Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
test(grok-contract): require kind:'size' on byte bounds and pin the 35 MiB visual cap
Alfredo Lopeze7abaa51e6ca
diff --git a/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/index.test.cjs b/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/index.test.cjsindex e156dcf68..5b53aeb57 100644--- a/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/index.test.cjs+++ b/packages/grok-provider-attempt-contract/index.test.cjs@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ test('tool catalogs remain bounded by serialized request bytes including UTF-8',assert.deepEqual(contract.parseGrokCompletionRequestV1(request), {ok: false,code: 'limit',+ kind: 'size',message: 'request exceeds maxRequestBodyBytes',})})@@ -347,6 +348,7 @@ test('opaque canonical names remain bounded by serialized UTF-8 request bytes',assert.deepEqual(contract.parseGrokCompletionRequestV1(request), {ok: false,code: 'limit',+ kind: 'size',message: 'request exceeds maxRequestBodyBytes',})})@@ -407,10 +409,60 @@ test('T-E2 the element bound reports itself distinctly from the byte bound', ()assert.deepEqual(refused, {ok: false,code: 'limit',+ kind: 'size',message: 'request exceeds maxRequestBodyBytes element bound',})})+// The proxy maps `kind: 'size'` to `payload_too_large` and every other+// contract failure to `invalid_request`, as the Codex transport does. Without+// the field both byte guards would reach the Host as a malformed request.+test("fail carries kind:'size' on the byte bound and the element bound", () => {+ const request = { ...BASE, tools: [{ name: 'eventasks__read', description: '', parameters: {} }] }+ request.tools[0].description = 'x'.repeat(+ contract.LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes + 1 - Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(request), 'utf8')+ )+ assert.deepEqual(contract.hashCanonicalGrokRequest(request), {+ ok: false,+ code: 'limit',+ kind: 'size',+ message: 'request exceeds maxRequestBodyBytes',+ })+ const elements = contract.hashCanonicalGrokRequest({+ ...BASE,+ messages: new Array(contract.LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes + 1).fill({}),+ })+ assert.deepEqual(elements, {+ ok: false,+ code: 'limit',+ kind: 'size',+ message: 'request exceeds maxRequestBodyBytes element bound',+ })+ // Witness: a failure that is not a size bound carries no kind.+ const wrongProvider = contract.hashCanonicalGrokRequest({ ...BASE, provider: 'codex-subscription' })+ assert.equal(wrongProvider.ok, false)+ assert.equal('kind' in wrongProvider, false)+})++// The V2 envelope ceiling: every image at its encoded maximum plus the whole+// non-image share, rounded up to a whole MiB. The visual cap takes no+// envelope allowance on top, following the Codex contract.+test('LIMITS.maxVisualRequestBodyBytes is 35 MiB, derived from the image and non-image budgets', () => {+ const visual = require('./visualPayload.cjs')+ assert.equal(contract.LIMITS.maxVisualRequestBodyBytes, 36700160)+ assert.equal(visual.GROK_VISUAL_LIMITS.maxTotalImageBytes, 20971520)+ assert.equal(visual.MAX_ENCODED_TOTAL_IMAGE_BYTES, 27962028)+ const mib = 1024 * 1024+ const floor = visual.MAX_ENCODED_TOTAL_IMAGE_BYTES + contract.LIMITS.maxRequestBodyBytes+ assert.equal(contract.LIMITS.maxVisualRequestBodyBytes, Math.ceil(floor / mib) * mib)+ // A full envelope of images, non-image data and allowance still fits.+ assert.ok(floor + contract.ENVELOPE_ALLOWANCE_BYTES <= contract.LIMITS.maxVisualRequestBodyBytes)+ const declarations = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'index.d.ts'), 'utf8')+ const block = declarations.match(/export declare const LIMITS: \{([\s\S]*?)\n\}/)+ assert.ok(block, 'index.d.ts must declare a LIMITS object literal')+ assert.match(block[1], /^\s*readonly maxVisualRequestBodyBytes: 36700160$/m)+})+test('LIMITS publishes the nesting depth cap', () => {assert.equal(contract.LIMITS.maxNestingDepth, 64)})