Evenfire is an intelligence layer platform for running LLM agents that take real actions, on your infrastructure
TypeScript
fix(sdk): restore the per-grant output ceiling and close the R4 residuals
Alfredo Lopezec27eef66816
diff --git a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yamlindex 741b54c2f..082826e5f 100644--- a/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml+++ b/charts/clerum-crds/crds/workflowrecipe.yaml@@ -478,13 +478,15 @@ spec:type: integerminimum: 1description: >-- DEPRECATED — accepted for- compatibility but no longer enforced.- The Codex ChatGPT wire discards- max_output_tokens, so no layer capped- the response by token count.- Scheduled for removal in a future- version.+ Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced+ as max_tokens on API-key providers+ (OpenAI, Claude, Z.AI, Bedrock,+ Google). codex-subscription cannot+ bind it: the ChatGPT wire rejects+ max_output_tokens, so there it only+ shapes the authorize request identity+ and the enforced bound is the+ contract limit of 16384.clientNotifications:type: objectrequired: [allowedEventTypes]@@ -1720,11 +1722,13 @@ spec:type: integerminimum: 1description: >-- DEPRECATED — accepted for compatibility but no- longer enforced. The Codex ChatGPT wire discards- max_output_tokens, so no layer capped the response- by token count. Scheduled for removal in a future- version.+ Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as max_tokens+ on API-key providers (OpenAI, Claude, Z.AI,+ Bedrock, Google). codex-subscription cannot bind+ it: the ChatGPT wire rejects max_output_tokens, so+ there it only shapes the authorize request identity+ and the enforced bound is the contract limit of+ 16384.maxRequestsPerRun:type: integerminimum: 1diff --git a/control-api/package-lock.json b/control-api/package-lock.jsonindex 4d43f93f6..50524b19b 100644--- a/control-api/package-lock.json+++ b/control-api/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.541",+ "version": "0.1.542","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.541",+ "version": "0.1.542","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/image-policy": "file:../packages/image-policy",diff --git a/control-api/package.json b/control-api/package.jsonindex 7a1f768c4..20e5a7fea 100644--- a/control-api/package.json+++ b/control-api/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-api",- "version": "0.1.541",+ "version": "0.1.542","description": "Internal Clerum control plane REST API + UI for managing CRDs and secrets","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts b/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.tsindex 833f20cf3..89b149045 100644--- a/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts+++ b/control-api/src/routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk.ts@@ -148,21 +148,22 @@ function parseModelArray(value: unknown, field: string, res: Response): string[]// wire for compatibility and are validated with the same shape rules, but they// are stripped before persistence — only per-minute/platform limits are stored.//-// J8: `maxOutputTokens` joins them. It was advertised as a policy ceiling but-// bound nothing: the Codex ChatGPT wire rejects `max_output_tokens`, so no-// layer ever capped the response by token count. The only real bound is the-// 300s wall clock, and the budget reservation is admission control that denies-// the NEXT call, after the overspend already happened. Persisting the key kept-// a promise the platform could not keep.+// R4-H2: `maxOutputTokens` was briefly moved here on the premise that nothing+// enforced it. That premise held only for codex-subscription, whose ChatGPT+// wire rejects `max_output_tokens` and whose proxy therefore omits it. Every+// API-key provider does send it (`openai.ts`, `bedrockConverse.ts`,+// `googleGenerative.ts`), so for them it was a working per-grant billing+// ceiling. The key is active again, with its real scope stated wherever an+// operator can read it, rather than a ceiling silently ignored everywhere.const DEPRECATED_QUOTA_LIMIT_KEYS: ReadonlyArray<keyof PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits> = ['maxRequestsPerRun','maxNotificationsPerRun',- 'maxOutputTokens',]const ACTIVE_QUOTA_LIMIT_KEYS: ReadonlyArray<keyof PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits> = ['maxInvocationsPerMinute','maxNotificationsPerMinute',+ 'maxOutputTokens',]function parseQuotaLimits(value: unknown, res: Response): PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits | null {diff --git a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.tsindex be07334b5..3ed47a978 100644--- a/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts+++ b/control-api/src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.ts@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ export interface AuthorizePromptBridgeParams {}export interface AuthorizedPromptBridge {+ /**+ * Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers;+ * codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded by+ * the contract's structural LIMITS.maxOutputTokens instead (R4-H2).+ */+ maxOutputTokens: number | nullinvocationId: string/** True when this idempotency key already produced an invocation. */replay: boolean@@ -397,6 +403,7 @@ async function authorizePromptBridgeInner(attemptGeneration: recorded.invocation.attemptGeneration,policyRevision: grant.policyRevision,policyHash: resolvedPolicyHash,+ maxOutputTokens: grant.quotaLimits.maxOutputTokens ?? null,},}}@@ -494,6 +501,7 @@ async function authorizePromptBridgeInner(attemptGeneration: recorded.invocation.attemptGeneration,policyRevision: grant.policyRevision,policyHash: resolvedPolicyHash,+ maxOutputTokens: grant.quotaLimits.maxOutputTokens ?? null,},}}diff --git a/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts b/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.tsindex 0a182f459..087604d12 100644--- a/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/routes.adminPluginWorkloadSdk.test.ts@@ -536,9 +536,10 @@ describe('routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk — grants', () => {// (malformed still 400s, pinned above) but are dropped on write, while the// active per-minute keys persist untouched.//- // J8: maxOutputTokens joins the stripped set. It was persisted and- // advertised as a policy ceiling, but the Codex ChatGPT wire discards- // max_output_tokens, so nothing ever capped the response by token count.+ // R4-H2: maxOutputTokens is NOT stripped. It briefly was, on the premise+ // that nothing enforced it — true only for codex-subscription. Every+ // API-key provider sends max_tokens, so for them it is a live per-grant+ // billing ceiling and it must reach the grant.vi.mocked(sdkDb.upsertGrant).mockResolvedValue({ id: 'g1' } as never)const res = await request(buildApp()).post('/admin/plugin-workload-sdk/grants')@@ -554,16 +555,16 @@ describe('routes/admin/pluginWorkloadSdk — grants', () => {expect(res.status).toBe(200)expect(sdkDb.upsertGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({- quotaLimits: { maxInvocationsPerMinute: 30 },+ quotaLimits: { maxInvocationsPerMinute: 30, maxOutputTokens: 4096 },}),'11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',expect.anything() // carrier transaction client (R1-H3 fase 2))})- it('still shape-validates the deprecated maxOutputTokens on the wire (J8)', async () => {- // Deprecating the key must not loosen the boundary: a malformed value is- // still a 400, exactly as it was while the key was persisted.+ it('rejects a malformed maxOutputTokens on the wire', async () => {+ // A ceiling of 0 would clamp every response to nothing; it is a 400, not a+ // silently ignored value.const res = await request(buildApp()).post('/admin/plugin-workload-sdk/grants').send({ ...validGrantBody, quotaLimits: { maxOutputTokens: 0 } })diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.tsindex 0b314e973..e6b6997ed 100644--- a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkAuthorizer.test.ts@@ -602,9 +602,11 @@ describe('authorizePromptBridge', () => {value: { invocationId: 'inv-1', replay: false },})if (!result.ok) throw new Error('expected the authorization to succeed')- // J8: a legacy grant may still carry maxOutputTokens, but the authorization- // must not re-advertise it as a policy ceiling — nothing enforced it.- expect(result.value).not.toHaveProperty('maxOutputTokens')+ // R4-H2: the grant's output ceiling travels on the authorization again.+ // J8 removed it on the premise that nothing enforced it, which held only+ // for codex-subscription; every API-key provider sends it as `max_tokens`,+ // so for them it was a working per-grant billing control.+ expect(result.value.maxOutputTokens).toBe(2048)expect(sdkDb.insertInvocation).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()// Issue #348: the per-run leg is inert — no period quota is consumed even// though the grant still carries a legacy maxRequestsPerRun value.diff --git a/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..3a997b713--- /dev/null+++ b/control-api/test/services.pluginWorkloadSdkSpend.properties.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'+import fc from 'fast-check'+import { deriveEffectiveSpend } from '../src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkFinalization.js'+import { isOauthBrokerProvider } from '../src/services/pluginWorkloadSdkSpendLedger.js'++/**+ * R4-M2. `deriveEffectiveSpend` is a pure `(floor, linkedCodex) -> spend` merge+ * with precedence rules, and it was covered only by hand-enumerated cases.+ * R4-H1 and R4-M1 were both sibling cases that enumeration missed — the shape+ * of that miss is what these properties close: they quantify over the whole+ * input space instead of the examples someone thought of.+ */++const OUTCOMES = ['exact', 'unknown', 'not_executed'] as const+const PROVIDERS = ['codex-subscription', 'openai', 'zai'] as const+const LINKED_OUTCOMES = ['success', 'error', 'canceled', 'unknown'] as const++/** A persisted floor row that always satisfies the table's token_pair_check. */+const persistedArb = fc+ .record({+ provider: fc.constantFrom(...PROVIDERS),+ outcome: fc.constantFrom(...OUTCOMES),+ tokens: fc.tuple(fc.nat({ max: 100_000 }), fc.nat({ max: 100_000 })),+ })+ .map(({ provider, outcome, tokens }) => ({+ provider,+ outcome,+ input_tokens: outcome === 'exact' ? tokens[0] : null,+ output_tokens: outcome === 'exact' ? tokens[1] : null,+ }))++const linkedArb = fc.option(+ fc.record({+ outcome: fc.constantFrom(...LINKED_OUTCOMES),+ usageInputTokens: fc.option(fc.nat({ max: 100_000 }), { nil: null }),+ usageOutputTokens: fc.option(fc.nat({ max: 100_000 }), { nil: null }),+ }),+ { nil: null }+)++/** Round-trip a derived spend back into the row shape it would be read from. */+function asRow(provider: string, spend: ReturnType<typeof deriveEffectiveSpend>) {+ return {+ provider,+ outcome: spend.outcome,+ input_tokens: spend.inputTokens,+ output_tokens: spend.outputTokens,+ }+}++describe('deriveEffectiveSpend properties', () => {+ it('is terminal for exact and not_executed floors', () => {+ fc.assert(+ fc.property(persistedArb, linkedArb, (persisted, linked) => {+ fc.pre(persisted.outcome !== 'unknown')+ const derived = deriveEffectiveSpend(persisted, linked)+ expect(derived.outcome).toBe(persisted.outcome)+ if (persisted.outcome === 'exact') {+ expect(derived.inputTokens).toBe(persisted.input_tokens)+ expect(derived.outputTokens).toBe(persisted.output_tokens)+ }+ })+ )+ })++ it('only ever lifts unknown, and only to exact backed by a complete token pair', () => {+ fc.assert(+ fc.property(persistedArb, linkedArb, (persisted, linked) => {+ fc.pre(persisted.outcome === 'unknown')+ const derived = deriveEffectiveSpend(persisted, linked)+ expect(['unknown', 'exact']).toContain(derived.outcome)++ const liftable =+ isOauthBrokerProvider(persisted.provider) &&+ linked?.outcome === 'success' &&+ Number.isInteger(linked.usageInputTokens) &&+ Number.isInteger(linked.usageOutputTokens)+ expect(derived.outcome === 'exact').toBe(Boolean(liftable))+ })+ )+ })++ it('never derives anything for a non-oauth-broker provider', () => {+ fc.assert(+ fc.property(persistedArb, linkedArb, (persisted, linked) => {+ fc.pre(!isOauthBrokerProvider(persisted.provider))+ expect(deriveEffectiveSpend(persisted, linked).outcome).toBe(persisted.outcome)+ })+ )+ })++ it('is idempotent: deriving from an already-derived row changes nothing', () => {+ fc.assert(+ fc.property(persistedArb, linkedArb, (persisted, linked) => {+ const once = deriveEffectiveSpend(persisted, linked)+ const twice = deriveEffectiveSpend(asRow(persisted.provider, once), linked)+ expect(twice).toEqual(once)+ })+ )+ })++ it('never fabricates a partial token pair', () => {+ fc.assert(+ fc.property(persistedArb, linkedArb, (persisted, linked) => {+ const { outcome, inputTokens, outputTokens } = deriveEffectiveSpend(persisted, linked)+ expect(outcome === 'exact').toBe(inputTokens !== null)+ expect(inputTokens === null).toBe(outputTokens === null)+ })+ )+ })+})diff --git a/control-ui/lib/api.ts b/control-ui/lib/api.tsindex 7b26a6c74..acb6bc7d2 100644--- a/control-ui/lib/api.ts+++ b/control-ui/lib/api.ts@@ -3722,13 +3722,12 @@ export type PluginWorkloadSdkGrantInput = {allowedTargetRefs?: string[]allowedUserRefs?: string[]allowedCallers?: string[]- // Input type omits the deprecated keys (per-run: issue #348; maxOutputTokens:- // J8): this UI never sends them and the server strips them on write. The- // response PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits still carries them for legacy grants.- quotaLimits?: Omit<- PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits,- 'maxRequestsPerRun' | 'maxNotificationsPerRun' | 'maxOutputTokens'- >+ // Input type omits the deprecated per-run keys (issue #348): this UI never+ // sends them and the server strips them on write. The response+ // PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits still carries them for legacy grants.+ // `maxOutputTokens` is NOT among them (R4-H2) — it is a live per-grant+ // ceiling on API-key providers.+ quotaLimits?: Omit<PluginWorkloadSdkQuotaLimits, 'maxRequestsPerRun' | 'maxNotificationsPerRun'>modelPolicies?: Record<string, PluginWorkloadSdkModelPolicy>promptTargets?: PluginWorkloadSdkPromptTarget[]defaultTargetRef?: stringdiff --git a/control-ui/package-lock.json b/control-ui/package-lock.jsonindex d93864f72..28b0f3e26 100644--- a/control-ui/package-lock.json+++ b/control-ui/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.488",+ "version": "0.1.489","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.488",+ "version": "0.1.489","dependencies": {"@clerum/display-field": "file:../packages/display-field","@clerum/llm-providers": "file:../packages/llm-providers",diff --git a/control-ui/package.json b/control-ui/package.jsonindex 58d7b4e32..b8bc71069 100644--- a/control-ui/package.json+++ b/control-ui/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-control-ui",- "version": "0.1.488",+ "version": "0.1.489","private": true,"scripts": {"dev": "NEXT_IGNORE_INCORRECT_LOCKFILE=1 next dev",diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.tsindex 8eed48c30..539f699bf 100644--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-codex-fallback.spec.ts@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {embeddedText,findSandboxUiContents,latestSdkInvocationStatus,+ profilesNow,promptBridgeAttemptsForRun,promptBridgeGrantTargets,readPluginWorkloadSdkStatus,@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ test('Desktop Apps falls back to the authorized non-Codex target when Codex is uawait expectProxyStopped()})- const runStartedAt = new Date().toISOString()+ const runStartedAt = profilesNow()const before = sdkInvocationCount(fixture, 'promptBridge')await typeEmbedded(app,diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-no-grant-guard.spec.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-no-grant-guard.spec.tsindex ef1a68bb0..27f4f6bf0 100644--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-no-grant-guard.spec.ts+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-no-grant-guard.spec.ts@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {embeddedText,findSandboxUiContents,latestSdkInvocationStatus,+ profilesNow,promptBridgeLedgerForRun,readPluginWorkloadSdkStatus,sandboxUiViewUrlPrefix,@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ test('Desktop Apps refuses a Codex prompt when the execution binding is missing'}).toContain(sandboxUiViewUrlPrefix(fixture))const webContentsId = embedded!.id- const runStartedAt = new Date().toISOString()+ const runStartedAt = profilesNow()const before = sdkInvocationCount(fixture, 'promptBridge')await typeEmbedded(app, webContentsId, '#prompt', 'This prompt must not dispatch Codex.')await activateEmbedded(app, webContentsId, '#run')diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-sandbox-ui.spec.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-sandbox-ui.spec.tsindex fb740c5d1..aa1dc4acb 100644--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-sandbox-ui.spec.ts+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/plugin-workload-sdk-sandbox-ui.spec.ts@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import {findSandboxUiContents,latestSdkInvocationStatus,notificationDeliverySignal,+ profilesNow,promptBridgeLedgerForRun,readPluginWorkloadSdkStatus,requireExpectedSdkProvider,@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ test('Desktop Apps executes promptBridge and clientNotifications inside the real}const marker = `desktop-sdk-${Date.now()}`- const runStartedAt = new Date().toISOString()+ const runStartedAt = profilesNow()await test.step('reject an empty prompt without creating an invocation', async () => {const before = sdkInvocationCount(fixture, 'promptBridge')diff --git a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.tsindex 14587e744..0e87cad0d 100644--- a/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts+++ b/desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/pluginWorkloadSdkSandboxUi.ts@@ -572,6 +572,18 @@ export function promptBridgeLedgerForRun(}}+/**+ * The run anchor, read from PostgreSQL rather than the runner.+ *+ * R2-L4: the ledger queries filter on `inv.created_at >= startedAt`, and+ * `created_at` is written by the database. Anchoring with the runner's clock+ * compares two unsynchronised clocks, so a few seconds of skew either drops+ * the run's own rows or picks up an earlier one. Same clock, both sides.+ */+export function profilesNow(): string {+ return profilesSql('SELECT now()::text').trim()+}+export type PromptBridgeAttemptRow = {attemptIndex: numbertargetRef: stringdiff --git a/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md b/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.mdindex 1698a18a8..d5aefdfcf 100644--- a/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md+++ b/docs/crds/workflowrecipe.md@@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ Declaring this block forces an always-on `mcp-host`. Runtime enforcement is addi| Field | Type | Required | Description || -------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- || `promptBridge.allowedModels` | string[] | No | Max 32. |-| `promptBridge.maxOutputTokens` | integer | No | Min 1. **Deprecated:** accepted but ignored; the Codex ChatGPT wire discards `max_output_tokens`, so nothing capped the response by token count. Removal planned. |+| `promptBridge.maxOutputTokens` | integer | No | Min 1. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers (OpenAI, Claude, Z.AI, Bedrock, Google). `codex-subscription` cannot bind it: the ChatGPT wire rejects `max_output_tokens`, so there the ceiling only shapes the authorize request identity and the enforced bound is the contract limit of 16384. || `promptBridge.maxRequestsPerRun` | integer | No | Min 1. **Deprecated:** accepted but ignored; platform per-minute rate limits apply. Removal planned. || `promptBridge.maxConcurrentInvocations` | integer | No | Min 1. Runtime default 5. || `promptBridge.maxInvocationsPerMinute` | integer | No | Min 1. Platform default 120 when unset (ENV `CONTROL_API_PLUGIN_SDK_PROMPTBRIDGE_PER_MIN`, issue #348). |diff --git a/mcp-host/package-lock.json b/mcp-host/package-lock.jsonindex 152eba93b..987c638ff 100644--- a/mcp-host/package-lock.json+++ b/mcp-host/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.315",+ "version": "0.1.316","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.315",+ "version": "0.1.316","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.32.0",diff --git a/mcp-host/package.json b/mcp-host/package.jsonindex f3b8b5f24..cf34181ce 100644--- a/mcp-host/package.json+++ b/mcp-host/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "clerum-mcp-host",- "version": "0.1.315",+ "version": "0.1.316","description": "MCP Host - reads Host CRD and provides LLM access via OpenAI/Claude","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.tsindex 0c50bc889..227b0e507 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.test.ts@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ function authorization(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {attemptGeneration: 1,policyRevision: 7,policyHash: 'a'.repeat(64),+ maxOutputTokens: null,...overrides,}}@@ -206,18 +207,44 @@ describe('PromptBridgeHandler', () => {)})- it('forwards the workload maxTokens verbatim and applies no grant cap (J8)', async () => {+ // R4-H2. J8 dropped the clamp on the premise that nothing enforced the+ // ceiling. That held only for codex-subscription, whose ChatGPT wire rejects+ // `max_output_tokens`; every API-key provider does send it, so for them the+ // per-grant cap was a working billing control that the removal silenced.+ it('clamps the workload maxTokens down to the grant ceiling', async () => {+ const authorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(authorization({ maxOutputTokens: 4096 }))+ const { handler, complete } = makeDeps({ authorize })+ await handler.handle({ ...validBody, maxTokens: 9000 }, 'api')+ expect(complete).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ maxTokens: 4096 }))+ })++ it('applies the grant ceiling when the workload names no maxTokens', async () => {+ const authorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(authorization({ maxOutputTokens: 4096 }))+ const { handler, complete } = makeDeps({ authorize })+ await handler.handle(validBody, 'api')+ expect(complete).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ maxTokens: 4096 }))+ })++ it('passes the workload maxTokens through when the grant sets no ceiling', async () => {const { handler, complete } = makeDeps()await handler.handle({ ...validBody, maxTokens: 9000 }, 'api')expect(complete).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ maxTokens: 9000 }))})- it('sends no maxTokens when the workload asks for none (J8)', async () => {+ it('sends no maxTokens when neither the workload nor the grant names one', async () => {const { handler, complete } = makeDeps()await handler.handle(validBody, 'api')expect(complete.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toMatchObject({ maxTokens: undefined })})+ it.each([0, -1, 1.5])('rejects a non-positive-integer maxTokens (%s)', async maxTokens => {+ const { handler, complete } = makeDeps()+ await expect(handler.handle({ ...validBody, maxTokens }, 'api')).rejects.toMatchObject({+ code: 'invalid_request',+ })+ expect(complete).not.toHaveBeenCalled()+ })+it('preserves metering when the logical terminal acknowledgement is unavailable', async () => {const report = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('control-api unavailable'))const onUsage = vi.fn()diff --git a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.tsindex 7e8108dc6..85913afe8 100644--- a/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts+++ b/mcp-host/src/pluginWorkloadSdk/promptBridge/handler.ts@@ -245,8 +245,13 @@ export function validatePromptBridgeRequest(raw: unknown): PromptBridgeRequest {if (body.modelPolicyRef !== undefined && typeof body.modelPolicyRef !== 'string') {throw new PluginWorkloadError('invalid_request', 'modelPolicyRef must be a string')}- if (body.maxTokens !== undefined && typeof body.maxTokens !== 'number') {- throw new PluginWorkloadError('invalid_request', 'maxTokens must be a number')+ if (+ body.maxTokens !== undefined &&+ (typeof body.maxTokens !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(body.maxTokens) || body.maxTokens < 1)+ ) {+ // R4-H2: `typeof number` alone let 0, -1 and 1.5 through to the provider+ // and made the grant clamp's Math.min ill-defined.+ throw new PluginWorkloadError('invalid_request', 'maxTokens must be a positive integer')}if (body.temperature !== undefined && typeof body.temperature !== 'number') {throw new PluginWorkloadError('invalid_request', 'temperature must be a number')@@ -429,12 +434,13 @@ export class PromptBridgeHandler {acknowledgementMode: this.deps.finalizePromptBridge? 'atomic_terminal_finalization': 'per_attempt',- // J8: the workload's own maxTokens is the only value on this seam. The- // grant no longer advertises an output cap, because nothing enforced it:- // Codex ChatGPT `/codex/responses` rejects max_output_tokens and the- // proxy omits it, so the clamp bounded only the hashed request shape- // while the real call ran uncapped.- maxTokens: request.maxTokens,+ // R4-H2: the per-grant ceiling is enforced here, before the request+ // reaches any provider. On API-key providers it lands as `max_tokens`+ // on the wire; on codex-subscription it bounds the hashed request+ // identity while the proxy omits it from the ChatGPT wire, which also+ // keeps a capped grant eligible for failover instead of failing the+ // contract's 16384 range check outright.+ maxTokens: clampMaxTokens(request.maxTokens, authorized.maxOutputTokens),temperature: request.temperature ?? authorized.modelPolicy?.temperature,timeoutMs: this.deps.promptTimeoutMs,recipeNamespace: this.deps.recipeNamespace,@@ -654,3 +660,27 @@ function unexpectedAuthorizationResponse(): PluginWorkloadError {false)}++/**+ * Bound a workload's requested output against the grant's ceiling.+ *+ * Scope, stated honestly (R4-H2): on API-key providers this is the real cap —+ * `max_tokens` reaches the provider. On codex-subscription the ChatGPT wire+ * rejects `max_output_tokens` and the proxy omits it, so there the clamp bounds+ * the hashed request identity rather than the response, and the enforced bound+ * is the contract's structural `LIMITS.maxOutputTokens`. It still matters+ * there: an unclamped request above that limit fails the contract range check+ * as a non-retryable error, which is terminal with no failover.+ *+ * A grant with no ceiling passes the request through; a workload that names no+ * maxTokens inherits the ceiling. Both inputs are validated upstream, so the+ * `Math.min` is over two positive integers.+ */+function clampMaxTokens(+ requested: number | undefined,+ grantCap: number | null+): number | undefined {+ if (grantCap === null) return requested+ if (requested === undefined) return grantCap+ return Math.min(requested, grantCap)+}diff --git a/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json b/workflow-recipes/package-lock.jsonindex 5dba5dd9f..73b6c46b0 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json+++ b/workflow-recipes/package-lock.json@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@{"name": "workload-recipes-controller",- "version": "0.1.333",+ "version": "0.1.334","lockfileVersion": 3,"requires": true,"packages": {"": {"name": "workload-recipes-controller",- "version": "0.1.333",+ "version": "0.1.334","license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE","dependencies": {"@aws-sdk/client-s3": "^3.1009.0",diff --git a/workflow-recipes/package.json b/workflow-recipes/package.jsonindex 2726ba936..19ae9f239 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/package.json+++ b/workflow-recipes/package.json@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@{"name": "workload-recipes-controller",- "version": "0.1.333",+ "version": "0.1.334","description": "Workload Recipes Controller (WRC) - WorkloadRecipe lifecycle management and MCP server interface","main": "dist/main.js","engines": {diff --git a/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts b/workflow-recipes/src/types.tsindex 66dd006ce..b03be713b 100644--- a/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts+++ b/workflow-recipes/src/types.ts@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ export interface OAuthClientDef {export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSpec {promptBridge?: {allowedModels?: string[]- /** @deprecated Accepted for compatibility; no longer enforced (J8). The Codex ChatGPT wire discards max_output_tokens, so no layer capped the response by token count. */+ /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead (R4-H2). */maxOutputTokens?: number/** @deprecated Accepted for compatibility; no longer enforced (issue #348). Platform per-minute rate limits apply. */maxRequestsPerRun?: number@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSpec {export interface PluginWorkloadSdkSnippetConfig {promptBridge?: {allowedModels?: string[]- /** @deprecated Accepted for compatibility; no longer enforced (J8). The Codex ChatGPT wire discards max_output_tokens, so no layer capped the response by token count. */+ /** Per-grant output ceiling. Enforced as `max_tokens` on API-key providers; codex-subscription cannot bind it on the ChatGPT wire and is bounded there by the contract limit of 16384 instead (R4-H2). */maxOutputTokens?: number}clientNotifications?: {