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Harden OAuth Proxy silent consent against AS-in-the-middle (#3960)
Jeremiah Lowin7fb037f20ca1
diff --git a/docs/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx b/docs/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdxindex 1a67dea65..afdf0532d 100644--- a/docs/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx+++ b/docs/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx@@ -297,14 +297,20 @@ auth = OAuthProxy(..., client_storage=MemoryStore())</ParamField>-<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type="bool" default="True">- Whether to require user consent before authorizing MCP clients. When enabled (default), users see a consent screen that displays which client is requesting access, preventing [confused deputy attacks](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/security_best_practices#confused-deputy-problem) by ensuring users explicitly approve new clients.+<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type='bool | Literal["remember", "external"]' default="True">+ Consent screen behavior for authorization requests. The consent page displays which client is requesting access, defending against [confused deputy attacks](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/security_best_practices#confused-deputy-problem) and AS-in-the-middle attacks (GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c) by requiring explicit user approval.- **Default behavior (True):**- Users see a consent screen on first authorization. Consent choices are remembered via signed cookies, so users only need to approve each client once. This protects against malicious clients impersonating the user.+ **`True` (default) β always prompt:**+ Users see the consent screen on every authorization. Strongest protection against AS-in-the-middle attacks where a malicious MCP server redirects the victim's browser into a legitimate proxy and relies on a previously-remembered approval to silently complete the flow.- **Disabling consent (False):**- Authorization proceeds directly to the upstream provider without user confirmation. Only use this for local development or testing environments where the security trade-off is acceptable.+ **`"remember"` β silent consent on return:**+ Users see the consent screen on first authorization; subsequent flows from the same browser for the same `(client_id, redirect_uri)` are silently approved via a signed cookie. Cross-site navigations (detected via `Sec-Fetch-Site`) still prompt, which preserves the mitigation against AS-in-the-middle while keeping the prompt-free UX for direct client-initiated flows. Weaker than `True` β use only if the prompt friction is a problem.++ **`"external"` β delegate to upstream:**+ Skip the built-in consent page; consent is collected by the upstream IdP or a custom login page referenced via `upstream_authorization_endpoint`. No security warning is logged.++ **`False` β disable entirely:**+ Authorization proceeds directly to the upstream provider without any consent UI. Logs a security warning. Only for local development or testing.```python# Development/testing only - skip consent screen@@ -312,6 +318,12 @@ auth = OAuthProxy(..., client_storage=MemoryStore())...,require_authorization_consent=False # β οΈ Security warning: only for local/testing)++ # Convenience mode - silent consent on return visits (less safe than True)+ auth = OAuthProxy(+ ...,+ require_authorization_consent="remember",+ )```<Warning>diff --git a/docs/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx b/docs/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdxindex d811d8583..d33cd611a 100644--- a/docs/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx+++ b/docs/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ auth = OIDCProxy(</ParamField>-<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type="bool" default="True">- Whether to require user consent before authorizing MCP clients. When enabled (default), users see a consent screen that displays which client is requesting access. See [OAuthProxy documentation](/servers/auth/oauth-proxy#confused-deputy-attacks) for details on confused deputy attack protection.+<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type='bool | Literal["remember", "external"]' default="True">+ Consent screen behavior for authorization requests. Accepts `True` (default; always prompt β strongest protection), `"remember"` (silent consent on return visits via signed cookie, gated by `Sec-Fetch-Site` to block AS-in-the-middle attacks), `"external"` (consent handled by upstream IdP or custom page), or `False` (disable entirely; local/testing only). See the [OAuthProxy documentation](/servers/auth/oauth-proxy) for full details on each mode and the security trade-offs.</ParamField><ParamField body="consent_csp_policy" type="str | None" default="None">diff --git a/docs/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx b/docs/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdxindex c3c2e25c5..c8fb0f1f3 100644--- a/docs/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx+++ b/docs/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy.mdx@@ -287,14 +287,20 @@ auth = OAuthProxy(..., client_storage=MemoryStore())</ParamField>-<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type="bool" default="True">- Whether to require user consent before authorizing MCP clients. When enabled (default), users see a consent screen that displays which client is requesting access, preventing [confused deputy attacks](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/security_best_practices#confused-deputy-problem) by ensuring users explicitly approve new clients.+<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type='bool | Literal["remember", "external"]' default="True">+ Consent screen behavior for authorization requests. The consent page displays which client is requesting access, defending against [confused deputy attacks](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/security_best_practices#confused-deputy-problem) and AS-in-the-middle attacks (GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c) by requiring explicit user approval.- **Default behavior (True):**- Users see a consent screen on first authorization. Consent choices are remembered via signed cookies, so users only need to approve each client once. This protects against malicious clients impersonating the user.+ **`True` (default) β always prompt:**+ Users see the consent screen on every authorization. Strongest protection against AS-in-the-middle attacks where a malicious MCP server redirects the victim's browser into a legitimate proxy and relies on a previously-remembered approval to silently complete the flow.- **Disabling consent (False):**- Authorization proceeds directly to the upstream provider without user confirmation. Only use this for local development or testing environments where the security trade-off is acceptable.+ **`"remember"` β silent consent on return:**+ Users see the consent screen on first authorization; subsequent flows from the same browser for the same `(client_id, redirect_uri)` are silently approved via a signed cookie. Cross-site navigations (detected via `Sec-Fetch-Site`) still prompt, which preserves the mitigation against AS-in-the-middle while keeping the prompt-free UX for direct client-initiated flows. Weaker than `True` β use only if the prompt friction is a problem.++ **`"external"` β delegate to upstream:**+ Skip the built-in consent page; consent is collected by the upstream IdP or a custom login page referenced via `upstream_authorization_endpoint`. No security warning is logged.++ **`False` β disable entirely:**+ Authorization proceeds directly to the upstream provider without any consent UI. Logs a security warning. Only for local development or testing.```python# Development/testing only - skip consent screen@@ -302,6 +308,12 @@ auth = OAuthProxy(..., client_storage=MemoryStore())...,require_authorization_consent=False # β οΈ Security warning: only for local/testing)++ # Convenience mode - silent consent on return visits (less safe than True)+ auth = OAuthProxy(+ ...,+ require_authorization_consent="remember",+ )```<Warning>diff --git a/docs/v2/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx b/docs/v2/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdxindex a8a97a8de..750298298 100644--- a/docs/v2/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx+++ b/docs/v2/servers/auth/oidc-proxy.mdx@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ auth = OIDCProxy(</ParamField>-<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type="bool" default="True">- Whether to require user consent before authorizing MCP clients. When enabled (default), users see a consent screen that displays which client is requesting access. See [OAuthProxy documentation](/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy#confused-deputy-attacks) for details on confused deputy attack protection.+<ParamField body="require_authorization_consent" type='bool | Literal["remember", "external"]' default="True">+ Consent screen behavior for authorization requests. Accepts `True` (default; always prompt β strongest protection), `"remember"` (silent consent on return visits via signed cookie, gated by `Sec-Fetch-Site` to block AS-in-the-middle attacks), `"external"` (consent handled by upstream IdP or custom page), or `False` (disable entirely; local/testing only). See the [OAuthProxy documentation](/v2/servers/auth/oauth-proxy) for full details on each mode and the security trade-offs.</ParamField><ParamField body="consent_csp_policy" type="str | None" default="None">diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.pyindex 01b28baf3..2917d10d3 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py@@ -329,28 +329,54 @@ class ConsentMixin:txn = txn_model.model_dump()client_key = self._make_client_key(txn["client_id"], txn["client_redirect_uri"])- approved = set(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS"))- denied = set(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS"))-- if client_key in approved:- consent_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)- txn_model.consent_token = consent_token- await self._transaction_store.put(key=txn_id, value=txn_model, ttl=15 * 60)- upstream_url = self._build_upstream_authorize_url(txn_id, txn)- response = RedirectResponse(url=upstream_url, status_code=302)- self._set_consent_binding_cookie(request, response, txn_id, consent_token)- return response-- if client_key in denied:- callback_params = {- "error": "access_denied",- "state": txn.get("client_state") or "",- }- sep = "&" if "?" in txn["client_redirect_uri"] else "?"- return RedirectResponse(- url=f"{txn['client_redirect_uri']}{sep}{urlencode(callback_params)}",- status_code=302,- )+ # Silent consent only fires in "remember" mode, and only when the+ # request arrived via a safe navigation context. AS-in-the-middle+ # attacks (GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c) surface as cross-site redirects from+ # a third-party origin into /authorize; forcing the HTML prompt in+ # that case preserves the consent-screen mitigation without blocking+ # legitimate client-initiated flows (Sec-Fetch-Site: none).+ if self._require_authorization_consent == "remember":+ sec_fetch_site = request.headers.get("Sec-Fetch-Site")+ # Fail closed on missing header: legacy clients degrade to the+ # explicit prompt rather than silent approval.+ silent_eligible = sec_fetch_site in ("same-origin", "same-site", "none")++ if silent_eligible:+ approved = set(+ self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS")+ )+ denied = set(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS"))++ if client_key in approved:+ consent_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)+ txn_model.consent_token = consent_token+ await self._transaction_store.put(+ key=txn_id, value=txn_model, ttl=15 * 60+ )+ upstream_url = self._build_upstream_authorize_url(txn_id, txn)+ response = RedirectResponse(url=upstream_url, status_code=302)+ self._set_consent_binding_cookie(+ request, response, txn_id, consent_token+ )+ return response++ if client_key in denied:+ callback_params = {+ "error": "access_denied",+ "state": txn.get("client_state") or "",+ }+ sep = "&" if "?" in txn["client_redirect_uri"] else "?"+ return RedirectResponse(+ url=f"{txn['client_redirect_uri']}{sep}{urlencode(callback_params)}",+ status_code=302,+ )+ else:+ logger.info(+ "Silent consent skipped for transaction %s: Sec-Fetch-Site=%r "+ "(cross-site navigation; forcing explicit consent prompt)",+ txn_id,+ sec_fetch_site,+ )# Need consent: issue CSRF token and show HTMLcsrf_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)@@ -465,23 +491,33 @@ class ConsentMixin:client_key = self._make_client_key(txn["client_id"], txn["client_redirect_uri"])- if action == "approve":- approved = list(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS"))- if client_key in approved:- approved.remove(client_key)- approved.append(client_key)- approved = approved[-_MAX_REMEMBERED_CLIENTS:]- approved_b64 = self._encode_list_cookie(approved)+ remember_mode = self._require_authorization_consent == "remember"+ if action == "approve":consent_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)txn_model.consent_token = consent_tokenawait self._transaction_store.put(key=txn_id, value=txn_model, ttl=15 * 60)upstream_url = self._build_upstream_authorize_url(txn_id, txn)response = RedirectResponse(url=upstream_url, status_code=302)- self._set_list_cookie(- response, "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_b64, max_age=365 * 24 * 3600- )++ # Only persist the approval for future silent consent in "remember"+ # mode; in the default "always" mode the cookie would never be read.+ if remember_mode:+ approved = list(+ self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS")+ )+ if client_key in approved:+ approved.remove(client_key)+ approved.append(client_key)+ approved = approved[-_MAX_REMEMBERED_CLIENTS:]+ self._set_list_cookie(+ response,+ "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS",+ self._encode_list_cookie(approved),+ max_age=365 * 24 * 3600,+ )+# Clear CSRF cookie by setting empty short-lived valueself._set_list_cookie(response, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE", self._encode_list_cookie([]), max_age=60@@ -490,13 +526,6 @@ class ConsentMixin:return responseelif action == "deny":- denied = list(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS"))- if client_key in denied:- denied.remove(client_key)- denied.append(client_key)- denied = denied[-_MAX_REMEMBERED_CLIENTS:]- denied_b64 = self._encode_list_cookie(denied)-callback_params = {"error": "access_denied","state": txn.get("client_state") or "",@@ -506,9 +535,20 @@ class ConsentMixin:f"{txn['client_redirect_uri']}{sep}{urlencode(callback_params)}")response = RedirectResponse(url=client_callback_url, status_code=302)- self._set_list_cookie(- response, "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS", denied_b64, max_age=365 * 24 * 3600- )++ if remember_mode:+ denied = list(self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS"))+ if client_key in denied:+ denied.remove(client_key)+ denied.append(client_key)+ denied = denied[-_MAX_REMEMBERED_CLIENTS:]+ self._set_list_cookie(+ response,+ "MCP_DENIED_CLIENTS",+ self._encode_list_cookie(denied),+ max_age=365 * 24 * 3600,+ )+self._set_list_cookie(response, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE", self._encode_list_cookie([]), max_age=60)diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/proxy.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/proxy.pyindex e7cf82542..cf049f885 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/proxy.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/proxy.py@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):# JWT signing keyjwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,# Consent screen configuration- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,# Token expiry fallbackfallback_access_token_expiry_seconds: int | None = None,@@ -311,12 +311,19 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):If bytes are provided, they will be used as-is.If a string is provided, it will be derived into a 32-byte key using PBKDF2 (1.2M iterations).If not provided, it will be derived from the upstream client secret using HKDF.- require_authorization_consent: Whether to require user consent before authorizing clients (default True).- When True, users see a consent screen before being redirected to the upstream IdP.- When False, authorization proceeds directly without user confirmation.- When "external", the built-in consent screen is skipped but no warning is- logged, indicating that consent is handled externally (e.g. by the upstream IdP).- SECURITY WARNING: Only set to False for local development or testing environments.+ require_authorization_consent: Consent screen behavior (default True).+ - True: always show the consent screen before redirecting to the+ upstream IdP. Strongest protection against AS-in-the-middle attacks+ (GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c).+ - "remember": show the consent screen the first time, then silently+ approve subsequent authorizations for the same (client_id,+ redirect_uri) in the same browser. Cross-site navigations are+ still prompted to block AS-in-the-middle attacks. Lower UX+ friction, but weaker protection than True.+ - "external": skip the built-in consent screen; consent is handled+ externally (e.g. by the upstream IdP or a custom login page).+ - False: skip consent entirely. SECURITY WARNING: only set to+ False for local development or testing environments.consent_csp_policy: Content Security Policy for the consent page.If None (default), uses the built-in CSP policy with appropriate directives.If empty string "", disables CSP entirely (no meta tag is rendered).@@ -397,7 +404,7 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):self._token_endpoint_auth_method: str | None = token_endpoint_auth_method# Consent screen configuration- self._require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = (+ self._require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = (require_authorization_consent)self._consent_csp_policy: str | None = consent_csp_policy@@ -405,6 +412,13 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):logger.info("Built-in consent screen disabled; consent is handled externally.")+ elif require_authorization_consent == "remember":+ logger.info(+ "Consent screen in 'remember' mode: silent consent on return visits "+ "for previously-approved clients (with Sec-Fetch-Site gating). "+ "Set require_authorization_consent=True for strongest protection "+ "against AS-in-the-middle attacks (GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c)."+ )elif not require_authorization_consent:logger.warning("Authorization consent screen disabled - only use for local development or testing. "@@ -785,8 +799,10 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):3. Return local /consent URL; browser visits consent first4. Consent handler redirects to upstream IdP if approved/already approved- If consent is disabled (require_authorization_consent=False), skip the consent screen- and redirect directly to the upstream IdP.+ If consent is disabled (require_authorization_consent=False or "external"),+ skip the consent screen and redirect directly to the upstream IdP. In+ "remember" mode, still route through /consent so the cookie lookup and+ Sec-Fetch-Site gating can run."""# Security check: validate client's requested resource matches this server# This prevents tokens intended for one server from being used on another@@ -863,8 +879,10 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):ttl=15 * 60, # Auto-expire after 15 minutes)- # If consent is disabled or handled externally, skip consent screen- if self._require_authorization_consent is not True:+ # If consent is disabled or handled externally, skip consent screen.+ # "remember" mode still routes through /consent so cookie lookup and+ # Sec-Fetch-Site gating can run.+ if self._require_authorization_consent in (False, "external"):upstream_url = self._build_upstream_authorize_url(txn_id, transaction.model_dump())@@ -1971,8 +1989,10 @@ class OAuthProxy(OAuthProvider, ConsentMixin):# Verify consent binding cookie to prevent confused deputy attacks.# When consent is enabled, the browser that approved consent receives# a signed cookie. A different browser (e.g., a victim lured to the- # IdP URL) won't have this cookie and will be rejected.- if self._require_authorization_consent is True:+ # IdP URL) won't have this cookie and will be rejected. "remember"+ # mode still issues consent tokens (on silent approval or HTML+ # approval), so both code paths need binding verification.+ if self._require_authorization_consent in (True, "remember"):consent_token = transaction_model.consent_tokenif not consent_token:logger.error("Transaction %s missing consent_token", txn_id)diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oidc_proxy.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oidc_proxy.pyindex 08c746f0b..549c375ad 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oidc_proxy.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oidc_proxy.py@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ class OIDCProxy(OAuthProxy):# Token validation configurationtoken_endpoint_auth_method: str | None = None,# Consent screen configuration- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,# Extra parametersdiff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/auth0.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/auth0.pyindex 601f314ef..28c50d060 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/auth0.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/auth0.py@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ class Auth0Provider(OIDCProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,) -> None:diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/aws.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/aws.pyindex 6f2cfcd56..6837dc5b5 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/aws.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/aws.py@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ class AWSCognitoProvider(OIDCProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,):diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/azure.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/azure.pyindex d336e84ac..0f0763b97 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/azure.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/azure.py@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ class AzureProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,base_authority: str = "login.microsoftonline.com",diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/clerk.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/clerk.pyindex b465faf39..b17261573 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/clerk.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/clerk.py@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ class ClerkProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,extra_authorize_params: dict[str, str] | None = None,diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/discord.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/discord.pyindex 333001cfa..edf407ae1 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/discord.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/discord.py@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ class DiscordProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/github.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/github.pyindex 0655a8bd5..57ee16799 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/github.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/github.py@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ class GitHubProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/google.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/google.pyindex 219e6c0db..55dcad17c 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/google.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/google.py@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ class GoogleProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,extra_authorize_params: dict[str, str] | None = None,diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/oci.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/oci.pyindex 07bad2a41..ae765299d 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/oci.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/oci.py@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ class OCIProvider(OIDCProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,) -> None:diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/workos.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/workos.pyindex bd6d582ad..91ab83dc1 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/workos.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/providers/workos.py@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ class WorkOSProvider(OAuthProxy):allowed_client_redirect_uris: list[str] | None = None,client_storage: AsyncKeyValue | None = None,jwt_signing_key: str | bytes | None = None,- require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["external"] = True,+ require_authorization_consent: bool | Literal["remember", "external"] = True,consent_csp_policy: str | None = None,forward_resource: bool = True,http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,diff --git a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.pyindex 025eb3452..b898043b8 100644--- a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py+++ b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py@@ -95,6 +95,22 @@ def oauth_proxy_https():)+def oauth_proxy_https_remember():+ """OAuthProxy in 'remember' mode for silent-consent cookie tests."""+ return OAuthProxy(+ upstream_authorization_endpoint="https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",+ upstream_token_endpoint="https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",+ upstream_client_id="client-id",+ upstream_client_secret="client-secret",+ token_verifier=_Verifier(),+ base_url="https://myserver.example",+ client_storage=MemoryStore(),+ jwt_signing_key="test-secret",+ require_authorization_consent="remember",+ )++async def _start_flow(proxy: OAuthProxy, client_id: str, redirect: str) -> tuple[str, str]:@@ -587,11 +603,15 @@ class TestConsentSecurity:assert r.status_code == 200assert r.headers.get("X-Frame-Options") == "DENY"- async def test_deny_sets_cookie_and_redirects_with_error(self, oauth_proxy_https):- """Verify denying consent sets signed cookie and redirects with error."""+ async def test_deny_sets_cookie_and_redirects_with_error(+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember+ ):+ """Verify denying consent in 'remember' mode sets signed cookie and redirects with error."""client_redirect = "http://localhost:5002/callback"- txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, "client-b", client_redirect)- app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, "client-b", client_redirect+ )+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())with TestClient(app) as c:consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)@@ -617,13 +637,13 @@ class TestConsentSecurity:)async def test_approve_sets_cookie_and_redirects_to_upstream(- self, oauth_proxy_https+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember):- """Verify approving consent sets signed cookie and redirects to upstream."""+ """Verify approving consent in 'remember' mode sets signed cookie and redirects to upstream."""txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(- oauth_proxy_https, "client-c", "http://localhost:5003/callback"+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, "client-c", "http://localhost:5003/callback")- app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())with TestClient(app) as c:consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)@@ -643,29 +663,33 @@ class TestConsentSecurity:set_cookie = ";\n".join(r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines())assert "__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS" in set_cookie- async def test_tampered_cookie_is_ignored(self, oauth_proxy_https):+ async def test_tampered_cookie_is_ignored(self, oauth_proxy_https_remember):"""Verify tampered approval cookie is ignored and consent page shown."""txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(- oauth_proxy_https, "client-d", "http://localhost:5004/callback"+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, "client-d", "http://localhost:5004/callback")- app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())with TestClient(app) as c:# Create a tampered cookie (invalid signature)# Value format: payload.signature; using wrong signature to force failuretampered_value = "W10=.invalidsig"c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", tampered_value)- r = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}", follow_redirects=False)+ r = c.get(+ f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}",+ headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "none"},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )# Should not auto-redirect to upstream; should show consent pageassert r.status_code == 200# httpx returns a URL object; compare path or stringifyassert urlparse(str(r.request.url)).path == "/consent"- async def test_autoapprove_cookie_skips_consent(self, oauth_proxy_https):- """Verify valid approval cookie auto-approves and redirects to upstream."""+ async def test_autoapprove_cookie_skips_consent(self, oauth_proxy_https_remember):+ """Verify valid approval cookie auto-approves and redirects to upstream in 'remember' mode."""client_id = "client-e"redirect = "http://localhost:5005/callback"- txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, client_id, redirect)- app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect)+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())with TestClient(app) as c:# Approve once to set approved cookieconsent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")@@ -684,15 +708,188 @@ class TestConsentSecurity:# Extract approved cookie valueset_cookie = ";\n".join(r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines())m = re.search(r"__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS=([^;]+)", set_cookie)- assert m, "approved cookie should be set"+ assert m, "approved cookie should be set in 'remember' mode"approved_cookie = m.group(1)# Start a new flow for the same client and redirect- new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, client_id, redirect)+ new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect+ )# Should auto-redirect to upstream when visiting consent due to cookie+ # (requires a safe Sec-Fetch-Site value β "none" simulates a direct+ # client-initiated navigation like an MCP host opening the browser).c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_cookie)- r2 = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}", follow_redirects=False)+ r2 = c.get(+ f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}",+ headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "none"},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )assert r2.status_code in (302, 303)assert r2.headers.get("location", "").startswith("https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize")+++class TestConsentModes:+ """Tests for the three consent modes: True (always), 'remember' (silent), 'external'.++ Covers the default-behavior change in GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c: True no longer+ silently approves return visits, and 'remember' mode gates silent consent+ on Sec-Fetch-Site to block AS-in-the-middle attacks.+ """++ async def test_default_mode_does_not_set_approval_cookie(self, oauth_proxy_https):+ """Approving in default (True) mode must NOT set a long-lived approval cookie.++ In 'always prompt' mode there's no reason to remember approvals, and+ writing the cookie would only create a no-op attack surface.+ """+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https, "client-default", "http://localhost:7001/callback"+ )+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ with TestClient(app) as c:+ consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")+ csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)+ assert csrf+ for k, v in consent.cookies.items():+ c.cookies.set(k, v)+ r = c.post(+ "/consent",+ data={"action": "approve", "txn_id": txn_id, "csrf_token": csrf},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ assert r.status_code in (302, 303)+ set_cookie = ";\n".join(r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines())+ # Consent binding cookie still set for the in-flight transaction+ assert "__Host-MCP_CONSENT_BINDING" in set_cookie+ # But no remembered-approval cookie+ assert "MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS" not in set_cookie++ async def test_default_mode_ignores_existing_approval_cookie(+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember, oauth_proxy_https+ ):+ """A valid approval cookie is ignored in default (True) mode β always prompts.++ Uses the 'remember' proxy to generate a legitimately-signed cookie, then+ replays it against a default-mode proxy (same jwt_signing_key) to confirm+ the consent page is still shown.+ """+ # Both fixtures use the same signing key, so cookies generated by one+ # verify against the other.+ client_id = "client-xmode"+ redirect = "http://localhost:7002/callback"+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect)+ app_remember = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())+ with TestClient(app_remember) as c:+ consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")+ csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)+ assert csrf+ for k, v in consent.cookies.items():+ c.cookies.set(k, v)+ r = c.post(+ "/consent",+ data={"action": "approve", "txn_id": txn_id, "csrf_token": csrf},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ set_cookie_remember = ";\n".join(+ r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines()+ )+ m = re.search(r"__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS=([^;]+)", set_cookie_remember)+ assert m, "remember-mode proxy should have set approval cookie"+ approved_cookie = m.group(1)++ # Now replay against the default-mode proxy for the same client/redirect.+ new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, client_id, redirect)+ app_default = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ with TestClient(app_default) as c:+ c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_cookie)+ r = c.get(+ f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}",+ headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "none"},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ # Default mode: HTML consent page, no silent redirect to upstream.+ assert r.status_code == 200+ assert "text/html" in r.headers.get("content-type", "")++ async def test_remember_mode_cross_site_forces_prompt(+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember+ ):+ """Sec-Fetch-Site=cross-site must skip silent consent even with valid cookie.++ Blocks the GHSA-6x8h-498w-gv8c AS-in-the-middle scenario: attacker+ redirects the victim's browser to /authorize from a third-party origin,+ which browsers mark cross-site. Legit local-host flows are Sec-Fetch-Site=none.+ """+ client_id = "client-cross"+ redirect = "http://localhost:7003/callback"+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect)+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())+ with TestClient(app) as c:+ # Seed a valid approval cookie via the normal consent flow.+ consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")+ csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)+ assert csrf+ for k, v in consent.cookies.items():+ c.cookies.set(k, v)+ r = c.post(+ "/consent",+ data={"action": "approve", "txn_id": txn_id, "csrf_token": csrf},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ set_cookie = ";\n".join(r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines())+ m = re.search(r"__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS=([^;]+)", set_cookie)+ assert m+ approved_cookie = m.group(1)++ # Start a new flow and simulate a cross-site navigation.+ new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect+ )+ c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_cookie)+ r2 = c.get(+ f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}",+ headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site"},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ # Silent consent skipped; HTML prompt shown.+ assert r2.status_code == 200+ assert "text/html" in r2.headers.get("content-type", "")++ async def test_remember_mode_missing_sec_fetch_site_fails_closed(+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember+ ):+ """Missing Sec-Fetch-Site header must fall back to the explicit prompt.++ Legacy clients that don't send the header degrade to the safer behavior+ rather than granting silent consent.+ """+ client_id = "client-nofetch"+ redirect = "http://localhost:7004/callback"+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect)+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())+ with TestClient(app) as c:+ consent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")+ csrf = _extract_csrf(consent.text)+ assert csrf+ for k, v in consent.cookies.items():+ c.cookies.set(k, v)+ r = c.post(+ "/consent",+ data={"action": "approve", "txn_id": txn_id, "csrf_token": csrf},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )+ set_cookie = ";\n".join(r.headers.get("set-cookie", "").splitlines())+ m = re.search(r"__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS=([^;]+)", set_cookie)+ assert m+ approved_cookie = m.group(1)++ new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect+ )+ c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_cookie)+ # No Sec-Fetch-Site header at all.+ r2 = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}", follow_redirects=False)+ assert r2.status_code == 200+ assert "text/html" in r2.headers.get("content-type", "")diff --git a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_page.py b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_page.pyindex bd394db74..a0a4ea050 100644--- a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_page.py+++ b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_page.py@@ -48,6 +48,22 @@ def oauth_proxy_https():)+def oauth_proxy_https_remember():+ """OAuthProxy in 'remember' mode for silent-consent cookie tests."""+ return OAuthProxy(+ upstream_authorization_endpoint="https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",+ upstream_token_endpoint="https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",+ upstream_client_id="client-id",+ upstream_client_secret="client-secret",+ token_verifier=_Verifier(),+ base_url="https://myserver.example",+ client_storage=MemoryStore(),+ jwt_signing_key="test-secret",+ require_authorization_consent="remember",+ )++async def _start_flow(proxy: OAuthProxy, client_id: str, redirect: str) -> tuple[str, str]:@@ -476,12 +492,14 @@ class TestConsentBindingCookie:set_cookie_header = r.headers.get("set-cookie", "")assert "__Host-MCP_CONSENT_BINDING" in set_cookie_header- async def test_auto_approve_sets_consent_binding_cookie(self, oauth_proxy_https):- """Auto-approve path (previously approved client) must also set the binding cookie."""+ async def test_auto_approve_sets_consent_binding_cookie(+ self, oauth_proxy_https_remember+ ):+ """Auto-approve path (previously approved client in 'remember' mode) must also set the binding cookie."""client_id = "client-autobinding"redirect = "http://localhost:6002/callback"- txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, client_id, redirect)- app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https.get_routes())+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect)+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_https_remember.get_routes())with TestClient(app) as c:# First: approve manually to get the approved cookieconsent = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")@@ -503,9 +521,16 @@ class TestConsentBindingCookie:approved_cookie = m.group(1)# Second: start new flow, auto-approve should set binding cookie- new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(oauth_proxy_https, client_id, redirect)+ # (Sec-Fetch-Site=none simulates a direct client-initiated navigation.)+ new_txn, _ = await _start_flow(+ oauth_proxy_https_remember, client_id, redirect+ )c.cookies.set("__Host-MCP_APPROVED_CLIENTS", approved_cookie)- r2 = c.get(f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}", follow_redirects=False)+ r2 = c.get(+ f"/consent?txn_id={new_txn}",+ headers={"Sec-Fetch-Site": "none"},+ follow_redirects=False,+ )assert r2.status_code in (302, 303)set_cookie_header = r2.headers.get("set-cookie", "")assert "__Host-MCP_CONSENT_BINDING" in set_cookie_header