Garry's Opinionated OpenClaw/Hermes Agent Brain
TypeScript
/**
* v0.15 brain-tool allow-list. Review carefully when extending. Op names
* verified against origin/master:src/core/operations.ts (post shell-jobs +
* Knowledge Runtime).
*
* Read-only (all safe):
* query, search, get_page, list_pages,
* get_backlinks, traverse_graph, resolve_slugs, get_ingest_log
*
* Conditional write:
* put_page (namespace-enforced by the tool schema + server-side check)
*
* Every name below MUST exist in src/core/operations.ts OPERATIONS; the
* brain-allowlist test pins this invariant so an upstream rename fails CI
* instead of silently dropping a tool.
*/
export const BRAIN_TOOL_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'query',
'search',
'get_page',
'list_pages',
'get_backlinks',
'traverse_graph',
// v114 (#1941): read-only provenance discovery. Edge-WRITE ops (add_link /
// remove_link) are deliberately NOT allowlisted — exposing graph writes to
// subagents is a separate trust decision.
'list_link_sources',
'resolve_slugs',
'get_ingest_log',
'put_page',
// #2778: the canonical timeline-write op. Fenced exactly like put_page —
// operations.ts:enforceSubagentSlugFence confines the target slug to the
// trusted-workspace allow-list (or the wiki/agents/<id>/ namespace) when
// ctx.viaSubagent=true, so a subagent can only append timeline entries to
// pages it could have written anyway.
'add_timeline_entry',
// v0.29 — Salience + Anomaly Detection. Both read-only. `get_recent_transcripts`
// is intentionally NOT included: subagent calls always have ctx.remote=true,
// and the v0.29 trust gate rejects remote callers — adding it here would be
// a footgun (subagent calls op, gets permission_denied, looks like a bug).
// The cycle synthesize phase already calls discoverTranscripts directly.
'get_recent_salience',
'find_anomalies',
]);