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fix: CSRF double-submit cookie check in consent flow (#3519)

Jeremiah Lowin8fdb3cc27c92
diff --git a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py
index 597b8f87e..b2ad20642 100644
--- a/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py
+++ b/src/fastmcp/server/auth/oauth_proxy/consent.py
@@ -110,9 +110,13 @@ class ConsentMixin:
self: OAuthProxy, request: Request, base_name: str
) -> list[str]:
"""Decode and verify a signed base64-encoded JSON list from cookie. Returns [] if missing/invalid."""
- # Prefer secure name, but also check non-secure variant for dev
secure_name = self._cookie_name(base_name)
- raw = request.cookies.get(secure_name) or request.cookies.get(f"__{base_name}")
+ raw = request.cookies.get(secure_name)
+ # Only fall back to the non-__Host- name over plain HTTP. On HTTPS,
+ # __Host- enforces host-only scope; accepting the weaker name would
+ # let a sibling-subdomain attacker inject a domain-scoped cookie.
+ if not raw and not self._is_https:
+ raw = request.cookies.get(f"__{base_name}")
if not raw:
return []
try:
@@ -397,11 +401,13 @@ class ConsentMixin:
cimd_domain=cimd_domain,
)
response = create_secure_html_response(html)
- # Store CSRF in cookie with short lifetime
+ # Merge new CSRF token with any existing ones (supports concurrent flows)
+ existing_tokens = self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE")
+ existing_tokens.append(csrf_token)
self._set_list_cookie(
response,
"MCP_CONSENT_STATE",
- self._encode_list_cookie([csrf_token]),
+ self._encode_list_cookie(existing_tokens),
max_age=15 * 60,
)
return response
@@ -435,6 +441,23 @@ class ConsentMixin:
"<h1>Error</h1><p>Invalid or expired consent token</p>", status_code=400
)
+ # Double-submit CSRF check: verify the form token matches the cookie.
+ # Without this, an attacker who knows their own tx_id/csrf_token can
+ # CSRF the victim's browser into approving consent, bypassing the
+ # consent binding cookie protection.
+ cookie_csrf_tokens = self._decode_list_cookie(request, "MCP_CONSENT_STATE")
+ if csrf_token not in cookie_csrf_tokens:
+ logger.warning(
+ "CSRF double-submit check failed for transaction %s "
+ "(possible cross-site consent forgery)",
+ txn_id,
+ )
+ return create_secure_html_response(
+ "<h1>Error</h1><p>Authorization session mismatch. "
+ "Please try authenticating again.</p>",
+ status_code=403,
+ )
+
client_key = self._make_client_key(txn["client_id"], txn["client_redirect_uri"])
if action == "approve":
diff --git a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py
index 7a65df297..025eb3452 100644
--- a/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py
+++ b/tests/server/auth/test_oauth_consent_flow.py
@@ -462,6 +462,45 @@ class TestCSRFProtection:
)
+class TestCSRFDoubleSubmit:
+ """Tests for CSRF double-submit cookie validation (GHSA-rww4-4w9c-7733 bypass)."""
+
+ async def test_consent_rejected_without_csrf_cookie(self, oauth_proxy_with_storage):
+ """Submitting a valid CSRF token without the matching cookie should be rejected.
+
+ This prevents an attacker from using their own tx_id/csrf_token to CSRF
+ the victim's browser into approving consent.
+ """
+ txn_id, _ = await _start_flow(
+ oauth_proxy_with_storage,
+ "csrf-double-submit-client",
+ "http://localhost:9090/callback",
+ )
+
+ app = Starlette(routes=oauth_proxy_with_storage.get_routes())
+ with TestClient(app) as test_client:
+ # Visit consent page to populate the transaction with a CSRF token
+ consent_resp = test_client.get(f"/consent?txn_id={txn_id}")
+ assert consent_resp.status_code == 200
+ csrf_token = _extract_csrf(consent_resp.text)
+ assert csrf_token
+
+ # Simulate the attack: use a FRESH client (no cookies from the consent
+ # page) to submit the form with a valid CSRF token β€” as if the attacker
+ # tricked the victim's browser into POSTing their tx_id/csrf_token.
+ with TestClient(app) as attacker_client:
+ response = attacker_client.post(
+ "/consent",
+ data={
+ "action": "approve",
+ "txn_id": txn_id,
+ "csrf_token": csrf_token,
+ },
+ follow_redirects=False,
+ )
+ assert response.status_code == 403
+
+
class TestStoragePersistence:
"""Tests for state persistence across storage backends."""