7.4 billion tokens per month. 34 free LLM providers. 635 free model endpoints. All behind one /v1 endpoint, plus any custom OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Smart routing, automatic failover, encrypted keys. Personal experimentation only.
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { redactSecrets, installLogRedaction } from '../../lib/log-redaction.js';
/**
* Fixtures are assembled at runtime rather than written out as literals.
*
* These patterns can only be exercised by strings that look like credentials, but
* a source file holding such a literal is indistinguishable from a real leak to
* GitHub push protection and to any other scanner — this file was rejected once
* for exactly that. Building each value from a vendor prefix plus deterministic
* filler keeps the coverage while guaranteeing the repo contains no credential,
* synthetic or otherwise. The stride-based filler is also low-entropy on purpose,
* so it cannot be mistaken for a live key.
*/
const ALNUM = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789';
const LOWER = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789';
const HEX = '0123456789abcdef';
function filler(length: number, charset: string = ALNUM): string {
let out = '';
for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) out += charset[(i * 7 + 3) % charset.length];
return out;
}
// [label, prefix, body length, charset] — lengths mirror each vendor's real format.
const SPECS: Array<[string, string, number, string]> = [
['Google', 'AIza', 35, ALNUM],
['Groq', 'gsk_', 52, ALNUM],
['Cerebras', 'csk-', 48, LOWER],
['NVIDIA', 'nvapi-', 64, ALNUM],
['GitHub PAT', 'github_pat_', 82, ALNUM],
['HuggingFace', 'hf_', 34, ALNUM],
['OpenRouter', 'sk-or-v1-', 64, HEX],
['Cloudflare', 'cfut_', 44, ALNUM],
['AMD Radeon Cloud', 'rc-', 48, HEX],
['Vercel', 'vck_', 56, ALNUM],
['Aion', 'alv2_', 43, ALNUM],
['Pollinations', 'sk_', 32, ALNUM],
['Mistral (bare)', '', 32, ALNUM],
['Own gateway key', 'freellmapi-', 48, HEX],
];
const SAMPLES: Array<[string, string]> = SPECS.map(
([label, prefix, len, charset]) => [label, prefix + filler(len, charset)],
);
// Dotted composite shape (Chutes / Z.ai / Ollama cloud): id.id.secret
SAMPLES.push(['Chutes', `cpk_${filler(32, HEX)}.${filler(32, HEX)}.${filler(32)}`]);
const GOOGLE_LIKE = `AIza${filler(35)}`;
const GROQ_LIKE = `gsk_${filler(52)}`;
const UNIFIED_LIKE = `freellmapi-${filler(48, HEX)}`;
describe('redactSecrets', () => {
for (const [label, secret] of SAMPLES) {
it(`redacts a ${label} key`, () => {
const out = redactSecrets(`request failed with key ${secret} on attempt 2`);
expect(out).not.toContain(secret);
expect(out).toContain('attempt 2');
});
}
it('redacts a key embedded in a URL query string', () => {
const secret = GOOGLE_LIKE;
const out = redactSecrets(
`POST https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/gemini-3-pro:generateContent?key=${secret} 429`,
);
expect(out).not.toContain(secret);
// The URL itself must survive — it is the diagnostic value of the line.
expect(out).toContain('generativelanguage.googleapis.com');
expect(out).toContain('429');
});
it('redacts Authorization bearer tokens', () => {
const out = redactSecrets('headers: { Authorization: Bearer abc123def456ghi789jkl012 }');
expect(out).not.toContain('abc123def456ghi789jkl012');
expect(out).toContain('Bearer [redacted]');
});
it('redacts an x-goog-api-key header value', () => {
const secret = GOOGLE_LIKE;
const out = redactSecrets(`{"x-goog-api-key":"${secret}"}`);
expect(out).not.toContain(secret);
});
it('redacts assignment forms for secret-ish names', () => {
const out = redactSecrets('ENCRYPTION_KEY=0123456789abcdef api_key: swordfishsecret');
expect(out).not.toContain('0123456789abcdef');
expect(out).not.toContain('swordfishsecret');
});
it('leaves ordinary log lines untouched', () => {
const line = 'routed groq/llama-3.3-70b in 412ms (attempt 1, 250 tokens)';
expect(redactSecrets(line)).toBe(line);
});
it('does not mangle short identifiers or model names', () => {
const line = 'model gemini-3-pro-preview key_id 42 status healthy';
expect(redactSecrets(line)).toBe(line);
});
it('emits exactly one marker when two patterns cover the same value', () => {
// "API key: freellmapi-..." matches both the prefix rule and the key=value
// rule; without a guard the second pass rewrote the first marker and left a
// trailing bracket ("[redacted-key]]").
const out = redactSecrets(
` Your unified API key: ${UNIFIED_LIKE}`,
);
expect(out).not.toContain(']]');
expect(out.match(/\[redacted/g)).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('leaves a long run of one repeated character alone', () => {
// The 32+ char catch-all is an entropy heuristic, and a run of a single
// character has none: separator rules, padding and progress output are not
// credentials, and redacting them made real output unreadable while
// protecting nothing.
const line = `divider ${'a'.repeat(36)} end`;
expect(redactSecrets(line)).toBe(line);
expect(redactSecrets(`${'='.repeat(40)}`)).toBe('='.repeat(40));
});
it('still redacts a genuine high-entropy 32-char token', () => {
// The guard above must not have opened a hole: two distinct characters in
// the first 32 is all it takes to be caught, which every real key is.
const secret = filler(32);
const out = redactSecrets(`token ${secret} rejected`);
expect(out).not.toContain(secret);
expect(out).toContain('[redacted-token]');
expect(out).toContain('rejected');
});
it('is idempotent — redacting twice changes nothing', () => {
const once = redactSecrets('Authorization: Bearer abc123def456ghi789jkl012');
expect(redactSecrets(once)).toBe(once);
});
});
describe('installLogRedaction', () => {
let restore: (() => void) | null = null;
afterEach(() => {
restore?.();
restore = null;
});
it('redacts secrets passed to console.log and console.error', () => {
const seen: unknown[][] = [];
const origLog = console.log;
const origErr = console.error;
console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => { seen.push(args); };
console.error = (...args: unknown[]) => { seen.push(args); };
restore = installLogRedaction();
const secret = GROQ_LIKE;
console.log(`using ${secret}`);
console.error(new Error(`auth failed for ${secret}`));
restore();
console.log = origLog;
console.error = origErr;
restore = null;
expect(seen).toHaveLength(2);
expect(String(seen[0]![0])).not.toContain(secret);
const err = seen[1]![0] as Error;
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err.message).not.toContain(secret);
});
it('redacts secrets nested inside a logged object, keeping it an object', () => {
const seen: unknown[][] = [];
const origLog = console.log;
console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => { seen.push(args); };
restore = installLogRedaction();
const secret = GOOGLE_LIKE;
console.log({ platform: 'google', apiKey: secret });
restore();
console.log = origLog;
restore = null;
const logged = seen[0]![0] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(typeof logged).toBe('object');
expect(logged.platform).toBe('google');
expect(JSON.stringify(logged)).not.toContain(secret);
});
it('passes through values it cannot serialise', () => {
const seen: unknown[][] = [];
const origLog = console.log;
console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => { seen.push(args); };
restore = installLogRedaction();
const cyclic: Record<string, unknown> = { name: 'loop' };
cyclic.self = cyclic;
console.log(cyclic);
restore();
console.log = origLog;
restore = null;
expect(seen[0]![0]).toBe(cyclic);
});
it('is idempotent', () => {
restore = installLogRedaction();
const second = installLogRedaction();
second();
const seen: unknown[][] = [];
const origLog = console.log;
console.log = (...args: unknown[]) => { seen.push(args); };
console.log('plain line');
console.log = origLog;
expect(String(seen[0]![0])).toBe('plain line');
});
});