Light, fluffy, and always free - The AWS Local Emulator alternative
chore: remove the scripts and issues directories (#3725)
Hector Venturac2e17203f9a7
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignoreindex e92bc2287f..5a2b5bed2e 100644--- a/.gitignore+++ b/.gitignore@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ test-results.xml*.logtest-results-scripts/node_modules/# Python tooling caches__pycache__/diff --git a/issues/sigv4-review-remaining-findings.md b/issues/sigv4-review-remaining-findings.mddeleted file mode 100644index 82308c8b28..0000000000--- a/issues/sigv4-review-remaining-findings.md+++ /dev/null@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@-# SigV4 / presigned-URL review — remaining findings--Companion to branch `fix/sigv4-auth-bypass` (PR fixing the SigV4 signature-forgery-auth-bypass). This ledgers everything from the original review pass that is-**not** fixed in that PR, plus two findings from the original brief that turned-out, on investigation, not to be real bugs.--Source review: `.temp/wt-l10-lambdaowner/review-2657.md` (41 findings across 6 files).--## Fixed in fix/sigv4-auth-bypass--- `SigV4Validator.java:104` (elasticache) — unregistered access key fell back to- itself as the signing secret (self-signable auth bypass). Fixed: fail closed- when `findSecretKey` returns empty.-- `RdsSigV4Validator.java:104` — identical bug, identical fix.-- `SigV4Validator.java:80` (elasticache) — `expectedUsername != null && user != null && ...`- let a token that omits `User` bypass the username binding. Fixed: drop the- `user != null` conjunct.--## Investigated, NOT bugs — do not re-fix--- **`RdsSigV4Validator.java:80`** (originally flagged as the same missing-User- bypass as the ElastiCache file). Not exploitable here: `dbUser` is in the- required-parameters check at line 74-75, so `dbUser` can never be null by the- time line 80 runs. The `clientUsername == null` branch is the documented- "may be null to skip" contract, and the only live caller- (`PostgresProtocolHandler.java:84`) always passes a real username. Confirmed- by a RED test that could not be made to fail — the exploit doesn't exist.--- **`PreSignedUrlFilter.java:30` — hardcoded "test"/"test" credential accepted- under auth enforcement.** Originally flagged HIGH. This is a deliberate,- already-tested convenience credential, not a presigned-URL-specific hole:- `S3Service.isKnownAccessKey` (S3Service.java, private method backing- `authorizeSignedRequest`/`authorizeS3Read`/`authorizeObjectWrite`) has the- identical `LEGACY_ACCESS_KEY_ID.equals(accessKeyId)` fallback, and- `S3AuthEnforcementIntegrationTest.java` has two tests — line 210- (`signedRequestWithLocalAccessKeyCanReadPrivateObject`, header-signed) and- line 222 (`presignedRequestWithLocalAccessKeyCanReadPrivateObject`, presigned)- — that assert this credential works identically on *both* paths under- enforced auth. I removed the fallback from `PreSignedUrlFilter.resolveSecretKey`- as a RED test, confirmed it broke both of the above tests plus two others in- that suite, and reverted. If this convenience credential is ever revoked,- it has to happen symmetrically in `S3Service.isKnownAccessKey` too — that's- an architectural decision (removes a documented local-dev affordance for the- entire S3 emulator, not a 3-line patch), out of scope for a signature-forgery- fix PR.--- **`PreSignedUrlFilter.java:128` — signature verified but no bucket/key- authorization check.** Originally flagged HIGH. Checked: `S3Service` has no- bucket-owner/account field anywhere, and `authorizeS3Read`/`authorizeObjectWrite`- return early ("allow") for *any* signed request with a known access key,- regardless of path — this is the same idiom used for ordinary header-signed- requests via `S3RequestAuthorizationParser` + `S3Controller` (see- `S3Controller.java:720,797,802,...` calling `authorizeObjectRead`/- `authorizePutObject`). Multi-account bucket ownership enforcement doesn't- exist anywhere in this codebase's S3 implementation; this isn't a gap- `PreSignedUrlFilter` introduced. Real per-account S3 authorization would be a- separate, much larger feature.-- **Related, unresolved, worth a second look:** `S3RequestAuthorizationParser.parse`- returns `RequestAuthorization(true, accessKeyId)` for a presigned request- based only on the *presence* of `X-Amz-Algorithm` in the query string — it- does not itself verify the signature. Actual signature verification happens- separately in `PreSignedUrlFilter`. These two are independent checks that- currently line up because the filter runs on every request with- `X-Amz-Algorithm` set. If any route ever reaches `S3Controller`'s- `authorizeObjectRead`/etc. without `PreSignedUrlFilter` having run first,- that route would treat `signed=true` (and thus "authorized") for a payload- whose signature was never checked. I did not find such a route, but I also- didn't exhaustively verify filter registration/ordering across every- `@Provider`. Worth a targeted audit.--## Deferred — real bug, not fixed here (plumbing too large for this PR)--- **`RdsSigV4Validator.java:52` — signed host/port never verified against the- actual DB endpoint; region/service not pinned (cross-resource token- replay).** Real: `validate()` builds its canonical request purely from the- token's own `host:port`/region/service and never compares any of it to the- endpoint this particular proxy fronts. A token signed for any other RDS- instance in the same account validates here.-- Plumbing needed to fix properly (mapped, not implemented):- - `RdsSigV4Validator.validate(...)` needs an `expectedHost`, `expectedPort`,- `expectedRegion` (and pin `service.equals("rds-db")`).- - `RdsAuthProxy` constructor needs to carry those through to the- `PostgresProtocolHandler`/`MySqlProtocolHandler` call sites- (`PostgresProtocolHandler.java:84`, and the MySQL equivalent).- - `RdsProxyManager.startProxy(...)` already receives `advertisedHost` (used- today only for `tlsCertificates.ensureHost(advertisedHost)`) and- `proxyPort` — both would need to be threaded into `RdsAuthProxy` instead of- being dropped.- - Region isn't threaded down to `RdsProxyManager` at all today; it's- available at the `RdsService` call sites (`instanceRegion` computed just- above each `proxyManager.startProxy(...)` call) but not passed.- - Seven call sites in `RdsService.java` construct/start proxies:- lines 628, 1123, 1319, 1931, 3803, 3887, 4008. All seven would need the new- parameters.- - **Caveat that needs its own investigation before touching this:**- `RdsService.proxyEndpoint(int proxyPort)` calls- `currentContainerNetworkResolver.resolvePublishedPort(proxyPort)` — the- port a real client signs against (the published/advertised port) is not- guaranteed to equal `proxyPort`, the port the proxy binds to internally.- Comparing the wrong one would turn a security fix into an outage for every- RDS IAM-auth user. This needs to be nailed down before writing the- validator-side check, not guessed at in the same PR as the signature fix.--- **`ContainerLauncher.java` — lost in-flight volume reference race between- `ensureCodeVolume` and `releaseCodeVolumeReference`.** Not a SigV4 bug — the- 7th HIGH finding from the same review pass, unrelated feature area.- `ensureCodeVolume` does- `volumesInFlight.computeIfAbsent(volName, ...).incrementAndGet()` — the map- lookup and the increment are two separate steps. A concurrent- `releaseCodeVolumeReference` for the same volume can run its- `computeIfPresent` (decrement to 0, remove the mapping) in between: the first- thread's `incrementAndGet()` then mutates an `AtomicInteger` that is no- longer in the map. The new launch's in-flight reservation is silently lost,- so `cleanupSupersededVolumes` sees no reservation and can delete the volume- while that launch is still pre-`create()` — Docker auto-creates an empty- volume and the container gets an empty `/var/task`.- - Fix: make the increment atomic with map membership —- `volumesInFlight.compute(volName, (k, c) -> { if (c == null) c = new AtomicInteger(); c.incrementAndGet(); return c; });`- (compute's function runs under the bin lock, serialized against- `computeIfPresent`). Not fixed here — different subsystem, deserves its- own PR and its own tests.- - **Collision note:** PR #2657 (`fix/lambda-placeholder-owner-account`)- touches `ContainerLauncher.java` extensively (credential-triad- all-or-nothing logic) but does *not* touch `ensureCodeVolume`/- `releaseCodeVolumeReference`/`volumesInFlight` — no overlap, safe to fix- independently whenever picked up.--## Resolved collision: PR #2657 had reintroduced the false "safe" comment--PR #2657 (`fix/lambda-placeholder-owner-account`) merged into `upstream/main`-as `be892864d` and added this comment directly above the vulnerable-`iamService.findSecretKey(accessKeyId).orElse(accessKeyId)` line in **both**-`SigV4Validator.java` and `RdsSigV4Validator.java` (not just the ElastiCache-file, as first flagged here):--> "Deliberately no fallback for a bare 12-digit account ID here: trusting an-> unregistered numeric access key paired with the well-known "test" secret-> would let any client forge an IAM-auth token for an arbitrary account and-> authenticate as any matching cache user. An unregistered key falls back to-> itself, unchanged (never a valid secret), so it always fails the signature-> check below."--This is the exact false safety claim `fix/sigv4-auth-bypass` proves wrong with-a RED test (self-signing with `secret == accessKeyId` produces a matching-signature). Rebasing `fix/sigv4-auth-bypass` onto `upstream/main` after #2657-merged produced real conflicts on both files (this comment vs. the fail-closed-fix); both were resolved by keeping the fail-closed fix and dropping the-misleading comment entirely. No follow-up needed here — the comment is gone-from both files as of this branch's rebase.--## Medium/low findings not touched by this PR (from review-2657.md)--By file:line, one line each — none of these are exploitable auth bypasses,-just correctness/robustness/availability issues:--**SigV4Validator.java (elasticache)**-- `:87` — no upper bound on `X-Amz-Expires`, no future-dated-token rejection (medium)-- `:102` — credential-scope date/region/service accepted without cross-validation (medium)-- `:160` — catch-all exception handler logs only at debug, masking real operational faults (low)--**RdsSigV4Validator.java**-- `:86` — no not-yet-valid check, unbounded `X-Amz-Expires` (medium)-- `:96` — credential-scope date vs `X-Amz-Date` not cross-checked; malformed scope rejected with no log (medium)-- `:114` — canonical query string sorted by param name only, not name-then-value (low, availability false-negative)-- general — `URLDecoder.decode` treats literal `+` as space, can cause spurious mismatches (low)--**PreSignedUrlFilter.java (s3)**-- `:109` — `X-Amz-Credential` is double URL-decoded (JAX-RS already decodes it) (medium)-- `:132` — path parsing in the custom-signature branch assumes a leading slash that `UriInfo.getPath()` doesn't have; can select the wrong bucket/key (medium)-- `:100` — malformed `X-Amz-Date` throws unhandled from `isExpired()`, producing a 500 instead of 400/403 (medium)-- `:150` — credential scope date/region/service accepted verbatim, not cross-checked against `X-Amz-Date`/expected service/region (medium)-- `:154` — `signedHeaders.split(";")` NPE risk; no requirement that `host` is among signed headers (low)-- `:215` — all verification exceptions swallowed at debug level (low)-- `:138` — fail-open (no signature check at all) if both `isAuthEnforced()` and `shouldValidateSignatures()` are false (low, config-dependent)--**LaunchedContainerAwsEnv.java** (unrelated feature area, same review pass)-- `:152` — inconsistent credential triple when host env is partially set (medium)-- `:148` — host AWS secrets forwarded into container env, visible via `docker inspect` (medium)-- `:146` — warning-once gate can silently stop warning on subsequent real-credential forwards (low)-- `:168` — `URI.create(flociEndpoint).getHost()` can NPE-adjacent produce `FLOCI_HOSTNAME=null` (low)-- `:160` — `SessionCreds` fields not null-checked before interpolation into env (low)--**ContainerLauncher.java** (beyond the HIGH race above, unrelated to SigV4)-- one uncaught exception permanently kills the volume-cleanup scheduler (medium)-- small-code `/var/task` copy uses the non-strict tar path; can start container with partial/empty code (medium)-- `copyFileToContainer` never joins its writer thread or surfaces tar failures (medium)-- `createTarFromDir` silently drops symlinked directories, mangles symlinks (medium)-- `launch()` cleanup only triggers on `RuntimeException`; an `Error` leaks the runtime-api port and container (low)-- credential all-or-nothing filter misses legacy `AWS_SECURITY_TOKEN` (low)-- `expectExtensions` counts extensions that failed to exec-launch, forcing a full 5s stall every cold start (low)-- Lambda version hardcoded to `$LATEST` in env and log-stream name despite versioned functions (low)--**KubernetesPodLauncher.java** (unrelated feature area, same review pass)-- runtime API port released even when server stop fails/times out (medium)-- `launch()` cleanup only triggers on `RuntimeException`; Errors leak the port and pod (medium)-- interrupted stop leaves pod running and port leaked while handle reports STOPPED (medium)-- unauthenticated plain-HTTP code/layer download URLs are guessable (medium)-- `awaitRunning` swallows `InterruptedException` without restoring the interrupt flag (low)-- `ensureCaConfigMap` check-then-act race causes redundant concurrent applies (low)diff --git a/scripts/test-acm-integration b/scripts/test-acm-integrationdeleted file mode 100755index 0fb28fb29e..0000000000--- a/scripts/test-acm-integration+++ /dev/null@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@-#!/usr/bin/env bash-set -euo pipefail--exec "$(dirname "$0")/test-focused" AcmIntegrationTest "$@"