Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
/**
* Output-side redaction for shell-job stdout/stderr (v0.36.5.0).
*
* Honest defense for the documented limitation: `inherit:` keeps values out
* of the JOB ROW INPUT fields (`data.cmd`, `data.argv`, `data.env`), but if
* the script prints the value to stdout or stderr, it lands in
* `result.stdout_tail` / `result.stderr_tail` / `error_text` and from there
* into `minion_jobs.result` plaintext.
*
* This module scrubs resolved inherit values out of output text before the
* shell handler returns or throws. Opt-in via `redact_secrets: true` on the
* job params (or `--redact-secrets` on the CLI).
*
* What gets redacted: only the resolved values of names listed in `inherit:`.
* The agent identified those by name as "secret"-class. Caller-supplied
* `env:` values are NOT redacted — those are the agent's chosen "I'm fine
* with this in the row" channel.
*
* Heuristic, not perfect: a determined script can encode-then-print
* (base64, hex-split, character-by-character) and bypass the literal-string
* replace. The agent + script are in the same trust domain, so this layer
* defends against accidental echo (the common case), not adversarial print.
*
* Replacement token: `<REDACTED:name>` (the inherit name, human-readable)
* so the operator inspecting the row knows WHICH secret was scrubbed.
*/
/**
* Scrub every resolved inherit value out of the given text. Returns the
* scrubbed text; original is not mutated.
*
* @param text The stdout/stderr/error text to scrub.
* @param secrets inherit-name → resolved value pairs: a Map, or any ordered
* iterable of `[name, value]` (secret-scan passes an array so
* two values can share a pattern name). Empty values are
* skipped. Values are replaced in iteration order; that only
* matters when one value is a substring of another — put the
* longer value first, or its span is corrupted by the shorter
* replacement before it is reached.
*/
export function redactSecretsInText(
text: string,
secrets: Iterable<readonly [string, string]>,
): string {
if (text.length === 0) return text;
let result = text;
for (const [name, value] of secrets) {
if (value.length === 0) continue;
// String-mode replaceAll: no regex interpretation, so special chars in
// the value (?, *, +, parens, etc.) replace as literal substrings. This
// matches the threat model: the value is whatever the worker had in
// config; we want the exact byte sequence scrubbed.
result = result.replaceAll(value, `<REDACTED:${name}>`);
}
return result;
}