Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
fix(external-rest-api): expose the CIMD client metadata document publicly
Jose Gabriel Ramirez Encinase9a53e61dddd
diff --git a/deploy/base/profiles/configmaps.yaml b/deploy/base/profiles/configmaps.yamlindex ef5064e0b..740ed168b 100644--- a/deploy/base/profiles/configmaps.yaml+++ b/deploy/base/profiles/configmaps.yaml@@ -73,6 +73,22 @@ data:proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;}+ # Public CIMD (SEP-991) document: the remote MCP-OAuth client_id is+ # <public origin>/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client, fetched by the+ # remote Authorization Server via external-rest-api. Exact path only,+ # read-only (limit_except GET also admits HEAD), no query forwarded.+ location = /api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client {+ limit_except GET {+ deny all;+ }+ set $control_api_origin control-api.control-plane.svc.cluster.local:8090;+ proxy_pass http://$control_api_origin/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client;+ proxy_http_version 1.1;+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ }+location / {return 403;}diff --git a/external-rest-api/package-lock.json b/external-rest-api/package-lock.jsonindex a2e4bc4f5..dd9f4c6a3 100644--- a/external-rest-api/package-lock.json+++ b/external-rest-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-external-rest-api",- "version": "0.1.100",+ "version": "0.1.101","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-external-rest-api",- "version": "0.1.100",+ "version": "0.1.101","dependencies": {"@clerum/jwt-key-policy": "file:../packages/jwt-key-policy","cors": "^2.8.5",diff --git a/external-rest-api/package.json b/external-rest-api/package.jsonindex 88323b742..4b1a80ddc 100644--- a/external-rest-api/package.json+++ b/external-rest-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-external-rest-api",- "version": "0.1.100",+ "version": "0.1.101","description": "External REST API for profile, team management, and RPC token brokerage","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts b/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.tsindex 3fe2d55e2..9ef40b16b 100644--- a/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts+++ b/external-rest-api/src/releaseManifest.ts@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export type ReleaseManifest = {export const releaseManifest: ReleaseManifest = {releaseId: 'v0.11.0',- externalRestApiVersion: '0.1.100',+ externalRestApiVersion: '0.1.101',rpcProxyVersion: '0.1.126',desktopVersion: '0.11.0',minimumDesktopVersion: '0.1.252',diff --git a/external-rest-api/src/routes/oauthCallback.ts b/external-rest-api/src/routes/oauthCallback.tsindex bd2f47f89..5c5023462 100644--- a/external-rest-api/src/routes/oauthCallback.ts+++ b/external-rest-api/src/routes/oauthCallback.ts@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ const REMOTE_SERVER_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/// Lowercase only: control-api mints the nonce with crypto.randomUUID(), which is// always lowercase, so any other casing is not a redirect URI it ever registered.const INSTALL_NONCE_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/+// Client ID Metadata Document (SEP-991) for the remote MCP-OAuth lane. Must equal+// control-api's CIMD_ROUTE_PATH (control-api/src/oauth/cimdIdentity.ts): the CIMD+// client_id is `<public origin>/api/v1` + this path, and a remote Authorization Server+// fetches that URL through this gateway.+const CIMD_ROUTE_PATH = '/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client'function rawQueryOf(req: Request): string {const queryStart = req.originalUrl.indexOf('?')@@ -21,9 +26,9 @@ function rawQueryOf(req: Request): string {* untouched so the signed `state` and `code` are never re-encoded — and relay its* response, including the HTML success page that bounces to clerum://oauth-completed.*- * This is the only public, unauthenticated route in this gateway, so it MUST stay a- * thin passthrough: never read or trust anything beyond the validated path segments- * and the opaque query string.+ * These, together with the CIMD document below, are the only public, unauthenticated+ * routes in this gateway, so they MUST stay thin passthroughs: never read or trust+ * anything beyond the validated path segments and the opaque query string.*/export function createOauthCallbackRouter(): Router {const router = Router()@@ -66,5 +71,18 @@ export function createOauthCallbackRouter(): Router {}})+ // PUBLIC CIMD document: a remote Authorization Server fetches our OAuth client+ // identity here. Fixed path, no caller-controlled segment and no query string are+ // forwarded (the forward carries this gateway's service token). Express answers+ // HEAD through this GET handler.+ router.get(CIMD_ROUTE_PATH, async (_req, res, next) => {+ try {+ const result = await controlApiPassthroughGet(CIMD_ROUTE_PATH, '')+ res.status(result.status).type(result.contentType).send(result.body)+ } catch (err) {+ next(err)+ }+ })+return router}diff --git a/external-rest-api/test/routes.cimd.test.ts b/external-rest-api/test/routes.cimd.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..84d5f66ff--- /dev/null+++ b/external-rest-api/test/routes.cimd.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'+import request from 'supertest'+import { createApp } from '../src/app.js'+import { config } from '../src/config.js'++// The remote MCP-OAuth CIMD client_id is `<public origin>/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client`+// (control-api/src/oauth/cimdIdentity.ts). A remote Authorization Server fetches it over+// the public internet, and this gateway is the public hop in front of control-api, so the+// document must be relayed here without a user session.+const CIMD_PATH = '/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client'++const CIMD_BODY = JSON.stringify({+ client_id: `https://example.test${CIMD_PATH}`,+ client_name: 'Evenfire',+ redirect_uris: ['https://example.test/api/v1/oauth-callback/remote'],+ token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none',+ grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],+ response_types: ['code'],+ application_type: 'web',+})++function stubControlApi() {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(CIMD_BODY, {+ status: 200,+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8' },+ })+ )+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)+ return fetchMock+}++describe('CIMD document passthrough', () => {+ afterEach(() => {+ vi.unstubAllGlobals()+ })++ it('relays the control-api document to an unauthenticated GET', async () => {+ const fetchMock = stubControlApi()+ const res = await request(createApp()).get(CIMD_PATH).expect(200)++ expect(res.headers['content-type']).toContain('application/json')+ expect(res.body).toEqual(JSON.parse(CIMD_BODY))+ expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)+ const base = config.controlApiBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '')+ expect(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe(`${base}/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client`)+ expect(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1]).toMatchObject({ method: 'GET' })+ })++ it('never forwards a caller-supplied query string', async () => {+ const fetchMock = stubControlApi()+ await request(createApp()).get(`${CIMD_PATH}?x=1&redirect=../admin`).expect(200)++ const base = config.controlApiBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '')+ expect(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe(`${base}/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client`)+ })++ it('relays a control-api failure status verbatim', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(+ new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'cimd_base_url_unconfigured' }), {+ status: 503,+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },+ })+ )+ vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock)++ const res = await request(createApp()).get(CIMD_PATH).expect(503)+ expect(res.body).toEqual({ error: 'cimd_base_url_unconfigured' })+ })++ it('does not expose any other method or sibling path', async () => {+ const fetchMock = stubControlApi()+ const app = createApp()++ await request(app).post(CIMD_PATH).send({}).expect(404)+ await request(app).get('/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client/extra').expect(404)+ await request(app).get('/api/v1/.well-known/other').expect(404)+ expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })+})diff --git a/scripts/tests/test-profile-control-funnel-nginx-contract.sh b/scripts/tests/test-profile-control-funnel-nginx-contract.shnew file mode 100755index 000000000..06a78a8b4--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/tests/test-profile-control-funnel-nginx-contract.sh@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@+#!/usr/bin/env bash+# Pins the public surface of the profile-control-funnel nginx (the hop between+# external-rest-api and control-api). Everything not listed here must stay 403.+#+# The remote MCP-OAuth CIMD client_id is <public origin>/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client+# (control-api/src/oauth/cimdIdentity.ts). A remote Authorization Server fetches it+# through external-rest-api and this funnel, so the funnel must forward that exact+# path, read-only, and nothing broader under /.well-known/.+set -euo pipefail++ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"+CONFIG="${1:-${ROOT}/deploy/base/profiles/configmaps.yaml}"+CIMD_PATH='/api/v1/.well-known/evenfire-mcp-client'++failed=0+fail() {+ echo "FAIL: $*" >&2+ failed=1+}++# Print the body of the first nginx block whose opening line matches $1 exactly+# (after trimming leading whitespace), up to its matching closing brace.+block_of() {+ awk -v want="$1" '+ !inside {+ line = $0+ sub(/^[ \t]+/, "", line)+ if (line == want) { inside = 1; depth = 1; next }+ next+ }+ {+ line = $0+ depth += gsub(/\{/, "", line)+ depth -= gsub(/\}/, "", line)+ if (depth == 0) exit+ }+ ' "${CONFIG}"+}++[[ -f "${CONFIG}" ]] || {+ echo "FAIL: missing ${CONFIG}" >&2+ exit 1+}++# 1. Exact-match CIMD location, GET/HEAD only, fixed upstream URI.+cimd_block="$(block_of "location = ${CIMD_PATH} {")"+if [[ -z "${cimd_block}" ]]; then+ fail "no exact-match 'location = ${CIMD_PATH}' block"+else+ grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*limit_except GET \{' <<<"${cimd_block}" ||+ fail "CIMD location must restrict methods with 'limit_except GET'"+ grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*deny all;' <<<"${cimd_block}" ||+ fail "CIMD location limit_except must 'deny all'"+ grep -Fq "proxy_pass http://\$control_api_origin${CIMD_PATH};" <<<"${cimd_block}" ||+ fail "CIMD location must proxy to the fixed control-api CIMD path"+ if grep -Fq '$request_uri' <<<"${cimd_block}"; then+ fail "CIMD location must not forward the caller's request URI or query"+ fi+fi++# 2. No other location may expose anything under /.well-known/.+other_well_known="$(grep -E '^[[:space:]]*location[[:space:]]' "${CONFIG}" |+ grep -F '.well-known' |+ grep -vF "location = ${CIMD_PATH} {" || true)"+if [[ -n "${other_well_known}" ]]; then+ fail "unexpected /.well-known location(s): ${other_well_known}"+fi++# 3. The existing public surface and the deny-all fallback stay in place.+grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*location ~ \^/api/v1/external/ \{' "${CONFIG}" ||+ fail "missing /api/v1/external/ location"+grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*location ~ \^/api/v1/oauth-callback/ \{' "${CONFIG}" ||+ fail "missing /api/v1/oauth-callback/ location"+fallback_block="$(block_of 'location / {')"+grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*return 403;' <<<"${fallback_block}" ||+ fail "fallback 'location /' must return 403"++if [[ "${failed}" -ne 0 ]]; then+ exit 1+fi+echo "PASS: profile-control-funnel nginx public surface"