Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev' into feat/mcp-server-oauth
Diego Zacariasebee526685c3
diff --cc control-api/src/db.tsindex ae0e7ea50,0c8a8c34f..b172e91c5--- a/control-api/src/db.ts+++ b/control-api/src/db.ts@@@ -5933,20 -5967,25 +5967,43 @@@ export const CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS: Db},},{- version: '0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',- // Renamed twice while rebasing onto dev: 0091 -> 0100 -> 0101 (each dev sync- // collided with a migration dev landed at the same number). Environments where- // the feature branch already deployed recorded it under an earlier name (the- // dev cluster most likely as 0100_...). legacyVersions lets the runner mark- // 0101 applied from that prior row instead of re-running the DDL and leaving an- // orphan schema_migrations entry. Both names are unique to this migration- // (dev's 0100 is 0100_seed_minimax_allowed_model), so there is no false-skip.+ version: '0101_codex_multi_connection',+ apply: applyCodexMultiConnectionSchema,+ },+ {+ version: '0102_codex_catalog_models',+ apply: applyCodexCatalogModelsSchema,+ },+ {+ version: '0103_llm_provider_attempts_connection_id',+ apply: applyLlmProviderAttemptConnectionIdSchema,+ },+ {+ version: '0104_codex_grant_default_model',+ apply: applyCodexGrantDefaultModelSchema,+ },+ {+ version: '0105_codex_reusable_connection_key',+ apply: applyCodexReusableConnectionKeySchema,+ },++ {++ version: '0106_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',++ // Renamed repeatedly while rebasing onto dev: 0091 -> 0100 -> 0101 -> 0106++ // (each dev sync collided with a migration dev landed at the same number; the++ // latest sync brought dev's 0101–0105 codex migrations, so 0101 is now taken++ // by 0101_codex_multi_connection). Environments where the feature branch++ // already deployed recorded it under an earlier name (the dev cluster most++ // likely as 0100_...). legacyVersions lets the runner mark 0106 applied from++ // that prior row instead of re-running the DDL and leaving an orphan++ // schema_migrations entry. Every prior name is unique to this migration, so++ // there is no false-skip.+ legacyVersions: [++ '0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ '0100_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ '0091_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ ],+ apply: applyOAuthGrantsOwnerGeneralization,+ },]async function consolidateWorkflowAllowedUsersToTriggers(db: DbClient): Promise<void> {diff --cc control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.tsindex fe3d6a568,12bfb61b3..c461b401c--- a/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts+++ b/control-api/src/utils/auth/mcpHostJwtToken.ts@@@ -173,11 -173,9 +173,14 @@@ export const ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPE// (status.pluginWorkloadSdk) declares the SDK; SDK routes reject access// tokens without it via scope_denied.'plugin-workload-sdk',+ // OAuth mcp-server broker (U1). Lets mcp-host exchange its control JWT for a+ // per-connection provider access token at POST /api/v1/mcp-oauth/user-token.+ // Provisioners request it only for hosts that front OAuth mcp-servers; the+ // route rejects control tokens lacking it with 403 insufficient_scope.+ 'oauth:user-token',+ // Derive-only Codex execution. HCC/WRC may request this after projecting an+ // eligible broker target. Never add it to user-declarable Host/Recipe CRD fields.+ 'llm:codex:execute',] as constexport type McpHostControlScope = (typeof ALL_MCP_HOST_CONTROL_SCOPES)[number]diff --cc control-api/src/utils/log/redact.tsindex a72746bed,d1d5db37e..c00e374ce--- a/control-api/src/utils/log/redact.ts+++ b/control-api/src/utils/log/redact.ts@@@ -17,8 -19,12 +19,14 @@@ export const TOKEN_LEAK_REDACT_PATHS: r'claimToken','client_secret','clientSecret',+ 'code_verifier',+ 'codeVerifier',+ 'executionTicket',+ 'attemptReceipt',+ 'id_token',+ 'idToken',+ 'pkceVerifier',+ 'refresh_token',]/** Asserted by unit tests so redactions can grow but never shrink. */@@@ -32,6 -40,10 +42,12 @@@ export const REQUIRED_REDACT_PATHS: rea'claimToken','client_secret','clientSecret',+ 'code_verifier',+ 'codeVerifier',+ 'executionTicket',+ 'attemptReceipt',+ 'id_token',+ 'idToken',+ 'pkceVerifier',+ 'refresh_token',]diff --cc control-api/test/db.oauthGrantsOwnerGeneralization.test.tsindex 6639885ee,000000000..936985932mode 100644,000000..100644--- a/control-api/test/db.oauthGrantsOwnerGeneralization.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/db.oauthGrantsOwnerGeneralization.test.ts@@@ -1,80 -1,0 +1,83 @@@+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'++const clientQuery = vi.fn()+const clientRelease = vi.fn()+const mockConnect = vi.fn()+const mockPoolCtor = vi.fn(function MockPool() {+ return { connect: mockConnect, query: vi.fn() }+})++vi.mock('pg', () => ({ Pool: mockPoolCtor }))++describe('0101 oauth_grants owner generalization migration', () => {+ beforeEach(() => {+ vi.resetModules()+ vi.clearAllMocks()+ mockConnect.mockResolvedValue({ query: clientQuery, release: clientRelease })+ clientQuery.mockResolvedValue({ rows: [], rowCount: 0 })+ })++ it('is registered last in the migration array, after 0100_seed_minimax', async () => {+ const { CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS } = await import('../src/db.js')+ const versions = CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS.map(m => m.version)- expect(versions.at(-1)).toBe('0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization')++ expect(versions.at(-1)).toBe('0106_oauth_grants_owner_generalization')+ expect(versions).toContain('0099_gfs_upload_finalizing_recovery')+ expect(versions).toContain('0100_seed_minimax_allowed_model')+ })++ it('carries its prior names as legacyVersions so a deploy that already ran it is not re-executed', async () => {- // Renamed 0091 -> 0100 -> 0101 across dev syncs. Environments that recorded an- // earlier name (the dev cluster) must mark 0101 applied from that row instead- // of re-running the DDL. See applyPendingMigrations' legacyVersions branch.++ // Renamed 0091 -> 0100 -> 0101 -> 0106 across dev syncs (the last sync brought++ // dev's 0101-0105 codex migrations, taking the 0101 slot). Environments that++ // recorded an earlier name (the dev cluster) must mark 0106 applied from that++ // row instead of re-running the DDL. See applyPendingMigrations' legacyVersions++ // branch.+ const { CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS } = await import('../src/db.js')+ const migration = CONTROL_API_MIGRATIONS.find(- m => m.version === '0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization'++ m => m.version === '0106_oauth_grants_owner_generalization'+ )+ expect(migration?.legacyVersions).toEqual([++ '0101_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ '0100_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ '0091_oauth_grants_owner_generalization',+ ])+ })++ it('adds owner_kind/context_id/bootstrapped_by, replaces the kind CHECK to admit shared, and rebuilds uniqueness', async () => {+ const { initDb } = await import('../src/db.js')+ await initDb()+ const sqls = clientQuery.mock.calls.map(([sql]) => String(sql))+ const migration = sqls.find(+ sql => sql.includes('ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS owner_kind') && sql.includes('oauth_grants')+ )+ expect(migration, 'the oauth_grants generalization DDL was applied').toBeDefined()+ const ddl = migration as string++ // New columns (idempotent).+ expect(ddl).toContain("ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS owner_kind TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'recipe'")+ expect(ddl).toContain('ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS context_id TEXT')+ expect(ddl).toContain('ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS bootstrapped_by_user_id TEXT')++ // The kind/user_id CHECK is DROP+re-ADD to admit 'shared' — without this a+ // shared INSERT would violate the old user/service-only CHECK.+ expect(ddl).toContain('DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_grants_kind_userid_check')+ expect(ddl).toContain("grant_kind = 'shared' AND user_id IS NULL")+ expect(ddl).toContain('context_id IS NOT NULL')+ expect(ddl).toContain('bootstrapped_by_user_id IS NOT NULL')++ // oauth_grants_unique recreated as a superset with owner_kind.+ expect(ddl).toContain('DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS oauth_grants_unique')+ expect(ddl).toContain(+ 'UNIQUE (owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, user_id, oauth_client_id)'+ )++ // Shared partial unique index keyed by context_id.+ expect(ddl).toContain('CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS oauth_grants_shared_unique')+ expect(ddl).toContain(+ 'ON oauth_grants (owner_kind, recipe_namespace, recipe_name, context_id, oauth_client_id)'+ )+ expect(ddl).toContain("WHERE grant_kind = 'shared'")++ // Non-destructive: recipe_namespace/recipe_name are NOT renamed.+ expect(ddl).not.toContain('RENAME COLUMN')+ })+})diff --cc deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yamlindex a99a0b531,2c35e4d6f..5b9b634d3--- a/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml+++ b/deploy/base/control-plane/configmaps.yaml@@@ -249,34 -237,28 +252,56 @@@ dataproxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;}+ # U5: mint a fresh authorize-URL for an OAuth mcp-server (reactive+ # consent). rpc-proxy is the sole caller; requireInternalService('rpc-proxy')+ # gates it at control-api.+ location = /api/v1/internal/mcp-oauth/authorize-url {+ limit_except POST {+ deny all;+ }+ proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ }++ location = /api/v1/internal/llm/provider-attempts/redeem {+ limit_except POST {+ deny all;+ }+ proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ }++ # spec 11 U4: revoke an OAuth mcp-server grant (desktop "Disconnect").+ # rpc-proxy is the sole caller; requireInternalService('rpc-proxy') gates+ # it at control-api.+ location = /api/v1/internal/mcp-oauth/grant {+ limit_except DELETE {+ deny all;+ }+ proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ }++ location = /api/v1/internal/llm/provider-attempts/finalize {+ limit_except POST {+ deny all;+ }+ proxy_pass http://control_api_upstream;+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;+ }+location / {return 403;}diff --cc host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.tsindex 3729828f6,f49cf4ad0..7bc6ce9d0--- a/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/hostReconciler.ts@@@ -47,9 -63,9 +63,10 @@@ import { EffectiveHostLifecycle, Suspenimport { ReflectHostOutcomeFn, StatelessLifecycleExecutor } from './statelessLifecycleExecutor'import {CommunicationChannelCRD,+ EffectiveMcpHostControlScope,HostCRD,HostChannelReaderStatus,+ HostRuntimeControlScope,HostRuntimeStatus,HostWorkflowControlScope,HostWorkflowControlSpec,@@@ -1167,23 -1068,23 +1186,31 @@@ export class HostReconcilerprivate static runtimeTokenScopeHash(host: HostCRD,hasChannelIngress = false,- frontsOAuthServer = false++ frontsOAuthServer = false,+ projection?: CodexExecutionProjection): string {// Hash the EFFECTIVE (resolved) scopes — what actually gets minted into the// control token — so change-detection matches the default-fallback applied// at issuance (otherwise a null workflowControl hashes as [] while the token- // carries the first-party defaults, and the two drift).- const workflowScopes = [- ...resolveWorkflowControlScopes(host.spec.workflowControl, { hasChannelIngress }),+ // carries the first-party defaults, and the two drift). Uses the SAME+ // `resolveRuntimeControlScopes` as the mint path (see- // `resolveWorkflowControlScopesForHost`) so the hashed set and the minted- // set — including the derive-only `oauth:user-token` — can never diverge.- return HostReconciler.shortHash(- [- ...resolveRuntimeControlScopes(host.spec.workflowControl, {- hasChannelIngress,- frontsOAuthServer,- }),- ].sort()- )++ // `resolveEffectiveControlScopesForHost`) so the hashed set and the minted++ // set — including the derive-only `oauth:user-token` and the codex++ // projection's derived scopes — can never diverge.++ const runtimeScopes = [++ ...resolveRuntimeControlScopes(host.spec.workflowControl, {++ hasChannelIngress,++ frontsOAuthServer,++ }),+ ].sort()+ const derived = projection?.derivedScopes ?? []+ if (derived.length === 0) {- return HostReconciler.shortHash(workflowScopes)++ return HostReconciler.shortHash(runtimeScopes)+ }+ return HostReconciler.shortHash({- scopes: [...workflowScopes, ...derived].sort(),++ scopes: [...runtimeScopes, ...derived].sort(),+ drift: projection?.driftHashInput,+ })}private static gfsCapabilitySetHash(): string {@@@ -1209,8 -1110,8 +1236,9 @@@nowMs: number,gfsTokenTtlSec: number,hasChannelIngress = false,+ frontsOAuthServer = false,- preservedHostUid?: string+ preservedHostUid?: string,+ projection?: CodexExecutionProjection): Record<string, string> {const refreshTtlSec = Number.isFinite(tokens.refreshExpiresInSeconds)? Math.max(0, tokens.refreshExpiresInSeconds)@@@ -1228,7 -1129,7 +1256,8 @@@[RUNTIME_TOKEN_SCOPE_HASH_ANNOTATION]: HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(host,hasChannelIngress,- frontsOAuthServer++ frontsOAuthServer,+ projection),[RUNTIME_TOKEN_ISSUER_ANNOTATION]: RUNTIME_TOKEN_ISSUER,[RUNTIME_TOKEN_AUDIENCE_ANNOTATION]: RUNTIME_TOKEN_AUDIENCE,@@@ -1259,7 -1160,7 +1288,8 @@@secret: k8s.V1Secret,nowMs: number,hasChannelIngress = false,- frontsOAuthServer = false++ frontsOAuthServer = false,+ projection?: CodexExecutionProjection): { refresh: boolean; rolloutRequired: boolean; reason: string; refreshTokenExpMs?: number } {const labels = secret.metadata?.labels ?? {}if (labels[MANAGED_BY_LABEL] !== MANAGED_BY_VALUE || labels[HOST_LABEL] !== host.name) {@@@ -1277,7 -1178,7 +1307,8 @@@const expectedScopeHash = HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(host,hasChannelIngress,- frontsOAuthServer++ frontsOAuthServer,+ projection)const hasContractMetadata =RUNTIME_TOKEN_HOST_BINDING_HASH_ANNOTATION in annotations ||@@@ -1488,6 -1381,80 +1519,87 @@@return scopes}+ private projectCodexForHost(host: HostCRD): CodexExecutionProjection {+ const connectionKey = assignedHostCodexConnectionRef(host.spec.model?.connectionRef)+ const snapshot = snapshotForAssignedCodexGrant(+ connectionKey,+ this.lastCodexConfigMap,+ this.codexSnapshot+ )+ return projectCodexExecution(host.spec, snapshot)+ }++ private resolveEffectiveControlScopesForHost(+ host: HostCRD,++ frontsOAuthServer: boolean,+ hasChannelIngress = this.hasChannelIngress(host)+ ): EffectiveMcpHostControlScope[] {- const workflow = this.resolveWorkflowControlScopesForHost(host, hasChannelIngress)++ const workflow = this.resolveWorkflowControlScopesForHost(++ host,++ hasChannelIngress,++ frontsOAuthServer++ )+ const derived = this.projectCodexForHost(host).derivedScopes.filter(+ scope => !workflow.includes(scope as HostWorkflowControlScope)+ )+ return [...workflow, ...derived] as EffectiveMcpHostControlScope[]+ }++ private runtimeScopeHashFor(+ host: HostCRD,++ frontsOAuthServer: boolean,+ hasChannelIngress = this.hasChannelIngress(host)+ ): string {+ return HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(+ host,+ hasChannelIngress,++ frontsOAuthServer,+ this.projectCodexForHost(host)+ )+ }++ private async refreshCodexSnapshot(): Promise<void> {+ try {+ const cm = await this.coreApi.readNamespacedConfigMap({+ name: ALLOWED_MODELS_CONFIGMAP_NAME,+ namespace: config.hccTargetNamespace,+ })+ this.lastCodexConfigMap = cm+ this.codexSnapshot = parseAllowedModelsSnapshot(cm)+ } catch (err) {+ const timeout =+ err instanceof HostK8sRequestTimeoutError ||+ (err as { code?: string }).code === HOST_K8S_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_CODE+ if (timeout) {+ this.lastCodexConfigMap = undefined+ this.codexSnapshot = snapshotFromConfigMapError('timeout')+ log.warn('Codex allowlist ConfigMap read timed out; failing closed', {+ configMap: ALLOWED_MODELS_CONFIGMAP_NAME,+ namespace: config.hccTargetNamespace,+ })+ return+ }+ const code = getErrorCode(err)+ if (code === 401 || code === 403) {+ this.lastCodexConfigMap = undefined+ this.codexSnapshot = snapshotFromConfigMapError('forbidden')+ log.warn('Codex allowlist ConfigMap read forbidden; failing closed', {+ configMap: ALLOWED_MODELS_CONFIGMAP_NAME,+ namespace: config.hccTargetNamespace,+ statusCode: code,+ })+ return+ }+ this.lastCodexConfigMap = undefined+ this.codexSnapshot = snapshotFromConfigMapError('missing')+ log.warn('Codex allowlist ConfigMap unavailable; failing closed', {+ configMap: ALLOWED_MODELS_CONFIGMAP_NAME,+ namespace: config.hccTargetNamespace,+ statusCode: code,+ })+ }+ }+private async ensureMcpHostRuntimeTokenSecret(host: HostCRD,options: BootstrapOptions = {}@@@ -1515,15 -1482,8 +1627,18 @@@RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_FRESHconst nowMs = Date.now()const hasChannelIngress = this.hasChannelIngress(host)- // Resolve ONCE per issuance and thread the SAME bool into the mint-scope- // derive, the refresh decision, the scope hash and the stored- // annotation, so the minted token and the drift hash never diverge.++ // Resolve ONCE per issuance and thread the SAME frontsOAuthServer bool and++ // codex projection into the mint-scope derive, the refresh decision, the++ // scope hash and the stored annotation, so the minted token and the drift++ // hash never diverge.+ const frontsOAuthServer = await this.frontsOAuthServer(host)+ const projection = this.projectCodexForHost(host)- const scopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host, hasChannelIngress)+ const scopeHash = HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(+ host,+ hasChannelIngress,- frontsOAuthServer++ frontsOAuthServer,++ projection+ )let decision: {refresh: booleanrolloutRequired: boolean@@@ -1535,7 -1495,7 +1650,8 @@@existing,nowMs,hasChannelIngress,- frontsOAuthServer++ frontsOAuthServer,+ projection): { refresh: true, rolloutRequired: false, reason: 'missing_secret' }if (@@@ -1677,7 -1637,7 +1793,7 @@@const tokens = await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens(host.name,host.uid ?? '',- this.resolveWorkflowControlScopesForHost(host, hasChannelIngress, frontsOAuthServer)- this.resolveEffectiveControlScopesForHost(host, hasChannelIngress)++ this.resolveEffectiveControlScopesForHost(host, frontsOAuthServer, hasChannelIngress))const gfs = await mintHostGfsToken({ name: host.name, namespace: host.namespace })const body = buildMcpHostRuntimeTokenSecret(@@@ -1705,8 -1665,8 +1821,9 @@@nowMs,gfs.expiresInSeconds,hasChannelIngress,+ frontsOAuthServer,- existing?.metadata?.annotations?.[GFS_TOKEN_HOST_UID_ANNOTATION]+ existing?.metadata?.annotations?.[GFS_TOKEN_HOST_UID_ANNOTATION],+ projection),[RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_ANNOTATION]: RUNTIME_TOKEN_BOOTSTRAP_STATE_FRESH,[RUNTIME_TOKEN_ROLLOUT_REQUIRED_ANNOTATION]: rolloutRequired ? 'true' : 'false',@@@ -4263,11 -4314,7 +4471,7 @@@const ensureCurrentRuntimeTokenScope = async (): Promise<void> => {for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {revalidateHostMutationBoundary()- const currentScopeHash = HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(- host,- this.hasChannelIngress(host),- await this.frontsOAuthServer(host)- )- const currentScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host)++ const currentScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host, await this.frontsOAuthServer(host))if (runtimeTokenProvision.scopeHash === currentScopeHash) returnruntimeTokenProvision = await this.provisionRuntimeTokenRevision(host, {@@@ -4276,11 -4323,7 +4480,10 @@@lifecycle.effective.stateless && lifecycle.effective.state === 'suspended',})revalidateHostMutationBoundary()- const postProvisionScopeHash = HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(- const postProvisionScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host)++ const postProvisionScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(+ host,- this.hasChannelIngress(host),+ await this.frontsOAuthServer(host)+ )if (runtimeTokenProvision.scopeHash === postProvisionScopeHash) returnlog.warn('CommunicationChannel scope contract changed during token provisioning', {@@@ -4300,11 -4343,7 +4503,7 @@@await resolveDeploymentLifecycle()await ensureCurrentRuntimeTokenScope()const effective = await resolveDeploymentLifecycle()- const currentScopeHash = HostReconciler.runtimeTokenScopeHash(- host,- this.hasChannelIngress(host),- await this.frontsOAuthServer(host)- )- const currentScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host)++ const currentScopeHash = this.runtimeScopeHashFor(host, await this.frontsOAuthServer(host))if (runtimeTokenProvision.scopeHash === currentScopeHash) {revalidateHostMutationBoundary()return {diff --cc host-context-controller/src/types.tsindex c14322ba8,be518db34..e01d50d7d--- a/host-context-controller/src/types.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/src/types.ts@@@ -424,6 -400,9 +440,14 @@@ export type HostWorkflowControlScope| 'workflow:approval:resolve'| 'workflow:approval:decide'+ export type DerivedPlatformScope = 'llm:codex:execute'-export type EffectiveMcpHostControlScope = HostWorkflowControlScope | DerivedPlatformScope++// The full effective runtime control scope set minted into an mcp-host control++// JWT: the user-declarable workflow-control scopes PLUS every HCC-derived scope++// — `oauth:user-token` (see {@link HostRuntimeControlScope}) and the codex++// `llm:codex:execute` derive. Both derives can co-occur on one Host, so this++// must be their union, not either alone.++export type EffectiveMcpHostControlScope = HostRuntimeControlScope | DerivedPlatformScope+export interface HostWorkflowControlSpec {scopes?: HostWorkflowControlScope[]}diff --cc host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.tsindex ba498c7e0,b5aebd3b3..d50d2daff--- a/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.ts+++ b/host-context-controller/test/mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClient.test.ts@@@ -166,24 -166,22 +166,40 @@@ describe('mcpHostRuntimeTokenIssuerClieexpect(claims.jti).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/)})+ it('serializes the derive-only oauth:user-token scope into the request body', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({+ ok: true,+ json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse(),+ } as Response)+ globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch++ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()+ await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid', ['workflow:read', 'oauth:user-token'])++ const [, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]+ // The scope must survive verbatim into the wire body control-api reads —+ // proving the broker actually receives `oauth:user-token`.+ expect((init as RequestInit).body).toBe(+ '{"includeMcpHostControlToken":true,"host":"chatllm","hostUid":"host-uid","workflowControlScopes":["workflow:read","oauth:user-token"]}'+ )+ })++ it('forwards derived llm:codex:execute in the issuance body', async () => {+ const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({+ ok: true,+ json: async () => canonicalIssueResponse(),+ } as Response)+ globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch++ const issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens = await loadIssuer()+ await issueMcpHostRuntimeTokens('chatllm', 'host-uid', ['workflow:list', 'llm:codex:execute'])++ const [, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]+ expect((init as RequestInit).body).toBe(+ '{"includeMcpHostControlToken":true,"host":"chatllm","hostUid":"host-uid","workflowControlScopes":["workflow:list","llm:codex:execute"]}'+ )+ })+it('rejects a target namespace that differs from the live Host namespace', async () => {vi.resetModules()process.env.HCC_TARGET_NAMESPACE = 'first-party-hosts'diff --cc mcp-host/package-lock.jsonindex e73fa5691,2b5e0d13e..f2fa74fc4--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json@@@ -1,12 -1,12 +1,12 @@@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.301",- "version": "0.1.298",++ "version": "0.1.302","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.301",- "version": "0.1.298",++ "version": "0.1.302","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",diff --cc mcp-host/package.jsonindex d994b340c,aae3c98fc..986372386--- a/mcp-host/package.json+++ b/mcp-host/package.json@@@ -1,6 -1,6 +1,6 @@@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.301",- "version": "0.1.298",++ "version": "0.1.302","description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --cc tests/e2e/package-lock.jsonindex 2d8c350d2,2d8c350d2..ab0892116--- a/tests/e2e/package-lock.json+++ b/tests/e2e/package-lock.json@@@ -1,12 -1,12 +1,12 @@@{"name": "clerum-e2e-tests",-- "version": "0.1.78",++ "version": "0.1.79","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-e2e-tests",-- "version": "0.1.78",++ "version": "0.1.79","devDependencies": {"@types/jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.10","@types/node": "^22.0.0",diff --cc tests/e2e/package.jsonindex 0a723dd34,0a723dd34..c59047da2--- a/tests/e2e/package.json+++ b/tests/e2e/package.json@@@ -1,6 -1,6 +1,6 @@@{"name": "clerum-e2e-tests",-- "version": "0.1.78",++ "version": "0.1.79","private": true,"type": "module","scripts": {