Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
docs(security): r5-l1 correct reset proxy evidence
Josuéeb57b4822544
diff --git a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.mdindex d2a75dd7c..59a6521aa 100644--- a/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md+++ b/docs/how-to/codeql-js-missing-rate-limiting.md@@ -96,9 +96,13 @@ passed directly to Supertest and is never bound to a listening server. It mounts`createInvitationsRouter()`, whose `POST /invitations/password` handler has the existing`acceptRateLimit` limit of 10 requests per minute. The upstream Control API password-token routealso has trusted-source edge limiters and its 10/minute admission bucket. The alert does not-identify an unbounded deployed route; the response-proxy regression preserves the route's-observable retry and cookie headers while using a fixed header allowlist. Focused invitation and-trusted-source tests verify the existing 429/`Retry-After` behavior.+identify an unbounded deployed route. In the PostgreSQL integration test, the response proxy copies+the upstream status and body, sets a constant `application/json` content type, and deliberately+does not forward upstream response headers, including `Retry-After` or `Set-Cookie`. Separately,+the public External REST route creates its own bounded retry response and issues its own session+cookie only after a successful reset with a valid session token. Focused invitation and+trusted-source tests verify the public 429/`Retry-After` behavior; they do not assert that the test+proxy forwards those headers.### Won't fix (accepted) — real gap, follow-up backstop PR