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A modern platform for visual, flexible, and extensible graph-based investigations. For cybersecurity analysts and investigators.

fix(security): Host-header allowlist + restore dropped security headers

aeonframework0a3567af965f
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 0f74b891..bdcc78ba 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ Anyone on the network can then access Flowsint at `http://<server-ip>:5173`.
- `MASTER_VAULT_KEY_V1` — encrypts stored API keys. Generate one: `python3 -c "import os, base64; print('base64:' + base64.b64encode(os.urandom(32)).decode())"`
- `NEO4J_PASSWORD` — Neo4j database password.
+**Also add your server hostname/IP to the Host-header allowlist** in `flowsint-app/nginx.conf` (look for `map $http_host $is_flowsint_host`). The default allowlist accepts only `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`, which defends single-user installs against DNS rebinding; LAN and public deploys must opt-in their own hostname. Two commented-out template lines in the same map block show the format.
+
Only port `5173` is exposed to the network. PostgreSQL, Redis, Neo4j and the API are bound to `127.0.0.1` on the server and reachable only through the frontend proxy.
To pin a specific version instead of `latest`, set `FLOWSINT_VERSION` in `.env` (e.g. `FLOWSINT_VERSION=1.2.10`).
diff --git a/flowsint-app/nginx.conf b/flowsint-app/nginx.conf
index d097697c..c07f31a9 100644
--- a/flowsint-app/nginx.conf
+++ b/flowsint-app/nginx.conf
@@ -45,12 +45,39 @@ http {
# Security
server_tokens off;
+ # Host-header allowlist — defends against DNS rebinding.
+ # The CORSMiddleware on the API blocks cross-origin reads, but after a
+ # DNS rebinding flip the browser treats the request as same-origin and
+ # skips the CORS check entirely, so a server-side Host check is the
+ # canonical defense. Without it, attacker JS on evil.com can drive a
+ # victim's browser to POST /api/auth/register against a flowsint instance
+ # bound to localhost or a LAN IP, planting attacker-controlled accounts.
+ #
+ # Default allowlist covers single-user local deploys (localhost / 127.0.0.1
+ # / ::1, any port). When deploying on a network (see README "Deploy on a
+ # network"), add the server hostname/IP below — and add the public
+ # hostname too when fronting with a reverse proxy like Caddy.
+ map $http_host $is_flowsint_host {
+ default 0;
+ "~*^localhost(:[0-9]+)?$" 1;
+ "~*^127\.0\.0\.1(:[0-9]+)?$" 1;
+ "~*^\[::1\](:[0-9]+)?$" 1;
+ # "~*^flowsint\.example\.com$" 1;
+ # "~*^192\.168\.1\.42(:[0-9]+)?$" 1;
+ }
+
server {
listen 8080;
server_name _;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
+ # Default-deny unknown Host headers (DNS rebinding defense).
+ # See $is_flowsint_host map above for the allowlist.
+ if ($is_flowsint_host = 0) {
+ return 403;
+ }
+
# Security headers
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
@@ -88,6 +115,13 @@ http {
location ~* \.(js|css|png|jpg|jpeg|gif|ico|svg|woff|woff2|ttf|eot)$ {
expires 1y;
add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
+ # Re-declare server-level security headers — nginx's add_header
+ # inheritance is replace-all, not merge, so a location block that
+ # sets any add_header drops every header set higher up.
+ add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+ add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
+ add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
access_log off;
}
@@ -100,6 +134,12 @@ http {
location = /index.html {
expires -1;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate";
+ # Re-declare server-level security headers (see static-assets
+ # location above for why).
+ add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
+ add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+ add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block" always;
+ add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
}
# Deny access to hidden files