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chore(gfs): keep internal rollout artifacts out of public PR

Alfredo Lopezf92d8e730c72
diff --git a/docs/architecture/gfs-upload-v2.md b/docs/architecture/gfs-upload-v2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a9fbd2aea..000000000
--- a/docs/architecture/gfs-upload-v2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,235 +0,0 @@
-# GFS Upload v2 architecture
-
-Status: contract for the additive 200 MiB rollout. v2 remains disabled until
-the T0–T3 gates in [the testing contract](../testing/gfs-upload-v2.md) pass.
-
-## Decision
-
-The packaged Desktop app and Control UI use a custom indexed resumable upload
-protocol. A small metadata request creates a server-owned session; each binary
-part is sent in its own authenticated request; the GFS writer stages parts on
-the existing PVC and streams them in order into the immutable blob writer at
-finalization.
-
-This is deliberately not a one-request 200 MiB upload and is not a claim of
-tus 1.0 compatibility. It does not raise the legacy JSON/base64 body limit.
-
-| Contract | Frozen value |
-| --------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: |
-| Product maximum | `209715200` bytes (200 MiB binary) |
-| Oversize boundary | `209715201` is rejected before session/payload allocation |
-| Preferred part | `8388608` bytes (8 MiB) |
-| Hard part/request maximum | `16777216` bytes (16 MiB) |
-| Default session concurrency | 4 parts |
-| Instability fallback | 2 parts after the advertised threshold (default 3) of consecutive retryable failures/timeouts |
-| Legacy raw-file limit | `16777216` bytes (16 MiB), unchanged during rollout |
-| Legacy GFSC body cap | `25165824` bytes (24 MiB), unchanged during rollout |
-| Protocol arithmetic ceiling | `1073741824` bytes (1 GiB); not an enabled product value |
-
-Cloudflare evaluates the body of each HTTP request. The aggregate file limit
-is therefore independent of the request limit: every v2 data-bearing request
-is at most 16 MiB, and the verified zone setting can force a lower negotiated
-`maxChunkBytes`. No client may send a single 100 MB or 200 MiB body.
-
-The capability response owns the instability threshold. It is an integer from
-1 through 100; omitted legacy responses mean `3`. Both clients use the
-advertised value when deciding when to reduce concurrency and reject a malformed
-value rather than guessing. The retryable HTTP status allowlist is deliberately
-finite and identical in Desktop and Control UI: `408`, `425`, `429`, `500`,
-`502`, `503`, and `504`. `507 Insufficient Storage` and every other `5xx` are
-terminal until an explicit server-side recovery/retry is requested. A server
-may return `Retry-After`; clients honor it within their bounded retry budget.
-For binary part writes only, a transport failure or `502/503/504` receives a
-separate six-attempt service-recovery budget; ordinary lifecycle requests and
-other retryable statuses retain the three-attempt budget. This covers a bounded
-writer deployment restart without replaying a part blindly: each ambiguous
-attempt still reconciles the durable status and checksum first.
-The branch-owned Playwright gate can enable the negative journeys by setting
-`GFS_UPLOAD_V2_NEGATIVE_E2E=1`; they remain opt-in because they mutate HCC,
-restart the writer, and revoke only the seeded grant. The gate still requires
-an explicit non-production context and profile-owned random URLs.
-
-## Edge admission limits
-
-Upload-v2 has a transport-abuse admission layer before Control API forwards a
-body to GFSC. These budgets do not change the 200 MiB product/file limit, the
-8 MiB preferred part, the 16 MiB hard part limit, or GFSC's upload-session
-authority.
-
-| Admission budget | Default | Authority |
-| ------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------: | ------------------------------------------- |
-| Public edge coarse requests | 120/minute per user + source-IP key | external-rest-api process-local fast reject |
-| Requests per authenticated principal | 120/minute | Control API PostgreSQL fixed-window bucket |
-| Requests per source IP | 600/minute | Control API PostgreSQL fixed-window bucket |
-| Declared part bytes per principal | 512 MiB/minute | Control API PostgreSQL weighted bucket |
-| Declared part bytes per source IP | 2048 MiB/minute | Control API PostgreSQL weighted bucket |
-| Active relay requests per principal | 8 | Control API PostgreSQL advisory-lock slots |
-| Active relay requests per source IP | 16 | Control API PostgreSQL advisory-lock slots |
-| Active relay requests globally | 32 | Control API PostgreSQL advisory-lock slots |
-| Part request maximum | 16777216 bytes | Both relays, then GFSC |
-| GFSC part streams | 4/session, 16/global | GFSC session/stream authority |
-
-Byte budgets are charged in fixed 1 MiB units, rounded up from the declared
-`Content-Length`. A part requires matching decimal `Content-Length` and
-`Upload-Chunk-Length` headers. Control API counts observed bytes while piping
-the stream and rejects short, long, or over-limit bodies without buffering the
-whole part. The authoritative PostgreSQL admission fails closed if its backend
-is unavailable. A denied budget returns stable
-`429 { error: "gfs_upload_rate_limited", limit, retryAfterSeconds }` plus
-`Retry-After`; both relays preserve that contract.
-
-The source-IP bucket is trusted only across the authenticated
-`external-rest-api` service boundary. Control API ignores a client-supplied
-`x-gfs-upload-source-ip` from any other caller and falls back to the socket or
-trusted proxy address, so a valid internal token cannot rotate the IP key to
-evade the per-IP budget.
-
-## End-to-end shape
-
-The PR-level architecture complement is available as an editable source plus
-SVG/PNG exports. It separates the client, edge/authority, writer/persistence,
-storage, and recovery paths so the Cloudflare per-request boundary and the
-`outcome_unknown` reconciliation rule are visible without implying a single
-200 MiB request:
-
-![GFS Upload v2 PR #311 architecture](diagrams/gfs-upload-v2-pr311.png)
-
-- [Editable diagram source](diagrams/gfs-upload-v2-pr311.json)
-- [SVG export](diagrams/gfs-upload-v2-pr311.svg)
-- [PNG export](diagrams/gfs-upload-v2-pr311.png)
-
-```text
-Control UI / Desktop
- -> authenticated capabilities + small JSON session create
- -> indexed binary PUT parts (4 in flight, then 2 on instability)
- -> UI/HTTP relays with backpressure and no whole-file buffering
- -> gfsc writer
- -> staged part files on <GFS root>/.uploads/<server-upload-uuid>/parts
- -> ordered stream into immutable blob writer
- -> resource + manifest + audit + completed receipt transaction
-```
-
-The browser renderer never receives a GFSC bearer token. Desktop main reads
-one bounded part per request; file paths and metadata cross the preload bridge,
-not a whole-file IPC value. Legacy agent/host JSON callers remain separate.
-
-## Protocol surface
-
-The public relays expose the same contract to the authenticated user:
-
-- `GET /v1/capabilities` (`Cache-Control: no-store`);
-- `POST /v1/uploads` with at most 64 KiB JSON metadata;
-- `HEAD /v1/uploads/:uploadId` for the contiguous prefix;
-- `GET /v1/uploads/:uploadId/status` for a bounded committed-part map,
- including part number, offset, length, and SHA-256;
-- `PUT /v1/uploads/:uploadId/parts/:partNumber` with raw
- `application/offset+octet-stream` bytes;
-- `POST /v1/uploads/:uploadId/pause` and `/resume`;
-- `POST /v1/uploads/:uploadId/complete` with an empty or at most 16 KiB body;
-- `DELETE /v1/uploads/:uploadId` as terminal cancel.
-
-The writer selects one deterministic `partBytes` for a session. Part number,
-offset, and length are derived from that geometry; parallel PUTs are
-independently idempotent. A committed repeat with the same length and checksum
-is successful without rewriting; a conflicting repeat is a stable conflict.
-The database has unique `(upload_id, part_number)` and `(upload_id,
-offset_bytes)` keys, so a scalar append offset can never masquerade as a
-parallel protocol.
-
-### Session state
-
-`initiated → uploading ↔ paused → finalizing → completed` is the successful
-path. `aborted`, `expired`, and `failed` are terminal. Pause drains reserved
-parts before becoming `paused`; cancel advances `session_epoch`, aborts in-flight
-streams, releases the reservation, and removes staging. Cancel is not resume.
-
-`complete` first locks the session row and changes it to `finalizing`. DELETE
-observing that state returns `409 upload_finalizing`; it does not report a
-false cancellation. The publication transaction re-checks state and epoch
-before writing the resource, so a canceled response can never accompany a
-published resource.
-
-Client progress is monotonic for stale `uploading` snapshots that arrive out
-of order. A failed part retry is different: its in-flight contribution is
-removed so the next aggregate may move downward to the truthful committed
-plus in-flight value. Completion is the only state that may expose the exact
-file size; the browser and Desktop tests cover both the stale-snapshot guard
-and this failure correction.
-
-## Persistence and safety
-
-Desktop upload persistence is a version-2 envelope. Every resumable record is
-bound to `ownerId`, team/tenant id, normalized environment key, normalized API
-base URL, canonical drive, and local `authEpoch`; it stores no bearer or
-session token. Pre-v2 unscoped arrays are quarantined as `legacy_unscoped` and
-are never listed or resumed. Invalid/unsupported records are inert. A logout,
-deliberate team switch, or runtime/API-base switch blocks new dispatch, advances
-the epoch, aborts and awaits active v2 and legacy fallback work, clears
-credentials, and persists the old records as local `suspended_auth`. A finite
-internal team-context hop temporarily blocks only new GFS dispatches while it
-borrows the other team's token; read-only listing/snapshot and controls for an
-existing job remain available, existing uploads keep their captured token and
-scope, and the original team scope is restored before the gate opens. A
-deliberate switch fences the old uploads after the replacement session
-succeeds; if that local fence cannot be persisted, the app fails closed by
-clearing the replacement session and credentials rather than leaving an
-ambiguous team/token pairing. Resume is user-explicit and succeeds only when
-owner, team, environment, base URL, and drive match exactly; the new auth epoch
-is bound only after the server session is revalidated.
-
-The legacy compatibility fallback still accepts at most 16 MiB. It opens one
-descriptor with no-follow semantics where available, validates the descriptor
-with `fstat`, rejects symlinks/path swaps, reads that same descriptor with a
-bounded loop, and rechecks its identity/size before encoding. It never performs
-a pathname `stat` followed by a separate pathname `readFile`.
-
-`gfs_upload_sessions` stores owner, operation/target, an immutable request
-fingerprint, expected bytes, selected geometry, checksum, counters, state,
-epochs, expiry, and the completion receipt. `gfs_upload_parts` stores only
-part metadata, checksum, lease state, and a server-generated staging path; it
-never stores the chunk bytes in Postgres. The writer role alone may mutate both
-tables. `control_api_runtime`, `gfs_controller_reader`, and `PUBLIC` have no
-table privileges on either relation: Control API is a streaming/auth relay,
-not a second upload-session store client. Even `HEAD` is routed to the writer.
-
-Before accepting a part the writer re-authorizes the current principal,
-reserves the indexed part and a global/session stream slot, and validates the
-declared and observed lengths. The stream is checksumed incrementally into a
-server-generated path, fsynced, atomically renamed, then committed with the
-matching `session_epoch` and `lease_epoch`. Disconnect, timeout, checksum, or
-process failure removes only the uncommitted file and releases its lease.
-
-Create idempotency compares owner, drive, operation, normalized target/name,
-size, `ifMatch`, whole-file digest, and geometry. Reusing a key with any
-different fingerprint returns `409 idempotency_conflict` without exposing the
-old session. Finalization verifies complete ordered coverage, current auth and
-replace preconditions, streams the staged parts, verifies byte count/digest,
-and commits resource, manifest, audit, and receipt atomically.
-
-Disk admission reserves remaining staging plus the full immutable destination;
-active sessions, per-session parts, global streams, and finalizers are bounded.
-Metrics and logs are low-cardinality and never contain file contents, names,
-tokens, full paths, or upload IDs as labels.
-
-## Rollout boundary
-
-The public base owns the protocol, schema, relays, and generated-workload
-inputs. Private infrastructure owns only explicit overlays and image pins.
-`GFS_UPLOAD_V2_ENABLED=false` is the default and is the rollback switch. No
-production enablement follows from this document. Any change to the protocol,
-limits, state machine, ownership, or gates is an architecture/plan change and
-requires a fresh GPT-5.6 Sol design review plus explicit user approval.
-
-## Issue mapping
-
-- **#282** — route-scoped metadata parsing and raw binary relay; do not raise
- the global JSON parser cap.
-- **#285** — resumable upload behavior, retry/resume, response-loss and
- failure coverage; the indexed protocol replaces one-request streaming.
-- **#286** — update the issue contract to describe resumable indexed parts, not
- a single streaming request.
-- **#300** — Desktop IPC/memory boundary: v2 uses disk-backed, bounded parts
- and runtime capabilities instead of whole-file encoded content.
-
-The live issue state and ownership are rechecked at PR0; this mapping is not a
-substitute for current GitHub issue truth.
diff --git a/docs/testing/gfs-upload-v2.md b/docs/testing/gfs-upload-v2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5aace3009..000000000
--- a/docs/testing/gfs-upload-v2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# GFS Upload v2 testing contract
-
-This document is the executable test contract for the 200 MiB GFS Upload v2
-rollout. It is intentionally separate from the legacy small-file GFS suites.
-The feature flag remains false until T0, T1, T2, and T3 are green.
-
-## Test fixtures
-
-Generate deterministic files in a run-unique temporary directory, not in the
-repository and not in memory:
-
-| Fixture | Exact size |
-| ----------------- | ----------------------------------: |
-| below boundary | `209715199` bytes |
-| exact boundary | `209715200` bytes |
-| oversize | `209715201` bytes |
-| legacy regression | `16777216` bytes and one byte above |
-
-Record SHA-256 for every fixture and verify the downloaded result matches the
-source. A fixture may be sparse only when the target filesystem and the
-checksum step prove the bytes; the default fixture is deterministic, ordinary
-file data. No test uses `Buffer`, `arrayBuffer()`, base64, browser storage, or
-an API shortcut for a whole file.
-
-## T0 — static and unit
-
-T0 must execute real tests and fail loudly if zero tests run. It covers:
-
-- exact binary boundary and oversize rejection before session allocation;
-- strict part geometry, min/max part sizes, zero-byte geometry, gap/overlap
- rejection, checksums, indexed idempotent replay and fingerprint conflicts;
-- owner isolation, current authorization, leases, expiry, pause/resume,
- terminal cancel, finalization fencing, storage admission and bounded quotas;
-- route recognition and writer selection for capabilities, `HEAD`, status,
- part PUT, pause/resume, complete, and DELETE;
-- no v2 whole-file `Buffer`/`ArrayBuffer`/base64/JSON/IPC value;
-- retry classification, response-loss reconciliation, contiguous-vs-committed
- progress, four-to-two fallback using the advertised instability threshold,
- the identical finite retry-status allowlist (including terminal `507`), and
- Desktop IPC byte isolation;
-- proxy invariants: exact v2 prefix bypasses the broad JSON parser, declared
- and observed 16 MiB caps are enforced, `Expect` is stripped, upload headers
- survive, and disconnect aborts upstream.
-- canonical-drive propagation for a non-`main` drive through capabilities,
- create, HEAD, status, part, pause, resume, complete, and cancel; missing or
- create-body-mismatched drive is rejected before GFSC token minting;
-- replica-safe request limits, weighted 1 MiB byte charging, stable 429 plus
- `Retry-After`, active principal/IP/global concurrency release, and fail-closed
- admission-backend failure;
-- Desktop state-v2 migration and legacy quarantine, exact owner/team/env/base/
- drive resume matching, A → logout → B isolation, epoch-stale dispatch
- rejection, and `suspended_auth` requiring explicit same-scope resume;
-- active-part recovery after an unknown commit must decrement
- `active_part_count` exactly once, including when the reconciliation read also
- fails; the durable row state, not the transport outcome, is authoritative;
-- legacy fallback symlink/path-swap rejection and proof that logout aborts and
- awaits a pending fallback before clearing the captured credential.
-
-The T0 red fixtures are contract tests: before the implementation seam exists,
-they must be marked as planned/disabled in the test harness rather than hidden
-behind a passing assertion. Once PR1/PR2 land, each fixture is enabled and a
-zero-executed-test result is a failure.
-
-## T1 — integration and real Postgres
-
-T1 uses real Postgres for migration and role checks. It proves:
-
-- additive migration order, exact writer-only session-table privileges, and
- complete denial for `control_api_runtime`, the reader role, and `PUBLIC`;
-- session/part uniqueness, offset geometry, idempotency, status map and
- response-loss replay;
-- restart recovery, orphan reconciliation, lease release, disk reservation,
- bounded per-subject/global concurrency and finalization limits;
-- external-rest-api → profile funnel → control-api → GFSC streaming with
- backpressure, auth re-check, header/status preservation and no broad-parser
- buffering;
-- atomic resource/manifest/audit/session completion with no duplicate on crash
- or replay, create-name race, replace `ifMatch` conflict, or checksum error;
-- cancel-versus-part-commit and cancel-versus-finalize hold-before-commit
- races. The latter must deterministically return `409 upload_finalizing` and
- yield either one committed publication or a cleaned failure, never a
- canceled response with a published resource;
-- same name/size/mtime with different bytes cannot adopt a committed part or
- complete a resumed session.
-
-The dedicated real-Postgres lane is fail-loud: it must report at least one
-executed test file and one passed test. A successful job with zero executed or
-zero passed tests is a failure, not a skipped/green result.
-
-The 512 MiB/1 GiB arithmetic ceiling is tested only under an explicit protocol
-test configuration. It must not become an enabled 200 MiB product capability.
-
-## Control UI and Desktop E2E Guardian gate
-
-New large-upload projects must enter through real visible user actions (file
-picker or drag/drop from the product surface), observe a visible intermediate
-progress state at least twice before completion, and verify the final visible
-state plus a business signal: resource identity/version and SHA-256. The tests
-must use stable accessible labels or `data-testid` selectors, wait on critical
-responses/state transitions, retain traces on failure, and clean up by
-run-unique owner/session identifiers.
-
-Required journeys:
-
-1. create and replace at `209715199` and `209715200` bytes;
-2. connection drop/timeout, writer restart, response loss, resume after app
- restart, and exact committed-part adoption;
-3. visible pause then resume, and separate terminal cancel with no resource;
-4. retryable failures that show four parts in flight before the threshold and
- no more than two afterward, with one correct progress bar;
-5. oversize `209715201` rejection before any session/part/complete request;
-6. permission revocation while paused, with visible denial and no publication;
-7. v2-disabled legacy fallback at 16 MiB and rejection above the legacy cap;
-8. foreign/missing session and direct terminal/deep-link guards never show
- `Completed` without the server receipt.
-
-The E2E Guardian adversarial gate must fail if an intermediate page disappears,
-submit does nothing, the API succeeds but the UI does not transition, or a
-direct terminal URL makes the happy path look complete. Do not use fixed
-sleeps, direct terminal navigation in a happy path, storage/session mutation,
-global core-route mocks, or `{ force: true }` to bypass the product journey.
-
-## T2 — owned Minikube and Cloudflare-backed dev host
-
-Before cluster work record worktree, branch, exact HEAD, `origin/dev`, profile,
-explicit Kubernetes context, pre-gate marker, random profile-owned ports, and
-active processes. Every `kubectl` invocation carries that context. Use four
-subjects or a documented test-only quota override for concurrent maximum-size
-uploads. Prove no OOMKill/restart/corruption, peak RSS below 80% of limits,
-bounded finalization, expected disk growth, unrelated small-request latency
-within baseline, and no more than four per-session/sixteen global part streams
-unless capability negotiation advertises lower.
-
-The browser and packaged Desktop journeys run through the Cloudflare-backed
-dev hostname. A local green suite is not T2 evidence.
-
-## T3 — packaged Desktop
-
-Use the packaged Electron artifact, not only renderer tests. Select and
-drag/drop exact-boundary arbitrary binary files (including `.parquet`), verify
-responsive progress, pause/resume, terminal cancel, persisted resume after
-restart, source-file mutation failure, no giant IPC message, bounded large
-download-to-disk, and legacy fallback against a v2-disabled server.
-
-## Static E2E audit and evidence
-
-Before accepting new E2E files add `tools/e2e_static_audit.py` and run it on
-changed specs. It rejects fixed sleeps, storage/session mutation, core-route
-success mocks, fragile selectors, direct terminal happy paths, and missing
-critical-response waits. Configure large-upload projects with
-`trace: 'retain-on-failure'`; retries may not hide a failed journey.
-
-Every gate records command, exact commit SHA, fixture size/hash, route and
-hostname, pass/fail, executed/skipped counts, peak RSS, restarts, PVC free
-space, and unresolved blockers. T0/T1 evidence must pass before commit/push/PR;
-the exact-head `review-pr` audit must pass before T2. The review is read-only
-and cannot be replaced by a green unit suite or a documentation screenshot.
diff --git a/scripts/e2e/gfs-upload-v2-gate.sh b/scripts/e2e/gfs-upload-v2-gate.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 769bd38b6..000000000
--- a/scripts/e2e/gfs-upload-v2-gate.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# GFS Upload v2 gate. This wrapper is intentionally opt-in: the large-upload
-# journeys must run only against a branch-owned, non-production dev host with
-# profile-scoped random URLs. It never treats a shell/API run as UI evidence.
-
-repo_root="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
-cd "$repo_root"
-
-: "${E2E_K8S_CONTEXT:?Set E2E_K8S_CONTEXT to the owned non-production context}"
-: "${CONTROL_UI_BASE_URL:?Set CONTROL_UI_BASE_URL to the profile-owned random URL}"
-: "${EXTERNAL_REST_API_BASE_URL:?Set EXTERNAL_REST_API_BASE_URL to the profile-owned random URL}"
-
-case "$E2E_K8S_CONTEXT" in
- *prod*|*production*)
- echo "Refusing GFS Upload v2 E2E against production context: $E2E_K8S_CONTEXT" >&2
- exit 2
- ;;
-esac
-
-python3 tools/e2e_static_audit.py \
- control-ui/e2e/gfs-upload-v2.spec.ts \
- desktop-app/test/e2e-playwright/gfs-upload-v2.test.ts
-
-run_ui="${GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUN_UI:-0}"
-run_desktop="${GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUN_DESKTOP:-0}"
-run_integration="${GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUN_INTEGRATION:-0}"
-# Negative journeys mutate HCC, restart the writer, and revoke only the seeded
-# grant. Keep them explicit so a caller cannot turn an arbitrary context into
-# a destructive default by selecting a UI lane alone.
-run_negative="${GFS_UPLOAD_V2_NEGATIVE_E2E:-0}"
-
-if [[ "$run_ui" == "1" ]]; then
- GFS_UPLOAD_V2_E2E=1 GFS_UPLOAD_V2_NEGATIVE_E2E="$run_negative" npm --prefix control-ui exec playwright test \
- --config=playwright.config.ts --project=large-upload e2e/gfs-upload-v2.spec.ts
-fi
-
-if [[ "$run_desktop" == "1" ]]; then
- GFS_UPLOAD_V2_E2E=1 GFS_UPLOAD_V2_NEGATIVE_E2E="$run_negative" npm --prefix desktop-app exec playwright test \
- --config=test/e2e-playwright/playwright.config.ts \
- --project=packaged-gfs-upload-v2 test/e2e-playwright/gfs-upload-v2.test.ts
-fi
-
-if [[ "$run_integration" == "1" ]]; then
- : "${CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL:?Set CONTROL_API_REAL_PG_ADMIN_URL for the real-Postgres integration lane}"
- real_pg_log="$(mktemp)"
- real_pg_normalized="$(mktemp)"
- trap 'rm -f "$real_pg_log" "$real_pg_normalized"' EXIT
- npm --prefix control-api test -- --run realPostgres 2>&1 | tee "$real_pg_log"
- sed $'s/\033\\[[0-9;]*m//g' "$real_pg_log" >"$real_pg_normalized"
- grep -Eq 'Test Files[[:space:]]+[1-9][0-9]* passed' "$real_pg_normalized" || {
- echo 'real-Postgres E2E lane executed zero passing test files' >&2
- exit 1
- }
- grep -Eq 'Tests[[:space:]]+[1-9][0-9]* passed' "$real_pg_normalized" || {
- echo 'real-Postgres E2E lane executed zero passing tests' >&2
- exit 1
- }
- # Runtime restart/chaos/load is caller-owned because it must be bound to the
- # exact branch profile and Cloudflare-backed dev hostname. Do not silently
- # substitute an older RED gate or report integration-only evidence as T2.
- : "${GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUNTIME_GATE_COMMAND:?Set GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUNTIME_GATE_COMMAND to the exact-head restart/chaos/load command}"
- bash -lc "$GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUNTIME_GATE_COMMAND"
-fi
-
-if [[ "$run_ui$run_desktop$run_integration" == "000" ]]; then
- echo "No runtime lane selected. Static audit passed; set one or more GFS_UPLOAD_V2_RUN_* flags." >&2
- exit 2
-fi