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TypeScript
fix(auth): stop a same-host reverse proxy from waiving the setup code (#1287)
tashdroid5f9645cffb35
diff --git a/server/src/__tests__/routes/auth-setup-code.test.ts b/server/src/__tests__/routes/auth-setup-code.test.tsindex 7906ad00..c0658833 100644--- a/server/src/__tests__/routes/auth-setup-code.test.ts+++ b/server/src/__tests__/routes/auth-setup-code.test.ts@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ function appWithRemote(remoteAddr: string): Express {return app;}-async function postSetup(app: Express, body: unknown) {+async function postSetup(app: Express, body: unknown, headers: Record<string, string> = {}) {const server = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');if (!server.listening) await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.once('listening', () => resolve()));const addr = server.address() as { port: number };const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}/api/auth/setup`, {method: 'POST',- headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },+ headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...headers },body: JSON.stringify(body),});const data = await res.json().catch(() => null);@@ -90,6 +90,43 @@ describe('First-run setup code gate (FIX 1)', () => {expect(typeof body.token).toBe('string');});+ // The documented reverse-proxy deployment (Caddy/nginx/Traefik on the same+ // host, docs/en/proxy/OVERVIEW.md) makes every request a loopback socket, so+ // the socket test alone said "local" for the entire internet and any visitor+ // could claim an unclaimed dashboard with no code. A forwarded hop can never+ // GRANT locality, but a non-loopback one withdraws it.+ it('rejects a loopback socket whose forwarded hop is remote', async () => {+ const { status, body } = await postSetup(+ appWithRemote('127.0.0.1'),+ CREDS,+ { 'X-Forwarded-For': '203.0.113.7' },+ );+ expect(status).toBe(403);+ expect(body.error.type).toBe('setup_code_required');+ const count = (getDb().prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM users').get() as { c: number }).c;+ expect(count).toBe(0);+ });++ it('still allows a same-host proxy that forwards a local browser', async () => {+ const { status } = await postSetup(+ appWithRemote('127.0.0.1'),+ CREDS,+ { 'X-Forwarded-For': '127.0.0.1' },+ );+ expect(status).toBe(201);+ });++ it('accepts the setup code through a proxy with a remote forwarded hop', async () => {+ const code = getSetupCode();+ expect(code).toBeTruthy();+ const { status } = await postSetup(+ appWithRemote('127.0.0.1'),+ { ...CREDS, setupCode: code },+ { 'X-Forwarded-For': '203.0.113.7' },+ );+ expect(status).toBe(201);+ });+it('still 409s a second setup once an account exists (remote, even with a code)', async () => {// Claim locally first.expect((await postSetup(appWithRemote('127.0.0.1'), CREDS)).status).toBe(201);diff --git a/server/src/routes/auth.ts b/server/src/routes/auth.tsindex d7a8ff93..88ee7ca6 100644--- a/server/src/routes/auth.ts+++ b/server/src/routes/auth.ts@@ -91,18 +91,37 @@ function bearer(req: Request): string | undefined {?? (req.headers['x-dashboard-token'] as string | undefined);}-// Is the caller connecting from the local machine? We check the actual socket-// peer address, NOT req.ip or X-Forwarded-For: those are attacker-controlled-// behind a proxy (and trust proxy is off by default anyway), so trusting them-// here would let a remote caller pretend to be local and skip the setup code.-function isLoopbackRemote(req: Request): boolean {- let addr = req.socket.remoteAddress ?? '';+function isLoopbackAddress(value: string | undefined): boolean {+ let addr = (value ?? '').trim();// Node reports IPv4 loopback over a dual-stack socket as "::ffff:127.0.0.1".if (addr.startsWith('::ffff:')) addr = addr.slice(7);if (addr === '::1') return true;return /^127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(addr);}+// Is the caller connecting from the local machine? The socket peer address is+// the authority, NOT req.ip: forwarded headers are attacker-controlled, so+// letting one of them ASSERT locality would hand a remote caller the setup+// code exemption outright.+//+// But the socket peer alone is not sufficient either, because the reverse-proxy+// deployment this project documents (docs/en/proxy/OVERVIEW.md, and+// docs/en/troubleshooting/01-common-issues.md on TRUST_PROXY) puts Caddy/nginx/+// Traefik on the SAME host: every request then arrives from 127.0.0.1 and the+// socket test is true for the entire internet. So a forwarded hop can never+// grant locality, but it can withdraw it — exactly the treatment the Ollama+// open-loopback mode already applies in routes/ollama.ts:25-38.+function isLoopbackRemote(req: Request): boolean {+ if (!isLoopbackAddress(req.socket.remoteAddress)) return false;+ const forwarded = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];+ const firstForwarded = (Array.isArray(forwarded) ? forwarded[0] : forwarded)+ ?.split(',')[0];+ // A local reverse proxy is itself a loopback socket, but its first forwarded+ // hop may be remote. Refuse that request rather than silently widening the+ // no-code first-run path through the proxy.+ return !firstForwarded || isLoopbackAddress(firstForwarded);+}+// Has the dashboard been set up yet, and is this caller authenticated?authRouter.get('/status', (req: Request, res: Response) => {const session = validateSession(bearer(req));