR; absent for+ * the authorize-url minting paths that never persist a grant.+ */+ crUid?: string}export interface McpServerOAuthReader {@@ -589,6 +595,8 @@ async function handleMcpOAuthCallback(accessToken: parsed.accessToken,refreshToken: parsed.refreshToken,accessTokenExpiresInSec: parsed.expiresIn,+ // Seal to this installation so a same-name reinstall's teardown never purges it.+ crUid: subject.crUid,})} else {await upsertOAuthGrant(deps.db, deps.encryptionKey, {@@ -603,6 +611,8 @@ async function handleMcpOAuthCallback(accessToken: parsed.accessToken,refreshToken: parsed.refreshToken,accessTokenExpiresInSec: parsed.expiresIn,+ // Seal to this installation so a same-name reinstall's teardown never purges it.+ crUid: subject.crUid,})}diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/dcrCleanup.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/dcrCleanup.tsindex b3a9cd3f1..69d93f775 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/dcrCleanup.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/dcrCleanup.ts@@ -1,17 +1,11 @@-import type { DbClient } from '../db.js'import { pinnedFetch } from '../http/pinnedFetch.js'import type { DcrDeps } from './dcr.js'-import {- type DynamicClientKey,- deleteDynamicClient,- getDynamicClient,-} from './dynamicClientStore.js'/**- * Shared DCR (RFC 7591/7592) client teardown (spec 02 C2/C4, DEC-18). Extracted- * here once the compensation idiom reached a 4th call site (the mcp-server- * uninstall) — the install saga's rollback paths (`remoteMcp.ts`) and the- * uninstall now share ONE implementation (colateral DRY note of C2).+ * Best-effort RFC 7592 client-delete at the AS's management endpoint (spec 02+ * C2/C4, DEC-18). Shared by the install saga's rollback paths (`remoteMcp.ts`) and+ * the uninstall teardown module (`mcpServerOAuthTeardown.ts`) — the reliable local+ * revocation is the store delete each caller runs; this is the courtesy cleanup.*/const DCR_DELETE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000@@ -20,8 +14,8 @@ const DCR_DELETE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000* Best-effort RFC 7592 client-delete against the AS's management endpoint, so a* dynamic client we minted does not linger at the AS after a local abort/uninstall.* Single-hop pinned DELETE (never re-resolves) with the registration bearer; any- * failure is swallowed — the local `deleteDynamicClient` is the reliable- * revocation, this is courtesy cleanup. Never logs the bearer.+ * failure is swallowed — the caller's local store delete is the reliable revocation,+ * this is courtesy cleanup. Never logs the bearer.*/export async function bestEffortRfc7592Delete(dcrDeps: DcrDeps,@@ -37,44 +31,6 @@ export async function bestEffortRfc7592Delete(timeoutMs: DCR_DELETE_TIMEOUT_MS,})} catch {- // Best-effort; the local store delete is the reliable revocation.+ // Best-effort; the caller's local store delete is the reliable revocation.}}--export interface DcrTeardownResult {- /** Rows removed from `dynamic_clients` (0 ⇒ no DCR client for this server — already clean). */- localRowsDeleted: number- /** Whether a courtesy RFC 7592 DELETE was attempted (the row carried a management handle). */- attemptedRemoteDelete: boolean-}--/**- * Full DCR teardown for a server CR keyed per-server (`owner_kind/namespace/name`):- * read the stored row, best-effort RFC 7592 DELETE at the AS (courtesy), then the- * reliable local `deleteDynamicClient`. Idempotent — a server with no DCR client- * (0 rows) is a clean no-op. Reads never mask the local delete: if the store read- * throws (e.g. a decrypt error), the local delete still runs.- */-export async function cleanupDynamicClientForServer(- db: DbClient,- encryptionKey: Buffer,- dcrDeps: DcrDeps,- key: DynamicClientKey-): Promise<DcrTeardownResult> {- let registrationClientUri: string | undefined- let registrationAccessToken: string | undefined- try {- const row = await getDynamicClient(db, encryptionKey, key)- registrationClientUri = row?.registrationClientUri- registrationAccessToken = row?.registrationAccessToken- } catch {- // Read failed — fall through to the reliable local delete below.- }- let attemptedRemoteDelete = false- if (registrationClientUri && registrationAccessToken) {- attemptedRemoteDelete = true- await bestEffortRfc7592Delete(dcrDeps, registrationClientUri, registrationAccessToken)- }- const localRowsDeleted = await deleteDynamicClient(db, key)- return { localRowsDeleted, attemptedRemoteDelete }-}diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.tsindex 8be4832d5..a783f4fa3 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.ts@@ -285,21 +285,6 @@ export async function listExpiringDynamicClients(})}-/**- * Hard-delete the dynamic client for a server CR (idempotent). Returns the- * number of rows removed so a caller can audit whether anything was revoked- * (0 ⇒ already gone). Mirrors `deleteOAuthGrant`.- */-export async function deleteDynamicClient(db: DbClient, key: DynamicClientKey): Promise<number> {- const ownerKind = resolveOwnerKind(key)- const result = await db.query(- `DELETE FROM dynamic_clients- WHERE owner_kind = $1 AND server_namespace = $2 AND server_name = $3`,- [ownerKind, key.serverNamespace, key.serverName]- )- return result.rowCount ?? 0-}-/*** RFC 7592 management handle of a dynamic client: the endpoint and the bearer* needed to DELETE it at the AS. Present only when both were persisted.diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/mcpServerOAuthTeardown.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/mcpServerOAuthTeardown.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..11e45e728--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/mcpServerOAuthTeardown.ts@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@+import type { DbClient } from '../db.js'+import type { Logger } from '../observability/logger.js'+import { mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal } from '../observability/metrics.js'+import type { DcrDeps } from './dcr.js'+import { bestEffortRfc7592Delete } from './dcrCleanup.js'+import { claimDeleteDynamicClientForResource } from './dynamicClientStore.js'+import { deleteOAuthGrantsForServer } from './store.js'++/**+ * Shared OAuth teardown for a mcp-server uninstall, fenced by the uninstalled CR's+ * `metadata.uid` (R3-H5). Replaces the previous name-only pair — `dcrCleanup`'s+ * `cleanupDynamicClientForServer` and the loose `deleteOAuthGrantsForServer` call in+ * the uninstall route — so a same-name REINSTALL's state is never torn down or revoked+ * by the uninstall of a previous installation.+ *+ * Two race windows the uid fence + the single-statement claim close:+ * - B: the reinstall wrote its row before the old teardown ran → the old name-only+ * read+revoke would revoke the NEW client. Here the DELETE…RETURNING only revokes+ * the client of the row it actually removed (this uid's, or a legacy row's).+ * - C: the old read→await(7592)→delete gap let a reinstall slip a new row in between.+ * Here there is no gap: the claim is one statement.+ *+ * Runs AFTER the CR delete; never throws. Each stage is best-effort — a throw is+ * caught, counted (metric, existing stage labels) and logged (names-only), and the+ * uninstall keeps its 200. Changing that response policy is R3-H7, out of scope.+ */+export type TeardownStageResult = 'done' | 'none' | 'failed'++export interface McpServerOAuthTeardownResult {+ /** 'done' = a DCR row was removed, 'none' = none matched (clean), 'failed' = threw. */+ dynamicClient: TeardownStageResult+ /** 'done' = grant rows were purged, 'none' = none matched (clean), 'failed' = threw. */+ grants: TeardownStageResult+}++export async function teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db: DbClient,+ encryptionKey: Buffer,+ dcrDeps: DcrDeps,+ input: { namespace: string; name: string; crUid: string },+ logger: Logger+): Promise<McpServerOAuthTeardownResult> {+ const { namespace, name, crUid } = input+ const result: McpServerOAuthTeardownResult = { dynamicClient: 'none', grants: 'none' }++ // DCR: single-statement claim+read. Deletes the row bound to this uid (or a legacy+ // row) and returns its RFC 7592 handle; a pending row or a row bound to a different+ // uid (a reinstall) is left intact. Only the actually-deleted row's client is revoked.+ try {+ const claimed = await claimDeleteDynamicClientForResource(+ db,+ encryptionKey,+ { ownerKind: 'mcpserver', serverNamespace: namespace, serverName: name },+ crUid+ )+ if (claimed.deleted) {+ result.dynamicClient = 'done'+ if (claimed.handle) {+ await bestEffortRfc7592Delete(+ dcrDeps,+ claimed.handle.registrationClientUri,+ claimed.handle.registrationAccessToken+ )+ }+ logger.info(+ { serverName: name, namespace, attemptedRemoteDelete: Boolean(claimed.handle) },+ 'Revoked remote OAuth dynamic client on uninstall'+ )+ }+ } catch (err) {+ result.dynamicClient = 'failed'+ mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal.inc({ stage: 'dynamic_client' })+ logger.error(+ { serverName: name, namespace, err },+ 'Dynamic client cleanup failed on uninstall (CR already deleted)'+ )+ }++ // Grants: purge this installation's rows (fenced by cr_uid + legacy). A reinstall's+ // grant (a different uid) survives.+ try {+ const purged = await deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(db, {+ recipeNamespace: namespace,+ recipeName: name,+ crUid,+ })+ if (purged > 0) {+ result.grants = 'done'+ logger.info(+ { serverName: name, namespace, count: purged },+ 'Purged OAuth grants on uninstall'+ )+ }+ } catch (err) {+ result.grants = 'failed'+ mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal.inc({ stage: 'oauth_grants' })+ logger.error(+ { serverName: name, namespace, err },+ 'OAuth grants purge failed on uninstall (CR already deleted)'+ )+ }++ return result+}diff --git a/control-api/src/oauth/store.ts b/control-api/src/oauth/store.tsindex 74e13565c..479c904e6 100644--- a/control-api/src/oauth/store.ts+++ b/control-api/src/oauth/store.ts@@ -104,6 +104,12 @@ export type UpsertOAuthGrantInput = OAuthGrantKey & {refreshToken?: string/** Seconds until access token expires; null if provider didn't supply expires_in. */accessTokenExpiresInSec?: number+ /**+ * metadata.uid of the owning McpServer, sealing the grant to this installation+ * (user path only). Omitted for recipe-domain grants → NULL. The latest consent+ * re-seals the row so a reinstall's grant carries the new uid.+ */+ crUid?: string}/**@@ -136,14 +142,15 @@ export async function upsertOAuthGrant(`INSERT INTO oauth_grants (owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, user_id, oauth_client_id, grant_kind,provider, access_token_encrypted, refresh_token_encrypted,- access_token_expires_at, updated_at- ) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'user', $6, $7, $8, $9, NOW())+ access_token_expires_at, cr_uid, updated_at+ ) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'user', $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, NOW())ON CONFLICT (owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, user_id, oauth_client_id)DO UPDATE SETprovider = EXCLUDED.provider,access_token_encrypted = EXCLUDED.access_token_encrypted,refresh_token_encrypted = EXCLUDED.refresh_token_encrypted,access_token_expires_at = EXCLUDED.access_token_expires_at,+ cr_uid = EXCLUDED.cr_uid,updated_at = NOW()`,[ownerKind,@@ -155,6 +162,7 @@ export async function upsertOAuthGrant(accessTokenEncrypted,refreshTokenEncrypted,accessTokenExpiresAt,+ input.crUid ?? null,])return@@ -322,16 +330,23 @@ export async function refreshOAuthGrantTokens(* an OAuth mcp-server with `grantScope='context'` lends their provider identity* to the whole Context.*- * INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING — first-wins tokens AND bootstrapper. If a- * concurrent second member also completes consent (both minted an authorize URL- * inside the state TTL), their row is a no-op: they inherit the team's grant,- * and `bootstrapped_by_user_id` keeps pointing at whoever landed first- * (mini-spec 05 §3). Distinct from the refresh path (`upsertOAuthGrant` above)- * on purpose: conflating them would let the last completer silently overwrite- * the team identity and the audit trail.+ * INSERT … ON CONFLICT — first-wins tokens AND bootstrapper WITHIN ONE+ * INSTALLATION. If a concurrent second member of the SAME install also completes+ * consent (both minted an authorize URL inside the state TTL), their row is a+ * no-op: they inherit the team's grant, and `bootstrapped_by_user_id` keeps+ * pointing at whoever landed first (mini-spec 05 §3).*- * Returns `{ inserted }` so the caller can tell "you bootstrapped the team" from- * "you joined an existing team identity".+ * Fenced by `cr_uid` (R3-H5): a conflicting row of the SAME uid is left as-is+ * (first bootstrapper wins), but a row of a DIFFERENT uid — or a legacy row+ * (cr_uid NULL) left by a previous installation of the same name whose teardown+ * did not reach it — is NOT this install's first bootstrapper, so it is REPLACED+ * (the `WHERE cr_uid IS DISTINCT FROM` guard on the DO UPDATE). Distinct from the+ * refresh path (`upsertOAuthGrant` above): conflating them would let the last+ * completer of the same install silently overwrite the team identity and audit.+ *+ * Returns `{ inserted }` — true when THIS consent established this install's shared+ * identity (a fresh insert, or a replace of a stale other-install/legacy row);+ * false when it joined an existing same-install team identity.*/export type BootstrapSharedOAuthGrantInput = {ownerKind: 'mcpserver'@@ -345,6 +360,8 @@ export type BootstrapSharedOAuthGrantInput = {accessToken: stringrefreshToken?: stringaccessTokenExpiresInSec?: number+ /** metadata.uid of the owning McpServer, sealing the grant to this installation. */+ crUid?: string}export async function bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(@@ -366,11 +383,19 @@ export async function bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, user_id, context_id,oauth_client_id, grant_kind, bootstrapped_by_user_id,provider, access_token_encrypted, refresh_token_encrypted,- access_token_expires_at, updated_at- ) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULL, $4, $5, 'shared', $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, NOW())+ access_token_expires_at, cr_uid, updated_at+ ) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULL, $4, $5, 'shared', $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, NOW())ON CONFLICT (owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, context_id, oauth_client_id)WHERE grant_kind = 'shared'- DO NOTHING+ DO UPDATE SET+ bootstrapped_by_user_id = EXCLUDED.bootstrapped_by_user_id,+ provider = EXCLUDED.provider,+ access_token_encrypted = EXCLUDED.access_token_encrypted,+ refresh_token_encrypted = EXCLUDED.refresh_token_encrypted,+ access_token_expires_at = EXCLUDED.access_token_expires_at,+ cr_uid = EXCLUDED.cr_uid,+ updated_at = NOW()+ WHERE oauth_grants.cr_uid IS DISTINCT FROM EXCLUDED.cr_uidRETURNING id`,[input.ownerKind,@@ -383,6 +408,7 @@ export async function bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(accessTokenEncrypted,refreshTokenEncrypted,accessTokenExpiresAt,+ input.crUid ?? null,])return { inserted: (result.rowCount ?? 0) > 0 }@@ -568,15 +594,21 @@ export async function deleteOAuthGrant(db: DbClient, input: GetOAuthGrantInput):*/export async function deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(db: DbClient,- coords: { recipeNamespace: string; recipeName: string }+ coords: { recipeNamespace: string; recipeName: string; crUid: string }): Promise<number> {// `owner_kind = 'mcpserver'` is load-bearing: it must never touch recipe-domain// grants that share a name coordinate. No user_id / context_id / oauth_client_id /- // grant_kind filter — the wipe is intentionally all-flavors.+ // grant_kind filter — the wipe is intentionally all-flavors FOR THIS INSTALLATION.+ //+ // Fenced by `cr_uid`: grants sealed with the uninstalled CR's uid are purged, and+ // legacy grants (cr_uid IS NULL, written before install identity or by a pod mid-+ // rollout) are purged too. A grant sealed with a DIFFERENT uid — a same-name+ // reinstall's consent that landed in the teardown window — SURVIVES (R3-H5).const result = await db.query(`DELETE FROM oauth_grants- WHERE owner_kind = 'mcpserver' AND recipe_namespace = $1 AND recipe_name = $2`,- [coords.recipeNamespace, coords.recipeName]+ WHERE owner_kind = 'mcpserver' AND recipe_namespace = $1 AND recipe_name = $2+ AND (cr_uid = $3 OR cr_uid IS NULL)`,+ [coords.recipeNamespace, coords.recipeName, coords.crUid])return result.rowCount ?? 0}diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallDeletesOauthClientSecret.test.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallDeletesOauthClientSecret.test.tsindex eeb9deae1..7d2a86198 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallDeletesOauthClientSecret.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallDeletesOauthClientSecret.test.ts@@ -47,18 +47,28 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — deletes the oauth-client Secret onfunction buildApp() {const deleteSecretCalls: Array<{ name: string; namespace: string }> = []const gateway = {+ // The uninstall reads the CR before deleting to capture metadata.uid (R3-H5).+ getResource: vi.fn(async () => ({+ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME, uid: `uid-${SERVER_NAME}`, resourceVersion: '1' },+ })),deleteResource: vi.fn(async () => ({ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME } })),deleteSecret: vi.fn(async (name: string, namespace: string) => {deleteSecretCalls.push({ name, namespace })return {}}),// The uninstall now fences each Secret cleanup on the identity read back- // BEFORE the CR delete (uid/resourceVersion precondition), so a live- // read must expose that identity exactly as real K8s getSecret does —- // returning a bare `{}` would report `identity-unavailable` and skip the- // delete, which is not a state a real existing Secret can be in.+ // BEFORE the CR delete (uid/resourceVersion precondition), so a live read+ // must expose that identity exactly as real K8s getSecret does. The+ // `${name}-oauth-client` cleanup ALSO requires the control-api managed-by+ // label (R3-H6 ownership guard) — without it the guard classifies the Secret+ // `not-managed` and skips the delete, so the fixture must carry the label a+ // real install-saga-created Secret has.getSecret: vi.fn(async (name: string) => ({- metadata: { uid: `uid-${name}`, resourceVersion: '1' },+ metadata: {+ uid: `uid-${name}`,+ resourceVersion: '1',+ labels: { 'clerum.io/managed-by': 'control-api' },+ },})),listResource: vi.fn(async () => []),updateResource: vi.fn(async () => ({})),diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallPurgesGrants.test.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallPurgesGrants.test.tsindex b027794b9..adf94e903 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallPurgesGrants.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallPurgesGrants.test.ts@@ -44,11 +44,16 @@ vi.mock('../../../db.js', async importActual => {const { createAdminResourcesRouter } = await import('../resources.js')const { config } = await import('../../../config.js')-describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — purges oauth_grants on uninstall (H-3)', () => {+describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — purges oauth_grants on uninstall (H-3, R3-H5)', () => {const SERVER_NAME = 'gdrive'+ const CR_UID = 'uid-gdrive-live'function buildApp() {const gateway = {+ // The uninstall reads the CR before deleting to capture metadata.uid (R3-H5).+ getResource: vi.fn(async () => ({+ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME, uid: CR_UID, resourceVersion: '7' },+ })),deleteResource: vi.fn(async () => ({ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME } })),deleteSecret: vi.fn(async () => ({})),getSecret: vi.fn(async () => ({})),@@ -66,7 +71,7 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — purges oauth_grants on uninstall (dbMock.query.mockClear()})- it('executes a server-scoped DELETE FROM oauth_grants during uninstall', async () => {+ it('executes a cr_uid-fenced server-scoped DELETE FROM oauth_grants during uninstall', async () => {const { app } = buildApp()const res = await request(app).delete(`/api/v1/admin/mcp-servers/${SERVER_NAME}`)@@ -76,8 +81,24 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — purges oauth_grants on uninstall (c =>/DELETE\s+FROM\s+oauth_grants/i.test(c.text) && c.text.includes("owner_kind = 'mcpserver'"))- // Before H-3 no such query is issued — this is the regression anchor.+ // Before H-3 no such query is issued; before R3-H5 it carried no cr_uid fence.expect(purge).toBeDefined()- expect(purge!.values).toEqual([config.mcpServersNamespace, SERVER_NAME])+ expect(purge!.text).toContain('cr_uid = $3 OR cr_uid IS NULL')+ expect(purge!.values).toEqual([config.mcpServersNamespace, SERVER_NAME, CR_UID])+ })++ it('deletes the CR fenced on the uid read before delete', async () => {+ const { app, gateway } = buildApp()++ await request(app).delete(`/api/v1/admin/mcp-servers/${SERVER_NAME}`)++ expect(gateway.getResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith(+ 'mcpservers',+ SERVER_NAME,+ config.mcpServersNamespace+ )+ // deleteResource receives the uid precondition captured from the read CR.+ const deleteArgs = gateway.deleteResource.mock.calls[0]+ expect(deleteArgs[3]).toEqual({ uid: CR_UID })})})diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallTeardownMetrics.test.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallTeardownMetrics.test.tsindex ce2c631a8..54c554344 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallTeardownMetrics.test.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/__tests__/mcpServerUninstallTeardownMetrics.test.ts@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ describe('DELETE /admin/mcp-servers/:name — teardown failure increments the cofunction buildApp() {const gateway = {+ // The uninstall reads the CR before deleting to capture metadata.uid (R3-H5).+ getResource: vi.fn(async () => ({+ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME, uid: 'uid-gdrive-live', resourceVersion: '1' },+ })),deleteResource: vi.fn(async () => ({ metadata: { name: SERVER_NAME } })),deleteSecret: vi.fn(async () => ({})),getSecret: vi.fn(async () => ({})),diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.tsindex 5213a0071..9cc8aa66f 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/resources.ts@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ import { enforceNamespace } from '../../http/namespaceAudit.js'import { validateCommunicationChannelSpec } from '../../http/validateCommunicationChannelSpec.js'import { validateMcpServerSpecPreflight } from '../../http/validateMcpServerSpec.js'import { K8sGateway } from '../../k8s.js'-import { cleanupDynamicClientForServer } from '../../oauth/dcrCleanup.js'import { deriveOAuthEncryptionKey } from '../../oauth/encryption.js'-import { deleteOAuthGrantsForServer } from '../../oauth/store.js'+import { teardownMcpServerOAuthState } from '../../oauth/mcpServerOAuthTeardown.js'import { rootLogger } from '../../observability/logger.js'import { mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal } from '../../observability/metrics.js'import { stripHookRefFromHosts } from '../../services/hostGuardrailRefs.js'@@ -1178,7 +1177,30 @@ export function createAdminResourcesRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {}): null- const deleted = await gateway.deleteResource(plural, name, ns)+ // mcpservers only: read the CR before deleting so its metadata.uid fences BOTH+ // the delete (a same-name reinstall's CR has a different uid → the delete+ // precondition 409s and we never tear down its state) AND the OAuth teardown+ // (only this installation's dynamic_clients row + grants are removed, R3-H5). A+ // 404 means the CR is already gone → no uid, so the teardown is skipped entirely.+ let mcpServerCrUid: string | undefined+ if (plural === 'mcpservers') {+ try {+ const cr = await gateway.getResource(plural, name, ns)+ mcpServerCrUid = resourcePreconditionsFromResource(cr)?.uid+ } catch (err) {+ // getResource wraps a namespaced 404 as K8sNotFoundError (httpStatus, not+ // statusCode), so match both shapes — as the update handler does above.+ if (!(err instanceof K8sNotFoundError) && extractK8sStatusCode(err) !== 404) throw err+ // CR already gone: leave uid undefined so the teardown below is skipped.+ }+ }++ // Only the mcpservers delete is uid-fenced; every other plural keeps the exact+ // 3-arg call it had (a trailing undefined would change the observed call shape).+ const deleted =+ mcpServerCrUid !== undefined+ ? await gateway.deleteResource(plural, name, ns, { uid: mcpServerCrUid })+ : await gateway.deleteResource(plural, name, ns)if (plural === 'communicationchannels' && ccSecretRefName && ccSecretCleanup) {if (ccSecretCleanup.status !== 'ready') {@@ -1297,59 +1319,28 @@ export function createAdminResourcesRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {}}- // Remote DCR client teardown (K, DEC-18): revoke the encrypted- // `dynamic_clients` row (reliable) + best-effort RFC 7592 delete at the AS- // (courtesy). Keyed per-server-CR; idempotent (0 rows ⇒ not a DCR server).- // Never blocks or fails the uninstall — the CR is already deleted.- try {- const teardown = await cleanupDynamicClientForServer(+ // OAuth teardown fenced by the CR uid (R3-H5): revoke this installation's+ // encrypted `dynamic_clients` row + best-effort RFC 7592 delete at the AS, and+ // purge its `oauth_grants` rows — never a same-name reinstall's state. Skipped+ // when the uid is unknown (the CR read 404'd): a name-only teardown here would+ // reopen the very race this fences. The module never throws; it counts/logs per+ // stage and the uninstall keeps its 200 (the response policy is R3-H7).+ if (mcpServerCrUid !== undefined) {+ const teardown = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(dcrDb,oauthEncryptionKey,{ logger: log },+ { namespace: ns, name, crUid: mcpServerCrUid },+ log+ )+ log.info({- ownerKind: 'mcpserver',- serverNamespace: ns,serverName: name,- }- )- if (teardown.localRowsDeleted > 0) {- log.info(- {- serverName: name,- namespace: ns,- attemptedRemoteDelete: teardown.attemptedRemoteDelete,- },- 'Revoked remote OAuth dynamic client on uninstall'- )- }- } catch (err) {- mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal.inc({ stage: 'dynamic_client' })- log.error(- { serverName: name, namespace: ns, err },- 'Dynamic client cleanup failed on uninstall (CR already deleted)'- )- }-- // Server teardown (DEC-R2): wipe ALL of this server's oauth_grants rows —- // every user / context / client / flavor. Idempotent; never blocks the- // uninstall (the CR is already deleted). This is NOT the per-user- // revocation path — see deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.- try {- const purged = await deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(dcrDb, {- recipeNamespace: ns,- recipeName: name,- })- if (purged > 0) {- log.info(- { serverName: name, namespace: ns, count: purged },- 'Purged OAuth grants on uninstall'- )- }- } catch (err) {- mcpServerUninstallTeardownFailuresTotal.inc({ stage: 'oauth_grants' })- log.error(- { serverName: name, namespace: ns, err },- 'OAuth grants purge failed on uninstall (CR already deleted)'+ namespace: ns,+ dynamicClient: teardown.dynamicClient,+ grants: teardown.grants,+ },+ 'MCP server OAuth teardown completed')}diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/external/oauthCallback.ts b/control-api/src/routes/external/oauthCallback.tsindex 0b7e68898..7e18f5235 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/external/oauthCallback.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/external/oauthCallback.ts@@ -90,7 +90,15 @@ export function createOAuthCallbackRouter(gateway: K8sGateway): Router {}const resolved = resolveServerOAuthSubject(server)if (!resolved) return null- return { namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace, ...resolved }+ // Seal grants written by this consent to the CR's identity (R3-H5): the uid is+ // the apiserver's, unique per object, so a same-name reinstall's teardown never+ // purges this installation's grant. Undefined only if the CR carried no uid.+ const crUid = (server as { metadata?: { uid?: unknown } }).metadata?.uid+ return {+ namespace: config.mcpServersNamespace,+ ...(typeof crUid === 'string' && crUid ? { crUid } : {}),+ ...resolved,+ }},}diff --git a/control-api/test/fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.ts b/control-api/test/fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.tsindex c36ae42d1..85cd74f09 100644--- a/control-api/test/fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.ts+++ b/control-api/test/fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.ts@@ -468,7 +468,25 @@ export function makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb(): {const [owner_kind, server_namespace, server_name, fourth] = valuesconst key = keyOf(owner_kind, server_namespace, server_name)const row = rows.get(key)- // By-install DELETE (compensation): remove only when the install_id matches.+ // Claim-delete (teardown): WHERE (cr_uid = $4 OR legacy) RETURNING the handle.+ // Deletes the row bound to this uid or a legacy row (both identity cols NULL);+ // a pending row or a row bound to a different uid does NOT match.+ if (text.includes('RETURNING')) {+ if (row && (row.cr_uid === fourth || (row.install_id == null && row.cr_uid == null))) {+ rows.delete(key)+ return {+ rows: [+ {+ registration_client_uri: row.registration_client_uri,+ registration_access_token_encrypted: row.registration_access_token_encrypted,+ },+ ],+ rowCount: 1,+ }+ }+ return { rows: [], rowCount: 0 }+ }+ // By-install DELETE (saga compensation): remove only when the install_id matches.if (values.length === 4) {if (row && row.install_id === fourth) {rows.delete(key)@@ -476,7 +494,7 @@ export function makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb(): {}return { rows: [], rowCount: 0 }}- // By-name DELETE (legacy deleteDynamicClient / dcrCleanup).+ // By-name DELETE (legacy).const existed = rows.delete(key)return { rows: [], rowCount: existed ? 1 : 0 }}diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.callback.mcp.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.callback.mcp.test.tsindex db8ce3f89..8834c8037 100644--- a/control-api/test/oauth.callback.mcp.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.callback.mcp.test.ts@@ -178,10 +178,12 @@ describe('handleOAuthCallback — mcp subject (U5)', () => {expect(db.query).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)const [sql, params] = db.query.mock.calls[0] as [string, unknown[]]- // The shared bootstrap INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING (first-wins).+ // The shared bootstrap INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE fenced by cr_uid (R3-H5):+ // same-uid conflict no-ops (first-wins), a different uid / legacy row is replaced.expect(sql).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')expect(sql).toContain("'shared'")- expect(sql).toContain('DO NOTHING')+ expect(sql).toContain('DO UPDATE SET')+ expect(sql).toContain('oauth_grants.cr_uid IS DISTINCT FROM EXCLUDED.cr_uid')// owner_kind, ns, name, context_id(=contextRef), oauthClientId, bootstrappedByexpect(params[0]).toBe('mcpserver')expect(params[1]).toBe(MCP_NS)diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.dcrCleanup.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.dcrCleanup.test.tsindex 3dbf454f7..6a8e775a2 100644--- a/control-api/test/oauth.dcrCleanup.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.dcrCleanup.test.ts@@ -1,89 +1,17 @@import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'-import { bestEffortRfc7592Delete, cleanupDynamicClientForServer } from '../src/oauth/dcrCleanup.js'-import { getDynamicClient, upsertDynamicClient } from '../src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.js'-import { deriveOAuthEncryptionKey } from '../src/oauth/encryption.js'-import { makeDcrTransport, makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb } from './fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.js'+import { bestEffortRfc7592Delete } from '../src/oauth/dcrCleanup.js'/**- * C4/K (DEC-18) — uninstall teardown of a remote server's DCR client. The row is- * written by the REAL store (`upsertDynamicClient`, T1 — encrypted envelope never- * hand-built) and the RFC 7592 DELETE goes through the injected pinned transport.- * Idempotent: a non-DCR server is a clean no-op.+ * C4/K (DEC-18) — best-effort RFC 7592 client-delete at the AS. The full server+ * teardown moved to `mcpServerOAuthTeardown.ts` (fenced by cr_uid, R3-H5) and is+ * covered by its real-Postgres suite; this pins the courtesy revocation's+ * failure-swallowing contract shared by the saga rollback and the teardown module.*/-const ENC = deriveOAuthEncryptionKey(- '00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'-)const PUBLIC_IP = async () => ['93.184.216.34']-const KEY = {- ownerKind: 'mcpserver' as const,- serverNamespace: 'mcp-server',- serverName: 'notion-remote',-}-describe('cleanupDynamicClientForServer (uninstall)', () => {- it('revokes the local row AND attempts the best-effort RFC 7592 delete', async () => {- const { db } = makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb()- await upsertDynamicClient(db, ENC, {- ...KEY,- issuer: 'https://mcp.notion.com',- clientId: 'dcr-client-123',- clientMode: 'confidential',- clientSecret: 'shh',- registrationAccessToken: 'reg-bearer-xyz',- registrationClientUri: 'https://mcp.notion.com/register/dcr-client-123',- })-- const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })- const result = await cleanupDynamicClientForServer(- db,- ENC,- { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },- KEY- )-- expect(result).toEqual({ localRowsDeleted: 1, attemptedRemoteDelete: true })- // Local row gone.- expect(await getDynamicClient(db, ENC, KEY)).toBeNull()- // RFC 7592 DELETE hit the registration_client_uri with the bearer.- const del = calls.find(c => c.method === 'DELETE')- expect(del?.url).toBe('https://mcp.notion.com/register/dcr-client-123')- expect(del?.headers.authorization).toBe('Bearer reg-bearer-xyz')- })-- it('is idempotent — a server with no DCR client is a clean no-op (0 rows, no remote delete)', async () => {- const { db } = makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb()- const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })- const result = await cleanupDynamicClientForServer(- db,- ENC,- { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },- KEY- )- expect(result).toEqual({ localRowsDeleted: 0, attemptedRemoteDelete: false })- expect(calls.some(c => c.method === 'DELETE')).toBe(false)- })-- it('a DCR row without a management handle still deletes locally (no remote delete)', async () => {- const { db } = makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb()- await upsertDynamicClient(db, ENC, {- ...KEY,- issuer: 'https://mcp.notion.com',- clientId: 'dcr-client-nohandle',- clientMode: 'public',- })- const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })- const result = await cleanupDynamicClientForServer(- db,- ENC,- { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },- KEY- )- expect(result).toEqual({ localRowsDeleted: 1, attemptedRemoteDelete: false })- expect(calls.some(c => c.method === 'DELETE')).toBe(false)- })-- it('bestEffortRfc7592Delete swallows transport failures (courtesy cleanup)', async () => {+describe('bestEffortRfc7592Delete', () => {+ it('swallows transport failures (courtesy cleanup)', async () => {const transport = async () => {throw new Error('AS unreachable')}diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.realPostgres.integration.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.realPostgres.integration.test.tsindex 5c63e7026..50fd005fd 100644--- a/control-api/test/oauth.deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.realPostgres.integration.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.deleteOAuthGrantsForServer.realPostgres.integration.test.ts@@ -66,8 +66,11 @@ describeRealPostgres('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (re}})- it('wipes every flavor of the target server and leaves a peer server intact', async () => {- // Target server 'gdrive': one user grant + one shared/context grant.+ const U = 'uid-gdrive-U'+ const U_PRIME = 'uid-gdrive-Uprime'++ it('purges this uid + legacy grants, spares a different uid and a peer server (fenced)', async () => {+ // Target server 'gdrive', THIS installation (uid U): a user grant + a shared grant.await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {grantKind: 'user',ownerKind: 'mcpserver',@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ describeRealPostgres('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (reprovider: 'google',accessToken: 'at-user-a',refreshToken: 'rt-user-a',+ crUid: U,})const { inserted } = await bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {ownerKind: 'mcpserver',@@ -89,9 +93,37 @@ describeRealPostgres('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (reprovider: 'google',accessToken: 'shared-at',refreshToken: 'shared-rt',+ crUid: U,})expect(inserted).toBe(true)+ // A LEGACY gdrive grant (cr_uid NULL — written before install identity): purged too.+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: 'gdrive',+ userId: 'user-legacy',+ oauthClientId: 'google-drive',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-legacy',+ refreshToken: 'rt-legacy',+ })++ // A gdrive grant of a DIFFERENT installation (uid U′ — a reinstall's consent): MUST survive.+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: 'gdrive',+ userId: 'user-reinstall',+ oauthClientId: 'google-drive',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-reinstall',+ refreshToken: 'rt-reinstall',+ crUid: U_PRIME,+ })+// Peer server 'teamdrive': a grant that MUST survive the gdrive purge.await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {grantKind: 'user',@@ -103,15 +135,18 @@ describeRealPostgres('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (reprovider: 'google',accessToken: 'at-peer',refreshToken: 'rt-peer',+ crUid: U,})const purged = await deleteOAuthGrantsForServer(db, {recipeNamespace: NS,recipeName: 'gdrive',+ crUid: U,})- expect(purged).toBe(2)+ // U's user + U's shared + the legacy row = 3. U′'s grant is NOT counted.+ expect(purged).toBe(3)- // Observable state (T4): both gdrive flavors are gone …+ // Observable state (T4): both U-sealed gdrive flavors and the legacy row are gone …expect(await oauthGrantExists(db, {grantKind: 'user',@@ -132,6 +167,27 @@ describeRealPostgres('deleteOAuthGrantsForServer — full server-scoped wipe (reoauthClientId: 'google-drive',})).toBe(false)+ expect(+ await oauthGrantExists(db, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: 'gdrive',+ userId: 'user-legacy',+ oauthClientId: 'google-drive',+ })+ ).toBe(false)+ // … the DIFFERENT-uid gdrive grant (the reinstall's) SURVIVES (R3-H5 fence) …+ expect(+ await oauthGrantExists(db, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: 'gdrive',+ userId: 'user-reinstall',+ oauthClientId: 'google-drive',+ })+ ).toBe(true)// … and the peer server's grant is untouched (scoped purge, no blast radius).expect(await oauthGrantExists(db, {diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.dynamicClientStore.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.dynamicClientStore.test.tsindex c7b665c9f..e4abd2ed7 100644--- a/control-api/test/oauth.dynamicClientStore.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.dynamicClientStore.test.ts@@ -2,11 +2,7 @@ import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'import fc from 'fast-check'import { config } from '../src/config.js'import type { DbClient } from '../src/db.js'-import {- deleteDynamicClient,- getDynamicClient,- upsertDynamicClient,-} from '../src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.js'+import { getDynamicClient, upsertDynamicClient } from '../src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.js'import { deriveOAuthEncryptionKey } from '../src/oauth/encryption.js'import { makeInMemoryDynamicClientsDb } from './fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.js'@@ -81,20 +77,6 @@ describe('dynamicClientStore — upsert SQL + encryption at rest', () => {expect(calls[0].values[6]).toBeNull()expect(calls[0].values[7]).toBeNull()})-- it('delete is a hard DELETE keyed by owner coordinates, returning rowCount (idempotent)', async () => {- const { db, calls } = fakeDb([], 0)- const removed = await deleteDynamicClient(db, CONF_KEY)- expect(removed).toBe(0)- expect(calls[0].text).toContain('DELETE FROM dynamic_clients')- expect(calls[0].values).toEqual(['mcpserver', 'mcp-server', 'vercel-remote'])- })-- it('defaults ownerKind to mcpserver when omitted', async () => {- const { db, calls } = fakeDb([], 1)- await deleteDynamicClient(db, { serverNamespace: 'mcp-server', serverName: 'x' })- expect(calls[0].values[0]).toBe('mcpserver')- })})describe('dynamicClientStore — round-trip (T1: envelope from the real producer)', () => {diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.mcpServerOAuthTeardown.realPostgres.integration.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.mcpServerOAuthTeardown.realPostgres.integration.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..029574212--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.mcpServerOAuthTeardown.realPostgres.integration.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'+import { Pool } from 'pg'+import { config } from '../src/config.js'+import type { DbClient } from '../src/db.js'+import { initDb } from '../src/db.js'+import {+ type UpsertDynamicClientInput,+ bindDynamicClientToResource,+ getDynamicClient,+ insertDynamicClientPending,+} from '../src/oauth/dynamicClientStore.js'+import { deriveOAuthEncryptionKey } from '../src/oauth/encryption.js'+import { teardownMcpServerOAuthState } from '../src/oauth/mcpServerOAuthTeardown.js'+import {+ bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant,+ oauthGrantExists,+ upsertOAuthGrant,+} from '../src/oauth/store.js'+import { rootLogger } from '../src/observability/logger.js'+import { makeDcrTransport } from './fixtures/remoteOAuthDiscovery.js'++/**+ * R3-H5 (T1/T3/T4) — the uninstall OAuth teardown fenced by the CR uid, observed as+ * SURVIVING ROWS and the exact RFC 7592 DELETE fired (T4), never as SQL text. All+ * rows are seeded by the REAL producers (insertDynamicClientPending + bind for DCR;+ * upsert/bootstrap for grants) and read through the REAL readers (T1).+ *+ * Gated on a real Postgres:+ * CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL=postgres://<u>:<p>@<host>:5432/<db> npm test -- \+ * test/oauth.mcpServerOAuthTeardown.realPostgres.integration.test.ts+ */+const adminUrl = process.env.CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL+const describeRealPostgres = adminUrl ? describe : describe.skip++function databaseUrl(baseUrl: string, database: string): string {+ const url = new URL(baseUrl)+ url.pathname = `/${database}`+ return url.toString()+}++const KEY = deriveOAuthEncryptionKey(config.oauthEncryptionKey)+const NS = config.mcpServersNamespace+const PUBLIC_IP = async () => ['93.184.216.34']++describeRealPostgres('teardownMcpServerOAuthState — fenced by cr_uid (real Postgres)', () => {+ const database = `control_api_teardown_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`+ let adminPool: Pool+ let dbPool: Pool+ let db: DbClient++ beforeAll(async () => {+ if (!adminUrl) throw new Error('CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL is required')+ adminPool = new Pool({ connectionString: adminUrl })+ await adminPool.query(`CREATE DATABASE "${database.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)+ dbPool = new Pool({ connectionString: databaseUrl(adminUrl, database) })+ await initDb({ connect: () => dbPool.connect() })+ db = { query: (text, values) => dbPool.query(text, values) }+ })++ afterAll(async () => {+ await dbPool?.end()+ if (adminPool) {+ await adminPool.query(+ `SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity+ WHERE datname = $1 AND pid <> pg_backend_pid()`,+ [database]+ )+ await adminPool.query(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS "${database.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)+ await adminPool.end()+ }+ })++ const dcrCreds = (serverName: string, tag: string): UpsertDynamicClientInput => ({+ serverNamespace: NS,+ serverName,+ issuer: 'https://as.example.com',+ clientId: `cid-${tag}`,+ clientMode: 'confidential',+ clientSecret: `secret-${tag}`,+ registrationAccessToken: `rat-${tag}`,+ registrationClientUri: `https://as.example.com/register/${tag}`,+ })++ it('deletes the U-bound dynamic client and revokes ONLY its client', async () => {+ const name = `srv-tp-own-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const install = randomUUID()+ const U = randomUUID()+ await insertDynamicClientPending(db, KEY, { ...dcrCreds(name, 'own'), installId: install })+ await bindDynamicClientToResource(db, { serverNamespace: NS, serverName: name }, install, U)++ const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })+ const result = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db,+ KEY,+ { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },+ { namespace: NS, name, crUid: U },+ rootLogger+ )++ expect(result.dynamicClient).toBe('done')+ expect(await getDynamicClient(db, KEY, { serverNamespace: NS, serverName: name })).toBeNull()+ // Exactly this row's client was revoked at the AS.+ const deletes = calls.filter(c => c.method === 'DELETE').map(c => c.url)+ expect(deletes).toEqual(['https://as.example.com/register/own'])+ })++ // Window B: the reinstall (uid U′) wrote its row BEFORE the old teardown ran. The+ // name-only teardown would read+revoke THIS new client; the fenced one leaves it be.+ it('leaves a reinstall row (uid U′) intact and does NOT revoke its client (Window B)', async () => {+ const name = `srv-tp-reinstall-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const install = randomUUID()+ const Uprime = randomUUID()+ const U = randomUUID() // the uninstalled (older) install's uid+ await insertDynamicClientPending(db, KEY, {+ ...dcrCreds(name, 'reinstall'),+ installId: install,+ })+ await bindDynamicClientToResource(+ db,+ { serverNamespace: NS, serverName: name },+ install,+ Uprime+ )++ const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })+ const result = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db,+ KEY,+ { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },+ { namespace: NS, name, crUid: U },+ rootLogger+ )++ // The reinstall's row is a DIFFERENT uid → not claimed → 'none'.+ expect(result.dynamicClient).toBe('none')+ const survivor = await getDynamicClient(db, KEY, { serverNamespace: NS, serverName: name })+ expect(survivor?.crUid).toBe(Uprime)+ expect(calls.filter(c => c.method === 'DELETE')).toHaveLength(0)+ })++ it('deletes a legacy dynamic client row (both identity columns NULL)', async () => {+ const name = `srv-tp-legacy-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const install = randomUUID()+ await insertDynamicClientPending(db, KEY, { ...dcrCreds(name, 'legacy'), installId: install })+ // Emulate a pre-0119 legacy row: null the identity columns the migration added+ // (the encrypted creds still came from the real producer above).+ await db.query(+ `UPDATE dynamic_clients SET install_id = NULL, cr_uid = NULL+ WHERE owner_kind = 'mcpserver' AND server_namespace = $1 AND server_name = $2`,+ [NS, name]+ )++ const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })+ const result = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db,+ KEY,+ { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },+ { namespace: NS, name, crUid: randomUUID() },+ rootLogger+ )+ expect(result.dynamicClient).toBe('done')+ expect(await getDynamicClient(db, KEY, { serverNamespace: NS, serverName: name })).toBeNull()+ expect(calls.filter(c => c.method === 'DELETE').map(c => c.url)).toEqual([+ 'https://as.example.com/register/legacy',+ ])+ })++ it('purges this uid + legacy grants and spares a reinstall grant (uid U′)', async () => {+ const name = `srv-tp-grants-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const U = randomUUID()+ const Uprime = randomUUID()++ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId: 'user-u',+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-u',+ crUid: U,+ })+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId: 'user-legacy',+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-legacy',+ // no crUid → legacy row+ })+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId: 'user-reinstall',+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-reinstall',+ crUid: Uprime,+ })++ const { transport } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })+ const result = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db,+ KEY,+ { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },+ { namespace: NS, name, crUid: U },+ rootLogger+ )+ expect(result.grants).toBe('done')++ const exists = (userId: string) =>+ oauthGrantExists(db, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId,+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ })+ expect(await exists('user-u')).toBe(false)+ expect(await exists('user-legacy')).toBe(false)+ // The reinstall's grant (uid U′) survives (R3-H5).+ expect(await exists('user-reinstall')).toBe(true)+ })++ it('a server with no OAuth state is a clean no-op (none/none, no revoke)', async () => {+ const name = `srv-tp-clean-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const { transport, calls } = makeDcrTransport({ responseJson: '' })+ const result = await teardownMcpServerOAuthState(+ db,+ KEY,+ { transport, resolveDns: PUBLIC_IP },+ { namespace: NS, name, crUid: randomUUID() },+ rootLogger+ )+ expect(result).toEqual({ dynamicClient: 'none', grants: 'none' })+ expect(calls.filter(c => c.method === 'DELETE')).toHaveLength(0)+ })+})++// D-T3: the callback-side producer semantics that seal grants to an installation.+describeRealPostgres('grant cr_uid sealing (D-T3, real Postgres)', () => {+ const database = `control_api_sealing_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '')}`+ let adminPool: Pool+ let dbPool: Pool+ let db: DbClient++ beforeAll(async () => {+ if (!adminUrl) throw new Error('CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL is required')+ adminPool = new Pool({ connectionString: adminUrl })+ await adminPool.query(`CREATE DATABASE "${database.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)+ dbPool = new Pool({ connectionString: databaseUrl(adminUrl, database) })+ await initDb({ connect: () => dbPool.connect() })+ db = { query: (text, values) => dbPool.query(text, values) }+ })++ afterAll(async () => {+ await dbPool?.end()+ if (adminPool) {+ await adminPool.query(+ `SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity+ WHERE datname = $1 AND pid <> pg_backend_pid()`,+ [database]+ )+ await adminPool.query(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS "${database.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)+ await adminPool.end()+ }+ })++ async function grantCrUid(name: string, contextId?: string): Promise<string | null> {+ const res = await dbPool.query(+ contextId+ ? `SELECT cr_uid FROM oauth_grants WHERE owner_kind='mcpserver' AND recipe_namespace=$1+ AND recipe_name=$2 AND context_id=$3 AND grant_kind='shared'`+ : `SELECT cr_uid FROM oauth_grants WHERE owner_kind='mcpserver' AND recipe_namespace=$1+ AND recipe_name=$2 AND grant_kind='user'`,+ contextId ? [NS, name, contextId] : [NS, name]+ )+ return (res.rows[0] as { cr_uid: string | null }).cr_uid+ }++ it('upsertOAuthGrant (user) seals cr_uid and re-seals it on the latest consent', async () => {+ const name = `srv-seal-user-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const U = randomUUID()+ const Uprime = randomUUID()+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId: 'user-a',+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-1',+ crUid: U,+ })+ expect(await grantCrUid(name)).toBe(U)+ // A later consent (reinstall) re-seals the SAME row with the new uid.+ await upsertOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ grantKind: 'user',+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ userId: 'user-a',+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'at-2',+ crUid: Uprime,+ })+ expect(await grantCrUid(name)).toBe(Uprime)+ })++ it('bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant: same uid → no replace; different uid / legacy → replace', async () => {+ const name = `srv-seal-shared-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`+ const ctx = 'ctx-A'+ const U = randomUUID()+ const Uprime = randomUUID()++ const first = await bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ contextId: ctx,+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ bootstrappedByUserId: 'user-a',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'shared-1',+ crUid: U,+ })+ expect(first.inserted).toBe(true)+ expect(await grantCrUid(name, ctx)).toBe(U)++ // Same uid, second member of the SAME install → first bootstrapper wins (no replace).+ const sameUid = await bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ contextId: ctx,+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ bootstrappedByUserId: 'user-b',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'shared-2',+ crUid: U,+ })+ expect(sameUid.inserted).toBe(false)+ expect(await grantCrUid(name, ctx)).toBe(U)++ // Different uid (reinstall) → this is not the same install's first bootstrapper;+ // the stale row is replaced and re-sealed to the new uid.+ const otherUid = await bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {+ ownerKind: 'mcpserver',+ recipeNamespace: NS,+ recipeName: name,+ contextId: ctx,+ oauthClientId: 'client',+ bootstrappedByUserId: 'user-c',+ provider: 'google',+ accessToken: 'shared-3',+ crUid: Uprime,+ })+ expect(otherUid.inserted).toBe(true)+ expect(await grantCrUid(name, ctx)).toBe(Uprime)+ })+})diff --git a/control-api/test/oauth.store.sharedGrants.test.ts b/control-api/test/oauth.store.sharedGrants.test.tsindex 70096ef45..de4373886 100644--- a/control-api/test/oauth.store.sharedGrants.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/oauth.store.sharedGrants.test.ts@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const SHARED_KEY = {}describe('oauth store — shared (context-identity) grants', () => {- it('bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant issues INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING with bootstrapped_by, returns inserted', async () => {+ it('bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant issues INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE fenced by cr_uid, returns inserted', async () => {const { db, calls } = fakeDb([{ id: 1 }], 1)const out = await bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant(db, KEY, {...SHARED_KEY,@@ -49,14 +49,19 @@ describe('oauth store — shared (context-identity) grants', () => {accessToken: 'A',refreshToken: 'R',accessTokenExpiresInSec: 3600,+ crUid: 'uid-1',})expect(out.inserted).toBe(true)expect(calls[0].text).toContain('INSERT INTO oauth_grants')expect(calls[0].text).toContain('ON CONFLICT')- expect(calls[0].text).toContain('DO NOTHING')+ // R3-H5: same-uid conflict no-ops (first bootstrapper wins), a DIFFERENT uid /+ // legacy row is replaced — expressed as DO UPDATE guarded on cr_uid DISTINCT.+ expect(calls[0].text).toContain('DO UPDATE SET')+ expect(calls[0].text).toContain('oauth_grants.cr_uid IS DISTINCT FROM EXCLUDED.cr_uid')expect(calls[0].text).toContain('bootstrapped_by_user_id')expect(calls[0].text).toContain("'shared'")- // owner, ns, name, contextId, clientId, bootstrappedBy are bound in order.+ // owner, ns, name, contextId, clientId, bootstrappedBy are bound in order,+ // and cr_uid is the last bound param.expect(calls[0].values.slice(0, 6)).toEqual(['mcpserver','mcp-server',@@ -65,6 +70,7 @@ describe('oauth store — shared (context-identity) grants', () => {'google-drive','user-1',])+ expect((calls[0].values as unknown[]).at(-1)).toBe('uid-1')})it('bootstrapSharedOAuthGrant reports inserted=false when the conflict no-ops', async () => {diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.tsindex 99d30c283..f832d3e67 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.resources.test.ts@@ -1244,6 +1244,10 @@ describe('routes/resources', () => {config.mcpServersNamespace = 'mcpservers-ns'const gateway = {+ // The uninstall reads the CR before deleting to capture metadata.uid (R3-H5).+ getResource: vi+ .fn()+ .mockResolvedValue({ metadata: { name: 'mcp-a', uid: 'uid-mcp-a', resourceVersion: '1' } }),deleteResource: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deleted: true }),deleteSecret: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ deleted: true }),listResource: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([@@ -1262,7 +1266,10 @@ describe('routes/resources', () => {await request(app).delete('/admin/mcp-servers/mcp-a').expect(200)- expect(gateway.deleteResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith('mcpservers', 'mcp-a', 'mcpservers-ns')+ // The CR delete is now fenced on the uid read back before deletion (R3-H5).+ expect(gateway.deleteResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith('mcpservers', 'mcp-a', 'mcpservers-ns', {+ uid: 'uid-mcp-a',+ })expect(gateway.listResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith('contexts', 'contexts-ns')expect(gateway.updateResource).toHaveBeenCalledWith('contexts',