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fix: prevent path traversal in skill download (#3493)
Jeremiah Lowinb720fc5e3873
diff --git a/src/fastmcp/utilities/skills.py b/src/fastmcp/utilities/skills.pyindex a84728fe3..49b13d859 100644--- a/src/fastmcp/utilities/skills.py+++ b/src/fastmcp/utilities/skills.py@@ -164,7 +164,11 @@ async def download_skill(```"""target_dir = Path(target_dir).expanduser().resolve()- skill_dir = target_dir / skill_name+ skill_dir = (target_dir / skill_name).resolve()++ # Security: ensure skill_dir stays within target_dir+ if not skill_dir.is_relative_to(target_dir):+ raise ValueError(f"Skill name {skill_name!r} would escape the target directory")# Check if directory existsif skill_dir.exists() and not overwrite:diff --git a/tests/utilities/test_skills.py b/tests/utilities/test_skills.pyindex 28a3f4fd1..46170529d 100644--- a/tests/utilities/test_skills.py+++ b/tests/utilities/test_skills.py@@ -267,3 +267,24 @@ class TestSyncSkills:assert isinstance(path, Path)assert path.exists()assert (path / "SKILL.md").exists()+++class TestPathTraversal:+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(+ "malicious_name",+ [+ "../escape",+ "../../root",+ "../../../etc/passwd",+ "foo/../../escape",+ ],+ )+ async def test_malicious_skill_name_raises(+ self, skills_server: FastMCP, tmp_path: Path, malicious_name: str+ ):+ target = tmp_path / "downloaded"+ target.mkdir()++ async with Client(skills_server) as client:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="would escape the target directory"):+ await download_skill(client, malicious_name, target)